Super-California?

In the short second session of the Thirtieth Congress in late 1848 and early 1849, Senator Stephen A. Douglas had a simple solution to the question of the status of slavery in the newly acquired Mexican Cession. (A solution to the problem was urgent for Douglas, for local political reasons as well as for the sake of the Union; normally heavily Democratic Illinois had almost gone for Taylor because of pro-Wilmot Proviso Democrats defecting to Van Buren's Free Soil candidacy. Taylor's percentage of the vote in Illinois--42.4 percent--was virtually the same as Clay's 42.1 percent in 1844. But Cass got only 44.9 percent of the vote, a marked decline from Polk's 53.9 percent. http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/u/usa/pres/1844.txt http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/u/usa/pres/1848.txt Evidently Abraham Lincoln and other local Whig leaders had persuaded most Illinois Whigs that Taylor would sign the Wilmot Proviso. Besides, antislavery Whigs in Illinois as elsewhere had a deep suspicion of Van Buren.) Douglas' solution was to admit the entire Mexican Cession as one single state of California, thereby bypassing the territorial stage to which the Proviso would apply.

Since Whigs controlled the House of Representatives, the success of Douglas' proposal depended on getting at least some Whig support. Most northern Whigs regarded it as a "pusillanimous dodge" (to use Michael F. Holt's phrase in The Rise and Fall of the American Whig Party, p. 385 https://books.google.com/books?id=hMkYklGTY1MC&pg=PA385) and demanded passage of the Wilmot Proviso to undercut the Free Soilers. (As noted, the Free Soilers in Illinois got most of their support from Democrats, but in some other northern states, notably Ohio, they hurt the Whigs more.) Fortunately for Douglas, he did get support from southern Whigs:

"The solution to which southern Whigs resorted was Douglas's California proposal, which had been bottled up in the Senate since early December. Some of them, like Clayton and his frequent correspondent, Kentucky Governor Crittenden, had favored that plan from the time Douglas introduced it, but only after the majority of southern Democrats signed the [Calhoun militantly pro-slavery] Southern Address http://history.furman.edu/~benson/docs/calhoun.htm did most southern Whigs turn to it. Skipping the territorial phase and admitting the Mexican Cession at once as a single state struck Whigs as a suitable solution for a variety of reasons, even though everyone expected that California would be a free state. First, given northern Whigs' insistence on enacting the Proviso, they knew they needed Democratic support to pass the measure. Such support seemed probable, not only from northern Democrats like Douglas, who wanted to resolve the territorial issue permanently in order to undermine the Free Soil party, but also from the many southern Democrats who rejected the Southern Address as bad politics and a threat to the Union. Furthermore, the prospect of blocking slavery extension and gaining a new free state might even win over support from northern Whigs like Nathan Hall, who feared the disruptive impact of the territorial impact as much as southern Whigs.

"Second, virtually all southern Whigs, convinced 'that no sensible man would carry his slaves there if he could,' had always regarded the question of slavery extension into the Mexican Cession as symbolic rather than substantive. As Toombs told Crittenden, when he described the bill southern Whigs planned to introduce, 'It cannot be a slave country; we have only the point of honor to save; this will save it, and rescue the country from all danger of agitation.'

"Third, if they passed their proposal, they might be able to claim concrete as well as symbolic gains for the South--not just an end to northern aggressions but the actual expansion of the area in which slavery was legal. That paradox is explained by the ambiguity of what men meant by the 'territory' of the Mexican Cession that was to be included in the state of California. Texas, a slave state, claimed all the land east of the Rio Grande as its own, an area that encompassed about a fourth of the former Mexican province of New Mexico, and half of the present state of New Mexico, including Santa Fe....The bill southern Whigs introduced blandly--and imprecisely--spoke of erecting a new state 'out of and including all that territory ceded to the United States by the recent treaty of peace.' Toombs, a major proponent and engineer of the southern Whig plan, explicitly denied that 'that territory' included the areas claimed by Texas...

