Taranto/Pearl style attack on the IJN?

Can't stop the bandwagon, might as well join it.

In terms of broad strokes, the IJA increases their influence even more during the thirties, Nomonhan never quite becomes the decisive Soviet victory it was in OTL, the IJN's argument for 'Go South' is weaker than in OTL, hyper inflation hits KMT China earlier and more visibly than OTL. As the Soviets seemingly collapse in June and July 1941, the Kwantung Army feels the time is ripe to remove the threat of Communism from the Far East, the collapse of the Soviet Union ensures a stronger bargaining position against the British, Hitler has thrown in some vague promises about vast shipments of oil to flow through from the Caucauses when the Aryan and Yamato peoples shake hands across the Ob river. In mid-August, twenty Japanese divisions wander into Siberia where the Soviets are waiting for them.

Japan wasn't mentioned in July's Anglo-Soviet agreement and Britain doesn't declare war automatically, whilst future scholars will state how abysmally things are going for the Japanese expeditionary force it's not quite clear at the same time how long Soviet forces in the Far East can withstand the Japanese offensive. Molotov insists that things are in the balance on the eastern front as much as they are on the west, what is Britain going to do about it?

Of course Churchill's holding back for a reason, yes, Britain wassn't going to waste the element of surprise by immediately going to war with Japan. He loves adventure but you need to always organise the picnic before setting out. The Soviets are demanding it, the Americans quietly give their assent, the British Empire is going on the offensive in the Pacific, when the time is right of course.

I'm no naval strategist so to what extent a pre-emptive strike on the IJN by the Royal Navy is practical, or whether a further offensive is feasible, I'll leave to the experts.

Is it doable?

What would it look like?

How would it go?
 
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CalBear

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Nearly impossible, extremely high risk.

The U.S. managed to get within 600 miles of the Japanese coast to fly off Doolittle's force, but the force didn't wait around to recover any aircraft and beat feet as soon as the last bomber launched. Truk was a very tough nut, probably beyond the RN's capabilities before mid 1944, and likely not then. The Palaus were also WAY inside the Japanese defensive perimeter, getting in would be a maybe, getting out would be nearly impossibe.
 
I'm not sure. The IJN is pretty big and the UK has to split it's navy between Europe and Asia.

An attack similar to Pearl Harbor isn't really in the cards since even if the RN somehow got the carrier capacity together, the RN doesn't have the necessary doctrine to launch large carrier strikes in 1941. AFAIK the IJN was the only navy in the world at that time capable of effectively coordinating large amounts of carrier aircraft.

So a Taranto-style attack is more likely. But the success of that seems to be very much down to luck. It might do some damage, but I think even if similar damage is done, the effect would be much less significant to the IJN. Unless you sink a number of carriers, which is unlikely, the IJN won't be significantly weakened.
 
Perhaps setup a situation where a carrier Task force pre-empts the IJN/IJA Landings by attacking the covering fleet and transports in French Indo China

A sort of Operation Matador with Bells on - as the British Commonwealth forces attack into Thailand - 1 or 2 carriers (An un-beached Indomitable* and an un-sunk Ark Royal) launch night strikes into Camranh Bay and Saigon Harbour - while fighters beat up Soktran and the 2 Saigon Airfields trying to inflict as much damage on the Various air groups as possible.

Perhaps various assets within the Vichi French forces or government in FIC along with the discovery of several Japanese intel assets such as Captain Heenan are discovered and turned.


*I appreciate that she would not have made it to Singers in time even without the Grounding but perhaps an earlier intelligence scoop exposes the Japanese plan (at least the Malaya part) and both Indomitable and Ark Royal are sent to the Far east earlier than planned.
 
If by somehow England could get their carriers to Midway to refuel, could they have staged an attack on Japan by surprise? Then beat a course East ASAP?
 
If by somehow England could get their carriers to Midway to refuel, could they have staged an attack on Japan by surprise? Then beat a course East ASAP?

They have a large naval base in Singapore at the time - they dont need Midway

Midway - Tokyo = 2200+ NM

Singapore - Tokyo = 2900 NM

The Advantage of Singapore would be the facilities etc of a major naval base
 
An actual attack by the RN on the IJN in a Port in the Home Islands is virtually impossible IMO (but then I guess the US Thought the same about Pearl Harbour) - not only is it a fair distance from Singapore a fleet approching strike distance of the japanese coast which is probably 250- 300 NM at most is likely to be spotted.

As I said earlier a more limited and realistic effort would be to attack the IJN forces concentrating in French Indo China before Dec 5th and effectively hamstring 25th Army IJA's efforts in invading both South Thailand and Malaya before they left .

Obviously a decent and believable Intel coup as a POD would be necessary to make the British conduct the pre-emptive Operation Matador with a Naval component (Operation Muleta?).

Such a proactive act might bring the Thailand Government into supporting the Allies rather than being effectively forced into declaring war on them.

Obviously the main land component of the plan 11th Division Indian Army had too much to do and would have to be reinforced earlier - probably with another Diviosn with at least an additional brigade to hold its original positions.

One of my PODs is General Ironsides post France does not retire and does some arse kicking as an 'inspector of the Army' in the Far East - apparently he was quite good at it.
 

CalBear

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They have a large naval base in Singapore at the time - they dont need Midway

Midway - Tokyo = 2200+ NM

Singapore - Tokyo = 2900 NM

The Advantage of Singapore would be the facilities etc of a major naval base

That 700 NM is more than a minor issue. The RN lacked both the fleet train and high endurance ships that the U.S. possessed. U.S. destroyer had between 30 & 50% greater range than their RN counterparts, destroyer range was the most critical limitation of long range operations since they burn fuel at a far higher rate than the ships they escort (destroyers generally spend much more time at high speed than other ships in the task force, chasing contacts that usually are schools of fish).

