Successful Armada of 1779

Wouldn't sacking London and Kent be enough? A proper scorched earth would be a major setback. I mean, beyond the psychological impact (thinking of potential Irish uprising too), it could cause major disruptions to the food supply of London, and it gets even worse if ships found in ports are scuttled

That's the whole idea. :cool:
 
6. Something in India???

It depends on how ambitious the French can be- best case scenario, they get all the British possessions in India at the time, which to be fair wasn’t as big as it was soon to get. A more reasonable demand would be British Andhra or the expansion of French Chandannagar to include all of the Bengal presidency. Anything but the total power of one side gives independent indian states a much better chance than OTL as they can play the two powers off each other. I imagine they’d ally with Mysore and use it as a proxy to bring the Marathas to heel.
 

Skallagrim

Banned
What is the best case scenario for the Americans in any situation involving this Armada?

All of OTL's claims, minus any claims regarding Spanish Florida and its borders, plus Upper Canada and Lower Canada a.k.a. Quebec, as well as Britain giving up all claims to all areas west of Upper and Lower Canada (as in: HBC territory is forcibly opened to the USA, France, Spain...) which would in practice mean that the USA ends up owning it in a few decades. This is an absolute best case scenario, which relies fully on France wanting to deny Britain the pleasure of owning Quebec, but selling it to the USA for a low price.
 
Why are the numbers absurd? Great Britain had over 800,000 farmers (yeoman or tenant) at this point in time and around 8,000 large landowners who would have had on average five or six armed gamekeepers each already and could arm seven or eight more grooms and footmen plus the men of the family (and that isn't counting an unquantifiable number of prosperous tradesmen, millers, merchants, lawyers, bailiffs, innkeepers etc.) and having no police force was an armed society. If you could afford a house and furniture and a set of silver you kept a gun in 1779 if only a fowling piece or blunderbuss. This is the era of highwaymen and of gunfights between poachers and gamekeepers (poaching affrays they used to be known as) and I am being conservative in assuming that around 20% of the "armed" classes were too old, infirm, cowardly, childless, religious or unpatriotic to want to repel invaders.
Armed but untrained civilians are not a match for trained troops I agree but there are enough trained troops and reasonably well trained militia to more than match the French/Spanish in numbers plus (more than) enough mosstroopers/franc-tireurs to make sending out small scouting parties virtually impossible for the French/Spanish. And the differential in numbers is getting into the territory of quantity having a quality all of its own. The Franco-Spanish would have to deploy at least 50% of its force to securing its supply train and lines of communication.
 
All of OTL's claims, minus any claims regarding Spanish Florida and its borders, plus Upper Canada and Lower Canada a.k.a. Quebec, as well as Britain giving up all claims to all areas west of Upper and Lower Canada (as in: HBC territory is forcibly opened to the USA, France, Spain...) which would in practice mean that the USA ends up owning it in a few decades. This is an absolute best case scenario, which relies fully on France wanting to deny Britain the pleasure of owning Quebec, but selling it to the USA for a low price.

I may have not phrased that question properly. I’m referring to what is the best case scenario in the context of the Armada itself, not the final peace treaty. There are several convincing arguments that a crushing French victory is not necessarily good for the Americans, compared to our OTL gains. Well, what about a pyrrhic victory for either side? Is that better?
 
How about invasion of 1326?
Well, IIRC this 'invasion' was very similar to the Orange invasion. Was part of an fight for the power between english factions...After all the little force that managed to cross the channel and disembark would be crushed very quickly if they had not been prepared to quickly gather their supporters and allies or if they had not had a great support in England.
 

Skallagrim

Banned
I may have not phrased that question properly. I’m referring to what is the best case scenario in the context of the Armada itself, not the final peace treaty. There are several convincing arguments that a crushing French victory is not necessarily good for the Americans, compared to our OTL gains. Well, what about a pyrrhic victory for either side? Is that better?

Ah, like that! Well, the best way to get good results is if things are bad enough for Britain that they decide to just abandon the whole ARW and send all troops to Europe post-haste. This requires the Armada to do very well early on (destroying key military facilities, terrorising the countryside, and fully exploiting the window of opportunity to ferry as many troops over to Britain as possible). Then, as Britain just abandons the whole American theatre and fully commits to Europe, things start looking less sunny for France and Spain. Britain, though it is hard-fought, retakes control of the channel and blocks any further perspectives for both re-inforcement and evacuation, while committing all its forces to destroying all enemy forces in Britain. Rather than fold at its nadir, Britain fights until it has restored order (although at great cost) and only then do peace negotiations start.