"Because Douglas' bill was irretrievably mired in the Senate and because southern Whigs wanted the credit for solving the issue for themselves, they moved in the House, which Whigs controlled. On February 7, three days after the publication of the Southern Address, Representative William Ballard Preston of Virginia...soon to be secretary of the Navy in Taylor's administration, introduced the Whigs' measure and defended it as the 'only door' through which the rival sections could reach a mutually acceptable solution on the divisive territorial issue. Despite Preston's passionate entreaties to Northerners to give up the unnecessary Proviso, despite southern Whigs' optimism about the effect of Preston's speech, and despite backing of some sort of statehood bill from President Polk, important Democratic newspapers, and many Democrats in Congress, Preston's bill failed because of northern Whigs' implacable opposition. Whether they recognized its implications for enlarging Texas or feared that any conciliatory step might leave them vulnerable to the Free Soilers, they insisted that the Proviso be applied to the Cession." Holt, The Rise and Fall of the American Whig Party, pp. 388-90 https://books.google.com/books?id=5aGyVFn3VnMC&pg=PA389

However, the vote to attach the Proviso--which torpedoed the Preston bill--was very close: 91-87, according to Michael A Morrison, Slavery and the American West: The Eclipse of Manifest Destiny and the Coming of the Civil War, p. 102. https://books.google.com/books?id=qgjICQAAQBAJ&pg=PA102 If just a few more northern Whigs had been convinced that the Proviso was unnecessary--and remember that many of them would later back Taylor's plan for the immediate admission of both California and New Mexico, which likewise bypassed the Proviso--Preston's bill could have passed the House. Yes, there was the problem of determining the California-Texas border, but it did not seem as urgent in early 1849 as the Texas-New Mexico border situation would be in 1850 when Texans were talking of marching on Santa Fe. Once California was admitted as a state, the dispute would be between two states, and the US Supreme Court would have original jurisdiction to settle it. (Article III, section 2 of the Constitution provides that the judicial power of the United States extends to "controversies between two or more states" and gives the Supreme Court original jurisidiction in all cases "in which a state shall be a party.")

That of course leaves the Democratic-controlled Senate. Douglas' bill had fared poorly there. One problem was that while Polk was not opposed to some sort of statehood bill, he had doubts about Douglas's plan. "The President and his cabinet were taken by surprise. Frequent consultations were held. Douglas was repeatedly closeted with the President. All the members of the cabinet agreed that the plan of leaving the slavery question to the people of the new State was ingenious; but many objections were raised to a single State. In repeated interviews, Polk urged Douglas to draft a separate bill for New Mexico; but Douglas was obdurate." Allen Johnson, Stephen A. Douglas: A Study in American Politics, http://www.gutenberg.org/files/15508/15508-h/15508-h.htm So the bill, to Douglas' chagrin, was referred not to his own Committee on Territories but to the Committee on the Judiciary. "Perhaps this course was in accord with precedent, but it was noted that four out of the five members of this committee were Southerners, and that the vote to refer was a sectional one.[268] An adverse report was therefore to be expected." Ibid. Perhaps if Polk had agreed with Douglas' plan, he could have exerted enough pressure to get the Senate to refer it to Douglas' own committee and then to pass it--admittedly the power of a lame-duck president is limited, but still Polk's support would make it more difficult for southern Democrats to label Douglas' bill a sell-out to free soilers. (Not that they did so openly anyway; their chief argument was that a state should not be admitted to the Union without first having some sort of political organization. But there is no doubt that the slavery issue was on their minds.) In any event, if the Preston bill passed the House, and if it got Polk's support, the pressure to pass it in the Senate might be irresistible, despite the Judiciary Committee's prior rejection of the Douglas bill. After all, as Douglas argued, some form of government was needed for California to save it "from all the horrors of anarchy and violence" and there was no chance of a territorial government bill being passed before the second session of the Thirtieth Congress was to end in March. And after all, at least the Preston-Douglas plan provided for the admission of only one free state, whereas Taylor's later plan would provide for two such states, so the Preston-Douglas plan should have been at least marginally more acceptable to Southerners.

So what happens if the Preston-Douglas plan is passed? (Polk will sign it; it might not be his first choice among plans, but any bill that resolves the territorial issue without enacting the Wilmot Proviso will be satisfactory to him.) A few thoughts:

(1) The territorial issue would be settled before the elections of 1849. In those days, many members of Congress were elected during odd-numbered years, and in OTL it happened that a majority of the congressional elections of 1849 were in the South. Democrats, supporting Calhoun's "Southern Address" and warning that Taylor would sell out the South, scored impressive victories against Whigs in Virginia and Georgia. This led many southern Whigs to take a hard line against Taylor's plan for the admission of California and New Mexico as free states, even though they thought slavery had little or no chance of taking root there. Whigs also did poorly in northern elections, due in part to the strength of Democratic-Free Soil coalitions in some states--which made northern Whigs more determined than ever to pass the Wilmot Proviso. Thus, by the time the new Thirty-First Congress met in December 1849 sectional lines had hardened. Whigs were no longer guaranteed control of the House, and Robert Winthrop, a pro-Taylor Whig from Massachusetts, was narrowly defeated in the contest for Speaker by Democrat Howell Cobb of Georgia, in what was as much a sectional as a party contest, with some key southern Whigs deserting Winthrop. Had the territorial issue been settled, I have little doubt that Winthrop would have been elected.

