Terms for Japanese Surrender in 1942/43 and long term consequences

[The Oncoming Storm]

Just to add to the numerous WW2 Japan related threads we're having ATM, I've been doing some searching back through the forum on threads about if there had been no Pacific Theater in WW2. Obviously Japan staged it's attacks on the U.S. and SE Asia because Roosevelt's embargos meant that it would have run out of resources like oil by the middle of 1942. Even then many in the military and government knew that Japan's chances of succeeding in the medium term were hopeless. Hirohito's brother even implored him not to order the attack, although some comments on previous threads that I found raised the possibility that if he had done that he could well have been assasinated or effectively deposed into being a figurehead by the hardliners. Therefore I think that it was inevitable that Japan was going to try and seize S.E. Asia.

The scenario then I had in mind is one we've talked about a lot recently, the British in Malaya have managed to get their act together and defeat Yamashita's Army. This denies Japan access to the oilfields of Sumatra and Burma and Malaya's rubber, they would still have taken the Borneo oilfields but with Singapore available to use as a base, Allied submarines would probably have sunk most of the tankers heading back to Japan as they did IOTL. Japan has enough oil to continue the War into autumn/winter 1942 or possibly early 1943 and then it's military and economy start to come apart through lack of fuel.

At this point enough of the leadership realise that the position is hopeless and decide to ask the Allies for an armistice, with the war in Europe still carrying on as IOTL, Roosevelt and Churchill are anxious to free up resources for the invasion of Europe so they decide to offer terms to end the Pacific War early. This is before Casablanca and the issuing of unconditional Axis surrender as a war aim. The terms are as follows;

1. Immediate surrender to Allied forces of all Japanese forces outside of the Home Islands. Those found to have committed war crimes will face a tribunial.
2. Surrender of all IJN vessels larger than 10,000 tonnes. (I'd imagine the Japanese would scuttle ships like the Yamato rather than surrender them)
3. Japan to withdraw from Manchuria, Korea and other possessions outside the Home Islands and to renounce all territorial claims to these lands.
4. Those persons accused of ordering attrocities in China and other places who are currently within the Home Islands such as Tojo, are to be surrendered to the Allies for trial, no Japanese prisoners will be repatriated until this has been complied with.
5. A progressive lifting of the embargos conditional on the above terms being honoured.

The Allies also make it clear that if the terms are rejected Japan will be subjected to a naval blockade. In one of the threads I found earlier CalBear had posted that even IOTL if the Allies hadn't dropped the atomic bomb or invaded Japan the blockade and the consequent lack of food would probably have reduced Japan's population at the end of 1946 back to it's 1700 level through mass starvation. Assuming the Japanese accept these terms how would it's subsequent history have developed? No occupation means that Japan would still be a militarised society with a God-Emperor and as the Pacific bombing campaign hadn't happened it's industries would remain intact but Japan's military would have been neutered by the War and it would be no immediate threat to it's neighbours.

I think this scenario could see a deeply bitter and resentful Japan looking for revenge over it's humiliation, it probably does not become the economic powerhouse that it did during the 1960's and becomes more isolationist, possibly becoming this TL's North Korea although not as depraved, while some more extreme elements dream of exacting revenge. What do other posters think of this? Would Japan have asked for terms in this scenario and would the Allies have agreed?

 

[Nivek]

At that period the Japanese were still taking the offensive.. so those term are be considereted an Insult and use to fanatize the soldiers.

In winter of 1944 /1945 those maybe can be considereted but the Korea Isssue will be hard(the people then to forget than exist japanese politician elected from korean provinces and even Korean turned japanese one)

And ditto for formosa, who before the war was considereted a 'Home Islands' too

 

[Kooluk Swordsman]

I could be wrong, but I don't see the Allies forcing or Japan accepting a withdrawal from Korea. After all, when it was annexed by Japan practically no one cared, and none of the Western Powers really had any desire to have it.

Everything else I totally agree with. Though I wonder what would Japan actually do with a militarized society in the 1960's, if everything goes as in OTL. Any attempt to "right the wrongs" of WWII would be met with an American fist.

Japan would not become the technological center of the world, nor the economic powerhouse of Asia. That would be interesting. Maybe if they become isolationist like you said, they spend all of their time building up a military in secret, waiting for the right time to strike (Like Killzone.... I can't think of any historical reference).

