TFs 11 & 14 combine for relief of Wake

With PODs of Vice Admiral Pye, A) ordering TF 11 (Saratoga) and TF 14 (Lexington) to combine for the relief of Wake; and, B) not ordering a turn around to Pearl after hearing about Soryu & Hiryu, what likely happens??
 
With PODs of Vice Admiral Pye, A) ordering TF 11 (Saratoga) and TF 14 (Lexington) to combine for the relief of Wake; and, B) not ordering a turn around to Pearl after hearing about Soryu & Hiryu, what likely happens??


In december 1941, the USN carriers mostly had still the obsolete F2B fighter as main carrier aircraft, untill enough F4F-3's had been delivered, replacing these slow and vulnerable planes. Combined with the equally unsuited TBD's and too few SBD's, the carirers in 1941 had little fightingpower against the IJN elite carrier based airgroups. (At least Lexngton had retained her Buffaloes as fighters and possibly still had her SB2 Vindicators still, with the meantioned TBD torpedoplanes, while Sratoga, comming from the US Westcoast might have replaced her Buffaloes by new F4F's besides having her SBD Dauntless groups.

One question remains: Where was Halsey's group containign USS Enterprise? She had already been equipped with the new F4F-3 wildcat and had her two SBD groups (of both types some had been lost at Pearl Harbor), combined with her TBD squadron, so a third carrier might be usefull, to make up numbers, especially for capable fighters. (Those of Lexington were totally unsuited to fight the Japanese.) So USS Enterprise was the wanted ship to have, as only she was in range in the OTL and had the new fighter onboard. Saratoga was too far away and Lexington more or less teethless at the given period of history.

Also to be considered it that both Soeryu and Hiryu lacked the ammunition needed to fight of warships at sea, as they had used most of this ordonance at Pearl Harbor, leaving only land attack ordonance for the planes to attack Wake Island. It was the excelent A6M-2 Zero that won the day there, as this aircraft had no equal at the time in the Pacific Region. The available IJN fighters effectively outnumbered the combined number of USN fighters in that period on two carriers against two, due to the common practice of the USN to ship more attackplanes and dive/scoutbombers than fighters. With one USN Carriers equipped with totally unsuited F2B Buffaloes, the command of the air was Japanese.
 

Art

Monthly Donor
The problem is . . .

That the tanker that was with the task force, I forget which one, was too slow. It only made 10 knots or less, and that slowed the task force down. It does not get in position until December 23rd. Now if you speed up the U. S. task force, and slow down the Japanese fleet, then you can have a naval engagement and the relief of Wake. If they get the supplies and reinforcements that were sent, I do not see the S. N. L. F. taking Wake.
 
Thanks for the info on USN plane deployment in late 41 Warspite.

A couple follow up questions:

#1: do Pye, his staff, Fletcher in Saratoga, Brown in Lexington realize (or strongly suspect) how badly outclassed their fighters would be by the A6M?

#2: should the afore mentioned leadership suspect or be able to make an educated guess that the Soryu and Hiryu are likely low on anti-ship ordnance after Pearl Harbor?

#3: any idea how badly chewed up the Soryu/Hiryu aircrews and aircraft were after Pearl. In general I'm aware the planes of the KB took a fair amount of damage from AA at Pearl, particularly the second strike. And would anyone in USN leadership

#4: is the USN and Pye (who is only acting head of PACFLT) just too risk adverse right now to even place the carriers in a situation for the potential of a battle?

#5: What would have been the Hiryu's and Soryu's likely reaction if they found out there were 2 USN carriers in the neighborhood?
 
Also importantly, what US submarines were in the area? Any chance of an intercept? We know the Japanese were worried about submarines - they didn't know about the defective torpedoes, after all - and that might be just one more worry that would prevent them from seeking an engagement off Wake.

Between aircraft losses, fuel/ammunition, and submarines, is it possible the Japanese retreat? Keep in mind that since the Japanese don't really have any remaining anti-ship munitions, they are essentially fighting a defensive battle. They can grind down the obsolescent US air wings, true, but they can't present too much of a threat to the actual ships. How would that play out? Would the US realize this and try to create the circumstances for a surface engagement?
 

