Sweden joins the Crimean War

What if Sweden had joined the Crimean War, on the Ottomans, the British and the French's side, to retake the Aland Islands, from Russia?
 
What if Sweden had joined the Crimean War, on the Ottomans, the British and the French's side, to retake the Aland Islands, from Russia?

Sweden does not have the manpower or Army to face Russia post-1809. It was already enforcing a Neutralist policy, changing that after 45 years is not going to help Sweden either.

It needs even more Anglo-French help than the Ottomans do...
 
Britain hoped to have Sweden join the war so they could take a shot at Kronstadt in 1855-56. With the French and British armies largely tied down at Sevastopol, the British wanted to try a 'knock out' blow aimed at St. Petersburg. To do that they needed better ports in the Baltic to prepare, and would have needed Swedish assistance and manpower for this proposed maneuver.

However, they couldn't really offer anything to entice the Swedish into the alliance. IIRC the Swedes said they might consider joining the war if Prussia joined the Allies and held the Russian army down in Poland, but I might be remembering that wrong.
 
Sweden my not have had the man power but Russia wasn't exactly the abtomen of military success during the Crimean War.
 
Sweden my not have had the man power but Russia wasn't exactly the abtomen of military success during the Crimean War.
Taking land from Russia opens the path for future conflicts with Russia, though, and just because Russia's performance during the Crimean War wasn't great (which the Swedish couldn't have known at the outbreak of the war in any case), Sweden's chances of fending off the Russians in the long term until Russia gives up on whatever lands lost or grudges created from the war are close to nil as one can get. Conquering land requires keeping said land, after all, and it's hard to do that when the land belonged to a Great Power manifold times more populous than one's own country.
 
Taking land from Russia opens the path for future conflicts with Russia, though, and just because Russia's performance during the Crimean War wasn't great (which the Swedish couldn't have known at the outbreak of the war in any case), Sweden's chances of fending off the Russians in the long term until Russia gives up on whatever lands lost or grudges created from the war are close to nil as one can get. Conquering land requires keeping said land, after all, and it's hard to do that when the land belonged to a Great Power manifold times more populous than one's own country.
Very true, was was gust considering the cirmian war not after.
 
Sweden my not have had the man power but Russia wasn't exactly the abtomen of military success during the Crimean War.

That's not the problem. The gains would financially not be enough to compensate the debt Sweden gets into. And it opens future conflict with Russia if it even gets successful. I don't know how many soldiers Sweden can mobilise but Russia can field more and it is close to Finland than to the Crimea from St. Petersburg.

Even a defeat of Russia and a small gain for Moldova in Bessarabia was enough for Russia to declare war again in 1877, just 21 years later after the end of the last war.
 
Britain hoped to have Sweden join the war so they could take a shot at Kronstadt in 1855-56. With the French and British armies largely tied down at Sevastopol, the British wanted to try a 'knock out' blow aimed at St. Petersburg. To do that they needed better ports in the Baltic to prepare, and would have needed Swedish assistance and manpower for this proposed maneuver.

This is probably the only route to getting Sweden into the war, which basically involves sticking them into the middle of two ultimatium so the choice is out of Stolkholm's hands (since they aren't willingly going to declare war). If the Franco-British alliance decided that Russia had grown to be too much of a threat to the balance of power and needed to be parsed back in the peace to keep the basic post-Vienna order in tact, they could conceivably twist arms in Sweden and the Swedes agree to some basing rights in an effort to placate the other Great Powers. If the naval attack into the Gulf of Finland gets really serious (they manage to break the forts and lob a cannonball into the Czar's water closet) then conceivably Russia could threaten war with the Swedes unless they force the Allies out.

Highly specific course of events, but it could be done
 
Sweden wanted a general European anti-russian alliance to permanently push Russia back.

Sweden had the resources to take Russia on in the Crimean War, but they knew the Russians would be back in a generation or so, and that it could not handle Russia alone - OTL gave them right, 1877 the Russians were back for the Ottomans and would have been for Sweden too.

Sweden needs Prussia and Austria to join or some kind of permanent alliance to keep Rusdia away after that.

Either that or an arsehat government without the ability to think ahead at all. That would work too.
 
Didn't the Russians keep a fairly large force in Karelia to forestall the possibility?

So far as I'm aware yes. They kept more troops on the coasts of the Baltics than in the Crimea because the threat of an Allied landing was a potent thought in the tsar's mind.
 
So far as I'm aware yes. They kept more troops on the coasts of the Baltics than in the Crimea because the threat of an Allied landing was a potent thought in the tsar's mind.

You can also get pretty far up into the Russian heartland by the Neva and Duna/Daguva rivers quickly from the Baltic Sea, the same is not the case with Crimea.
 
You can also get pretty far up into the Russian heartland by the Neva and Duna/Daguva rivers quickly from the Baltic Sea, the same is not the case with Crimea.

