Summer 1914 Would the nice guy finish last? Part 4 – Austria-Hungary

If Franz opted against war


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raharris1973

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After the Sarajevo events the Crown/Cabinets/Militaries of the Austro-Hungarian Empire decide that while a hostile response to Serbia of some sort is warranted, an actual war is not desired. The Serbs, if they are they are issued an ultimatum, are to be given one they would accept. Other diplomatic ripostes can be in the toolkit (subversion of minorities in Serbia, diplomatic overtures to Turkey, Bulgaria), but no war.

What are the near and mid-term consequences?
 
After the Sarajevo events the Crown/Cabinets/Militaries of the Austro-Hungarian Empire decide that while a hostile response to Serbia of some sort is warranted, an actual war is not desired. The Serbs, if they are they are issued an ultimatum, are to be given one they would accept. Other diplomatic ripostes can be in the toolkit (subversion of minorities in Serbia, diplomatic overtures to Turkey, Bulgaria), but no war.

What are the near and mid-term consequences?

I feel if a world war didn't start because of the Sarajevo incident, you would still see one beginning in the near future. Depending on the event which kicks it off, the alliances might not be as strong, with more nations waiting on the sidelines to see where it is going before jumping into the fray.
 

Deleted member 1487

After the Sarajevo events the Crown/Cabinets/Militaries of the Austro-Hungarian Empire decide that while a hostile response to Serbia of some sort is warranted, an actual war is not desired. The Serbs, if they are they are issued an ultimatum, are to be given one they would accept. Other diplomatic ripostes can be in the toolkit (subversion of minorities in Serbia, diplomatic overtures to Turkey, Bulgaria), but no war.

What are the near and mid-term consequences?

Why would they do this? There were very solid reasons for pushing for war with Serbia in 1914, in fact very similar reason to the US invading Afghanistan.
Not going to war would have very negative effects internally IMHO, as it would make it look like A-H would just accept its very nearly emperor to be murdered by outside forces without consequence. The only acceptable ultimatums would be ones that Serbia wouldn't have accepted anyway, so either Serbia has to look bad or the Habsburgs would...and with the only voice wanting peace dead in the streets of Sarajevo (FF was very strongly against war in general), there are no moderating voices that thought that war was unacceptable/undesirable.
 

raharris1973

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why would they do this? a foreboding this won't go well

Why would they do this? There were very solid reasons for pushing for war with Serbia in 1914, in fact very similar reason to the US invading Afghanistan.

Don't get me wrong, OTL's was an understandable decision, but I don't think it was the only possible decision.

True the assassination was a terrorist provocation, but there were a couple differences between the Sarajevo murders and 9/11. At the geopolitical, practical level, Serbia had powerful friends, Russia, France and potentially Britain. The Taliban and Al-Qaeda did not have comparably powerful friends.

Also, while the assassination target was a VIP, it was an assassination, not a mass attack on the Viennese population.

As it was, Austria was very interested in finding out Germany's attitude before deciding its course of action. The Hungarians at first had some doubts about desirability of a war or acquiring any territory from Serbia.

To develop second thoughts about a war on Serbia, the Austrians only need to have considered how exposed they would be if Germany did not commit most of its forces against *Russia* from the beginning. Had they thought through the implications of the Schlieffen Plan, it might not have seemed to be such a good bet to fight in 1914, regardless of blank checks from Germany.



Not going to war would have very negative effects internally IMHO, as it would make it look like A-H would just accept its very nearly emperor to be murdered by outside forces without consequence. The only acceptable ultimatums would be ones that Serbia wouldn't have accepted anyway, so either Serbia has to look bad or the Habsburgs would...and with the only voice wanting peace dead in the streets of Sarajevo (FF was very strongly against war in general), there are no moderating voices that thought that war was unacceptable/undesirable.
 
After the Sarajevo events the Crown/Cabinets/Militaries of the Austro-Hungarian Empire decide that while a hostile response to Serbia of some sort is warranted, an actual war is not desired. The Serbs, if they are they are issued an ultimatum, are to be given one they would accept. Other diplomatic ripostes can be in the toolkit (subversion of minorities in Serbia, diplomatic overtures to Turkey, Bulgaria), but no war.

What are the near and mid-term consequences?

Russia will find another pretext in some other year.

I voted "A", no war in 1914.
 
Russia will find another pretext in some other year.

Russia wasn't really eager to fight any wars it didn't have to, they were just afraid of losing what remained of their diplomatic clout in the Balkans.