Art

Monthly Donor
Here are the loses suffered at Pearl in raw numbers

Fifty-five Japanese airmen and nine submariners were killed in the action, and one was captured. Of Japan's 414[54] available planes, 29 were lost during the battle[67] (nine in the first attack wave, 20 in the second),[nb 15] with another 74 damaged by antiaircraft fire from the ground.


It seems 9 of the aircraft shot down at Pearl were fighters, 15 were dive bombers, and 5 were torpedo bombers. I do not know the ratio in terms of damaged planes, but I would guess that a lot of the Kates and Vals were damaged. It has been only been 16 days since the attack, and Soryu carried 18 Zeros, 18 Vals, 18 Kates, and Hiryu only carried 18 Zeros, 18 Vals, 18 Kates. So . . . Maybe. Only 2 squadrons of A6Ms! And at least a few of the Kates had been shot down, including the bombadier who sunk the Arizona.
 

CalBear

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Here are the actual numbers for the U.S. carriers:

Lexington: 16 F2A-3 Buffalo, 30 SBD Dauntless (16 -2 version, 14 -3), 12 TBD Devastator

Saratoga: 16 F4F Wildcats, 16 F2A Buffaloes (VMF-221), 43 SBD-3 Dauntless, 12 TBD Devastators

Source

Japanese losses were:

Soryu: 3 A6M, 2 D3A
Hiryu: 1 A6M

However, in addition to these specifically lost aircraft CarDiv 2 also reported a total of 20 damaged A6M, 23 D3A, and 3 B5N. This would indicate that as many as 24 of the 36 A6M Zeros assigned to the carriers were not available and as few as ten D3A may have been combat operational.

The same source indicates that Kaga had 18 D3A, 7 B5N, and 3 A6M damaged

Source: Admiral Ryunosuke Kusaka's Rengo Kanti Damaged aircraft


Had the two forces engaged, the results would not have been as cut and dried as some posters have indicated.

As to your questions:

1. No they did not. In part this is because it didn't actually exist.

The utter superiority of the A6M is one of those myths that simply does not stand up to close examination. As John Lundstrom notes in his superb The First Team, the Wildcat actually had a positive (albeit slim) victory ratio against the Zero. The Zero was a remarkable design, exceptionally long range, very good maneuverability, and generally a brilliant design. It was, however, severely flawed in both armament and construction. The relative vulnerability of the A6M to fire is well known and oft discussed, what is not as often discussed is the weakness of the weapon suite, especially against contemporary Western designs. The chances of a Zero getting a kill against a USN aircraft was almost directly in proportion to the number of 20mm shells that it had remaining. The 7.62mm machine guns were simply not up to the job.

2. Pye had no idea about the remaining Japanese capacities. Frankly, he was in a state of shock, as was most of the United States.

3. Detailed above.

4. Yes.

5. Delight. Followed rapidly by sorrow at the loss of at least one carrier (The Soryu class was probably the most fragile of the remarkably fragile IJN carrier designs).


Thanks for the info on USN plane deployment in late 41 Warspite.

A couple follow up questions:

#1: do Pye, his staff, Fletcher in Saratoga, Brown in Lexington realize (or strongly suspect) how badly outclassed their fighters would be by the A6M?

#2: should the afore mentioned leadership suspect or be able to make an educated guess that the Soryu and Hiryu are likely low on anti-ship ordnance after Pearl Harbor?

#3: any idea how badly chewed up the Soryu/Hiryu aircrews and aircraft were after Pearl. In general I'm aware the planes of the KB took a fair amount of damage from AA at Pearl, particularly the second strike. And would anyone in USN leadership

#4: is the USN and Pye (who is only acting head of PACFLT) just too risk adverse right now to even place the carriers in a situation for the potential of a battle?

#5: What would have been the Hiryu's and Soryu's likely reaction if they found out there were 2 USN carriers in the neighborhood?
 
About the Zero, another reason for it's remarkable performance was that it wasn't weighed down with trifles such as a radio. So while when it had sighted the enemy it was great at one on one dogfights and could disengage if it was surprised and re-engage on better terms pairs or groups of Zeros could coordinate attacks and ships couldn't share info with their fighter cover.