 

[Mr Qwerty]

The Japanese Empire keeps Korea, Formosa, and its Micronesian islands.

What's most interesting is what part Japan plays in the Cold War (assuming the Cold War happens, which is fairly likely in my opinion).

 

[The Oncoming Storm]

I could be wrong, but I don't see the Allies forcing or Japan accepting a withdrawal from Korea. After all, when it was annexed by Japan practically no one cared, and none of the Western Powers really had any desire to have it.

Everything else I totally agree with. Though I wonder what would Japan actually do with a militarized society in the 1960's, if everything goes as in OTL. Any attempt to "right the wrongs" of WWII would be met with an American fist.

Japan would not become the technological center of the world, nor the economic powerhouse of Asia. That would be interesting. Maybe if they become isolationist like you said, they spend all of their time building up a military in secret, waiting for the right time to strike (Like Killzone.... I can't think of any historical reference).

My thinking on Korea is to bottle the Japanese up in their homeland and not give them any excuse for wanting to have a strong navy so as to protect their possessions. It's also for Korea's benefit, Japan's rule there was just as brutal and nasty as everywhere else.

Ah Killzone! What memories! As to the militarised society I mean the glorification of the samurai, the bushido code and the more questionable aspects of Shinto. They're wouldn't be a military to challenge the US but there would be the aspiration to create one among parts of society. Even if as you say, the minute they start to look like they're going to try a be a great power all the Americans need to do is cut off the oil and then wait for the apologetic phone call from Tokyo!

 

[Astrodragon]

My thinking on Korea is to bottle the Japanese up in their homeland and not give them any excuse for wanting to have a strong navy so as to protect their possessions. It's also for Korea's benefit, Japan's rule there was just as brutal and nasty as everywhere else.

Ah Killzone! What memories! As to the militarised society I mean the glorification of the samurai, the bushido code and the more questionable aspects of Shinto. They're wouldn't be a military to challenge the US but there would be the aspiration to create one among parts of society. Even if as you say, the minute they start to look like they're going to try a be a great power all the Americans need to do is cut off the oil and then wait for the apologetic phone call from Tokyo!

Treaty limits on the navy and airforce will be fine for the allies - they dont care about how many troops the Japanese station on the mainland.

 

[Wendell]

Japan likely still loses the South Seas Mandate. Taiwan may or may not be kept, but I suspect that Japan will have to give up Korea. Keeping Karafuto and the Kuriles may be in the cards though.

 

[stevep]

The Oncoming Storm

It might be practical although the Americans have a hell of a grudge over Pearl and when full details get out of Japanese atrocities, as I don't think that much was known at the time.

The question might be over retention of Korea, as others have mentioned and possibly Taiwan as I don't think the Chinese have much of a presence there at the time. Manchuria I think the allies would [now but not before the war] insist on being returned to China.

I suspect that the Japanese army especially would have great problems agreeing to approaching the allies at this point as even if the military were falling apart numbers and logistics would mean the allies were some way off direct attacks on Japan. If an approach was made the Japanese would probably seek to influence things by offering terms themselves, which would probably be far too moderate for the allies and be rejected but possibly something like what you're saying could then occur via debate.

Interesting idea I've not seen mentioned before. We talk a lot about possibly Britain holding Malaya and winning time for reinforcements to support most of the Dutch Indies but I think then assume a long slog to drive a weakened Japan back, especially given the Europe 1st policy but if Japan actually had some sort of internal coup against the militants and made an approach themselves.

Steve

 

[The Oncoming Storm]

Thanks everyone for your comments, lots to think about!

Stevep, I agree that Japan's not in imminent threat of invasion, it was this which IOTL tipped many in the government into supporting surrender. But if Japan's resource position has now become so critical that it's incapable of any offensive actions then the Allies may decide that it's better to simply contain Japan with submarine warfare so they can redeploy forces to Europe. They will continue to supply China with weapons so Chiang's army can force the Kwantung out. The Americans will want to retake the Philippines as well as take out the Pacific fortresses like Saipan and Truk but with Japan's capacity to defend those conquests severely limited it would have been a relatively easier operation than IOTL.