(2) How would the Supreme Court ultimately resolve the California-Texas boundary issue? Given its generally pro-southern views at this time, I would say the odds are that it would take Texas' side.

(3) Even Douglas admitted that his new California was in the long run too large a state, so he put in a provision that it could later be divided into new states by Congress. When the Judiciary Committee argued that this was contrary to state sovereignty, Douglas agreed to modify this by saying that California could be divided by Congress "with the state's consent." So in that sense, the territorial struggle would not be over but would be transferred to California itself--we have already discussed in this group the attempts to detach southern California from the rest of the state in the 1850's.

(4) A related point--what happens to the Mormons in this Greater California? Both the Californians and the Mormons may want to separate Utah from California, but it's hard to see Congress agreeing to it as long as polygamy remains a Mormon doctrine. Meanwhile the Mormons do not have even the limited self-government Utah had in OTL as a territory.

(5) Can a Fugitive Slave Law pass the northern-dominated House without the territorial issue? It is true that the Clay "Omnibus" failed, and that the compromise measures of 1850, including the fugitive slave bill, were ultimately enacted as separate measures--but that doesn't mean that members weren't conscious that each measure was part of an overall compromise that would collapse if any of its separate components failed. Many northerners abstained on the fugitive bill who might have faced strong pressure to vote against it if it weren't part of a compromise that seemed essential to preserve the Union.

(6) Without the territorial issue, presumably the Whigs are less bitterly divided than they were in OTL in 1852 and have a better chance of retaining the White House. It's even possible we delay Taylor's death (after all, the sectional conflict took a toll on his health) and that he is re-elected in 1852...

(7) The lack of a compromise of 1850--with its provisions for territorial governments in New Mexico and Utah unencumbered by the Wilmot Proviso-- destroys the precedent Douglas constantly cited in 1854 for the Kansas- Nebraska bill. True, there is still Cass's campaign of 1848 to cite as evidence that territorial sovereignty was the doctrine of the Democratic Party [1]--but there would have been no case where it had actually been implemented. Whether that would make any real difference is doubtful--one can argue that the "precedent" of 1850 (which in any event was a specific measure for the Mexican Cession, and not intended to apply elsewhere, let alone to repeal the Missouri Compromise) was just an excuse. Still, the vote in the House was close, and perhaps that "precedent" influenced a few members. (And of course it is possible we have butterflied away Pierce's candidacy, and might have another president--whether a Whig or a Democrat--who does not exert the pressure Pierce did in OTL to pass the bill. And if the Whigs do better in *1852 than in OTL there may be a few more Whigs in the House, and this in itself may kill the bill, since not a single northern Whig voted for it, and not all southern Whigs did so.)

[1] Though actually in 1848 Cass was ambiguous about the stage at which "popular sovereignty" applied--throughout the territorial stage or only when the territory had enough people to be admitted as a state?
 
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Well, I imagine it would just be this:
Cession 2.gif
 
The Mormon thing is going to be complicated. At this time period it would take months to get from Santa Fe or Salt Lake City to San Francisco. SuperCalifornia is obviously a stop gap that was meant to be broken up later, but Mormon polygamy complicates that.

The most likely solution is that some places get spun off but not Utah. Either Utah ends up *Northern California which includes a strip of Nevada and most of OTL northern Utah, or else *New Mexico gets Utah.

But the results are interesting. The laws against practicing polygamy were federal. That was OK as long as Utah was a territory. As part of a state, the federal government is not going to be passing laws against polygamy there anymore. Which means its up to the state. I see two ways it can go. One, the state pushes against polygamy but has much less troops and resources than the Feds, so there is a low level armed conflict that ultimately could erupt into civil war and the feds being called in. Interesting how this could intersect with the larger Civil War, if it still happens (I think it probably doesn't in TTL). Second, the state could de facto ignore the Mormons, maybe formally excluding them from the franchise a la OTL Idaho, but otherwise leaving them be. You could even see a political machine taking advantage of the situation. If Mormons can't/don't vote then the small gentile minority in those areas could grab a lot of nice offices for themselves.
 