While this happens, the USA is unopposed, and essentially has a good shot at taking Canada. Once the peace is finally concluded, Britain is unwilling to commit to some sort of reconquest, and the USA keeps its gains-- backed by France at the negotiating table, which would rather see Quebec as part of the USA than as part of the British Empire. And then you get pretty much what I outlined earlier. Indeed, if France and Spain just walk all over Britain and it essentially surrenders when it is at its lowest point, then France particularly is in a position to demand a lot for itself (Quebec, easily, and possibly Upper Canada, maybe even all or some of the Ohio Country... all at the expense of the USA).

The very best for the USA is that Britain is forced to prioritise Europe and then does so instead of folding... essentially just giving up on North America outside the Maritimes on the basis of "We have more pressing matters to attend to at the moment."
 
Why are the numbers absurd?

Because they have nothing to do with a real size of militia that existed at this time (I brought the official numbers in one of the earlier posts) and based upon a completely false assumption that an average Englishman of the late XVIII would automatically became military after getting a musket.

Armed but untrained civilians are not a match for trained troops I agree but there are enough trained troops

Again, the premise (as in "rule of the game") was that there are approximately regular 20K British soldiers ready to face the invading force (as in OTL). How many regular troops Britain had all over the world is a different question (rather unrelated to this scenario). Clearly not enough to deal with the American rebels on its own hence the appeals for help to Catherine II and, after her refusal, hiring 20 - 25K of the Hessian mercenaries. The point of the exercise is not a patriotic flag waving but an attempt to figure out what could be a realistic goal for the Franco-Spanish invasion in the best case scenario. The OTL goal of just "distracting" some British forces from the American theater seems worthy of Louis XVI and his advisers, aka, idiotic because it does not answer the fundamental question: what are you going to do with 30 - 40K soldiers on the enemy's soil if the landing is successful? As in the famous Chinese curse: "Let your dreams come true". :perservingface:

So there is no need to talk about the massacre of the evil invaders by the armed doctors and priests or by the farmers "swarming around" with the pitchforks attacking the enemies in an attempt to get back a stolen pig or about a mighty force of the local squires who sobered up for an occasion and are trying to imitate the Mameluks in a Battle of the Pyramids. :winkytongue:


The Franco-Spanish would have to deploy at least 50% of its force to securing its supply train and lines of communication.

Sorry, which "lines of communication" you are talking about? There are 40 - 50 miles from the landing point to London. With an average daily marching distance of the contemporary troops being approximately 15 - 20 miles (while marching 10 hours per day) or more during the forced marches, it would take 3 - 4 days with no special need to secure anything substantial on the road . Less with the forced marches (possible, taking into an account a relatively short distance to the ultimate destination point). Strictly speaking, even reaching (and burning) London would not be 100% necessary if destruction along the way is scary enough.

50% for securing the supply train on that distance is a pure fantasy: the armies of the 7YW simply would not be able to fight if this was anywhere close to a reality and the same goes for the "lines of communication". In this specific case and under this specific scenario the supply train would be minimal because the invaders are mostly living off the land while being able to carry with them few days worth of the bread and hardtack supplies: their purpose is to achieve maximum of destruction (as a tool of a political pressure), not to occupy any territory except for the port(s) of landing. Magazines could be established in these ports and guarded by the naval personnel and, with the limited theater of operations, they'd be well within the standard 5 days of march norm based on the magazine system.
 
It depends on how ambitious the French can be- best case scenario, they get all the British possessions in India at the time, which to be fair wasn’t as big as it was soon to get. A more reasonable demand would be British Andhra or the expansion of French Chandannagar to include all of the Bengal presidency. Anything but the total power of one side gives independent indian states a much better chance than OTL as they can play the two powers off each other. I imagine they’d ally with Mysore and use it as a proxy to bring the Marathas to heel.

Well, they could demand return of the former French territories in India which they had until 1754 (purple). Getting back sphere of influence (blue) would be more difficult.
250px-French_India_1741-1754.png
 
The French aren't dismantling the British empire with a war of scorched earth. The Gov't has to fear losing power and be occupied before it agrees to that. The scorched earth campaign might be good enough to have Britain give up the colonies, Gibraltar, and a minor bone for the French (a port in India, or maybe Canada, although reconquest of Canada wasn't really on the list of things to do for France). That's still quite a bit, but Britain might go for it to end the war. Anything more, and Britain is likely to fight on, and time is not on France's side. France must shut off the naval ports to deny the British Navy a home. I've no idea if that's realistic. As long as the Brits have a port, time is on their side.

IF France decides to regain Canada, the amount US can grab gets smaller.
 