Japan would be facing the prospect of a collapse back into a pre-industrial society and have the Empire dismantled from underneath it. In those circumstances I think it's likely that Hirohito or other leaders would say "Enough!" and try to seek the best possible terms.

 

[phx1138]

Therefore I think that it was inevitable that Japan was going to try and seize S.E. Asia.

That does not necessarily mean war with the U.S., despite what the Japanese thought at the time, & what all too many believe now.

The scenario then I had in mind is one we've talked about a lot recently, the British in Malaya have managed to get their act together and defeat Yamashita's Army. This denies Japan access to the oilfields of Sumatra and Burma and Malaya's rubber, they would still have taken the Borneo oilfields but with Singapore available to use as a base, Allied submarines would probably have sunk most of the tankers heading back to Japan as they did IOTL. Japan has enough oil to continue the War into autumn/winter 1942 or possibly early 1943 and then it's military and economy start to come apart through lack of fuel.

At this point enough of the leadership realise that the position is hopeless and decide to ask the Allies for an armistice

You're well into ASB territory now, because that takes at least 5 miracles by my count: Percival defeats Yamashita, MacArthur doesn't bungle in the P.I., the U.S. Sub Force doesn't have defective torpedoes, some nitwit doesn't cause Japan to change her merchant marine code prewar, & Japan's leadership is rational. The last is the hardest to accomplish IMO. OTL at this point, Japan hasn't suffered a serious defeat or setback. I'm far from convinced it was possible Percival could stop Yamashita absent divine intervention.

OTL, it was fully 18mo more before the sub blockade bit hard enough to have a serious impact; I'd want to know how you get Nimitz or English to change their targeting priorities sooner than OTL, & fix the Mk14 any sooner absent a miracle. Even with it fixed, the maru code was still not broken again until (IIRC) Nov '42, & that ain't changing, so you need to prevent it being changed prewar, & that needs another miracle, 'cause that was the product of some genuine stupidity (& some serious security paranoia by ONI, which had broken it).

Moreover, Japan wanted desperately to hold onto China & her conquests there. That was the whole point of widening the war: "settle the China question". So your terms requiring Japan give up her conquests in China are a non-starter until Japan is patently & unequivocally on the brink of the abyss, & OTL even in August 1945, Japan's leadership did not see the brink (or refused to acknowledge it).

Those found to have committed war crimes will face a tribunial.

Was this even a settled issue at the time OTL, even for the Germans? If not, why presume it for Japan? Furthermore, does this include Hirohito? There was strong sentiment in the U.S. he face trial. (As Bix has revealled, he was one of the prime causes of war in China, & did almost nothing to discourage the wider war.) There was an absolute refusal in Japan to countenance giving up the Imperial System; resistance to Hirohito going on trial is liable to be enormous. So is resistance to an armistice if this is one of the terms.

Japan to withdraw from Manchuria, Korea and other possessions outside the Home Islands and to renounce all territorial claims to these lands.

As noted, this is going to meet strong opposition, too.

even IOTL if the Allies hadn't dropped the atomic bomb or invaded Japan the blockade and the consequent lack of food would probably have reduced Japan's population at the end of 1946 back to it's 1700 level through mass starvation.

He's right. Famine was imminent. TTL, you don't have capability to impose a blockade that stringent so long as Japan offers any active resistance, & if you impose it on a surrendered nation IMO you're commiting a war crime (or a violation of international law); either way, IMO, Japan would be entitled to fight in self-defense. (That she would I take as given.)

Japan would be facing the prospect of a collapse back into a pre-industrial society and have the Empire dismantled from underneath it. In those circumstances I think it's likely that Hirohito or other leaders would say "Enough!" and try to seek the best possible terms.

What possible reason can you have to believe that? Given OTL they didn't even in the face of cities being burned, famine being imminent, & the economy being in ruin.

No occupation

Do you genuinely think the U.S. would let that go?

Japan would still be a militarised society with a God-Emperor ... but Japan's military would have been neutered by the War and it would be no immediate threat to it's neighbours.

I see a fundamental contradiction here. Unless Japan is decisively defeated, she is & will be a threat. You need occupation to change that.