Just curious, you an get far by what? A boat? Surely, this was not a very practical way to invade in mid-XIX century. :)

Of course, Sevastopol was far removed from ‘mainland’ and there were not only railroad (very few existed in Russia of that time) but just a decent land road, the area was quite short of any type of the resources, far away from the centers or weapons production and getting anything to that location by land was a monumental task.
 
Of course, Sevastopol was far removed from ‘mainland’ and there were not only railroad (very few existed in Russia of that time) but just a decent land road, the area was quite short of any type of the resources, far away from the centers or weapons production and getting anything to that location by land was a monumental task.

But it was the base for Russian power projection into the Black Sea and thus towards the Balkans and into the Straits, as well as greatly facilitating logistics for ambitions in the Caucuses. Given the goal of the Crimean War was to blunt the Russian expansion south by hamstringing their future capabilities for campaigns against the OE, knocking out the Black Sea fleet base would be vital in inserting any terms into the peace that demiliterized their navy in the region and hopefully improving the future odds for the Turks enough they could hold the balance of power together once they got things in order and Paris and London wouldn't have to prop them up or risk Russia breaking into the Med.and gaining acendency in Eastern Europe that Austria alone couldn't hold back. Nappy I and the need of the whole continent to come together to subdue France's grab at Hegemony was fresh in everybody's minds, and Russia at the time was the biggest risk point in throwing off the carefully created setup between the Powers that held the possability of another general, all consuming war at bay
 
Just curious, you an get far by what? A boat? Surely, this was not a very practical way to invade in mid-XIX century. :)

Of course, Sevastopol was far removed from ‘mainland’ and there were not only railroad (very few existed in Russia of that time) but just a decent land road, the area was quite short of any type of the resources, far away from the centers or weapons production and getting anything to that location by land was a monumental task.

Riverine transport is an excellent way to move supplies and in some cases even troops and their equipment. The Britishhad some experience with riverine gunbjoat warfare, and both them and the French brought such vessels to the siege of Bomarsund at Åland.

In case of a Swedish-supported effort against Riga or Saint Petersburg a large part of the Russian heartland will lie open to be raided or even occupied as the French and British can move and support substantial forces along the rivers.

Losing Sevastopol maybe a serious blow to Russian prestige and their ability to project powerin the Black Sea, but it is not a near-existential blow like Riga or Saint Petersburg would be.

The Russians knew this, so you can expect serious forces be ready to counter such a move - which they were OTL.
 
Unless the war turns into an all out free for all against Russia Sweden won't budge. If Austria enters Sweden might join, but you need Prussia on board before it cements Swedish entry. So the $64,000 question is what you need to bribe Prussia with to get them on board.
 
But it was the base for Russian power projection into the Black Sea and thus towards the Balkans and into the Straits, ...

There is no need to state the obvious, I just commented on the logistical problems (for the Russians) related to Sevastopol’s location. At the time it was made a naval base these problems were not critical by the reasons which should be obvious and nobody could anticipate aCW-like situation. Of course, Nicholas could order a railroad construction and the landslide fortifications but he was quite cautious about the railroads in general (their construction was costly) and refused to imagine a scenario of anybody’s landing on thr Russian soil.
 
Riverine transport is an excellent way to move supplies and in some cases even troops and their equipment. The Britishhad some experience with riverine gunbjoat warfare, and both them and the French brought such vessels to the siege of Bomarsund at Åland.

You are seemingly missing the difference between Russia of mid-XIX and China of the Opium Wars. The idea is completely impractical and so is reference to Bomarsund: an isolated unfinished fortress in which only 2 out of 12 towers were completed and which did not have adequate artillery and assailants with a numeric advantage 10:1. If anything, a purely naval bombardment (1st battle) failed and the 2nd assault had been won by the landing force (12,000 vs 2,000 defenders) with a heavy artillery. How this can be compared to the fortifications guarding St. Petersburg and Riga?

And what is also completely absent is an explanation why would Sweden join the war just to fight for the British and French interests?
 
You are seemingly missing the difference between Russia of mid-XIX and China of the Opium Wars. The idea is completely impractical and so is reference to Bomarsund: an isolated unfinished fortress in which only 2 out of 12 towers were completed and which did not have adequate artillery and assailants with a numeric advantage 10:1. If anything, a purely naval bombardment (1st battle) failed and the 2nd assault had been won by the landing force (12,000 vs 2,000 defenders) with a heavy artillery. How this can be compared to the fortifications guarding St. Petersburg and Riga?

And what is also completely absent is an explanation why would Sweden join the war just to fight for the British and French interests?

I am not saying it would be easy, or even possible, only that the Russians knew that the Neva and Düna/Daugava/Dvina river gives access to the Russian heartland and had positioned their forces accordingly, to be able to counter any move up either river - which should be taken into account in any Sweden joins the Crimean War scenario - Russia had some serious forces along the Baltic Sea coast and a much better ability to support and reinforce them compared to Sevastopol - the rivers work both way.
 
Top