With PODs of Vice Admiral Pye, A) ordering TF 11 (Saratoga) and TF 14 (Lexington) to combine for the relief of Wake; and, B) not ordering a turn around to Pearl after hearing about Soryu & Hiryu, what likely happens??
With PODs of Vice Admiral Pye, A) ordering TF 11 (Saratoga) and TF 14 (Lexington) to combine for the relief of Wake; and, B) not ordering a turn around to Pearl after hearing about Soryu & Hiryu, what likely happens??
Thanks for the info on USN plane deployment in late 41 Warspite.
A couple follow up questions:
#1: do Pye, his staff, Fletcher in Saratoga, Brown in Lexington realize (or strongly suspect) how badly outclassed their fighters would be by the A6M?
#2: should the afore mentioned leadership suspect or be able to make an educated guess that the Soryu and Hiryu are likely low on anti-ship ordnance after Pearl Harbor?
#3: any idea how badly chewed up the Soryu/Hiryu aircrews and aircraft were after Pearl. In general I'm aware the planes of the KB took a fair amount of damage from AA at Pearl, particularly the second strike. And would anyone in USN leadership
#4: is the USN and Pye (who is only acting head of PACFLT) just too risk adverse right now to even place the carriers in a situation for the potential of a battle?
#5: What would have been the Hiryu's and Soryu's likely reaction if they found out there were 2 USN carriers in the neighborhood?
Thanks for the info gentlemen.
So for an actual carrier vs. carrier battle near Wake,
A) PACFLT can't get any intel about the IJN flattops being in the area. (Whether the info came from signals intercepts, USN sub, air strikes on Wake, or whatever.)
B) Lexington and Saratoga would need to blunder into strike range of Soryu and Hiryu, & Fletcher/Brown decide they can't look a gift horse in the mouth or they realize they can't disengage before a strike is launched against them so they take their own shot. (Do TFs 11 & 14 need to improve their transit time from Pearl by a day for this to occur? Leave behind the oiler at some point?)
In the event of an actual battle, would the F4Fs have likely stayed behind to provide CAP? If so, for both or just Saratoga? (I've no idea how closely Brown & Fletcher would have coordinated outbound strikes and CAP. I'm suspecting they'd have been fairly independent.)
Would the Hiryu & Soryu really have been low on ordnance after Pearl Harbor? I have a hard time believing they would of. That would imply being low after supplying only two strikes worth.
If one of the IJN flattops was lost, what are the likely butterflys for the IJN?
1) I still see the NEI falling on much the same schedule.
2) no raid on Darwin?
3) no Indian Ocean raid?
4) keep a carrier division station at Truk to give more respect to USN carrier operations?
What sort of butterflys for US by sinking Horyu or Soryu?
1) Does Wake fall? (predicated I would guess on whether USN aircraft or the CAs/DDs of the TF can do something significant to the landing forces, preferably prior to landing)
2) more aggressive carrier action
3) no Dolittle raid?
If Wake holds, the entire complexion of the Pacific War changes. Wake is a dagger in the Japanese's perimeter's back. It was capable of staging B-17s which could reach Japnese bases in both the Marshalls and Marianas from Wake. It is fairly likely that Wake become THE main point of conflict for the first 18 months of the war, replacing Coral Sea, Midway, and maybe even Guadalcanal as the anvil where the IJN is beaten into scrap.
If Wake holds, the entire complexion of the Pacific War changes. Wake is a dagger in the Japanese's perimeter's back. It was capable of staging B-17s which could reach Japnese bases in both the Marshalls and Marianas from Wake. It is fairly likely that Wake become THE main point of conflict for the first 18 months of the war, replacing Coral Sea, Midway, and maybe even Guadalcanal as the anvil where the IJN is beaten into scrap.
Ok, so assuming the TF arrives a day earlier, Tangier is able to start unloading. The Tangier may or may not get sunk during unloading by B5Ns or D3As from Hiryu/Soryu. Enough marines land to be able to stop the 2nd invasion attempt. (But no carrier vs carrier encounter occurs)
The IJN planes report back that more marines have landed. Do they still go through with the 2nd invasion attempt?
Regardless, Wake holds. I assume the Kido Butai next mission is still the NEI, fairly similar to how it played out IOTL.
If Wake becomes "the main point of conflict", does that likely butterfly away the Indian Ocean Raid?
Does the IJN organize a Midway sized campaign against Wake to take it? If so, how soon can they pull the necessary resources to do that.
Or does the Kido Butai just do periodic raids to keep the air field on Wake pounded and non-operational?
or does the IJN do something else to interdict/take Wake?
Ditto from me.Thanks for the info on USN plane deployment in late 41 Warspite.
Highly unlikely IMO. Despite a report on the A6M having been received in DC, it wasn't believed.#1: do Pye, his staff, Fletcher in Saratoga, Brown in Lexington realize (or strongly suspect) how badly outclassed their fighters would be by the A6M?
I'd say so, given they're carrier sailors.#2: should the afore mentioned leadership suspect or be able to make an educated guess that the Soryu and Hiryu are likely low on anti-ship ordnance after Pearl Harbor?
They'd probably have an exaggerated estimate, if anything, given the tendency to overclaiming. They'd also probably have an exaggerated belief in the quality of their own aircrews.#3: any idea how badly chewed up the Soryu/Hiryu aircrews and aircraft were after Pearl. In general I'm aware the planes of the KB took a fair amount of damage from AA at Pearl, particularly the second strike. And would anyone in USN leadership
This was the major reason Pye pulled back: he lost his nerve. IMO, tho, given the likely outcome, he made the right call.#4: is the USN and Pye (who is only acting head of PACFLT) just too risk adverse right now to even place the carriers in a situation for the potential of a battle?
Wasn't CarDiv 2 Yamaguchi's command? He, like Halsey, would charge to the attack, IMO. In this instance, it would be an excellent decision, IMO. USN couldn't afford CV losses just now. (OTOH, the impact on IJN ops in the Indian Ocean & at Coral Sea could be serious...#5: What would have been the Hiryu's and Soryu's likely reaction if they found out there were 2 USN carriers in the neighborhood?
Small hazard. Only two boats, Pilly Lent's Triton & John Murphy's Tambor (sez Blair). Not men inclined to aggressively attack, even allowing they could make contact & close, neither likely.Also importantly, what US submarines were in the area? Any chance of an intercept? We know the Japanese were worried about submarines - they didn't know about the defective torpedoes, after all - and that might be just one more worry that would prevent them from seeking an engagement off Wake.