On the other hand, I think internet would be developed at the same time or earlier. Quite possibly in the British empire.
Interesting thought. Or modern communication development takes an altogether different path, with the television as the key proponent which spawns all the other aspects of 21st century global communication.
Without WWI, could have the Nazis risen to power?
There would not even be a Nazi party. As the Edwardian world, the old Anti-semite splinter parties of the Kaiserreich just keep puttering on, but fail to get a massive electorate. The whole politisation and radicalisation of the Weimar Republic falls flat. No Treaty of Versailles. No war guilt clause. No reparations. No occupation of the Rhine resp. the Ruhr. No hyperinflation. No war bonds. No bourgeoisie unsure which kind of regime they actually want. No revolution, no communist uprisings.
No Adolf Hitler as a soldier. No Adolf Hitler in politics. No Göring as a war hero.
Would have Einstein emigrated? Not unlikely. Probably not in 1932, maybe later, when the antisemitic atmosphere became worse.
As migration likely, as emigration unlikely.
Prior to 1933, Einstein enjoyed an excellent academical career in
Germany, being director of the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institut für Physik in Berlin.
As I said before, it is rather not likely for the antisemitic atmosphere in Germany being any worse than in 1932. Additionally, Einstein's emigration was rather by accident set in '32. He had planned to divy up his time between Princeton and Berlin - and chose not to return after Jan30th, 1933 already being in Princeton at this time. Without Hitler taking over, he would have continued to live in both places. He may have decided for one of them as he grew older - or as a true citizen of the world gone somewhere else instead - but one could not have called that emigration.
Not having open wars, i.e. a period of cold war or armed peace doesn't mean that military research is less intense. Instead the focus goes to the strategy rather than tactics. Creating intelligence networks is of strategical importance. Setting satellites in orbits is also strategical. Rocketry is tactical. Cell phones are tactical...
Interesting point, makes sense.
###
Question is: how long would the pre-1914 alliances continue to exist? They would lack the ideological cement which made the 1949-89 bipolar world last so long.
My guess is that the next generation of CP-political leaders would de-escalate greatly. Franz Ferdinand was known for his aversion of general war and even of a greater war against Serbia "which serves no serious purpose", Karl would be even meeker.
It is anybody's guess if Wilhelm II wouldn't be forced to leave the throne prior to his death in 1941. Some scandals he was involved with created a lot of opposition. It is, however, given the butterflies, not safe to say who is his successor. A lot of what happened within the dynasty depending on marriages which are improbable without the revolution. Given OTL's rulers of the House of Hohenzollern, from Louis Ferdinand on they would be rather decent blokes.
But: most people before 1914 expected a major political reform to happen soon, and actually the war (even prior to the Septemberreforms of 1918) brought about that. Someone new on the throne might lead to exactly that.
Also, concerning the main antagonisms in Western Europe: France would get over Alsace-Lorraine as the generation which experienced 1870 dies out, especially the longer the autonomy granted in 1911 would work. French minority rights in the Reichsland, despite incidents like Saverne, were rather better than for many other minorities in Europe at the time.
Similar things might be there for Italian irredentism. If the Habsburs are smart, they stage a plebiscite in Trieste and beforehands make the people conscious what non-existent economic role their harbor would play within Italia.
Austria-Hungary would probably undergo a strange series of reforms from above. I am certain that FF had something on the back of his mind, probably along the lines of erasing the 1867-Ausgleich and starting federalization from a new.
Russia is a toss-up. Both OTL revolutions needed wars as a catalyst, so either a revolution occurs nonetheless, or it goes a "Chinese way" where fast economical development keeps the emerging middle-class content.
More funding. More university students. Germany was also the leader in nuclear physics and the loss greatly harmed research.
In Germany's case, butterflies might on the contrary lead in the short run to less university students, as the Weimar governments made it a central policy to widely expands access to universities.
Germany will have an economy similar to the USA. So with the UK. Not identical but in the same league.
