Succesful Stalemate on Eastern Front?

How could Germany successfully defend their gains post Barbarossa in Russia, e.g. could they realistically defend the Eastern Front to a point of fighting the Russians to a stalemate? Is it possible for that front to regress into a trench vs trench situation? I understand how the more modern fighting makes this idea harder to imagine, but could it happen? (if it helps I'm talking about the German lines at about 1942 or 1943 in Russia for the most part)
 
Impossible to achieve this with Hitler in charge. He was under the mistaken impression that he knew how to fight a modern war.
 
Get rid of Lend-Lease, USSR will lack mobility and logistics for great counterattacks and it will be a slow grinding war
 
Have Hitler somehow decide appeasing the USA in December 1941 is preferable to full-scale war against it, the absence of Lend-Lease means the Soviets clear the Germans out of the USSR's borders but their war effort grinds to a halt and both totalitarianisms are bled white.
 
Stalemate was never really possible. A "stalemated" type situation would quickly devovle into attritional warfare in which German manpower would be exhausted within a couple years. The war would be extended slightly, but not by much. I could see this happening if Walther Model took charge in the East; he was extremely popular with Hitler and was a very able defensive commander. His more static doctrines were overall more effective than the "elastic defense" since they worked well with infantry forces supported by only a few low-medium strength Panzer divisions while the "backhand blow" strategy of Manstein required a massive concentration of Panzer reserves which left other parts of the front exposed and vulnerable to offensives by Soviet strategic reserves. Model's doctrine would have seen the Rzhev Salient fighting replicated on an enormous scale over the course of several years; large Russian offensives which are only able to penetrate at most 20-30 kilometers and suffer heavy losses, followed by localized and small scale German counterattacks to recover important ground or take advantage of tactical opportunities. This will eventually strip German manpower bare and eventually they'll simply collapse from exhaustion, as at the Rzjev Salient the Germans eventually retreated to avoid complete collapse.
 
Russia is far too large a territory to allow for static warfare across the entirety of the front. There can be specific points with heavy static defenses, but ultimately these can be operationally flanked or overcome with requisite armor which both sides have.

So the battle lines are going to change, but it's still possible for a strategic stalemate to occur where Soviet gains in one area is offset by a German counterattack later or an attack made elsewhere.

However, this is not possible as long as the US is giving the USSR Lend Lease as that provides the Red Army with its operational mobility. Furthermore, the Red Army became expert at precisely the kind of deep operations and strategic deceptions that allowed to them to exploit the Lend Lease aid given to them.

In order for a strategic stalemate to happen, you need to make several changes. First, the Germans need to do better with Barbarossa - much better. This is possible, but not easy and frankly requires a lot of hindsight, the kind of things we know about but which the Germans wouldn't. Second, you need to stop or severely reduce US Lend Lease that eventually gives the Red Army the edge by 1943. Third, you need to preserve German manpower a lot better, they squandered a lot in 1941-1942. Fourth, if you want the Germans to actually win the war, you not only need to stalemate the Eastern Front, but not have the US into the war as inevitably they will open up a second front.
 
The vast majority of the Eastern Front in 1942 was static. Lenningrad, Rzhev, Byransk, the upper Don, etc were essentially stable, with next to no teritorial changes once the Germans secured them.
 
Stalemate was never really possible. A "stalemated" type situation would quickly devovle into attritional warfare in which German manpower would be exhausted within a couple years. The war would be extended slightly, but not by much. I could see this happening if Walther Model took charge in the East; he was extremely popular with Hitler and was a very able defensive commander. His more static doctrines were overall more effective than the "elastic defense" since they worked well with infantry forces supported by only a few low-medium strength Panzer divisions while the "backhand blow" strategy of Manstein required a massive concentration of Panzer reserves which left other parts of the front exposed and vulnerable to offensives by Soviet strategic reserves. Model's doctrine would have seen the Rzhev Salient fighting replicated on an enormous scale over the course of several years; large Russian offensives which are only able to penetrate at most 20-30 kilometers and suffer heavy losses, followed by localized and small scale German counterattacks to recover important ground or take advantage of tactical opportunities. This will eventually strip German manpower bare and eventually they'll simply collapse from exhaustion, as at the Rzjev Salient the Germans eventually retreated to avoid complete collapse.

Stalemate is possible assuming the USSR doesn't get Lend-Lease. What would happen would be the kind of fighting post-Kursk-to-Bagration for multiple years. Grinding attrition warfare that collapses the Wehrmacht under superior Soviet firepower and weaponry but at a prohibitive cost and with the Soviets having none of the logistics to project power even to the Vistula, let alone to Berlin. Of course this is not a German *victory* but it certainly is no prelude to the Eastern Bloc.
 
