I thought you were suggesting that the US' low levels of defence spending wouldn't be an issue, since they could just ramp up training and production once war breaks out. You said (paraphrasing the pro-British position): "Because their defense spending was so low on day one they start out with a decisive disadvantage, and can't make it up, because any arrangements would be too makeshift to be effective." If "on day one" in this sentence doesn't refer to day one of the war, what does it refer to?
Tactics of the US if it invades Canada 1890
- Thread starter tallthinkev
- Start date
Sorry I thought I was being pretty clear. In the 19th Century the U.S. believed it could rely on a militia/national guard system to defend it's land borders. I think everyone on this board knows this. That always turned out causing serious problems when war broke out. The War of 1812, and the Civil War are notable examples of chaotic mobilizations. 1917 wasn't much better.
What triggers these hot debates are such assertions that the War of 1812 was fought to a draw. "No the U.S. clearly lost, because they didn't conquer Canada." "The war was all about American aggression against Canada, what was happening on the Atlantic was just an excuse." "The Americans needed to suck it up, because the British needed to attack it's commerce, because they were saving the world from the Tyranny of Napoleon." The U.S. only survived without losing territory, or having to accept harsh British terms because the British gave them a break. "If the war went on any longer the U.S. would've collapsed." Technical arguments are made to support that contention, and any argument that, that is counter factual is greeted with a dismissal that your only claiming American Exceptionalism.
Trent Affair debates go the same way. Union resistance would simple be impossible, because they Can't make guns, bullets, or gunpowder without the British. Any arguments that the situation would be desperate, but the Union wouldn't just give up. That there were other sources of high grade iron, nitrates, and lead, that given time would replace British sources, are dismissed as American Exceptionalism.
In this 1890 scenario any argument that the U.S. Army had a more modern tactical doctrine, or that it's equipment might be adequate to the job is again dismissed as, you guessed it, American Exceptionalism. In all these debates I've never said the U.S. would win, only that they might, or have a reasonable chance of winning, or making the war so costly that favorable terms would be negotiated. That was always going to be U.S. strategy in any 19th Century war with Britain. The other side, (not everyone, just the most strident) assert the chances of American success are slim to none. In 1890 the British have to win because their regulars. Advancing in line, for massed volley fire, saber, and lance charges, and close support guns be damned. That the U.S. Army could have better leadership at this point in history are dismissed as you guess it.
If instead of fighting the United States the British Army fought a campaign against the French in North Africa, or in Belgium, would the same people be arguing the British would clean their clocks? If they fought the Germans, say in Denmark would they argue the British clearly had the better army? I seriously doubt they would. In the Period from the 1870's till after the post 2nd Boer War reforms the British Army, it's attention absorbed by it's Colonial Wars had fallen behind it's rivals.
Given how chaotic the mobilization was in the civil war and WWI, I would assume the US and Britain would both take a while to mobilize their forces. We have to be aware that given how large North America is, the spaces that armies have to march is still pretty huge. The US army would probably do fairly well though compared to 1812 . An all out war would be fascinating though, I still think it would lead to a status quo ante bellum like in 1812 though. Whatever happens, the long term impact of this in the 20th century would be titanic.
Such a scenario implies some serious diplomatic falling out between the US and Britain. Perhaps something like the British openly assisting the Confederates and especially if they allow Confederate guerillas to cross in and out of Canada during reconstruction.. Confederate exiles and agents/ affiliates in Jamaica or Canada. Some sort of blatant interference would most likely infuriate Americans. Perhaps the British and American sides also have a falling out due to the Fenian raids.
en.wikipedia.org
Such a scenario implies some serious diplomatic falling out between the US and Britain. Perhaps something like the British openly assisting the Confederates and especially if they allow Confederate guerillas to cross in and out of Canada during reconstruction.. Confederate exiles and agents/ affiliates in Jamaica or Canada. Some sort of blatant interference would most likely infuriate Americans. Perhaps the British and American sides also have a falling out due to the Fenian raids.
St. Albans Raid - Wikipedia
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The problem is that danger of being invaded increases a lot more quickly than military capacity does. The United States coasted for a long time with minimal military expenditure, and they were fortunate enough not to be caught out by it. In many respects, this is similar to the position that Britain was in before the Crimea, with the exception that Russia wasn't in a position to invade the UK.