As for the range, early on Zeros used to cruise at 135mph with a very lean fuel mix, and commanders cut well into fuel reserves, which allowed Zeros to make surprisingly long transits early in the war. But when the US got it's shit together the Japanese had to start transiting tactically which cut right into their long range, it was still respectable but not overly startling.
 
Thanks for the info gentlemen.

So for an actual carrier vs. carrier battle near Wake,
A) PACFLT can't get any intel about the IJN flattops being in the area. (Whether the info came from signals intercepts, USN sub, air strikes on Wake, or whatever.)

B) Lexington and Saratoga would need to blunder into strike range of Soryu and Hiryu, & Fletcher/Brown decide they can't look a gift horse in the mouth or they realize they can't disengage before a strike is launched against them so they take their own shot. (Do TFs 11 & 14 need to improve their transit time from Pearl by a day for this to occur? Leave behind the oiler at some point?)


In the event of an actual battle, would the F4Fs have likely stayed behind to provide CAP? If so, for both or just Saratoga? (I've no idea how closely Brown & Fletcher would have coordinated outbound strikes and CAP. I'm suspecting they'd have been fairly independent.)


Would the Hiryu & Soryu really have been low on ordnance after Pearl Harbor? I have a hard time believing they would of. That would imply being low after supplying only two strikes worth.


If one of the IJN flattops was lost, what are the likely butterflys for the IJN?

1) I still see the NEI falling on much the same schedule.

2) no raid on Darwin?

3) no Indian Ocean raid?

4) keep a carrier division station at Truk to give more respect to USN carrier operations?


What sort of butterflys for US by sinking Horyu or Soryu?
1) Does Wake fall? (predicated I would guess on whether USN aircraft or the CAs/DDs of the TF can do something significant to the landing forces, preferably prior to landing)
2) more aggressive carrier action
3) no Dolittle raid?
 

CalBear

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Monthly Donor
The chances of an actual carrier v. carrier are not really high. The U.S. did not intend to sail the carriers all the way to Wake and the Jaapnese approached Wake from a somewhat different vector than the Americans. The Americans were not in a position to be hyper aggressive, not with the Battle Line a smoking ruin and the Japanese were low on fuel.

The thing is, the Americans do not HAVE to go full on against the Japanese, all they have to do is get the Tangier into position and unloaded. Once the 4th Marine Defense Battalion is on the island, the Japanese are pretty much screwed. Even the augmented invasion force only had 1,500 men, which was no where near enough to take on both the 400 men of the 1st Defense Battalion already on the island AND an addtional 900 or so Marines.

If Wake holds, the entire complexion of the Pacific War changes. Wake is a dagger in the Japanese's perimeter's back. It was capable of staging B-17s which could reach Japnese bases in both the Marshalls and Marianas from Wake. It is fairly likely that Wake become THE main point of conflict for the first 18 months of the war, replacing Coral Sea, Midway, and maybe even Guadalcanal as the anvil where the IJN is beaten into scrap.


Thanks for the info gentlemen.

So for an actual carrier vs. carrier battle near Wake,
A) PACFLT can't get any intel about the IJN flattops being in the area. (Whether the info came from signals intercepts, USN sub, air strikes on Wake, or whatever.)

B) Lexington and Saratoga would need to blunder into strike range of Soryu and Hiryu, & Fletcher/Brown decide they can't look a gift horse in the mouth or they realize they can't disengage before a strike is launched against them so they take their own shot. (Do TFs 11 & 14 need to improve their transit time from Pearl by a day for this to occur? Leave behind the oiler at some point?)


In the event of an actual battle, would the F4Fs have likely stayed behind to provide CAP? If so, for both or just Saratoga? (I've no idea how closely Brown & Fletcher would have coordinated outbound strikes and CAP. I'm suspecting they'd have been fairly independent.)


Would the Hiryu & Soryu really have been low on ordnance after Pearl Harbor? I have a hard time believing they would of. That would imply being low after supplying only two strikes worth.


