Summer 1914- Would the nice guy finish last? Part I - United Kingdom

If Britain tried to restrain Entente in July Crisis

  • A) Stops Entente-Central war in 1914

    Votes: 7 10.8%
  • B) Does not stop 1914 war & leaves Entente military prospects worse

    Votes: 33 50.8%
  • C) Does not stop 1914 war & leaves Entente military prospects same

    Votes: 4 6.2%
  • D) UK fights Germans by 1925, with worse prospects

    Votes: 5 7.7%
  • E) UK fights Germans by 1925, with better prospects

    Votes: 2 3.1%
  • F) UK fights France or Russia by 1925

    Votes: 1 1.5%
  • G) UK avoids war & loss of relative stature well past 1925

    Votes: 13 20.0%

  • Total voters
    65

raharris1973

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What if the British cabinet decided during the Austro-Serb crisis that preventing it from escalating to great power coalition warfare was a higher priority than the confidence and satisfaction of its Entente partners, and acted accordingly?

This does not require Britain to abandon concern for the European balance of power or to countenance unprovoked attacks on France or Russia. However, in acting on this decision, Britain does at least privately communicate to Russia and (and probably France) that it will not feel bound to fight Germany if Russia provokes Berlin by mobilizing, declaring war on, delivering a hard ultimatum to or invading Austria-Hungary. It also avoids making any visible military preparations that could encourage France and Russia to believe Britain will support them.

What would happen moving forward from this point, would Britain and Europe be better off or worse off? (see attached poll)
 
Most likely the situation would still escalate even without Entente provacation and without the UK they would be seriously weakened. Germany and Austria were fairly set upon war by this point.
 
The war is going to happen in 1914 no matter what at this point.
If Britain remains neutral, she'll obviously be better off economically.
It'll be worse for France, certainly.
If Germany still loses, the TTL's Treaty of Versailles is going to be a bit more brutal.

If Britain decides to get involved anyway, without any preparations, the war will drag on for longer and the Entente's prospects look grim.
 
I think the war proceeds anyway and the UK ends up entering the war about the same time for the same reasons as OTL: can't let Germany dominate the Continent and obligations to protect Belgium.
 
Sir Edward Grey tried to do this but didn't have much success. Lloyd George, ironically given his Quisling status in WWII, was one of those who marginalised him and would have been a very useful ally had he been of the other opinion. It should be remembered that Grey's proposal was a conference, probably in London, to resolve things diplomatically. However, knowing what we know about the Austro-Serb ultimatum (it was never meant to be agreed to, it was part one of a declaration of war), it's unclear how we get the central European powers (as opposed to the Central Powers) to agree to attend such a conference.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
Sir Edward Grey tried to do this but didn't have much success. Lloyd George, ironically given his Quisling status in WWII, was one of those who marginalised him and would have been a very useful ally had he been of the other opinion. It should be remembered that Grey's proposal was a conference, probably in London, to resolve things diplomatically. However, knowing what we know about the Austro-Serb ultimatum (it was never meant to be agreed to, it was part one of a declaration of war), it's unclear how we get the central European powers (as opposed to the Central Powers) to agree to attend such a conference.

You can't wait until the ultimatum is issue. The UK would have to take a very active role within a week or two of the assassination. It is a tough spot to be in. At this late a date, the UK would have to make clear that it would support A-H on reasonable demands and go to war on unreasonable demands at least in private. And this risk breaking the cordial entente. The problem for England is that it needs an army to be respected on the continent, but does not have a large army. And it has effectively entered an alliance system without clearly communicating its alliance to the world. At this point, it basically has to support the A-H sphere of influence in Serbia.

Much like the Kaiser did not think through the implication of building his navy, the English leaders did not think through the implication of joining France as an ally, which means becoming a Russian ally and supporting Russia demands which conflict with British strategic interests. Russia being dominant in the Balkans and possibly gaining warm water port harms vital British interests. IMO, the UK simply chose the wrong alliance system to join. If they make the other choice, the British Empire is still around and has a good shot at being the strongest power in the world. And all the UK would have to accept is some German colonial gains, probably at the expense of the French. By 1914, the UK had thrown away the good options.
 
People really need to learn how to make poll options mutually exclusive. The two most popular options are both right.
 
“A” seems the most likely outcome so I pick it.
‘B’ and ‘C’ seem infeasible since Russia and France don’t dare risk war without Britain, and Serbia was expendable.
‘D’ and ‘E’ are fuzzy – who knows?
‘F’ seems very unlikely, certainly less possible than D or E
‘G’ is possible, but probably less certain than ‘A’.
 
You can't wait until the ultimatum is issue. The UK would have to take a very active role within a week or two of the assassination. It is a tough spot to be in. At this late a date, the UK would have to make clear that it would support A-H on reasonable demands and go to war on unreasonable demands at least in private. And this risk breaking the cordial entente. The problem for England is that it needs an army to be respected on the continent, but does not have a large army. And it has effectively entered an alliance system without clearly communicating its alliance to the world. At this point, it basically has to support the A-H sphere of influence in Serbia.