Yes, claiming that thirty-five year old muzzle-loading smoothbore shell guns can take on modern compound armour battleships is American exceptionalism. It's like claiming the Mark IV tank of 1917 can take on a M47 Patton from 1952. Nobody's said the US army's field equipment isn't adequate to the job, just that it isn't better than the Boer equipment (smokeless magazine-fed charger-loading rifles and modern hydro-pneumatic quick-firing artillery), they only have a limited quantity of their most modern weapons, and even those aren't sufficiently better than the British to give the US the qualitative advantage they would need. And yes, claiming that the US Army had a more modern tactical doctrine, without bringing any evidence forward to support it, other than claims like "the US doesn't use volley fire" and "the US doesn't move its guns up into rifle range" which are easily disproved, is American exceptionalism.
Of course they wouldn't. But given that all those armies are both far larger and better-trained than the United States army, let alone the new armies the US would have had to raise in a conflict, this is in fact a point in favour of the consistency of the pro-British. This is, in fact, the exact comparison I gave with the case of Lord Salisbury, whose import seems to have escaped you.
No. In the 1890s the British have to win because they have nearly a quarter of a million regulars, ten times as many as the US. More than a hundred thousand of these are stationed in the UK and available to be sent more or less immediately to Canada; a large proportion of those on colonial duty can subsequently be relieved and sent to the front. The number of recruits the British regular army processes each year is normally larger than the size of the US regular army (1888 - 25,153; 1889 - 29,491; 1890 - 31,407); it also has larger stocks of weapons, equipment and uniforms, which combine to give it much greater capacity for expansion.
British regular soldiers serve for seven to eight years, rather than the five of the US regular army. When those men leave the army, they pass into the reserve and are liable to be recalled to the colours in the event of war to fill out battalions to war establishments and to act as battle casualty replacements.. Each man is registered with his local authorities, and 98% of them presented themselves as required in the Boer War. In 1890 there were 54,136 of these reservists, twice the size of the entire US regular army.
The US army has no reserves in 1890. During the Spanish-American War, regiments are forced to rely on recruiting and training men entirely from scratch. This system breaks down so spectacularly that after less than two months in action, V Corps is so drained by non-combat casualties that it has to be entirely withdrawn from Cuba and sent back to the United States.
The British militia is larger than the US state militias (later National Guard). Recruits enlist for five years, with 49 days of training in their first year and 28 days of training thereafter. As of 1890, 30,161 of them - a force larger than the US regular army - have joined what is called the militia reserve, in which they agree to be called out to serve with regular battalions in the event of war. During the Boer War, the militia reserve were called to the colours at the start of the conflict. From January 1900 onwards, these battalions - net of their militia reserve - also serve in rear areas in South Africa, and volunteer for service in Mediterranean garrisons, thereby allowing regular battalions to be sent to the front. In a Canadian war, they would be able to carry out similar duties of draft finding, garrison, and rear area duty: given the nature of their opponents, they might even serve in a combat role.
The Rifle Volunteers are part-time soldiers, like the US state militias. In 1890 there are 221,048 volunteers enrolled - nearly twice as many as the US state militias - of which 212,293 are 'efficient'. 'Efficient' means they have passed a minimum training requirement, including passing a marksmanship qualification. There are no national standards for US National Guard, each being organised and administered by the state. In the Boer War, as well as helping to garrison the United Kingdom, volunteer units formed Active Service Companies to be attached to regular battalions in the field. Their active service in WWI was after a series of reforms that converted the Rifle Volunteers into the Territorial Force, but the first battalion (1/14th London Regiment, the 'London Scottish'; in 1890, the 7th Middlesex Volunteer Rifle Corps) sees action 88 days after the start of the war.
Because the British army is much larger than the US army, its officers and generals have much greater experience of leading formations larger than a battalion - and, because it fights more wars, they often have experience of leading them into battle. Because the US army is so small, its officers lack this experience and have to draw on memories of campaigns over thirty years previously. Brigadier General John Brooke noted in 1890 that the army had not assembled a division since the Civil War - by contrast, the British army has at least one permanent division stationed at Aldershot at all times. And this lack of tactical experience percolates down to lower formations. Sheridan complained in 1887 that the army's enlisted strength was too small for even its companies to conduct basic drills, as did Major-General John Schofield in the same year in respect of its artillery. Captain Frank K. Ward, who joined the army in the 1860s, admitted in 1893 that he had never seen a full regiment of cavalry and had 'no practical knowledge of regimental movements'. Frederic Remington, observer of the Indian wars, noted that 'There are plenty of infantry field officers who couldn't get a pony past a dead dog in the road if they were following their regiments in action, not to dream of six rails on a snake fence.' A cavalry officer who joins the army in 1890 reflected after seven years that 'very little practical instruction was given in minor tactics. Once or twice a year we were ordered out and made an attempt to post an outpost or to act as an advance guard, but the work was always very poor.'