So unless Austria itself starts another war, there may never in fact be a war between the two.
 

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Except that if war happened in 1916, for example, Russia would be in a far better position than in 1914.

So would Austria-Hungary, which was in the middle of upgrading their artillery and expanding their shell stocks, while Germany was expanding her army and would have an extra two corps. Also the Schlieffen plan would be scrapped by 1916 which would mean Germany would focus on Russia first, while starting to fortify her Western border even more than IOTL. Germany would also avoid declaring war on France first, which would create major problems for her in trying to enter any war.

On the balance Russia and France would be stronger too, but wouldn't have the benefit of Germany picking a fight with them, so would have internal problems, especially France, while Britain would likely not be involved in any war if Germany didn't invade Belgium. So stronger powers all around, probably adding Romania to the Entente by 1915, but losing Britain as a combatant and therefore no blockade for Germany. The Ottomans also get their fancy new British dreadnoughts in 1914 and while the British are probably still dealing with the fall out from the Home Rule act by 1916.

Not sure if that trade is worth it for Russia.

Russia wasn't really eager to fight any wars it didn't have to, they were just afraid of losing what remained of their diplomatic clout in the Balkans.
I wouldn't say that. They just didn't want to fight wars that would destroy their country, make the monarchy unstable, and/or be unwinnable. If they thought they could win handily Russia had little problem going to war.

So unless Austria itself starts another war, there may never in fact be a war between the two.
That is very true. Assuming Franz Ferdinand was around, he would never advocate for war. He realized how badly Austria would do in a conflict, which would help preclude the Empire fighting anyone and drawing Russia into anything. Russia is unlikely to start a war unless the balance of military power changes and Austria could be picked apart. In that case Austria is not really going to be fighting, as much as Russia is getting in on the carving of the turkey.
 
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I wouldn't say that. They just didn't want to fight wars that would destroy their country, make the monarchy unstable, and/or be unwinnable. If they thought they could win handily Russia had little problem going to war.

Well, that goes without saying. Russia was no different from France or Britain or whoever in that respect. If they were playing in what it perceived as their own backyard and nobody objected they of course played. I mean serious big wars. They were aware of their own structural problems, it's just that the cures were expensive and slow to administer. If they felt they could get away without fighting they would have.

AH and Germany had the special condition of their own possibilities of easily-won little wars blocked by interests of other Powers. Which is probably why he alliance system ended up going the way it did.
 
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Russia wasn't really eager to fight any wars it didn't have to, they were just afraid of losing what remained of their diplomatic clout in the Balkans.

So unless Austria itself starts another war, there may never in fact be a war between the two.

Russia's programme in the Balkans and at the Straights meant that peace could continue only so long as peace was weakening the Ottoman Empire and isolating Austria-Hungary. Trends by 1914 were towards the resurgance of the Ottomans, (alliance with Germany was inevitable and a first class Ottoman army would result) meaning that for Russia it was not a question of if, only of when.
 

raharris1973

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Glenn & Wiking, where did you get your take that time

...was moving against Russia, rather than for it?

The most commonly expressed view in the secondary literature is that time was on Russia's side, with a particular emphasis on its greater strength with the completion of an armament program in 1917.


Wiking, the point you made about the Austrians and Germans getting stronger over the next year is not anything I had seen until this last year, when reading Terence Zuber's "the Real German War Plan". That was the first time I ever saw time as being described as on Germany's side.

Glenn, your point on the Russians being anxious to fight before the build up of the Ottoman fleet is one I had not seen before the last year. I read about it in Sean McMeekin's "Russian Origins of the First World War."
 

Deleted member 1487

...was moving against Russia, rather than for it?

The most commonly expressed view in the secondary literature is that time was on Russia's side, with a particular emphasis on its greater strength with the completion of an armament program in 1917.


Wiking, the point you made about the Austrians and Germans getting stronger over the next year is not anything I had seen until this last year, when reading Terence Zuber's "the Real German War Plan". That was the first time I ever saw time as being described as on Germany's side.

Glenn, your point on the Russians being anxious to fight before the build up of the Ottoman fleet is one I had not seen before the last year. I read about it in Sean McMeekin's "Russian Origins of the First World War."