Given occupation, tho, you've succeeded in making Japan a powerful ally of the U.S. & a potent asset against the Sovs in the Cold War. Japan continues to be a major economic rival to the U.S., with industries intact; expect Japanese cars to be a big import to the U.S. by 1960 (fully a decade ahead of OTL). You've also eliminated PRC, because there's no August Storm, so no Sov occupation of Manchuria, so no CCP victory over KMT in '49. This means there's a huge market open for Western goods, but also a serious economic competitor sometime in the '70s (at the latest IMO). You've also butterflied the Korean War, which makes Korea even more powerful than OTL economically.

With these examples in Asia, comparable to West Germany, I expect a serious population exodus from SU. I can't quite feature a wall all the way along the SU-Manchuria-Mongolia-China border somehow, tho... Still, I expect strong effort to prevent escapes. I also expect the example of democratic & prosperous countries to have a substantial effect on the Sov leadership. (Maybe less than I think... I have the FRG/DDR example in mind, here.)

IDK about a 3-way space race, but I wouldn't rule out heavy ROC/Japanese/ROK aid to NASA.

The cultural changes are liable to be huge...not least chop socky becoming mainstream in the '60s. (It does mean David Carradine never does "Kung Fu", too. It also probably means Bruce isn't Kato. TTL, mabye he's the Hornet.)

 

[stevep]

That does not necessarily mean war with the U.S., despite what the Japanese thought at the time, & what all too many believe now.

Agreed.

You're well into ASB territory now, because that takes at least 5 miracles by my count: Percival defeats Yamashita, MacArthur doesn't bungle in the P.I., the U.S. Sub Force doesn't have defective torpedoes, some nitwit doesn't cause Japan to change her merchant marine code prewar, & Japan's leadership is rational. The last is the hardest to accomplish IMO. OTL at this point, Japan hasn't suffered a serious defeat or setback. I'm far from convinced it was possible Percival could stop Yamashita absent divine intervention.

I agree with 5 as the main obsticle but:
i) Percival nearly did it OTL despite all the problems. Could easily see things go differently especially if there was a different commander and/or a bit more resources.
ii) The OP presumes the Philippines still fall. It doesn't seriously affect Japan's position as the cutting of supplies is occurring further south.
iii) The OP mentions allied subs. The US ones would still have problems but British and Dutch subs would still be capable of doing a lot of damage given the limited Japanese ASW and the choke points imposed by the situation. Would still take some time but likely to happen fairly quickly.
iv) Don't see the relevance of the code book changes? There would be fairly obvious choke points required by the location of the fighting and of the oil and other supplies that the Japanese have still managed to seize.

Do you genuinely think the U.S. would let that go?

I see a fundamental contradiction here. Unless Japan is decisively defeated, she is & will be a threat. You need occupation to change that.

This is another matter I have doubts on. Agree that with the feeling in the US at the time they will want revenge and also a permanent removal of Japanese power. A blockade will cripple the Japanese and force their withdrawal from China, possibly within a year or so, which might make the Japanese government more willing to consider coming to terms but not sure how willing the US would be to accept them.

Given occupation, tho, you've succeeded in making Japan a powerful ally of the U.S. & a potent asset against the Sovs in the Cold War. Japan continues to be a major economic rival to the U.S., with industries intact; expect Japanese cars to be a big import to the U.S. by 1960 (fully a decade ahead of OTL). You've also eliminated PRC, because there's no August Storm, so no Sov occupation of Manchuria, so no CCP victory over KMT in '49. This means there's a huge market open for Western goods, but also a serious economic competitor sometime in the '70s (at the latest IMO). You've also butterflied the Korean War, which makes Korea even more powerful than OTL economically.

With these examples in Asia, comparable to West Germany, I expect a serious population exodus from SU. I can't quite feature a wall all the way along the SU-Manchuria-Mongolia-China border somehow, tho... Still, I expect strong effort to prevent escapes. I also expect the example of democratic & prosperous countries to have a substantial effect on the Sov leadership. (Maybe less than I think... I have the FRG/DDR example in mind, here.)

IDK about a 3-way space race, but I wouldn't rule out heavy ROC/Japanese/ROK aid to NASA.

I'm not sure, if there isn't an occupation and a major reshaping of the Japanese economy, along with the introduction of a lot of US influences, that Japan would become the economic giant it did OTL. If it's still militarily dominated that will put a major damper on economic development while it's likely to have huge defence bills. Also it would still be deeply loathed across much of the region so even if you had a nationalist China forming a large market I can't see Japan getting much access after the brutal occupation.

