Technological and operational transfers if earlier Japanese-German cooperation?

Hendryk

Banned
In OTL, Germany was initially allied to China, and switched sides to Japan in 1938. WI the Japanese-German cooperation had started much earlier, circa 1922? What technological transfers could have taken place until the end of WW2, and could German military doctrines have influenced Japanese ones at least to a limited extent?

In particular, since Japan was using chemical and bacteriological weapons on the Chinese front, could it have produced nerve agents such as tabun in strategically meaningful amounts? Could Germans have provided input on how to make better tanks and, more importantly, how to use them to optimal effect? Could they have advised to equip aircraft with self-sealing fuel tanks? In what other ways could this earlier cooperation have made a difference?
 

Hendryk

Banned
The Japanese didn't really need better tanks, Panzer IV's against Chinese peasants is overkill.
It would however make a difference after 1941. Anyway, while this WI is valid for OTL as well, I'm more interested in seeing what impact it would have in "Superpower Empire", in which China is comparatively more industrialized and can field some armor of its own.

The other aspect of the question is what the Germans themselves would get out of it. For example, there are strategic minerals (manganese, molybdenum, etc.) in Manchuria and northern China that, after those places are put under Japanese occupation, could be exported to Germany for hard cash or bartered for stuff Japan needs.
 
It would however make a difference after 1941. Anyway, while this WI is valid for OTL as well, I'm more interested in seeing what impact it would have in "Superpower Empire", in which China is comparatively more industrialized and can field some armor of its own.

The other aspect of the question is what the Germans themselves would get out of it. For example, there are strategic minerals (manganese, molybdenum, etc.) in Manchuria and northern China that, after those places are put under Japanese occupation, could be exported to Germany for hard cash or bartered for stuff Japan needs.

You make a good point however the Japanese don't have much to offer the Germans tech wise Europe and the Pacific are very different wars.

Are you continuing Superpower Empire? :)
 

Hendryk

Banned
You make a good point however the Japanese don't have much to offer the Germans tech wise Europe and the Pacific are very different wars.
In OTL they were, but in my TL the Japanese in China end up in a fairly similar situation to Germans in Russia, though because Qian China doesn't have the USSR's industrial base, the effects take longer to kick in.

Are you continuing Superpower Empire? :)
Absolutely. I just got caught in a self-perpetuating data gathering loop which, combined with writer's block and sheer laziness, has resulted in a protracted hiatus. But there's more coming.
 
If the Germans move their tank research to Japan, they don't move it to Soviet and thus I think we would see weaker Soviet tank warfare.
 

CalBear

Moderator
Donor
Monthly Donor
In OTL, Germany was initially allied to China, and switched sides to Japan in 1938. WI the Japanese-German cooperation had started much earlier, circa 1922? What technological transfers could have taken place until the end of WW2, and could German military doctrines have influenced Japanese ones at least to a limited extent?

In particular, since Japan was using chemical and bacteriological weapons on the Chinese front, could it have produced nerve agents such as tabun in strategically meaningful amounts? Could Germans have provided input on how to make better tanks and, more importantly, how to use them to optimal effect? Could they have advised to equip aircraft with self-sealing fuel tanks? In what other ways could this earlier cooperation have made a difference?

A quick point on Japanese vs. Western aircraft/armor design. The Japanese knew all about self sealing tanks, crew armor and the like. It was not a lack of knowledge, it was a tactical decision. Light weight meant better ACM and longer range. Jpanese armor was also more than sufficient for the mission at hand. It wasn't until Okinawa (maybe Saipan in a few cases) that a true meduim tank would have been useful to the IJA.
 

Hendryk

Banned
A quick point on Japanese vs. Western aircraft/armor design. The Japanese knew all about self sealing tanks, crew armor and the like. It was not a lack of knowledge, it was a tactical decision. Light weight meant better ACM and longer range.
How do you think technical cooperation with Germany could have contributed to improving Japanese designs and/or production methods?