I'm not saying that time WAS on the side of the Central Powers; in many ways it was not. However Germany and Austria-Hungary were not stagnant in their military development. Germany passed their army bill, which is mentioned in several books, including this one:
http://www.amazon.com/The-Kaisers-Army-Technology-1870-1918/dp/0195143353

However the Russians were developing more: they were expanding their army and upgrading their artillery while also expanding their rail network.
Ceteris paribus Russia and the Entente would be ahead if all we counted was Russian expansion, Romania switching sides (which they would likely do after their last German born monarch dies in October 1914), Italy and Serbia are more recovered from their recent wars, and the limited expansion of A-H and Germany of their military power.

However not all things remain equal.
Britain was going to pass on the ships purchased by the Ottomans, which would massively upgrade their naval might in the Black Sea and force the Russians to either divert spending to their Black Seas fleet or accept that their dominance was now over in this area. Also the Ottomans were rapidly recovering from the Balkan wars and would be much more formidable from 1916 on, not to mention that they were also upgrading their rail network, including the Berlin-Baghdad railroad, which would have opened up major supply lines across the Ottoman Empire from the Central Powers, as well as enhancing their economy, which in turn translates into increased military power.

Beyond that Britain is also going to grant Home Rule to Ireland in 1914. This is going to cause lots of violence similar to what was experienced after WW1 IOTL with the Irish war for independence. This won't be resolved by 1916, which would likely sideline Britain from continental involvement.

Plus Germany would abandon their Schlieffen Plan, which means they will start spending on their border fortifications with France and probably Belgium. Russia is now the big boogey man, so Germany is going to re-write their war plans to work with Austria, rather than fight two separate wars and let their ally get smashed by Russia.
France is not going to be able to breakthrough German defenses in the West thanks to their shitty 'Offensive a Outrance' doctrine, which IOTL cost them 400,000 dead invading Alsace, Lorraine, and the Ardennes, and their light field pieces, which are useless for fighting entrenched infantry and fortifications, and fighting an offensive war is very unpopular in liberal, anti-military France, especially with the Socialists.
Plus Britain isn't going to fight an offensive war with Germany, especially if Belgium isn't invaded by Germany, which it won't be in a future war without the Schlieffen Plan, which will be scrapped in 1916.

Overall the resulting loss to Russia in fighting a war in Europe with the retiring of the Schlieffen Plan means that the strength of the Central Powers would increase in the East much more than the upgrades the Russians would have by 1916. France would be socially torn apart if they declared war on Germany to help Czarist Russia (especially as the secret treaty with Russia is not known to the public) and would be stymied by the very unfriendly terrain and defenses that exist in Alsace-Lorraine even if the Germans are outnumbered there. Britain wouldn't be in the fight, meaning Germany isn't blockaded and is therefore much stronger economically. Loss of imports has been calculated as costing Germany about 50% of her warmaking potential. They will be able to easily out material Russia in the 'Materialschlacht' that modern warfare was by the 20th century. Plus the new German siege artillery would be available in numbers by 1916 unlike IOTL in 1914 when there were only 2 of the 420mm guns. There is also likely more of the highly mobile and advanced Skoda 350mm mortars, as Austria was upgrading and modernizing her artillery park, which was projected for completion in 1916.

Beyond 1916 things are harder to predict militarily. Britain is going to become less hostile to Germany as the conservative government's leadership changes over the Home Rule Crisis that will develop. France is going to stagnate militarily, especially as the Loi de Cadre is going to be repealed in 1915-6, though they will get 150 modern howitzers, but still have no fortress buster artillery.

Russia will strengthen militarily, but will stagnate too into the 1920s, as the government becomes less stable over labor strikes, which were getting worse every year and several were being bloodily broken IOTL in August 1914 by the Cossacks. Technologically they will fall behind Germany because of their badly organized economy and government, as well as the vast illiteracy, poverty, and lack of education. Germany's technological talent pool is much deeper than any other country in the world save the US, which is not spending on its military outside of the navy.

Frankly by the 1920s Germany will be ahead in technology thanks to their unique government system that directs economic investments and their heavy investment in education and their university system, which is the best in the world at that time. Austria is also well endowed there, but only in Austria and Bohemia. Probably by 1936 as we have mentioned in other threads Germany will have an atom bomb or at least be well on their way there. Russia won't be anywhere near there, nor will France or Britain, because of their limited military budgets and Germany's lead in physics. France will probably follow by 1938 and Britain by 1939.