Also, while it's probably most likely, I'm still not sure that the nationalists would defeat the communists and establish a stable-ish government in China given the endemic corruption and in-fighting.

The cultural changes are liable to be huge...not least chop socky becoming mainstream in the '60s. (It does mean David Carradine never does "Kung Fu", too. It also probably means Bruce isn't Kato. TTL, mabye he's the Hornet.)

Do agree there are going to be a lot of cultural changes.

Steve

 

[The Oncoming Storm]

That does not necessarily mean war with the U.S., despite what the Japanese thought at the time, & what all too many believe now.

Looking at all the threads I've found that cover this issue, it's stated that Churchill and Roosevelt had assured each other that an attack on either country's interests by the Japanese would result in a DoW from the other. In theory Japan could have by passed the Philippines and gone all out on SE Asia but they would have been baring their throats to the Americans.

You're well into ASB territory now, because that takes at least 5 miracles by my count: Percival defeats Yamashita, MacArthur doesn't bungle in the P.I., the U.S. Sub Force doesn't have defective torpedoes, some nitwit doesn't cause Japan to change her merchant marine code prewar, & Japan's leadership is rational. The last is the hardest to accomplish IMO. OTL at this point, Japan hasn't suffered a serious defeat or setback. I'm far from convinced it was possible Percival could stop Yamashita absent divine intervention.

No argument about Percival, he was one of the worst generals of the war. But Yamashita's last attack on Singapore that succeeded in capturing the reservoirs and causing Percival to have a breakdown was his last desperate push as his army was at the very limit of his supplies. When Percival came out under a truce flag Yamashita thought he was coming to ask for HIS surrender! Although to be fair Percival's position was hopeless at this point. Therefore a more competent General would have knocked that army into shape (they had a 3:1 advantage over Yamashita FFS!) and may have realised that Malaya wasn't impenetrable jungle but had large open plantations in which an army could maneouvre. The British could well have at least slowed Yamashita's advance down so much that they could bring reinforcements in. It would also have helped if the British had taken the Japanese threat more seriously and not fallen for racist bull like that the Japanese wouldn't make good pilots because they were carried on their mother's backs as infants, then again complacency and arrogance were the middle names of the British Empire, see Elephinstone in Afghanistan and Gordon in Khartoum.

OTL, it was fully 18mo more before the sub blockade bit hard enough to have a serious impact; I'd want to know how you get Nimitz or English to change their targeting priorities sooner than OTL, & fix the Mk14 any sooner absent a miracle. Even with it fixed, the maru code was still not broken again until (IIRC) Nov '42, & that ain't changing, so you need to prevent it being changed prewar, & that needs another miracle, 'cause that was the product of some genuine stupidity (& some serious security paranoia by ONI, which had broken it).

Obviously I've put too much emphasis on the role of submarines in the OP! The real killer for Japan in this scenario is going to be shortages of oil, IOTL they had plenty of oil but by the end of the war they couldn't get enough of it back home as the USN was sinking so much of it's merchant marine. In hindsight 1942/43 is too short a timeframe for this to happen.

Moreover, Japan wanted desperately to hold onto China & her conquests there. That was the whole point of widening the war: "settle the China question". So your terms requiring Japan give up her conquests in China are a non-starter until Japan is patently & unequivocally on the brink of the abyss, & OTL even in August 1945, Japan's leadership did not see the brink (or refused to acknowledge it).

Again I should have expanded the scenario more, how about with the Burma Road still open, the Allies are able to provide far more supplies to the Chinese Army, as Japan's fuel shortage becomes ever more acute the Kwantung Army is unable to carry out any offensive actions and is forced to try and fend off the Chinese. Eventually the Chinese are able to launch a major offensive and without enough fuel to mount an effective defense the Japanese suffer a series of defeats and are pushed back into Manchuria.

Furthermore, does this include Hirohito? There was strong sentiment in the U.S. he face trial. (As Bix has revealled, he was one of the prime causes of war in China, & did almost nothing to discourage the wider war.) There was an absolute refusal in Japan to countenance giving up the Imperial System; resistance to Hirohito going on trial is liable to be enormous. So is resistance to an armistice if this is one of the terms.