Would it be plausible, also, to have Japan to produce Focke-Wulf 190s under license from 1943 or so? By then it would be facing regular bombing raids from China and would need the best interceptors it can get. As for Germany, obviously it would consider that every day that Japan spends still in the fight is one more day that America's full attention won't be focused on the European theater.

Japan would also need to hold back large-scale counteroffensives from Chinese ground forces, hence my interest in nerve agents as a tactical weapon. What else could be used to good effect?

It has been previously dicussed how the Japanese officer corps would be reluctant to accept input from foreign allies in the 1930s, the Bushido military culture and all that. However, the fighting in China would result in a high attrition rate among officers by the late 1930s, clearing the way for more open-minded men. By then they would also know what to expect, while still having the room for manoeuver to adapt.
 
First off one would need a reason for Japan of 22 to break away from Britain and Germany to move away from china. Germany of 22 is very different from 38 as you know.

Germany had if I remember correctly chemical, tank and air warfare programs in the Sovjetunion.
The Sovjets wear also important trading partners.

Now if Japan is facing a more industrialise china it might need to focus more on ground warfare, but in the 20`s the Brits are still the best in mech combat.

A different China should force a different strategy in Japan, and they will make different Tactical choices regarding the arms build up. Stronger ground forces would probably make a Siberian invasion more likely. I otl Germanys contribution to china military wise is not a small thing, but I am unsure how that affects your China.

Industrial tech would probably be something the Germans could give the Japanese.
 
How do you think technical cooperation with Germany could have contributed to improving Japanese designs and/or production methods?


Hendryk,

As CalBear has already told you, Japan knew about everything you're talking about and they believed they didn't need it. In the OTL, that belief was, for the most part, correct. They could build a certain number of fighters without self-sealing tanks and crew armor or they could build a smaller number with self- sealing tanks and crew armor. They chose the higher number.

In your "Superpower China" timeline, however, whether that belief is correct is entirely up to you. We've no idea what you think would be plausible for your timeline.

Would it be plausible, also, to have Japan to produce Focke-Wulf 190s under license from 1943 or so?

Why? Japan already had equally capable fighter designs and, if need be, could easily incorporate features like crew armor and self-sealing fuel tanks which Japan already knows about.

It's not a matter of Japan being stupid. It's a matter of Japan facing a real choice of just how to expend her relatively few resources in a few certain ways. She doesn't need a medium tank to chase Chinese peasants or to fight on small Pacific islands. She also doesn't need an interceptor which incorporates features like sealing fuel tanks if she can't fuel the damn thing.

As for Germany, obviously it would consider that every day that Japan spends still in the fight is one more day that America's full attention won't be focused on the European theater.

There's one area in which Germany and Japan may be able to assist each other; submarine warfare. Japan has the best torpedoes in the world and the worst submarine doctrine. At war's start, Germany has torpedoes that were almost as bad as US torpedoes and a much better submarine doctrine.

Long Lance in the Atlantic and a more aggressive/competent IJN submarine force in the Pacific will force the US to expend much more effort on ASW.

Japan would also need to hold back large-scale counteroffensives from Chinese ground forces, hence my interest in nerve agents as a tactical weapon.

Nerve agents? Even Hitler wasn't stupid enough to use those.

Once Japan starts gassing mainland China, Japan's cities get gassed in return. As vulnerable as Japan's cities were to incendiaries and napalm, adding phosgene to the mix is going to make thing far far worse.

However, the fighting in China would result in a high attrition rate among officers by the late 1930s, clearing the way for more open-minded men. By then they would also know what to expect, while still having the room for manoeuver to adapt.

The effects of higher officer casualties are part of your timeline and thus your call. I'll point out that IJA officer casualties during the Pacific War didn't automatically leave the best and brightest standing. In fact, it was usually the opposite.


Bill
 

Hendryk

Banned
There's one area in which Germany and Japan may be able to assist each other; submarine warfare. Japan has the best torpedoes in the world and the worst submarine doctrine. At war's start, Germany has torpedoes that were almost as bad as US torpedoes and a much better submarine doctrine.

