Synthesis of views on needed UK diplomatic and military response to Germany
Conventional Thesis:
Germany’s growing power and ambitions on sea and land compelled Britain to align with Russia and France in peacetime, and required an unlimited British combat commitment on sea and land on hbehalf of those allies in wartime, in order to protect Britain’s own vital interests, including the continental balance of power, against the nightmare of a German-dominated Europe.
Antithesis 1: (from Niall Ferguson - political/grand strategic critique)
The prospect of a German-dominated Europe was not so harmful that it justified British commitment to the Great War, particularly given all the costs it incurred. Additionally, the conventional thesis mischaracterizes Britain’s motives for forming the Triple Entente. Britain was primarily motivated to align with France and Russia to appease that power bloc which posted a greater threat to British Imperial interests, not by a perceived need to shore them up against an overly strong Germany. In fact, Germany posed much less of a threat to British Imperial interests than its allies (Russia, France, Japan, US) did. The weakening of Britain and its empire left it in a worse situation than it would have faced if a neutral, undamaged Britain had to live with a much strengthened Germany on the continent, even if that Germany could unify the economic resources of all Europe.
Antithesis 2: (from Liddell Hart – strategic/operational critique)
The British commitment to launch its main effort directly against the German army in France was a mistake. It would have been better for Britain to stick to its historical “peripheral” strategy of attacking Germany indirectly with multiple sea-based incursions, while leaving the main ground combat roles to continental allies. In Hart’s judgment, this was a preferable strategy, suited to Britain’s strengths, impervious to the strength of a mighty continental enemy, which had in the past always provided for British interests at a much lower price than London paid for the victory of 1918. Hart is silent on whether the pre-WWI alignment with France and Russia against Germany and Austria-Hungary was warranted or not.
Synthesis (mine – political/strategic/operational)
The depth and one-sidedness of Britain’s peacetime commitment to its French and Russian Entente partners created a moral hazard, making them more ready to risk war than they would have been without the Entente and its associated military conventions and staff talks. Especially risky in the July Crisis was Britain’s failure to separate a commitment to Russia’s role as a great power from the latter’s particular interest in Serbia. Since the result was a catastrophic war, there is a strong argument that Britain’s interests would have been better served by London striking a different balance between the continental powers, siding less whole-heartedly at least with Russia and France. Stricter limits on diplomatic support for France or Russia, or more responsiveness to Austro-Hungarian and German interests might have prevented catastrophe. However, from a political-strategic point-of-view, Ferguson’s recommendation of Britain standing aside in the face of an actual German invasion of Belgium and France would have been unacceptably risky, and out of step with British political-strategic traditions. From a military-operational point-of-view, Hart’s recommendation of a more peripheral, less continentally focused strategy was not a viable alternative to the course Britain pursued in OTL. If Britain had delayed or greatly limited its ground commitment to France while fighting a war against a German-led coalition, the result would have been the worst of both worlds – catastrophic war plus catastrophic defeat. All the risks of war that came from encouraging the Entente, many of its costs (imagine a British war effort consisting of multiple Gallipollis and Salonikas) without any realistic chance of winning. If Britain was going to side with the Entente coalition against the Central Powers, it had to fully and promptly commit to defending France or Germany surely would have defeated any British half-measures. So, to main peace in Europe and reduce chances for catastrophe, Britain probably should have had a more balanced diplomatic approach, but to hedge against a potential European hegemony, it probably still needed the capability to fight as a major land power in Europe.