If one of the IJN flattops was lost, what are the likely butterflys for the IJN?

1) I still see the NEI falling on much the same schedule.

2) no raid on Darwin?

3) no Indian Ocean raid?

4) keep a carrier division station at Truk to give more respect to USN carrier operations?


What sort of butterflys for US by sinking Horyu or Soryu?
1) Does Wake fall? (predicated I would guess on whether USN aircraft or the CAs/DDs of the TF can do something significant to the landing forces, preferably prior to landing)
2) more aggressive carrier action
3) no Dolittle raid?
 
If Wake holds, the entire complexion of the Pacific War changes. Wake is a dagger in the Japanese's perimeter's back. It was capable of staging B-17s which could reach Japnese bases in both the Marshalls and Marianas from Wake. It is fairly likely that Wake become THE main point of conflict for the first 18 months of the war, replacing Coral Sea, Midway, and maybe even Guadalcanal as the anvil where the IJN is beaten into scrap.

I couldn't agree with this more, despite what many people say about Wake being unimportant because it wasn't important IOTL.
 
If Wake holds, the entire complexion of the Pacific War changes. Wake is a dagger in the Japanese's perimeter's back. It was capable of staging B-17s which could reach Japnese bases in both the Marshalls and Marianas from Wake. It is fairly likely that Wake become THE main point of conflict for the first 18 months of the war, replacing Coral Sea, Midway, and maybe even Guadalcanal as the anvil where the IJN is beaten into scrap.

Ok, so assuming the TF arrives a day earlier, Tangier is able to start unloading. The Tangier may or may not get sunk during unloading by B5Ns or D3As from Hiryu/Soryu. Enough marines land to be able to stop the 2nd invasion attempt. (But no carrier vs carrier encounter occurs)

The IJN planes report back that more marines have landed. Do they still go through with the 2nd invasion attempt?

Regardless, Wake holds. I assume the Kido Butai next mission is still the NEI, fairly similar to how it played out IOTL.

If Wake becomes "the main point of conflict", does that likely butterfly away the Indian Ocean Raid?

Does the IJN organize a Midway sized campaign against Wake to take it? If so, how soon can they pull the necessary resources to do that.

Or does the Kido Butai just do periodic raids to keep the air field on Wake pounded and non-operational?

or does the IJN do something else to interdict/take Wake?
 
Ok, so assuming the TF arrives a day earlier, Tangier is able to start unloading. The Tangier may or may not get sunk during unloading by B5Ns or D3As from Hiryu/Soryu. Enough marines land to be able to stop the 2nd invasion attempt. (But no carrier vs carrier encounter occurs)

The IJN planes report back that more marines have landed. Do they still go through with the 2nd invasion attempt?

Regardless, Wake holds. I assume the Kido Butai next mission is still the NEI, fairly similar to how it played out IOTL.

If Wake becomes "the main point of conflict", does that likely butterfly away the Indian Ocean Raid?

Does the IJN organize a Midway sized campaign against Wake to take it? If so, how soon can they pull the necessary resources to do that.

Or does the Kido Butai just do periodic raids to keep the air field on Wake pounded and non-operational?

or does the IJN do something else to interdict/take Wake?


I tend to agree with you on this, as the Japanese already had made up a prioritylist before even going to war. Wake was nasty not to take, but had to wait untill the SE Asian front was secured by the conquest of the Malayan Peninsula and Dutch East Indies, as these had always been the main target, not the USA. It might have been troublesome to need to get back to Wake, if a first attempt wto take it early on would fail, but that was not likely a breakingpoint to alter the Japanese scheme of conquest even a little. Thigs would therefore continue as planned, just as in the OTL, Wake, or no Wake.
 
Wake was within land based bomber range. Perhaps it becomes like the Solomons where land-based aircraft cover light naval units fighting in the area.
 