Long Lance in the Atlantic and a more aggressive/competent IJN submarine force in the Pacific will force the US to expend much more effort on ASW.
You're on to something here. At which point would the exchange take place, good torpedoes vs. good doctrine? It's going to make a difference when the Japanese submarines stop going after strictly military targets and start going after supply ships and other vessels previously deemed "unworthy".

A related question about torpedoes: how did the French and British ones compare to the Japanese ones? Were there similar design flaws to the American ones?

Nerve agents? Even Hitler wasn't stupid enough to use those.

Once Japan starts gassing mainland China, Japan's cities get gassed in return. As vulnerable as Japan's cities were to incendiaries and napalm, adding phosgene to the mix is going to make thing far far worse.
By late 1943 Japan may actually be desperate enough to take its chances with chemical retaliation. That's something I haven't settled yet, but before I check the decisional plausibility I'd like to check the technical plausibility.
 
British Torps were the 2nd best, but more akin to good USN rather than not as good Long Lance. The cruisers at River Plate fired torps at ranges of 7km and they had big warheads. They also had some interesting oddities which could be good AH fodder, such as the 24.5" enriched oxygen torp on the Nelson and Rodney but not in wisdespread use.
http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WTBR_PreWWII.htm
 
How vulnerable would Japanese cities be to gassing though? I have no idea how powerful gases were available, but consider that Japanese cities had relatively few tall buildings and were usually next to the sea, and that winds were usually strong. Wouldn't the gas just blow away? It seems to me that burning cities were more effective.
 
Hendryk,

Riain is spot on about British torpedoes. From start to finish and across all models, they had the best torpedoes in the war. The US started with crap and eventually made some of the best, Germany started with poor torps and produced some better examples, while Japan had the Long Lance and little else. Britain, however, had the best overall performers across all examples from war's start until the end.

I don't know much about French torpedoes. I also don't know if they were used much either, so getting actual operational data for them would be very hard.

As for exchanging operational doctrine, the Germans are going to have to impress on the Japanese much more than simply the idea of sinking merchantmen. Japan did routinely dispatch submarines with explicit orders to attack merchant shipping. It was the commanders of those submarines and their training that then failed.

Here's that quote we always dredge up from CombinedFleet concerning the IJN submarine arm: This is reflected in a post-war report prepared by the US and British Navies which states, "It was frankly impossible to believe that submarines could spend weeks on the US west coast 'without contacts,' or spend more than 40 days running among the Solomons during the Guadalcanal campaign 'without seeing any targets.' Even the Japanese commanding officers could not disguise their embarrassment when recounting these tales. Further enlightenment is found in the extremely large number of times the target was 'too far away to attack.'"

Germany is going to have convince Japan to train differently, to chose commanders differently, and to relieve poorly performing commanders much faster. That's an institutional change and just not an adopted doctrine.

As for chemical warfare, I'd think the principle of "Chemical MAD" would hold true in your timeline just as it did in the OTL. Japan flirted with the idea of using chemicals to help defend Saipan, Okinawa, and the Philippines but each time recoiled from the idea because they knew the US would respond in types and quantities that Japan could never hope to match. Japan knows it is uniquely vulnerable to chemical attacks and, once the chemical genie leaves the bottle for whatever purpose, chemicals will rain down on the Home Islands.

Nerve gas and other war gasses are non-starters until and if Japan's militarists recognize the war is lost and want to drag as many people down to death with them as possible as Hitler attempted to do. It's worth noting that Hitler's various orders on this subject were routinely ignored by those around him, suggesting that similar orders from Tokyo will most likely be ignored too.


Bill
 
From what I have read on French Torpedoes they were Better then the USN and the German Navy but not as good as the British Torpedoes . Plus the French Subs were design for anti merchant shipping and they actuly had a sub that 2 x 8 inch Guns and 1 Aircraft called the Surcouf and she was design to have a 90 day cruise range . Also the French were working on Torpedoes that would explode with diffrent color warheads so difrent ships would know whose torps sunk what ship .
 

Hendryk

Banned
Germany is going to have convince Japan to train differently, to chose commanders differently, and to relieve poorly performing commanders much faster. That's an institutional change and just not an adopted doctrine.
So the question is, how could one plausibly achieve this institutional change?

