Becareful here monk, firstly the F111 did indeed carry out tank plinking during ODS, however they weren't intending to do so, the success of the air campaign meant that a number could be re-roled towards battlefield air interdiction towards the end of the war crucially at medium altitude. In NATO/WP I strongly suspect that F111s , Tornados ect would have more than enough interdiction targets to keep them busy.
A2G is not CAS , A2G is more wide ranging than CAS, so Battlefield Air Interdiction and general interdiction tasks further back behind WP lines, effectively trying to stop the WP follow on forces getting to the fight and swamping NATO armies or at least delaying them.
You also assume that the F16 fleet would be A2G orientated, not so, it would depend very much on the state of the air war, if not carrying out DCA sorites, SEAD and airfield denial operations could take up a significant amount of their efforts. IIRC it was assumed by all that in the first few days of conflict NATO wouldn't be able to provide a lot of CAS except in places where it was an emergency , ie a soviet tank army is threatening to break NATO lines. Until NATO air forces could create a favourable air situation , the ground forces would need to pretty much rely on their own resources, except for harriers, A10s and perhaps the German Alphajet fleet and organic attack helicopter fleets.
Supersonic aircraft can attack armour you are correct, but it doesn't mean they do it well , but then every ship can be mine sweeper, it doesn't mean a destroyer will do it as well as say a hunt class minesweeper. The same applies to supersonic aircraft, F111 can attack armour and vehicle columns as you say the problem is target acquisition. At low level you have very little time to acquire, and accurately drop weapons, hence the reason in the 1970s NATO used cluster bombs to improve the chances of attacking aircraft hitting armoured formations and in the 80s/90s you saw a real effort to develop smart munitions such as the SFW submunitions and things like Brimstone and Trigat.
This might be of interest, I recently read Air Defence Artillery in Combat, 1972 to the Present and in there it mentions that in 1973 Yom Kippur that as many as 4000 SA-7s are reported to have been fired during the conflict with 8 known kills and 38 damaged aircraft , so it takes a large number of MANPADs to score a kill, and again I appreciate these were early SA-7s and their spin offs however in the 80s we had stinger, and the SA-14/16 were coming into service and been more effective, but as with all these things they are not developed in a vacuum, ECM/countermeasures ect would and did develop to counter the threat.
MANPADs are prolific in both NATO and WP armies, however, they would require a large number to be fired to achieve kills, and NATO and presumably the WP would team up different elements to try and deal with the heavier AD systems such as AH or artillery, infact am sure CENTAG and 4ATAF did some good work to develop tactics that would attack helicopters or artillery prosecute air defence vehicles and allow the heavier hitting A10s and other battlefield aircraft to deliver weapons against the armoured units.
Regards
Everyone raves about the A10s gun as others have mentioned , the gun was the most effective means to kill armour from the air at the time of the A10s conception, I suspect if the A10 was designed 10 years later then the requirement for the gun would have been much reduced.
