Yes, they did. Will it be enough to make Canada sue for peace on US terms ? Definitely.
I'm not so certain, especially given we know nothing about the US joining the CP. What I do know is:
- The PAM, also known as the Permanent Force (PF), was in effect Canada's standing army, consisting of one regular infantry regiment and two cavalry regiments until 1914. The PAM did not participate directly in the First World War.
- The Non-Permanent Active Militia (NPAM) was Canada's part-time volunteer military force from the time of Confederation, composed of several dozen infantry battalions (redesignated as regiments in 1900) and cavalry regiments. With the withdrawal of the British forces in Canada after the turn of the 20th century, supporting corps were created in Canada as part of both the PAM and the NPAM. The NPAM did not mobilize during the First World War.
As for the US:
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=coo.31924095656413;view=1up;seq=13
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR.
The Regular Army of the United States on June 30, 1914, con-
sisted of 4,701 officers and *87,781 men. Of these, 758 officers and
17,901 men belong to the Coast Artillery, and are therefore prac-
tically stationary in coast defenses; 1,008 officers and 18,434 men
belong to the staff, technical and noncombatant branches of the
Army, including recruits and men engaged in recruiting. This
leaves the Army which can be moved from place to place—that is, the
mobile Army, so-called—composed of 2,935 officers and 51,446 men.
At that time the various characters of troops were disposed of
approximately as follows:
In the Philippines, 33 regiments Infantry, 2 regiments Cavalry, 1
regiment Field Artillery, 2 companies Engineers, 11 companies Coast
Artillery (aggregate strength, 9,572). In the Hawaiian Islands, 3
regiments Infantry, 1 regiment Cavalry, 1 regiment Field Artillery, 1
company Engineers, 8 companies Coast Artillery (aggregate strength,
8,195). In the Canal Zone, 1 regiment Infantry, 3 companies Coast
Artillery (aggregate strength, 2,179). In China, 2 battalions Infantry
(aggregate strength, 849). In Alaska, 1 regiment Infantry (aggre-
gate strength, 862). In Vera Cruz, 4 regiments Infantry, 2 troops
Cavalry, 1 battalion Field Artillery, 1 company Engineers (aggregate
strength, 4,090). In Porto Rico, a 2-battalion regiment Infantry
(strength, 707). In United States, 17 regiments Infantry, 11}}
regiments Cavalry, 3% regiments Field Artillery, 2 battalions Engi-
neers, 148 companies Coast Artillery (aggregate strength, 64,579).
Troops en route and officers at other foreign stations, 1,449.
Practically all these organizations in the United States are on
what is known as a peace footing, which means that an Infantry
company, which upon a war footing should have 150 men, now has
65 men; a Cavalry troop, which upon a war footing should have 100
men, now has 71 men; an Artillery battery, which upon a war footing
should have 190 men, now has 133 men. The Coast Artillery com-
panies are always kept on a war footing of 104 men each.
In addition to work with the troops themselves, the officers of the
Army are called upon to do a great variety of work known as detached
service. For instance, the Engineers have 66 officers detached for
river and harbor work, and the other branches of the Army have
578 officers of the line detached for service in training the Organized
Militia of the several States, on duty at schools, recruiting, etc.
*Includes Quartermaster Corps, 3,809, and Hospital Corps, 4,055.
As a result, scarcely any unit in the Army ever has its proper com-
plement of officers, and the need for an increase of officers is urgent
and imperative. In continental United States we had in the mobile
Army on June 30, 1914, 1,495 officers and 29,405 men.
We have a reserve—that is, men who have been trained in the
Army and under the terms of their enlistment are subject to be called
back to the colors in time of war—consisting of 16 men.
The Organized Militia of the various States totals 8,323 officers and
119,087 men. The enlisted men thereof are required, in order to
obtain the financial aid which the Congress authorizes the Secretary
of War to extend under certain conditions, to attend 24 drills a year
and 5 days annually in the field. If all of the National Guard
could be summoned in the event of war and should all respond (an
inconceivable result), and if they were all found fairly efficient in the
first line—that is, the troops who would be expected to immediately
take the field—we could summon a force in this country of Regulars
and National Guard amounting to 9,818 officers and 148,492 men.
And this is absolutely all. The only other recourse would then
be volunteers, and to equip, organize, train, and make them ready
would take, at the smallest possible estimate, six months.
Anyone who takes the slightest trouble to investigate will find that
in modern warfare a prepared enemy would progress so far on the
way to success in six months, if his antagonist had to wait six months
to meet him, that such unprepared antagonist might as well concede
defeat without contest.
With respect to reserve matériel, one or two obvious things had
perhaps better be stated. This matériel, of course, can not be
quickly improvised. It requires long periods of time to produce; it
is the absolute essential of modern warfare, and must be kept on hand
if emergencies are to be prepared for. We have on hand in reserve
sufficient small arms, small-arm ammunition and equipment, roughly
figuring, for the 500,000 men that would have to be called into the
field in any large emergency. We have nothing like sufficient artillery
and artillery ammunition. This has been urgently presented in all of
the recent reports of the head of this Department and the Chiefs of
Staff, and Congress has from time to time recently increased the appro-
priations for these purposes. There is universal agreement among
all who know, that artillery is an essential feature of modern warfare,
and that a proper proportion thereof to any army is indispensable
if success is to be even hoped for. It is imperative that the manu-
facture of artillery and artillery ammunition should progress as
rapidly as is possible until a proper reserve thereof has been obtained.