So there is no need to talk about the massacre of the evil invaders by the armed doctors and priests or by the farmers "swarming around" with the pitchforks attacking the enemies in an attempt to get back a stolen pig or about a mighty force of the local squires who sobered up for an occasion and are trying to imitate the Mameluks in a Battle of the Pyramids. :winkytongue:
As well as the 250,000 odd volunteers within four days march with firearms and ammunition of some sort. Hogarth's caricatures are just that, caricatures. And while the squirearchy are not enormously sympathetic figures they have been taught to ride, to stalk and to shoot. The ill disciplined, poorly led and inadequately armed Spanish irregulars were a serious annoyance to the French in Spain in the early 1800s. As I say below C18th armies aren't well equipped for fighting a war and dealing with resistance at the one time. Now I don't know who would be leading this Franco-Spanish expedition but I seriously doubt that in competence, professionalism, morale-building and training they would have surpassed Soult or Massena.
And the British irregulars in this scenario would have some ex-soldiers and sailors with previous combat experience among them and a lot more guns than the Spaniards of 1805.
Anyway, who was it told you that you had to sober up to go into battle;)?
Again, the premise (as in "rule of the game") was that there are approximately regular 20K British soldiers ready to face the invading force (as in OTL). How many regular troops Britain had all over the world is a different question (rather unrelated to this scenario). Clearly not enough to deal with the American rebels on its own hence the appeals for help to Catherine II and, after her refusal, hiring 20 - 25K of the Hessian mercenaries. The point of the exercise is not a patriotic flag waving but an attempt to figure out what could be a realistic goal for the Franco-Spanish invasion in the best case scenario.
I am not English and my ancestors at the time would have been sympathisers with the American Revolutionaries so I am not indulging in patriotic flag waving. I am trying to look at what would be achievable by a force of around 40,000 Franco-Spanish troops and I fear you are too sanguine about what they could achieve and how quickly. Firstly, they will have to leave around 5,000 of their number at the coast to invest Dover Castle and the other coastal fortifications and prevent an army forming in their rear and attacking them as they advance. Secondly, this being 1779, although they will be able to land armed troops relatively quickly it will take them at least a day to successfully unload their artillery, powder and shot before they start marching anywhere. Thirdly, following the slaughter of civilians in the Thirty Years War and the Northern Wars in the previous century and the ambiguous patriotic attachments of the local residents in the most fought over regions of Europe such as the Austrian/Spanish Netherlands, Finland and Poland, eighteenth century armies were not accustomed to popular resistance and their military practice reflected this. Baggage trains were only lightly guarded by sufficient force to see off marauding light cavalry and single dispatch riders routinely sent out. Fourthly, that Britons were reluctant to sign up for ten years military service is not the same thing as them being unwilling to fight against a foreign invader.
Because they have nothing to do with a real size of militia that existed at this time (I brought the official numbers in one of the earlier posts) and based upon a completely false assumption that an average Englishman of the late XVIII would automatically became military after getting a musket.
I think you are confusing the very real difficulties the authorities of the time had with getting militia members to turn out regularly (people away on business, too busy with their commercial or social lives etc.) with genuinely only nominal existence. Couldn't be arsed rather than didn't exist. In instances of real crisis (such as the Gordon Riots in the 1780s) the militia were able to muster out in respectable numbers. Remember the regular army inspected the militia annually to ensure that weapons uniforms etc. were accounted for. Remember too that the general population would include a number of ex soldiers in their fifties with experience of 1745 and the War of the Austrian Sucession and men in their forties with experience of the Seven Years War. I don't think that the average C18th Englishman would automatically become military after getting a musket but there would be enough trained men and professional soldiers about to give him some of the rudiments before he went into battle.
 
In the vein of my ‘best case for the Americans’ questions, is the following a plausible outcome:
The Armada secures a solid victory and lands troops in England. The Royal Navy then recovers and cuts off this army, before it reaches London. OR, the local British forces are enough to trap said landing force at their beachhead.
 
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As well as the 250,000 odd volunteers within four days march with firearms and ammunition of some sort.

This is a complete fantasy on quite a few accounts.

Not to mention that you still did not get what the conversation is about. It is about the meaningful French goals of the expedition and the ways to achieve these goals.
 
Not to mention that you still did not get what the conversation is about. It is about the meaningful French goals of the expedition and the ways to achieve these goals.
Oh I get it. It is just the use of the word "meaningful" I would take exception to. Realistically the force in question could hope to seize and hold Portsmouth (major site of naval recruitment and construction) or Bristol (major Western trading port) and hold off attempts to recapture it and make incursions into the surrounding countryside until Britain came to the treaty table. Or sponsor and support a major rebellion in Ireland. Portsmouth would be the most difficult to seize but most defensible to hold onto. Ireland might be their best bet as they would comfortably outnumber British regular forces on the island and most of Ascendancy couldn't (illegal) and wouldn't (they would be likely to join the rebels) arm their tenants.
This is a complete fantasy on quite a few accounts.
Really? I suggest you have a look at Bateman's guide to landownership in Great Britain which will give a conservative picture as 100 years later (when Bateman compiled it) consolidation of estates through marriage, rationalisation after the Agricultural Revolution and the loss of estates and farms to London's urban sprawl will have reduced numbers somewhat and calculate how many landowners of all sizes and tenant farmers live within three and four days journey of London. Then lift any decent social history of C18th England and read the chapter on crime and deterrence during the period. And the chapter on the country gentry. And the book (name of author escapes me) on England's land based defence preparations for the Armada of 1588. I doubt if the roads had got worse or the countryside been severely depopulated in the intervening 191 years.
 