The Mormon thing is going to be complicated. At this time period it would take months to get from Santa Fe or Salt Lake City to San Francisco. SuperCalifornia is obviously a stop gap that was meant to be broken up later, but Mormon polygamy complicates that. [emphasis added]

I don't think it would take anywhere near that long. Going by the maps compiled here:https://www.aei.org/publication/maps-of-the-day-travel-times-from-nyc-in-1800-1830-1857-and-1930/ (note that its measured in terms of travel time from New York City, but still we can use the "contour" lines to estimate travel between other points) it would take a maximum of 3 weeks to reach any part of the Mexican cession from San Francisco. Granted, the travel times shown on the map are from 1857, and so likely a bit faster than in 1848. But still, the travel times certainly wouldn't be so large as to make the new state un-governable from that alone.

Travel2.png
 
I don't think it would take anywhere near that long. Going by the maps compiled here:https://www.aei.org/publication/maps-of-the-day-travel-times-from-nyc-in-1800-1830-1857-and-1930/ (note that its measured in terms of travel time from New York City, but still we can use the "contour" lines to estimate travel between other points) it would take a maximum of 3 weeks to reach any part of the Mexican cession from San Francisco. Granted, the travel times shown on the map are from 1857, and so likely a bit faster than in 1848.

That 10 years makes a huge difference. In 1848, they didn't even have settled routes laid out. That mostly happened during the Gold Rush by trial and error.
 
It'll be a big ass state.
Considering that the Mexican Cession territories are at the "hind" of the United States, and that this state would be big, i agree. It'd be the Union's big, bouncing, problematic booty. :rolleyes:

Now, if we consider that this could butterfly away the 1850 Compromise, could we see an earlier civil war breaking out, perhaps later in the 1850's?
 
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The Mormon thing is going to be complicated. At this time period it would take months to get from Santa Fe or Salt Lake City to San Francisco. SuperCalifornia is obviously a stop gap that was meant to be broken up later, but Mormon polygamy complicates that.

The most likely solution is that some places get spun off but not Utah. Either Utah ends up *Northern California which includes a strip of Nevada and most of OTL northern Utah, or else *New Mexico gets Utah.

But the results are interesting. The laws against practicing polygamy were federal. That was OK as long as Utah was a territory. As part of a state, the federal government is not going to be passing laws against polygamy there anymore. Which means its up to the state.

Unless you get an Amendment defining marriage as "between one man and one woman" and empowering Congress to legislate against other forms.
Could the votes be found to pass such an Amendment?
 

Philip

Donor
Unless you get an Amendment defining marriage as "between one man and one woman" and empowering Congress to legislate against other forms.
Could the votes be found to pass such an Amendment?

The amendment would not necessarily need to define marriage. It would be sufficient to have the amendment empower Congress to define and regulate marriage (and divorce?).

The motivation need not be to stop polygamy. A dispute between a state that recognizes common law marriage and one that doesn't might do.

Perhaps it sparks a moral outrage that leads to demands for a nation-wide solution, maybe paralleling the Teetotalism.

Or, perhaps an interstate dispute over a child's legitimacy and inheritance rights drives a call for a national solution. I might like to see a timeline focused on a late IXX or early XX century industrialist's fortune being disputed. The Supreme Court makes a full-faith-and-credit ruling that the yellow press and general public 'know is obviously wrong'.
 
I just noticed this California will control the majority of the Colorado river, as it becomes more important I'm betting resistance to any kind of splitting the state will grow from those downstream of wherever a split is proposed.
Also you have the prestige factor. This is the largest state in the union, who would want to give up that even if they only have the loosest authority of the more remote parts?
 
I just noticed this California will control the majority of the Colorado river, as it becomes more important I'm betting resistance to any kind of splitting the state will grow from those downstream of wherever a split is proposed.
Also you have the prestige factor. This is the largest state in the union, who would want to give up that even if they only have the loosest authority of the more remote parts?

Expenses in keeping down the Indians, likely. Looking at the borders above that would be an absolute PAIN
 
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