No way. You greatly underestimate the US industry here during the first half of the 20th century. 1914-Germany had the potential to surpass Britain and become the number #2 player in global economics, but they are not in the position to threaten the US top economical position. They are a long shot away from the US in 1914, and there is no evidence that they could miraculously catch up without the US for some reason failing miserably.
The potential just is not there, and anywhere Germans develop it, the Americans have to fail epicly to not keep its position.
I am not saying that German (or other powers') enterprises cannot compete in general with American ones, but not as to reaching their economies reaching the US-GNP. (GNP per head might be a different thing in the long run.)
There might be a new deal if
- the US manage to fail miserably in its policies, BUT without affecting other economies
- China, Russia and/or India use their potential earlier/better than OTL
- (Central?) European powers start economic integration to challenge the US
-European powers manage to miraculously integrate and develop their colonies in an unforeseen measure. I know that you assume just that, but again, Germany is then not in a position to benefit massively from that due to their relatively small empire (even if perhaps expanded by parts of the Portuguese and/or Belgian ones)
It was a hugely wasteful project started before the physics was understood. Whole cities were built, then leveled a few years later. If you were designing a way to maximize the cost, you could not do much better.
But, if you use a way which is more effective and less costly and also starts after "the physics was understood", you do not accelerate, but decellerate the process, IMHO. Of course, once the groundwork is laid, the whole process is cheap for a developed nation. If Germany were hell-bent in OTL 2012 to get its own nukes, it would probably be a matter of months instead of years. But being the first is always the most difficult. Only with luck, or very thorough and well-though out theoretical planning (which takes time again), you can prevent from running into one or two dead-end-streets.
Counter-example: development of nuclear fusion. Goes nowhere despite peacetime.
All for a weapon that can take the Russian hordes off the table for the rest of time. Easy call. And since we know the medical value will fund basic research until the physic are understood (i.e you can build a bomb), it is an easy call for the German GHQ.
Which would, without defeat in WW1, be a very conservative body - just like probably all other nation's military planners. They would fiddle around with *tanks in the 1930s and have internal fights if this could be the next big thing in military doctrine.
Also, the Hohenzollern-regime would NOT feel hard-pressed to have a weapon beating the Russians if that is a nation which which they had tensions sometime, but no war since 1762 (or 1812 if anybody counts the token involvement).
The German military budget in OTL's Kaiserreich was an expense which the Reich was hard-pressed to get by. If peace wouldn't only last for 40, but for 50 or 75 years (counted 1871 onwards), the idea of calming down a little and get more understanding in Europe would not be lessen, but increase.
And if you argue, that researching a bomb is easier once the whole science behind it is understood in theory... then my argument runs that once the full effect of radiation etc. is understood, the idea to have a superbomb to blow up your immediate neighbours becomes a lot less alluring - unless a war-situation forces you to desperate measures.
Also, I would argue, without the break-down of civilization 14-18 meant, there would rather be more inhibitions anyways to develop weapons of mass-killing such as lethal chemical weapons, nuclear weapons or even strategic bombers.
Not everything that can be done is done. Otherwise, armoured cars could have been rushing through Belgium in 1914. Technology, ideas and loads of money to be poured into the military were there.
Medical research alone will get you plutonium piles in the 1920's or 1930's. Once you have that worked out and running in labs, you have the needed understanding. It is just funding after this, and a little engineering.
Plutonium piles before it is noticed OTL (1934, not 33, btw as to two Wikipedias). Now come on, you accelerate scientific progress here as if you have the singularity close-by!
However, in case you misunderstood me, I am not a proponent of the "war as father of all things"-theory. I would say that the general technological level would be slightly higher without both World Wars, and especially Europe's economical position would be a good deal better throughout the 20th century.
But I do not see weapon development to be revolutionary in the absense of war. Compare the leaps actually undertaken in 14-18 to the changes between 1865 and 1914. Surely, there was groundwork laid, but just as much ignored. To a lesser extent, this was still to a degree true when you compare 39-45 to 1919-38.
Now think about WW2. Did you forget the 30-50 million dead people in Europe.