I certainly agree Hirohito deserved to be swinging at the end of a rope but it was the promise by the Americans that he could keep his throne that helped to persuade many in the Japanese Government to accept surrender. Sometimes you have to be prepared to do a deal with the Devil. As for the others, I think the Chinese would have wanted justice for Nanking and all the other Japanese attoricities.

What possible reason can you have to believe that? Given OTL they didn't even in the face of cities being burned, famine being imminent, & the economy being in ruin.

Well the decision to go to war was opposed by many in the Government and military including Yamamoto. Even many who supported it were afraid that Japan would inevitably lose the long war that would follow. The dramatic success of Japan's early victories surprised all but the most diehard miliatrists and many of those who had been wavering came round to support the War. Maybe if the initial attacks are less successful and they fail to secure the oilfields the waverers would have become more strident in their opposition. Again this is something I should have made clearer in the OP, after either losing or being fought to a standstill in Malaya, the Japanese attempt another operation but this time the Allies are ready for them and inflict a Midway type defeat. As IOTL the Japanese don't have anything to stop the inevitable Allied counter attack but they have far less resources to use to stretch the war out. The subsequent war is mostly fought in China and SE Asia.

Do you genuinely think the U.S. would let that go?

My thinking is that the Allies want to wrap up the situation in the Pacific so that they can commit their full strength to go after Germany and Italy. I appreciate that it's often said that the split of American power between the European and Pacific Theaters was 90%/10% but that 10% was still tens of thousands of troops and thousands of tonnes of fuel, food and ammunition that would have still come in very handy in Europe. I'm thinking in particular if Patton had had more fuel around Metz in 1944.

Given occupation, tho, you've succeeded in making Japan a powerful ally of the U.S. & a potent asset against the Sovs in the Cold War. Japan continues to be a major economic rival to the U.S., with industries intact; expect Japanese cars to be a big import to the U.S. by 1960 (fully a decade ahead of OTL). You've also eliminated PRC, because there's no August Storm, so no Sov occupation of Manchuria, so no CCP victory over KMT in '49. This means there's a huge market open for Western goods, but also a serious economic competitor sometime in the '70s (at the latest IMO). You've also butterflied the Korean War, which makes Korea even more powerful than OTL economically.

With these examples in Asia, comparable to West Germany, I expect a serious population exodus from SU. I can't quite feature a wall all the way along the SU-Manchuria-Mongolia-China border somehow, tho... Still, I expect strong effort to prevent escapes. I also expect the example of democratic & prosperous countries to have a substantial effect on the Sov leadership. (Maybe less than I think... I have the FRG/DDR example in mind, here.)

IDK about a 3-way space race, but I wouldn't rule out heavy ROC/Japanese/ROK aid to NASA.

The cultural changes are liable to be huge...not least chop socky becoming mainstream in the '60s. (It does mean David Carradine never does "Kung Fu", too. It also probably means Bruce isn't Kato. TTL, mabye he's the Hornet.)

Huge butterflies indeed!

 

[Alratan]

It would also have helped if the British had taken the Japanese threat more seriously and not fallen for racist bull like that the Japanese wouldn't make good pilots because they were carried on their mother's backs as infants, then again complacency and arrogance were the middle names of the British Empire, see Elephinstone in Afghanistan and Gordon in Khartoum.

I keep seeing this argument, and it's just not true. The largest British military investment in the inter-war period was building up Singapore in preparation for war with the Japanese, a war they new would be hard and expensive.

If the British hadn't stripped all the best troops that were meant to be in Malaya and not diverted the supplies that were meant to be there to Russia, then would have a very good chance of winning.

 

[phx1138]

Percival nearly did it OTL despite all the problems. Could easily see things go differently especially if there was a different commander and/or a bit more resources.

Allowing for another CO, agreed. I was presuming OTL, absent it being said otherwise.

The OP presumes the Philippines still fall. It doesn't seriously affect Japan's position as the cutting of supplies is occurring further south.

Here, I may've misunderstood.

The OP mentions allied subs. The US ones would still have problems but British and Dutch subs would still be capable of doing a lot of damage given the limited Japanese ASW and the choke points imposed by the situation. Would still take some time but likely to happen fairly quickly.