Stalemate is possible assuming the USSR doesn't get Lend-Lease. What would happen would be the kind of fighting post-Kursk-to-Bagration for multiple years. Grinding attrition warfare that collapses the Wehrmacht under superior Soviet firepower and weaponry but at a prohibitive cost and with the Soviets having none of the logistics to project power even to the Vistula, let alone to Berlin. Of course this is not a German *victory* but it certainly is no prelude to the Eastern Bloc.

I feel that lend lease to the Soviet Union was inevitable. Once war between the United States and Japan began, whether Germany declares war on the US or not, the US will at least provide aid to the Soviet Union because of the simple fact that even though Germany isn't actually at war with the US it still is an ally of Japan, and it's in the long term interests of the US to see it defeated. Furthermore, once Japan is taken care of, the US is almost guaranteed to declare war on Germany, and with the isolationist spriti effectively destroyed there will be little objection to the continuation of the "Crusade against Fascism".
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
Have Hitler somehow decide appeasing the USA in December 1941 is preferable to full-scale war against it, the absence of Lend-Lease means the Soviets clear the Germans out of the USSR's borders but their war effort grinds to a halt and both totalitarianisms are bled white.

The United States had already begun extending Lend-Lease to the Soviet Union before war broke out between the United States and Germany.
 
It's very difficult to get to a stalemate on the eastern front, but not totally impossible. Get the Germans to notice the rather obvious Soviet buildups that proceeded the Soviet Stalingrad offensives, and that helps a lot.

Given a competent German leadership and several days notice, the Germans could probably have saved most of the troops and equipment lost at Stalingrad. That would have been very significant because the Germans had stripped away a lot of trucks and tanks from the rest of the army in order to make their army in the south mobile again in 1942. They lost a lot of that stuff at Stalingrad, and never regained the ability to do large-scale strategic movements.

Historically, every Soviet advance made the Soviets stronger for the next offensive, for several reasons. They regained manpower from the reconquered territories, in spite of German efforts to get men of military age out. They regained breadbasket regions, which was very important because the parts of the Soviet Union in Soviet hands as of fall 1942 was incapable of feeding itself long-term, and while US Lend-Lease food made a difference, there were limits to our ability to do that, especially if we were going to keep them supplied with Avgas, rubber, trucks, trains, etc.

The Soviets also gained some subtle advantages from their advances, which included a lot more partisans. The unfortunate reality is that most humans, which includes Russians, try very hard to end up on the winning side, which meant that partisans became much stronger when it became apparent that the Soviets were winning.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
In order for a strategic stalemate to happen, you need to make several changes. First, the Germans need to do better with Barbarossa - much better. This is possible, but not easy and frankly requires a lot of hindsight, the kind of things we know about but which the Germans wouldn't. Second, you need to stop or severely reduce US Lend Lease that eventually gives the Red Army the edge by 1943. Third, you need to preserve German manpower a lot better, they squandered a lot in 1941-1942. Fourth, if you want the Germans to actually win the war, you not only need to stalemate the Eastern Front, but not have the US into the war as inevitably they will open up a second front.


Agreed this would work, but i prefer a slightly different scenario.

1) Better Barbarossa. The German logistic command specialist had pointed out many of the problems, and were ignored. If the senior leadership listened more to the logistic command, and prepared for a possible multi-year war, then 1941 goes better. For example, more winter uniforms with plan to distribute them. A lot more ammo, the ammo plants run on total war footing over the winter on 1940/1941. Railroad crews work 24/7 to switch from wide to narrow gage. Etc. None of these transform the situation, but the cumulative effects mean German is stronger in spring of 42. A lot can be done without hindsight, just better, more adult planning.

2) Second. No lend/lease. So no FDR POD with a more isolationist USA president. For example, FDR dies of a stroke in March 1940, and the USA has a different President. A pro-German one is ASB, but no lend/lease combine with no pressure on Japan til the Navy is rebuilt is possible.

3) The Germans used the "Extermination through labor" to eliminate undesirables. Have someone persuade Hitler and "Extermination through trench/static warfare" both eliminates undesirable Slavs (Ukrainians, Poles, etc.) and saves the lives of Germans. No harsh treatment of non-Jews Poles and Ukrainians, and instead formation of infantry regiments. Hitler promises Poland a greater Poland in the east, and the Ukrainians whatever they want to hear. He can betray them later. Hitler not killing Jews is a bit ASB. Every dead Polish/Ukrainian soldier is one more German alive, and one more Slavic mouth consuming food and other valuable resources.

4) Fourth, No FDR helps a lot, but another POD may be required.
 
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