Not at all, otherwise I would't have let the German population grow by ca. 4 million in 1942-50 instead of shrinking it. So, my figures already INCLUDE the assumption that WW2 and the subsequent population losses did not happen.
As I already discussed with Thoresby, additional population growth ITTL is predominantly Eastern European, but not French, not British, neither South-European or Scandinavian. These populations will not lead to the effects in Africa you described; only few of the cases you described could IMHO be tilted, most probably this means Libya, Algeria and German South-West. Give or take a few "Cape Province"-style enclaves with a strong minority of European descent.
Note also, that I already exaggerated the German population growth, especially during the last half of the 20th century. My assumption assumes a higher birth rate in Germany post-1950 than in OTL.
Ok, now to Germany as an example. So take 65.1 million in 1913 and add 825 per year to get to 1918. So I get 69.2 million in 1918. Then take 8 years to 1926 with say a lower 800K per year. I get 75.6 compared to your 71.7. Then say take 8 more years to 1934 at 700K per year. I get 81.2. So I would say at least 35 million more Germans
How you come from 81.2 in 1934 to 116million in 2012 is left unexplained.
And IMO, you work on maximum assumptions. German pop growth OTL peaked in the 1895-1900 period at 1.52% p.a. and generally declined since then, peacetime or not. Already in 1905-10, it was down to 1.18%, to 0.58% in 1925-33, in 33-39 back up to (only, given the incentives!) 0.85%, the baby-boom of the 50s and 60s meant actually meagre 0.65% in 1950-70, and since then meagre 0.13%, mainly through immigration, p.a.
Even if I use the 3rd-Reich percentage as a figure for 1910-50, we reach 91 million then. With OTL figures from then on, we are not at 116 million (35 million more than today), but at 108 million only. Back at the 26 million additional Germans I initially talked about. Again, we might talk of even less Germans given the next paragraphs of mine!
(Addionally, the numbers of pre-1918 I worked with as a base include Alsace-Lorraine and other territories which should have been deduced right away, leading to even lower projections.)
A lot will depend on birth and death assumptions one makes.
And that is the point. We assume a peaceful and more prosperous Europe throughout the 20th century. This means that European societies IMHO will move earlier towards zero-growth, perhaps markedly so! And only very few German, British or French parents will say, "Jawohl, we will raise a third or a fourth child to settle Africa for the White man". Even in Nazi Germany, that approach only worked to a (from the Nazi's point of view) disappointing degree.
My assumption would be, that the demographic developments are more similar to French growth of less than 50% throughout the century, a figure too markedly low and long-term to be explained by Verdun alone. The only optimistic thing in this model is that it trends towards a stable population in the 21st century (as opposed to Germany, Italy e.a.).
I am also a technology moves faster guy with antibiotics in the 1930's.
...and Anti-Baby-Pill in the 1940s? What then?
And, now that we come to it, how about a perhaps increased number of casualties in de-colonization-conflicts?
For example, you see Germany go from 1.8 million prewar births per year to about 1.2 million for a 1/3 decline.
A decline which started prior to 1914. In the longer post-1914-timeline, the reduction of fertility due to women's emancipation, economical and social security (the latter especially in Germany) and an earlier consumer-culture will bring about a ceiling on populations in Europe.
You also have the baby shortage in the war as men at the front are not having sex with their wife. You can still see these echos in Russia population pyramids.
In the German pyramid as well. However, outside of a primitive society, wartime baby shortage means to a great deal a postponement of births, especially after WW2 with the infamous baby-boom in most Western societies.
I also should be clear. I see 300 million more Europeans outside of Europe.
I haven't done that before because, though I am convinced that I were closer to reality, I found your calculation possible, but now I am close to shouting "ASB". You assume levels of migration out of Europe which are unprecedented.
Also, there is still the issue of a disbalance between those areas slated to provide additional Europeans (mainly the Russian Empire, then Austria-Hungary [a careful calculation assuming the 1910-2010 growth of Switzerland by 113% showed a potential of 110millions Kakanians instead of the ca. 66 million people living on the area of the former monarchy in OTL 2012] and Germany).