OK, let's imagine that Germany, with some potential alterations going back as early as 1919, is facing societal stresses, internal disorder and possibly civil war to the point that the country is not paying for a numerous and state of the art military in the 1930s and is not invading its neighbors at all. I am contriving the end result of no aggressive & threatening Germany in the 1930s and early 1940s. My view is that it is at least a bit more plausible to have Germany not show up as a revisionist, expansionist power because it is internally chaotic and rent by strife rather than the opposite scenario of being a coherent democracy and simply not choosing to compete militarily and or use force or threat of force to revise the Versailles order.
Paul Kennedy made alot of the "two-front" dilemma posed for the UK and USSR (and I would extrapolate France & the USA also) posed by simultaneous aggressiveness by Imperial Japan and the European Fascist powers.
If Germany is a not a significant military threat to anyone, except perhaps itself, will the British, French or Soviets be more willing to oppose Mussolini or Imperial Japan earlier? Might they (and perhaps the U.S.) seriously sanction Italy over the Ethiopia invasion? Might they oppose the Italians in Spain with greater vigor. Might they seriously aid China beyond OTL levels and thoroughly sanction Japan much earlier in its course of aggression in China?
Actually, without the Allied flirtation with Mussolini, to align him against the Germans, would the Italians dare invade Abyssinia at all?
Will Japan restrain itself to not go to full-scale war with China in 1937?
Or, will all the powers follow the same appeasement and nonaggression pact policies pursued in OTL and leave the Ethiopians, Chinese, and each other to their own devices?