Economically Germany will develop a stronger automotive industry and develop strong ties with the Ottomans to get access to that oil, which will be firmly tied in when the Berlin-Baghdad railroad opens finally in the late 1910s or early 1920s. Austria was developing faster economically than any other nation in Europe, even Russia (proportionally) and had vast untapped potentially economically. Especially if they open up the canal system linking the Danube to the Vistula and regulate a number of rivers in Bohemia and Galicia, vast quantities of cheap Russian raw materials will cause a massive economic boom in Austria and Bohemia, which will allow them to seriously compete economically, which, if political issues are sorted out by Franz Ferdinand surviving and sorting out the Hungarians, that will translate into major military expansion in Austria in the 1920s and 30s.
 
where did you get your take that time...was moving against Russia, rather than for it?
I’d concluded that about 15 years ago, but McMeekin is the first time I’d noticed any historian recognizing the pattern.
In 1912 the Russian Balkans policy was at its zenith; the Balkans countries were unified against a Russian enemy (the Turks) and quickly eliminated Ottoman influence from nearly the entire area. That was basically the high point for Russia for thirty years – not until 1944 did the Soviet Union re-establish the pro-Russian unity in the Balkans Sazonov had just prior to the 1st Balkans War.

After the 1st Balkans War, the Balkans began a steady slide into the sphere of the Central Powers. Bulgaria’s inevitable war of revenge against Serbia (due in 1915 and overdue by 1916) meant that Austria and Bulgaria were going to take Serbia out – if not in 1914, then soon after. More importantly, the Ottoman Empire was still by far the most powerful regional player - potentially as powerful as the other Balkans countries combined, it was implacably hostile to Russia, and it was recovering its strength rapidly. For Russian ambitions to the south, 1914 was far better than waiting.
 
Glenn, your point on the Russians being anxious to fight before the build up of the Ottoman fleet is one I had not seen before the last year.
IMO, McMeekin somewhat exaggerated the political impact of the Turkish dreadnoughts due for delivery in 1914, but the trend for Russia was clear and it will be one of the reasons why the Russians decided to help make a war out of the July Crisis. Turkey, with access to ships built all over the world, would be able to permanently take superiority from the Russians in the Black Sea. The Russian crash naval program was not going to rectify the situation because the Russians simply couldn’t build enough ships in the Black Sea to compete with what Turkey could buy the world over. But, like McMeekin said, if Russia and Austria went to war in 1914, the dreadnoughts in Britain (and elsewhere) could be taken from the Ottomans, hence the Russians could still anticipate naval superiority in the Black Sea.
The most commonly expressed view in the secondary literature is that time was on Russia's side, with a particular emphasis on its greater strength with the completion of an armament program in 1917.
That was true in relation to Russia’s relative rise to Germany, but Germany was not the primary Russian focus in 1914 nor was going to absorb the bulk of Russian resources in the first campaigns. Germany was mainly France’s problem and Russia’s focus was in meeting its alliance obligations sooner, so that France could balance Germany while Russia took care of business elsewhere. Russia was focused more on the currents of power with Austria and Turkey. With Austria, they thought they could already whip them in 1914. With Turkey, the Ottoman army was gaining strength every day. Now that it was being trained and equipped by the Germans, it would become a force to be reckoned with.
 

raharris1973

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Germany's improving economic portfolio?

Wiking said: Frankly by the 1920s Germany will be ahead in technology thanks to their unique government system that directs economic investments and their heavy investment in education and their university system, which is the best in the world at that time. <snip Austria-Bohemia> Russia won't be anywhere near there, nor will France or Britain, because of their limited military budgets and Germany's lead in physics. France will probably follow by 1938 and Britain by 1939.

Economically Germany will develop a stronger automotive industry and develop strong ties with the Ottomans to get access to that oil, which will be firmly tied in when the Berlin-Baghdad railroad opens finally in the late 1910s or early 1920s.

This is a pretty good argument for being optimistic about Germany, but do you see German S&T and industrial growth translating into a favorable resolution of the financial and fiscal weaknesses they had all the way up to 1914 in OTL?

Niall Ferguson discusses in Pity of War how Germany, despite its high GDP, had a relatively weak international financial profile. Germany had fewer "invisible exports" and financial assets not only compared to Britain, but to France as well, a factor that was to the advantage of both France and Britain in competing for allies.

Paul Kennedy attributes the German loss of the naval race by 1911 or so as attributable to Germany's inferior fiscal system compared to Britain, even more than to German industrial challenges or its need for land armament. Briefly, the British parliament could tax the economy uniformly to raise funds for defence, but the 2nd Reich could not implement a direct (read : income) taxes at the national level and the different states provided revenue in inefficient ways. How likely would this be resolved by the 1920s. Britain, France, and even the US after 1913 had fewer constitutional impediments to securing revenue from income taxes nationally. I don't know if the Socialists could or would fix this.
 