So you may see 'the British have to win because their regulars,' but there's a lot more to the argument than that. In the absence of any compelling evidence that the US is drastically tactically superior to the British, which you haven't been able to prove, it's difficult to conclude that 25,000 US regulars and however many state militia they can bring into the field beat 100,000 regulars plus 50,000 reservists plus 30,000 militia reserve plus whatever Canadian militia the British might raise, all fighting on the defensive. And that's before you consider the naval sphere, which is where the British have an even more significant advantage than on land.
As I think I've illustrated above, the US has got much more of a job to mobilise their forces than the British do.
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AIUI In 1890 the British mobilization plan currently active detailed plans to embark 2 Corps and a Cavalry Division within (I think, going from memory here) 4-6 weeks. On steam ships they can be in Halifax in 10-14 days. Not sure how long it would take to move them to the hot spots from there, but the railways do connect Halifax and Quebec City, and from there to the rest of Quebec and Ontario so we are probably looking at weeks, rather than months. So, between 10 and 12 weeks after the declaration of war there could be somewhere around 65-70,000 British Regulars in Ontario and Quebec.
In Canada the Active Militia (basically our standing army at the time) numbered about 1000. The Non-Active Militia (Basically the Reserves) was around about 40,000. The Sedentary Militia had, in theory, not seen an enrollment since 1873, when it numbered over 600,000. In practice, many sedentary Militias would continue meeting through to the 1950's, though they were not an official force and I wouldn't want to count on their quality.
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Taking a break from who would win for a moment. Who do we figure would be in command?
On the British Side I would assume one of Wolseley's guys. My guess would be Buller. On the other hand, The Duke of Connaught had experience fighting in Canada, during the Fenian raids. If Queen Victoria would allow him to go, he might be a good choice.
On the British Side I would assume one of Wolseley's guys. My guess would be Buller. On the other hand, The Duke of Connaught had experience fighting in Canada, during the Fenian raids. If Queen Victoria would allow him to go, he might be a good choice.
Hart's Army List as of 31 December 1889 has all the relevant staff appointments. Wolseley and Buller are both in office at this stage (Adjutant-General and Quartermaster-General respectively), which means they'd probably be busy with mobilisation rather than given a field command. The logical choice for overall commander of an expeditionary force based on rank would probably be General H.S.H. Prince Edward of Saxe-Weimar, who at that time was commanding the forces in Ireland, but who last fought as a company commander in the Crimea and has held only a series of home commands since. However, Wolseley's term as adjutant-general ended on 1 October 1890, following which he replaced Prince Edward as commander in Ireland. Depending on the date of the war, or in light of his reputation as "our only soldier", you might well have seen Wolseley given command.
If Prince Edward is commanding, his replacement in charge of troops from Ireland could easily be Lieutenant-General Sir John Ross, current commander of the forces in Canada. Ross was in the Crimea and the Indian Mutiny and commanded the 2nd Division in the Second Anglo-Afghan War - my only hesitation would be whether they've stuck him in Halifax as a pleasant sinecure towards the end of a career. Commanding the division at Aldershot, you have Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Evelyn Wood VC, who hopefully needs little introduction - pioneer of night marches, the driving force behind the revival of manoeuvres, and advocate of mounted infantry tactics. Those are your obvious choices for your pre-formed divisions, and from then on anybody's guess is good as to which officers they might have selected. The Duke of Connaught is certainly an option for divisional command, though probably not the overall army given how junior he is. Although he's just finished a term as commander-in-chief of the Bombay Army, ironically enough he came back via Canada and would have been fairly handy for the theatre of conflict.
On the American side, the January 1890 list suggests your overall commander against Canada (given that George Crook died in March 1890) would be Oliver Otis Howard. Corps or divisional commanders are Brigadier Generals Nelson A. Miles, David S. Stanley, John Gibbon, Thomas H. Ruger, Wesley Merritt, and John R. Brooke. On top of that, the government can name whatever officers it wants as generals of volunteers, as it did for Joseph Wheeler in 1898 - at that point, however, you're guessing more than you are with British divisional commanders.