Much like the Kaiser did not think through the implication of building his navy, the English leaders did not think through the implication of joining France as an ally, which means becoming a Russian ally and supporting Russia demands which conflict with British strategic interests. Russia being dominant in the Balkans and possibly gaining warm water port harms vital British interests. IMO, the UK simply chose the wrong alliance system to join. If they make the other choice, the British Empire is still around and has a good shot at being the strongest power in the world. And all the UK would have to accept is some German colonial gains, probably at the expense of the French. By 1914, the UK had thrown away the good options.

This is pretty sound analysis - Britain's choice was either the Entente, or to go with Bismarck's old last-ditch policy of supporting Austria in the west of the Balkans and Russia in the east. Not sure about the idea of Britain not thinking through the implications of the association with France though - they must have known from 1905 onwards what the price of that was likely to be.
 

raharris1973

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My take on this is most similar to BlondieBC's

..as far as the folks thinking war was inevitable, I know Xhanavk thinks its because of German and Austrian intentions. What about the rest? Is it your take that war happens despite British discouragement because the Russians blow off the British point of view, or because German were going to launch war on France and Russia, even without provocation?


My point of view is complicated. I think it was in Britain's interest to avoid a German overthrow of France and Russia in the continent. I think that Niall Ferguson's scenario in a "The Pity of War" was riskier than Ferguson allows and was certainly out of character for Britain's traditional policy.

However, I also think that Britain's unqualified support of the Entente *before* it came to war may have fatefully emboldened Russia and France, while British efforts to restrain could have possibly kept the crisis localized to Austria-versus Serbia and avoided Europe wide war and near-term damage to France, Belgium, Russia and Britain.
 
Grey's opaque 'we won't say what we are going to do' policy served no one; the Germans concluded that British neutrality was a coin toss where they might win 50% of the time and the Franco-Russians gambled just as easily that Britain's participation on their side would happen. So rather than deter either side, Grey encouraged both sides.

Easiest 'out' for the British was to have enthusiastically supported the Austrians. (ie, if Britain just delivered an identically worded ultimatum to Belgrade as the ones just submitted by the Germans and the Austrians, the Russians will not dare move). Yet this never seemed to have occurred to anyone in London, as if Serbian interests were more important than Belgium, or as if the duty of being anti-German meant that even when British interests were functionally identical to Austrian interests, they could not be admitted. Very odd.
 
Austria still goes to war. Serbia is expendable. Emboldened by success, AH and Germany try something similar a couple of years down the line, no later. Britain has to make the same decision all over again.
 

raharris1973

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Synthesis of views on needed UK diplomatic and military response to Germany

Conventional Thesis:

Germany’s growing power and ambitions on sea and land compelled Britain to align with Russia and France in peacetime, and required an unlimited British combat commitment on sea and land on hbehalf of those allies in wartime, in order to protect Britain’s own vital interests, including the continental balance of power, against the nightmare of a German-dominated Europe.

Antithesis 1: (from Niall Ferguson - political/grand strategic critique)

The prospect of a German-dominated Europe was not so harmful that it justified British commitment to the Great War, particularly given all the costs it incurred. Additionally, the conventional thesis mischaracterizes Britain’s motives for forming the Triple Entente. Britain was primarily motivated to align with France and Russia to appease that power bloc which posted a greater threat to British Imperial interests, not by a perceived need to shore them up against an overly strong Germany. In fact, Germany posed much less of a threat to British Imperial interests than its allies (Russia, France, Japan, US) did. The weakening of Britain and its empire left it in a worse situation than it would have faced if a neutral, undamaged Britain had to live with a much strengthened Germany on the continent, even if that Germany could unify the economic resources of all Europe.

Antithesis 2: (from Liddell Hart – strategic/operational critique)

The British commitment to launch its main effort directly against the German army in France was a mistake. It would have been better for Britain to stick to its historical “peripheral” strategy of attacking Germany indirectly with multiple sea-based incursions, while leaving the main ground combat roles to continental allies. In Hart’s judgment, this was a preferable strategy, suited to Britain’s strengths, impervious to the strength of a mighty continental enemy, which had in the past always provided for British interests at a much lower price than London paid for the victory of 1918. Hart is silent on whether the pre-WWI alignment with France and Russia against Germany and Austria-Hungary was warranted or not.

Synthesis (mine – political/strategic/operational)