Thanks for the info on USN plane deployment in late 41 Warspite.
Ditto from me.:)
#1: do Pye, his staff, Fletcher in Saratoga, Brown in Lexington realize (or strongly suspect) how badly outclassed their fighters would be by the A6M?
Highly unlikely IMO. Despite a report on the A6M having been received in DC, it wasn't believed.:rolleyes:
#2: should the afore mentioned leadership suspect or be able to make an educated guess that the Soryu and Hiryu are likely low on anti-ship ordnance after Pearl Harbor?
I'd say so, given they're carrier sailors.
#3: any idea how badly chewed up the Soryu/Hiryu aircrews and aircraft were after Pearl. In general I'm aware the planes of the KB took a fair amount of damage from AA at Pearl, particularly the second strike. And would anyone in USN leadership
They'd probably have an exaggerated estimate, if anything, given the tendency to overclaiming. They'd also probably have an exaggerated belief in the quality of their own aircrews.
#4: is the USN and Pye (who is only acting head of PACFLT) just too risk adverse right now to even place the carriers in a situation for the potential of a battle?
This was the major reason Pye pulled back: he lost his nerve. IMO, tho, given the likely outcome, he made the right call.
#5: What would have been the Hiryu's and Soryu's likely reaction if they found out there were 2 USN carriers in the neighborhood?
Wasn't CarDiv 2 Yamaguchi's command? He, like Halsey, would charge to the attack, IMO. In this instance, it would be an excellent decision, IMO. USN couldn't afford CV losses just now. (OTOH, the impact on IJN ops in the Indian Ocean & at Coral Sea could be serious...;))
Also importantly, what US submarines were in the area? Any chance of an intercept? We know the Japanese were worried about submarines - they didn't know about the defective torpedoes, after all - and that might be just one more worry that would prevent them from seeking an engagement off Wake.
Small hazard. Only two boats, Pilly Lent's Triton & John Murphy's Tambor (sez Blair). Not men inclined to aggressively attack, even allowing they could make contact & close, neither likely.
 
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Art

Monthly Donor
Wake Island is a subject dear to me . . .

Ever since I read about it, and even more since I saw the movie, inacurate as it is, and read Bill Sloans Given Up for Dead. I REALLY think Wake could be held. The Japanese NEVER succeded in a opposed amphibious landing in the war, except at Wake. There were several reasons why Wake surrendered. I will list them for you.

1. The base did not have radar. Therefore the garrison could only guess when Japanese bombers could arrive. Because of this, the first air raid caught VMF-211 off guard. 7 out of 12 Wildcat fighters were smashed on the ground, and the 8th heavily damaged. The gasoline stores were set on fire and the machine shop smashed. And the second air raid hit the hospital.


2. The relief force was sent too late, and was tied down to a very slow oil tanker, the Neces, I think. She could only make 10 knots. So the Japanese got to Wake while the Lexington Task Group was 200 miles away or more. Slow the Japanese down, say Kajioka wants even more ships in order to succeed (which is possible, because he suffered a humilation at Wake), and the transports will get to Wake and be done with unloading the 4nd Marine Battalion, artillery, ammunition, and aircraft. After that, the S. N. L. F. will just die. Even Buffalos can be useful against Vals and Kates, and F-2-Fs have pilot armor and self-sealing fuel tanks, which A-6M Zeros lack. And 3 inch A. A. cannon were deadly to the Japanese bombers. Here is the confirmed kill ratio of VMF-211 and the First Marine Defense Battalion.


6 medium bombers shot down, and 2 Kates, perhaps more. At least 30-50 damaged. Far better than Pearl Harbor, which is another battle I have studied intensively. It is not that their fighting spirit that failed, but their equipment, and command structure.

3. That brings me to my final point. The commanding officer, Lieutenant Commander Cummingham, had a poor grasp of the situation, and unarmed civilians to protect. Indeed, there was a massacre of 98 civilian workers during the war, when the Japanese, furious at being left to wither on the vine and attacked from the air and sea, machine-gunned the civilians they had maintained to build fortifications. If the 4th Battalion is landed, then there will be a victory.
 

Hyperion

Banned
Realistically, the best chance would be to have Lexington, Saratoga, and Enterprise join forces and make an approach to Wake, with Halsey in command of the overall fleet.

IOTL, Enterprise was available, but kept back from the other two carriers. On the off chance that Halsey locates the Japanese, he would likely have a good chance with three against two.
 
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