Deleted member 1487

This is a pretty good argument for being optimistic about Germany, but do you see German S&T and industrial growth translating into a favorable resolution of the financial and fiscal weaknesses they had all the way up to 1914 in OTL?

Niall Ferguson discusses in Pity of War how Germany, despite its high GDP, had a relatively weak international financial profile. Germany had fewer "invisible exports" and financial assets not only compared to Britain, but to France as well, a factor that was to the advantage of both France and Britain in competing for allies.

Paul Kennedy attributes the German loss of the naval race by 1911 or so as attributable to Germany's inferior fiscal system compared to Britain, even more than to German industrial challenges or its need for land armament. Briefly, the British parliament could tax the economy uniformly to raise funds for defence, but the 2nd Reich could not implement a direct (read : income) taxes at the national level and the different states provided revenue in inefficient ways. How likely would this be resolved by the 1920s. Britain, France, and even the US after 1913 had fewer constitutional impediments to securing revenue from income taxes nationally. I don't know if the Socialists could or would fix this.

Ultimately Germany was going to have a constitutional crisis at some point, which, if provoked by the Socialists, will address the issue of taxation. I think it will eventually be addressed, but potentially not until the 1920s. The old guard was on the way out and even the military is going to recognize that a modern tax system will need to be established to compete with the rising threat of Russia, as well as their allies in the West. Austria is going to keep falling behind, so Germany will increasingly have to bear the security burden as Romania switches sides and Italy becomes more hostile to Austria. Besides the Socialists the middle class nationalists were the biggest voting block/lobby in the country and they were becoming increasingly hostile to the Kaiser's governance. The Army League replaced the Navy League and was in many ways the voice of the middle class nationalists, who were demanding increasing military spending, which was going to provoke a financial crisis eventually unless something gives, which is going to have to be the way taxes are assessed and collected.

As to your other points about the weakness of the German banking system relative to the French and British, keep in mind that by 1914 Germany had been a country for just over 40 years and was still in the process of developing its governmental structures, which both the French and British had had centuries to do. The financial power of Germany will grow as its economy and government mature.
France was on the way down, Britain was stagnating, and Germany was expanding. Traditionally the German economy relied on manufacturing, craftsmanship, and local/regional trade, while the French and British were locked into the global economy for centuries and had their colonies which provided exotic goods, while the metropol exported luxury goods; as a result they had a mature banking system and experience of centuries of mobilizing their economies and government for major projects (war and imperialism), while Germany was still learning those lessons and despite its steep learning curve was still behind it. Given 2-3 decades they would be ahead of the curve and would only be directly competing with the US in terms of GDP, trade volume, and international financial profile.

The German university system is really going to be what gives the long term edge that will erode whatever lead the French or British have economically and culturally.

This book has some relevant information about the position Germany was in prior to WW1, which indicates the path that could have been:
http://www.amazon.com/German-Genius...&qid=1354473522&sr=1-1&keywords=german+genius

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Industrial_Revolution#Germany
The German Empire came to rival Britain as Europe's primary industrial nation during this period. Since Germany industrialized later, it was able to model its factories after those of Britain, thus making more efficient use of its capital and avoiding legacy methods in its leap to the envelope of technology. Germany invested more heavily than the British in research, especially in chemistry, motors and electricity. The German concern system (known as Konzerne), being significantly concentrated, was able to make more efficient use of capital. Germany was not weighted down with an expensive worldwide empire that needed defense. Following Germany's annexation of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871, it absorbed parts of what had been France's industrial base.[43]

By 1900 the German chemical industry dominated the world market for synthetic dyes. The three major firms BASF, Bayer and Hoechst produced several hundred different dyes, along with the five smaller firms. In 1913 these eight firms produced almost 90 percent of the world supply of dyestuffs and sold about 80 percent of their production abroad. The three major firms had also integrated upstream into the production of essential raw materials and they began to expand into other areas of chemistry such as pharmaceuticals, photographic film, agricultural chemicals and electrochemicals. Top-level decision-making was in the hands of professional salaried managers, leading Chandler to call the German dye companies "the world's first truly managerial industrial enterprises".[44] There were many spinoffs from research—such as the pharmaceutical industry, which emerged from chemical research.[45]
 
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