The depth and one-sidedness of Britain’s peacetime commitment to its French and Russian Entente partners created a moral hazard, making them more ready to risk war than they would have been without the Entente and its associated military conventions and staff talks. Especially risky in the July Crisis was Britain’s failure to separate a commitment to Russia’s role as a great power from the latter’s particular interest in Serbia. Since the result was a catastrophic war, there is a strong argument that Britain’s interests would have been better served by London striking a different balance between the continental powers, siding less whole-heartedly at least with Russia and France. Stricter limits on diplomatic support for France or Russia, or more responsiveness to Austro-Hungarian and German interests might have prevented catastrophe. However, from a political-strategic point-of-view, Ferguson’s recommendation of Britain standing aside in the face of an actual German invasion of Belgium and France would have been unacceptably risky, and out of step with British political-strategic traditions. From a military-operational point-of-view, Hart’s recommendation of a more peripheral, less continentally focused strategy was not a viable alternative to the course Britain pursued in OTL. If Britain had delayed or greatly limited its ground commitment to France while fighting a war against a German-led coalition, the result would have been the worst of both worlds – catastrophic war plus catastrophic defeat. All the risks of war that came from encouraging the Entente, many of its costs (imagine a British war effort consisting of multiple Gallipollis and Salonikas) without any realistic chance of winning. If Britain was going to side with the Entente coalition against the Central Powers, it had to fully and promptly commit to defending France or Germany surely would have defeated any British half-measures. So, to main peace in Europe and reduce chances for catastrophe, Britain probably should have had a more balanced diplomatic approach, but to hedge against a potential European hegemony, it probably still needed the capability to fight as a major land power in Europe.
 

Deleted member 1487

I doubt France would have agreed to support Russia over Serbia if Britain made it clear that it would not engage in a war over Serbia. It was British assurances to support France that gave France the will to support Russia. Russia would not mobilize without French support, so assuming the central point is true, that Britain does not offer the French support and the French wouldn't support Russia without British support, then there is no WW1. A-H invades and crushes Serbia, Russia loses face and the Franco-Russian alliance is damaged.
 
I doubt France would have agreed to support Russia over Serbia if Britain made it clear that it would not engage in a war over Serbia. It was British assurances to support France that gave France the will to support Russia. Russia would not mobilize without French support, so assuming the central point is true, that Britain does not offer the French support and the French wouldn't support Russia without British support, then there is no WW1. A-H invades and crushes Serbia, Russia loses face and the Franco-Russian alliance is damaged.

I've next to no doubt but that if Britain had warned France and Russia that the British were on the side of Austria, that nothing would have come of the matter, beyond the Serbian army getting a well-deserved thrashing from the Austrians.
 
However, from a political-strategic point-of-view, Ferguson’s recommendation of Britain standing aside in the face of an actual German invasion of Belgium and France would have been unacceptably risky.

Ferguson was looking at the worst case scenario, which was Germany going after France come hell or high water. He was nonplussed even with this. The British could also have repeated the 1870 policy, which would have secured Belgium from invasion from either side without the need to commit a single British soldier. Of course, that would leave Russia without much support. Then again, the whole problem in 1914 was that Russia was getting too much support.

If Britain had delayed or greatly limited its ground commitment to France while fighting a war against a German-led coalition, the result would have been the worst of both worlds – catastrophic war plus catastrophic defeat.

That’s a speculative argument. It could just as easily been the case that British indifference towards France and Russia causes the war to end in 1914, that the Anglo-German relationship emerges more powerful than ever.

If Britain was going to side with the Entente coalition against the Central Powers, it had to fully and promptly commit to defending France or Germany surely would have defeated any British half-measures.

Now we’re talking of Britain’s war of illusions. British policymakers thought they could fight a war ‘on the cheap’, defeating the Germans by cutting cheques to the French and Russians, just like they did in 1814. They had completely miscast the true situation.
 
It doesn't matter what France and Russia want if the British stay neutral - they're going to get attacked no matter what, unless Russia decides to completely bail on the Serbians, which was a non-starter. If the British stay out, either the Germans win in 1914 via the Schlieffen Plan, or win later due to no naval blockade. Either way, Britain is faced with the nightmare scenario of Europe being dominated by a single hostile power, & thus is supremely screwed.
 

raharris1973

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So, Germany was looking to fight Russia and France no matter what?

Johnny:
It doesn't matter what France and Russia want if the British stay neutral - they're going to get attacked no matter what, unless Russia decides to completely bail on the Serbians, which was a non-starter.

Well, Russia not mobilizing *could* reduce the genuine incentives of the Germans to attack, and it *would* deny the Germans what they wanted for their domestic political theater, a plausible argument of Russian aggression.
If the Russians don't mobilize, the Germans might not want to attack and need to work harder to justify picking a fight with France or Russia among the center and left elements of its body politic.

So, was Germany run by proto-Nazis determined to launch a hegemonic war regardless of what the other powers did?

If the Germans thought the British were more of a free agent, that could even in some conceivable circumstances line up on Germany's side, they may have been much less nervous about Russian growth. Their grim pessimism about western-supported Russian power probably contributed alot to their feeling in 1914 of "now or never".

...and for the Russian side I doubt "bailing" on the Serbians would have ever built up as a non-starter without the perception, built up over several diplomatic crises, that Britain would be relatively supportive of the Russian position over the Austrian.



Glen:
The British could also have repeated the 1870 policy, which would have secured Belgium from invasion from either side without the need to commit a single British soldier.

How much of this was really active British policy though? I'm not aware of them making special deterrent warnings to the Prussians or French saying "I'll let you beat up on each other but don't touch Belgium". Rather, the British just didn't get involved. Meanwhile, the Prussians directly crossed the French border because it was the French enemy they wanted to rally to fight, and in the circumstances of of 1870, no widening of the war to include Belgium was considered necessary to meet Berlin's goals.
 
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