AFAIK, numbers were pretty small. Also, in DEI & OTL SWPA, they'd be under hostile air most of the time. It's a serious problem & part of the reason USN boats based in Oz did so poorly.

Don't see the relevance of the code book changes? There would be fairly obvious choke points required by the location of the fighting and of the oil and other supplies that the Japanese have still managed to seize.

It's a factor in knowing when & where the shipping's going to be. When USN recovered it late in '42, sinkings went up by more than 60%. And that was before the torpedo problems were fixed.

This is another matter I have doubts on. Agree that with the feeling in the US at the time they will want revenge and also a permanent removal of Japanese power. A blockade will cripple the Japanese and force their withdrawal from China, possibly within a year or so, which might make the Japanese government more willing to consider coming to terms but not sure how willing the US would be to accept them.

Without decisive, crushing defeat & occupation, the militarists keep credibility. Less, perhaps, but some: enough, IMO, the outstanding issues remain. So, too, Hirohito, who did damn all to reign in the Kwantung Army or militarists before the PacWar started. Bix's Hirohito leaves a strong impression he hoped he'd get away with it.

I'm not sure, if there isn't an occupation and a major reshaping of the Japanese economy, along with the introduction of a lot of US influences, that Japan would become the economic giant it did OTL. If it's still militarily dominated that will put a major damper on economic development while it's likely to have huge defence bills. Also it would still be deeply loathed across much of the region so even if you had a nationalist China forming a large market I can't see Japan getting much access after the brutal occupation.

I think we agree, here. I'm taking as given U.S. occupation of Japan is needed. I'd also allow for somewhat less "pacification", so no constitutional ban on overseas forces. (Maybe not...)

Also, while it's probably most likely, I'm still not sure that the nationalists would defeat the communists and establish a stable-ish government in China given the endemic corruption and in-fighting.

I'll allow a longer timescale for it than OTL, but bear in mind the amount of aid Mao got. Also bear in mind the Sovs were giving aid to Chiang, too, & were seemingly willing to live with him in charge. Also the likely aid he'd get from the U.S. postwar (per Taiwan). Plus serious investment...

Looking at all the threads I've found that cover this issue, it's stated that Churchill and Roosevelt had assured each other that an attack on either country's interests by the Japanese would result in a DoW from the other.

Like most, you're forgetting: FDR's promises weren't binding on Congress... Even Winston seemed to forget. (Eden did point it out to him...)

In theory Japan could have by passed the Philippines and gone all out on SE Asia but they would have been baring their throats to the Americans.

Indeed, unlikely, especially considering Japan's faulty belief. Nevertheless, the better option IMO.

No argument about Percival, he was one of the worst generals of the war. But Yamashita's last attack on Singapore that succeeded in capturing the reservoirs and causing Percival to have a breakdown was his last desperate push as his army was at the very limit of his supplies. When Percival came out under a truce flag Yamashita thought he was coming to ask for HIS surrender! Although to be fair Percival's position was hopeless at this point. Therefore a more competent General would have knocked that army into shape (they had a 3:1 advantage over Yamashita FFS!) and may have realised that Malaya wasn't impenetrable jungle but had large open plantations in which an army could maneouvre. The British could well have at least slowed Yamashita's advance down so much that they could bring reinforcements in. It would also have helped if the British had taken the Japanese threat more seriously and not fallen for racist bull like that the Japanese wouldn't make good pilots because they were carried on their mother's backs as infants, then again complacency and arrogance were the middle names of the British Empire, see Elephinstone in Afghanistan and Gordon in Khartoum.

Correct on all points, & I must confess forgetting most of it. Nevertheless, absent new commanders, I don't see the outcome changing. Unless you'll allow Phillips to decide to go a trifle earlier, & catch the landing force on the beach, instead of falling afoul of TBs & being sunk?

Obviously I've put too much emphasis on the role of submarines in the OP! The real killer for Japan in this scenario is going to be shortages of oil, IOTL they had plenty of oil but by the end of the war they couldn't get enough of it back home as the USN was sinking so much of it's merchant marine. In hindsight 1942/43 is too short a timeframe for this to happen.

