British fleet air defense in San Carlos Water (
Battle of San Carlos (1982)) was halved and proved rather inept by even French standards, Troop lift and sustainment damaged by 30% by the losses they took (Include Atlantic Conveyor which is mentioned in the cite) is in the AARs. After that it is a zero margin for error. If an American CTF had shown up without sustainable logistics or
suffered such sustainment and defensive hits and reverses (Savo Island or Samar ring a bell?) I would forecast a court martial in that admiral's future as what almost happened twice per those events. Personally, I'd byng the crowd who screwed up
Operation Corporate. Strategically it might have been the Foreign Office, but at the op-art level it is Woodward and Fieldhouse who bungled naval matters. Moore could have picked a better landing site. Atlantic Conveyor (Bad luck, that.) might have influenced the final shape of the campaign and what Moore did, but parking your landing force inside a Champaign glass of surrounding hills and in a crowded no maneuver room sea loch when you can land beyond enemy effective reach 30 km east and south is just frankly stupid asinine war-making that will flunk you out of amphib 101. The RN knew better than that.
Don't get me started on the ASW fiascos.
Fieldhouse predicted almost to the ship the losses that the RN would take and urged the PM to go anyway and she did.
As for San Carlos as a bad landing site.
I totally disagree.
The Royal Marines knew the Island very well and being the suspicious and paranoid types that they are had already decided on where the best place to conduct a landing would be long before 1982.
San Carlos was no mere last minute decision. The loss of Atlantic Conveyor and the 9 Transport helicopters certainly had an impact on the decision to send the Welsh Guards to Bluff cove via the 2 LCTs - and for me this was the biggest avoidable cock up of the war for the British (even more avoidable as it was expected that the troops would have unloaded before it got light*) - but it had no bearing on the landings at San Carlos (which began on 21st May and ended on 25th May - the day the Atlantic Conveyor was hit)
This gives a good account
Its approaching winter in the South Atlantic, so a protected anchorage with a suitable landing area was required - and it is far enough away from the main Argentine Force to allow for a landing and build up of forces to be conducted with little risk of a counter attack and the location was not expected by the Argentine leadership.
Yet not too far away that troops cannot make a cross country movement to invest Port Stanley which was the only real location on the islands worth holding.
The expected LZs, closer to Standley, were mined and covered by dug in Battalion sized units or too close to risk the Argentines counter attacking before the buildup of troops, logistics, Artillery and SAMs could be completed.
And any location on West Falklands is pointless.
The terrain worked both ways.
Due to Sea Dart, which due to the Argentine Navy being the only other user of (with 2 Type 42 DDGs of their own) the Argentine fliers were fully aware that they were dead meat unless they flew under its minimum envelope of about 30 feet (by the end of the campaign this was down to about 10-15 feet) and the SHAR CAP - meaning that the Argentine bombers had mere seconds to pick a target and bomb it.
Almost universally this was a warship.
And due to the low Altitude at which the attacks were made at least 13 bombs did not arm - but not one landing ship was attacked (I believe that a single LCI landing craft was hit by a bomb)
And while they had some success - they paid for it losing 1/4 or so of the aircraft used.
The landing area was supposed to be very quickly ringed by Rapier SAM positions which it was pretty much by the evening of the 21st May. Sadly what was not known at the time was that the system having performed very well on exercises and having come through testing with flying colors to date (it was nicknamed the 'Hittile' as it never missed) did not like being in the hold of a ship for 6 weeks and failed to achieve its expected dominance over the air threat due to the tracking systems being U/S.
Later it was found that the environment - being as it was full of helicopters and ships - the operators initially struggled with IFF issues and the fact that the Argentine aircraft were flying so low that the operator struggled to direct the missiles onto the targets!
As for ASW
Well the area around the Falklands is very shallow, very noisy and festooned with 100s of wrecks and an abundance of Whale life and other bios making for a very difficult environment to detect Subs and conduct ASW.
This is somewhat tempered by the fact that the single Argentine Submarine that actually was operating in the area....was really really shit.
As you see there was a distinct lack of Submarines to direct ASW efforts against - with only 2 operational boats out of the 4 the Argentine Navy owned fit for service - the older Ex USS Catfish the ARA Santa Fe a Guppy class which was crippled early in the campaign leaving Grytviken in South Georgia by British helicopters on the 25th April (after being detected surfaced in shallow water the subs captain decided that he was more at risk from Torpedo and Depth charge attacks so stayed on the surface - poor choice as it turned out the 2 Helicopters were armed with wire guided missiles having expecting a surface threat and ventilated her fin and the Santa Fe later received further damage from a Depth charge anyway forcing her to return to the port) and was later captured in South Georgia after the Island was liberated.
This left the single more modern German Made Type 209 class Sub the ARA San Luis which suffered from a malfunctioning attack computer and a poor crew, unfamiliar with the boat that could not service the fish and as far as I am aware made a single attack on the 1st May "against HMS Hermes" (read against a distant contact very likely the distant picket vessels HMS Brilliant and HMS Yarmouth) at a range which post war was estimated to be at least 2x the maximum engagement envelope of the torpedo if not further (so likely to be well over 20,000 yards/10 NMs) - the torpedo attack was detected by those 2 Frigates and great effort and a large amount of ordinance (multiple Depth Charges and at least one ASW Torpedo) was expended on anything that was remotely like a submarine (wrecks and whales) for the next 24 hours.
Another attack was supposedly made against a British Submarine on the 8th May with a Mk 37 which hit and destroyed the target. As the British did not lose any subs and to date no reports from British subs confirm the attack we have no clue as to what she actually engaged.
The closest San Juan came to success was an attack on the 10th of May against HMS Arrow who, along with a sister ship HMS Alacrity was making a high speed run through the sound - with a lack of Mine sweepers yet in theatre the 2 ships were deemed the most expendable warship much to the crews delight I am sure and was sent to see if they could 'find any mines'.
Well they do say if you cannot take a joke you should not have joined the military!
San Luis managed to fire 1 of 2 attempted shots but quickly lost the wires but again recorded a hit. The 2nd attack was aborted as both ships rapidly past out of range.
HMS Arrow due to her high speed was unaware of the attack although did report some damage to her decoy when it was recovered - which may have been 'impacted' by the San Juans SST-4 fish but equally may have struck an underwater wreck or the reef that existed at one end of the sound.
What was later established was that the San Juans crew were not actually arming their fish before firing them!
*The Royal Marine Officer in charge of the landings at Bluff Cove upon learning that the Welsh Guard Battalion had not disembarked was absolutely stunned and remonstrated with their Brigade CO - who was unswayed (he wanted to get his men closer to Standley in a second night lift) and being a senior officer of the Guard Brigade Mafia was not going to be told what to do by a mere unwashed mortal such as a Major of Marines.
It noted that the only senior British Officer to have not received any official recognition after the war was Said Brigade CO - Brigadier Tony Wilson and he retired from the Army not long after.
I have also heard and read that the Welsh Guards, unlike the Royal Marines and Paras were not fit enough to March across the Islands having just come off Parade duties in London (they had gotten fat) which is why they conducted the movement by sea! IMO another Regiment should have been sent instead - apparently the Green Howards (now 2nd Battalion/Yorkshire Regiment) should have been slated to refill 5th light infantry Brigade before it was sent to replace the 2 Parachute Battalions that had been moved over from 5th Light Infantry Brigade to 3rd Commando Brigade. 1st Para should also have been relieved of its Northern Ireland mission and sent as the 3rd Battalion. But apparently internal politics ensured that the 2 Guard Battalions were sent instead despite their potential unsuitability.