Was Germany in a position to provide training for foreign submarine officers before the signing of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement?
 
In OTL, Germany was initially allied to China, and switched sides to Japan in 1938. WI the Japanese-German cooperation had started much earlier, circa 1922? What technological transfers could have taken place until the end of WW2, and could German military doctrines have influenced Japanese ones at least to a limited extent?

In particular, since Japan was using chemical and bacteriological weapons on the Chinese front, could it have produced nerve agents such as tabun in strategically meaningful amounts? Could Germans have provided input on how to make better tanks and, more importantly, how to use them to optimal effect? Could they have advised to equip aircraft with self-sealing fuel tanks? In what other ways could this earlier cooperation have made a difference?

September 2nd 1939 - German long-range torpedo bombers, possibly based on German submarine-aircraft-carriers, take out much of the British fleet at Scapa Flow in a surprise attack? :D:D:D:D:D By August 1940, a certain operation named after a certain sea-living mammal, is successful? :eek::eek::eek::eek::eek:
 
September 2nd 1939 - German long-range torpedo bombers, possibly based on German submarine-aircraft-carriers, take out much of the British fleet at Scapa Flow in a surprise attack? :D:D:D:D:D By August 1940, a certain operation named after a certain sea-living mammal, is successful? :eek::eek::eek::eek::eek:

Sea Lion would never even take place. In case of Japanese involvment, it would be kindly suggested that the name be changed to something more inspiring, such as "Phoenix-rising-from-the-seas-eating-destroyer-with-lilies".

On-topic, while the Japanese might convince the Germans to focus on the RN, remember that the reason the Japanese had such a success against the PoW was that it stupidly sailed without air cover. The British would not make this mistake against the Germans, and even if torpedo bombers could reach Scapa, the fighter cover couldn't.
 
Was Germany in a position to provide training for foreign submarine officers before the signing of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement?

They would have WW1 veterans. They could be sent as a technical mission, might establish a german shadow krigsmarine in Japan?
 
So the question is, how could one plausibly achieve this institutional change?


Hendryk,

The IJN was supposedly the less xenophobic and more "worldly" branch of the Japanese military. I think if the attempt began early enough it could succeed.

Was Germany in a position to provide training for foreign submarine officers before the signing of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement?

After WW1 and in order to get around the restrictions of Versailles, Weimer Germany built and tested submarines in Holland, Sweden, and Spain along with building and testing tanks and armor doctrine in the USSR. Germany apparently had no qualms about sharing technology and doctrinal experiments with former enemies in return for freedom to research the same away from the eyes on the Versailles guarantors.

While distant, Japan would have been a nicely quiet location for similar projects because the Japanese were creating their own veil of secrecy over military matters.

IJN thinking was tantalizingly close to wolfpack methods seen in the Atlantic. Japanese subs were already supposed to work together, in conjunction with scouting aircraft, and under the direction of a command submarine. If the focus on warship attrition prior to a theoretical battleline clash could be muted, a commerce destruction campaign might possible.

The US had dropped Orange by the mid-30s and Japan knew it, but Japan kept planning on the US following that plan more out of inertia than anything else. She actually built specific units for her navy and chose which capabilities they would possess with an eye towards defeating Orange. The result was that the IJN became a very specialized entity which fared rather badly in the actual war.

If the Germans could get across the point that no battle plan survives contact with the enemy, Japan's thinking, planning, and execution would be more flexible.

Also, as I've noted, Japan's overall submarine commanders will need to develop the ruthlessness shown by their OTL US and German counterparts. Both those nations realized early on that poorly performing sub skippers needed to be removed from command earlier, not later, and that aggressive prospective commanders needed to be promoted ahead of their fellows. Japan kept poor commanders aboard her submarines far too long, allowing them to make tours of peacetime length regardless of their actual performance. IJN subs cruised the shipping rich waters of the US West Coast, the Solomons, the Philippines, and the Indian Ocean while logging either "no traffic" or "target too far away" comments. Doenitz and Lakewood would have yanked those commanders in a New York second after such reports.


Bill
 
Top