Maybe not, depending on how you go about it. See, despite the OTL delay, Nimitz & English didn't focus on tankers from the outset. (Have a look in Blair's Silent Victory for when the priority went to #1. I couldn't find it again, as usual.) Also, if the subs are pulled back to Pearl, instead of sent to Oz, it makes a major difference, 'cause now, the Luzon & Formosa Straits are open for business; OTL, they weren't til '44, due to the risk of fratricide with SWPA & Pearl boats. (The demarkation line ran right through the Luzon Strait, thanks to MacArthur's P.I. mania.)

There's also the "guerrilla submarines" issue, sending them to deliver dribs & drabs to P.I., instead of having them sink Japanese merchants. And Nimitz's terrible dispositions to every damn IJN base in PTO, rather than concentrating on Home Waters, Yellow Sea, & Luzon/Formosa Straits.

Since you don't say anything about changed COs, I was reluctant to attribute changes. Change COs, or change conditions some, I can believe there'd be a reaction. It's liable not to be good for Japan.

As noted, tho, the maru code is still the biggie....& I don't feature Nimitz (or any other CinCPac) or King giving it higher priority than it got OTL, unless the PacFleet's carriers were all sunk on 7 Dec, & their replacements sunk by June '42, which IMO would take Japan getting something like a miracle. Unless the only force CinCPac had was subs, it ain't happenin'.

Again I should have expanded the scenario more, how about with the Burma Road still open, the Allies are able to provide far more supplies to the Chinese Army

Yeah, that's pretty huge.

I certainly agree Hirohito deserved to be swinging at the end of a rope but it was the promise by the Americans that he could keep his throne that helped to persuade many in the Japanese Government to accept surrender. Sometimes you have to be prepared to do a deal with the Devil.

I agree with the sentiment. IMO, the Japanese would've accepted his abdication, perhaps even trial, provided The Throne wasn't destroyed: that is, his brother, or somebody, stepped in. (I've doubts the U.S. would've accepted the son, but...)

Well the decision to go to war was opposed by many in the Government and military including Yamamoto. Even many who supported it were afraid that Japan would inevitably lose the long war that would follow. The dramatic success of Japan's early victories surprised all but the most diehard miliatrists and many of those who had been wavering came round to support the War. Maybe if the initial attacks are less successful and they fail to secure the oilfields the waverers would have become more strident in their opposition. Again this is something I should have made clearer in the OP, after either losing or being fought to a standstill in Malaya, the Japanese attempt another operation but this time the Allies are ready for them and inflict a Midway type defeat. As IOTL the Japanese don't have anything to stop the inevitable Allied counter attack but they have far less resources to use to stretch the war out. The subsequent war is mostly fought in China and SE Asia.

That makes it more likely IMO. Given the contempt for the U.S., & the total lack of understanding of modern war, all Japan's senior military leaders had, IMO you want a major & stunning defeat pretty early to get this outcome. Yamashita getting turned back from Singapore would do nicely IMO. So would a hard smack by MacArthur or Brereton out of the P.I. early. Even if either or both eventually fall, IMO, you might've gotten the "reality check" you need.

My thinking is that the Allies want to wrap up the situation in the Pacific so that they can commit their full strength to go after Germany and Italy. I appreciate that it's often said that the split of American power between the European and Pacific Theaters was 90%/10% but that 10% was still tens of thousands of troops and thousands of tonnes of fuel, food and ammunition that would have still come in very handy in Europe. I'm thinking in particular if Patton had had more fuel around Metz in 1944.

Point taken. Except, you don't need to shorten the PacWar to achieve that. Just eliminate the Italian Campaign. (Yes, an old refrain from me.) In addition, just fixing the congestion problems in PTO & getting ships unloaded faster (rather than swinging at anchor waiting) would free up thousands of tons of shipping, which would be a big help for ETO. That said, the problem for Patton et al. in '44 wasn't existence of supply, it was where the fuel was: they could get it to Normandy, but not from Normandy to the front, because Monty, being a purblind nitwit, couldn't see he needed to clear the Scheldt Estuary to open Antwerp. (Canadian General Guy Simmonds, CO II Corps, got it...)

Huge butterflies indeed!

I've been a big fan of chop socky for years. I'm also probably one of the few with a complete run of Iron Fist. If he'd only started a year or two sooner...