An actual attack by the RN on the IJN in a Port in the Home Islands is virtually impossible IMO (but then I guess the US Thought the same about Pearl Harbour) - not only is it a fair distance from Singapore a fleet approching strike distance of the japanese coast which is probably 250- 300 NM at most is likely to be spotted.

As I said earlier a more limited and realistic effort would be to attack the IJN forces concentrating in French Indo China before Dec 5th and effectively hamstring 25th Army IJA's efforts in invading both South Thailand and Malaya before they left .

Obviously a decent and believable Intel coup as a POD would be necessary to make the British conduct the pre-emptive Operation Matador with a Naval component (Operation Muleta?).

Such a proactive act might bring the Thailand Government into supporting the Allies rather than being effectively forced into declaring war on them.

Obviously the main land component of the plan 11th Division Indian Army had too much to do and would have to be reinforced earlier - probably with another Diviosn with at least an additional brigade to hold its original positions.

One of my PODs is General Ironsides post France does not retire and does some arse kicking as an 'inspector of the Army' in the Far East - apparently he was quite good at it.

The Doolittle strike force was detected more than 600 miles out from Japan. The Japanese expected them to attack a full day later than was actually the case, based on known ranges of aircraft, the idea that they would be flying off medium bombers never entered their minds. Had the fleet been forced to close to single engine strike range, it would have been wiped out.
 
That 700 NM is more than a minor issue. The RN lacked both the fleet train and high endurance ships that the U.S. possessed. U.S. destroyer had between 30 & 50% greater range than their RN counterparts, destroyer range was the most critical limitation of long range operations since they burn fuel at a far higher rate than the ships they escort (destroyers generally spend much more time at high speed than other ships in the task force, chasing contacts that usually are schools of fish).

And Carriers repeatidly turning into the wind and cranking on at flank speed to launch and recover aircraft, and then returning to their previous course also drains fuel from all of the carriers consorts not just the Destroyers that are obliged to keep up with them.

THe RN did have the ability to RnR at sea just not to the same standard as the USN at the time.

But their fight is in the south China Sea - not the greater Pacific or in the Japanese Home Islands region and such a strike is highly improbable without great risk and operational difficulty in 1941.

The Doolittle strike force was detected more than 600 miles out from Japan. The Japanese expected them to attack a full day later than was actually the case, based on known ranges of aircraft, the idea that they would be flying off medium bombers never entered their minds. Had the fleet been forced to close to single engine strike range, it would have been wiped out.

Using Albacores, Fulmar Mk2s and F4F-3s (Sea Hurricanes are too short legged) the strike could be conducted at 300 odd miles but this is still highly likely to be detected and end in tears.

Its a no from me

However pre-emptively striking IJN forces in the French Indo China Ports is far more likely IMO and while not devoid of risk is quite within a given RN Fleets strike range and ability as well as fitting in with a pre-existing plan.
 
Out of curiosity (and because I honestly don't know enough about RN capabilities) why is Truk out of the question until '44?
 
They have a large naval base in Singapore at the time - they dont need Midway

Midway - Tokyo = 2200+ NM

Singapore - Tokyo = 2900 NM

The Advantage of Singapore would be the facilities etc of a major naval base

My point with Midway was that the attackers could approach from the open ocean. Using Singapore would leave too many chances of the RN being detected.
 
I agree that an attack at the IJN bases in FIC and Southern China would be more realistic.

Smashing the IJN landings against Malaya could help with the defense and maybe delay the fall of Singapore.
 
I think it would be up to the IJN to have a single port and park all their ships in it on Saturday night, rather than for the RN to decide which harbor to attack with unavailable carriers and inadequate aircraft. There's the question of British intelligence inadequacies, and Japanese informants to deal with as well.
 

CalBear

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Out of curiosity (and because I honestly don't know enough about RN capabilities) why is Truk out of the question until '44?

Unless you butterfly away the European War (which would also butterfly away the Japanese take over of French Indochina, and in turn eliminate the Embargo, eliminating the need to attack the DEI and Malaya) the RN doesn't have the forces available to go after Truk. Until the reversals in the Solomons and the impending loss of most of the Mandates led to the Japanese Combined Fleet abandoning the position, it was a major air (five air fields) and naval base (including machine shops, sub base, and anchorage for a significant portion of the IJN), the forces stationed there were formidable including large number of land based multi-engine torpedo bombers, very heavy AAA, and a major garrison of IJA troops (about 28,000 men). It was known, with some justification, as the Gibraltar of the Pacific, although it was never quite as potent as the U.S. believed (as an example it lacked the sort of mooring that the U.S. had at Pearl Harbor, where ships were provided electrical power from ashore, allowing them to completely shut down their machinery). USN pilots use to refer to it as F### Truk.

When the U.S. went after it for good they used 12 carriers (8 CV, 4 CVL), mounting almost 600 aircraft. The Japanese picked up intel indicting that the U.S. was going to attack, and in the period before the first probing strikes in fall of 1943 and the major attack in February of 1944, they moved 2 CV, 3 CVL, 4 CVE, 5 BB, 8 CA and around 20 destroyers from the atoll to the Home Islands.

The British simply lacked the combat power to knock the base out in one massive strike. Trying to do a quick raid and scoot away would sort of be like walking up to a hornet's nest and knocking out of a tree while wearing swimming trunks and flip-flops. Wouldn't end well.
 
I agree with CalBear that any attack on Truk in the early days of the War would prove costly and foolish. Japan had heavy invested itself in their base there.
 
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