Ah yes, I had forgotten that Buller was in the War Office at this point. Slated to take over for Wolseley IIRC. So yes, he is probably out. Wolseley might not be a bad idea. He certainly has experience and he also fought in Canada in the Red River Rebellion. Also a proponent of Mounted Infantry and an observer of the American Civil war (attached to Confederate forces? Or at least their choice of uniforms helped encourage his drive for khaki uniforms).
Wood could be good. Though I understand some of his contemporaries thought he was a better commandant in charge of training than he was a field General. Not sure how true that was. Wolseley was one of them but I don't think he ever forgave Wood for signing the peace treaty after the First Boer War.
That's probably true. He did help train Militia while he was in Canada, so he may be plugged to command the initially raised Militia units until he can take up command of a force from Britain?
Confirmed that it was the Confederates. Wolseley visited Lee's Headquarters in late 1862. Don't know for how long exactly though. He was in Canada for 9 years though (61-70) and did not become commandant of La Prairie Training School in Montreal until 1865, so it could have been for a few days or a year or more, for all I know. May not be hugely relevant to the OP, but it was interesting and could be relevant, so there you go.
Six weeks of leave, which included travelling time: however, he'd been following the conflict in the newspapers before and afterwards. There's detail on what lessons he drew from it here. Between then and taking over the training school he was working as an assistant quartermaster-general, i.e. on the staff in Canada.
I think, under the circumstances, almost all the field generals are going to find themselves doing a considerable amount of training. The various social and personal issues with senior officers that should have held Wood's career back encourages me that people acknowledged his capacity, and being in charge of the Aldershot division there's not much anybody could do to prevent him from being sent to Canada - even Wolseley...
I don't think the Canadian militia will be built into separate commands for practical reasons, at least to start with, though Connaught might spend some time working with them if he arrives before his troops do. What I think will happen is that the British will station full regular divisions along the frontier as manoeuvre formations, and assign NCOs from regular battalions to help train the Canadian militia in their local area. As and when Canadian militia battalions are judged ready for service, they'll be integrated into existing infantry brigades so that the regular battalions there provide stiffening. There might be political demand for independent formations as time passes, of course, but it runs into the problem of how many officers commanding brigades and above the Canadians can provide - it's not like WWI where they have until 1917 to raise five divisions.
The British army corps formation in the early 1890s is three divisions (under a lieutenant-general) of two brigades (under a major-general) of four infantry battalions each, plus miscellaneous attached units. There are all sorts of scenarios you can build out of that:
- Mixing at the brigade level, probably going from four British to two British and two Canadian battalions, then one British and three Canadian, for a completely integrated army with some Canadian brigade and divisional officers mixed in.
- Mixing at the brigade level (2 British, 2 Canadian), then adding four new Canadian battalions for a three-brigade division (2 brigades of 2 regular and 2 new Canadian battalions, 1 brigade of 4 experienced Canadian battalions), for a halfway house approach.
- Mixing at the brigade level, building Canadian brigades, and spinning fully-Canadian divisions out of those experienced brigades.
Worth reiterating that the US regular army being so small means that they don't have the option to build off an experienced core in the same way, any more than they did during the American Civil War.
Given that we're talking tactics and not strategy...
Probably a mix of Civil War/post-Napoleonic vs maneuvar warfare in the field and hit-and-run / guerilla warfare behind the lines. In a protracted conflict the British may be able to secure parts of the Northeastern states, Washington state, and other areas. The rich iron ore deposits in the northern Great Lakes might make an attractive area for annexation while Pittsburgh would be a very attractive military target. And do not underestimate the Royal Navy - Mahan's influence is still begin felt while the US Navy is NOT in a position to challenge the RN. However, the Peral Submarine is in the water in 1888, and maybe the US invests in submarine construction and kick-starts undersea warfare a decade or two ahead of OTL.
Probably a mix of Civil War/post-Napoleonic vs maneuvar warfare in the field and hit-and-run / guerilla warfare behind the lines. In a protracted conflict the British may be able to secure parts of the Northeastern states, Washington state, and other areas. The rich iron ore deposits in the northern Great Lakes might make an attractive area for annexation while Pittsburgh would be a very attractive military target. And do not underestimate the Royal Navy - Mahan's influence is still begin felt while the US Navy is NOT in a position to challenge the RN. However, the Peral Submarine is in the water in 1888, and maybe the US invests in submarine construction and kick-starts undersea warfare a decade or two ahead of OTL.