The French aren't dismantling the British empire with a war of scorched earth.

Of course they would not. The question was about the realistic goals which France and Spain could achieve.

The Gov't has to fear losing power and be occupied before it agrees to that. The scorched earth campaign might be good enough to have Britain give up the colonies, Gibraltar, and a minor bone for the French (a port in India, or maybe Canada, although reconquest of Canada wasn't really on the list of things to do for France).

French already had ports in India: Mehe, Karikal, Pondichery, Yanoan and Chandermagor.
250px-French_India_1815.gif


So it would be realistic for them to reclaim their former territories on Coromandel Coast lost in 1754.

250px-French_India_1741-1754.png


Canada seems to me less realistic (and probably less profitable) but perhaps some fishing rights.

For Spain getting Gibraltar back would be a big bonus, at least prestige wise. How important was it for the Brits at that time? OTOH, Menorca is quite realistic: in OTL on 5 January 1782 the Spanish regained control of the island (the Brits got back again in 1798 and lost forever in 1802).


That's still quite a bit, but Britain might go for it to end the war. Anything more, and Britain is likely to fight on, and time is not on France's side.

Exactly. This is why I keep talking about the "realistic" goals: those which could be relatively easily agreed upon by both sides.

France must shut off the naval ports to deny the British Navy a home. I've no idea if that's realistic.

Only in the scenario where the French are landing something comparable to the force planned by Napoleon: something in the range of at least 200K. Even if such a force is not adequate for occupying ALL British ports it would be intimidating enough for forcing the British government to sue for peace. But this also raises at least couple big questions:

1. Is French-Spanish capable of maintaining at least a local naval superiority for a prolonged time?


2. What is modus operandi of the landing troops? There are at least 2 seriously different scenarios:

2a. The "conventional European war" of that period: food confiscations (and a little bit of a looting here and there) are OK but in general, as Fritz put it, "the subjects don't have to know that there is an ongoing war". The targets of destruction are almost exclusively the military objects (wharves, arsenals, dockyards, etc.). The advantage is that the civilian population is not unduly alienated while the disadvantage is that the opponent's government is not unduly pressed either (unless you start burning property which belongs to its members ;)).

2b. Something close to the "total war" in expectation that the opponent would be compelled to start talks by a scope of the destruction. The civilian targets are just as "good" as the military/naval ones. With the invading army of 200K even the places like Birmingham and Coventry (and perhaps even Liverpool) are within the reach (if we are talking strictly about destruction, not occupation) and the damage (including potential damage) to the local economy could be great enough to speed up the talks process. A potential offset is an unhappy population but Southern Britain in not Spain - there are not too many places for guerrilla to hide and, anyway, the invaders are not into the permanent occupation. Well, the obvious problem with that scenario is that (with the exception of some "colonial activities") the European wars of that period usually were not fought this way and it would take a considerable change of the existing perceptions at least on the leadership level.
 
. Is French-Spanish capable of maintaining at least a local naval superiority for a prolonged time?
IMO, you have to deny a home naval port to the Brits. The overall conventional wisdom is that France/Spain combined can threaten the British Isles for a short time, but ultimately, the Brits have the superior naval forces and can deny prolonged access by the French. taking away home court advantage would even things up a bit.
 
Question : let's say a respectable force lands in Kent and goes North. Could they free up the Thames estuary to get boats all the way to London?
Ships of the line in front of Westminster would be a sight to remember.

I think that a land invasion IS a strategic objective in itself. An explanation that often comes up for Britain dominance over France in the XIXth century is that Britain only had one front to protect : the Sea, whereas France had to defend its seas and lanes as well as the land, diluting resources and skills over both.
With a landed invasion causing even minimal damage, the home front is proven as a potential, and achievable target
 

Lusitania

Donor
I am trying to follow this thread and really confused. The original thread was for the Spanish - French task force to be successful and launch an invasion of British which in best case scenario was to land 20,000 soldiers in the eastern England/wales.

Where did the french get the ability to land 50-100,000 troops in England. Has the French Nostradamus conjured up a spell that made all BRitish ships disappear and doubled the French and Spanish fleet?
 
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