Strategically Pointless Battles of the First and Second World War?

CalBear

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I have some qualms with your claim that "There is no doubt that the Red Army was the engine that defeated the Reich." It may have been the prime mover or the largest contributor, but I think "the engine" overstates the matter a bit. It likely would not have succeed without:
  • Diversion of German forces to Africa
  • Diversion of German resources to U-Boats and N. Atlantic
  • Committment of German resources and German losses in Battle of Britain
  • Industrial effects of the CBO
  • Diversion of German resources to combat the CBO
  • Lend Lease
You raise two good points:
- The Germans shifted tons of resources to fight the CBO -- thousands of guns and hundreds of thousands of gunners and repair crews. It's estimate that the Germans had more than 1M men tied up in anti-bomber air defenses and repair crews
- Liberating those farms was a big strategic blow to Germany and a big morale gain to the W Allies
The Soviets engaged the vast majority of the Wehrmacht throughout the war from Barbarossa onward. WW II was very much an Allied effort with each partner providing a critical element. However, the land combat element, which was what had to be done to actually win the war, was provided by the Red Army. The CBO would never have defeated the Reich on its own, it is also almost impossible to see any point in time that the WAllies would be able to bring sufficient forces to bear to successfully invade Europe without roughly 75% of the Heer being engaged in a futile effort to keep the Red Army from ending the War in Berlin, if not on the Rhine. On June 6, 1944 the Heer had 2.2 MILLION troops in the East.

The breakdown of Heer dispositions in June of 1944 by area is extremely revealing. The Eastern Front had 150 divisions assigned (plus 8 in Finland), the Western Front had 56 (many of these were below strength and were reconstituting in the West), there were 12 divisions in Norway (throwing snowballs) which is only three less than were deployed into Italy, with and additional 9 in the Balkans/Greece and 7 divisions in Inner Germany.

The decision to engage in North Africa was indeed idiotic on the part of the Reich, arguably it led to the failure to take Moscow, with all the myriad butterflies that would engender, but it did not lead to the defeat of the Reich in and of itself.

Reich resources to the U-boat campaign was actually very low, the decision by the Nazis to build heavy surface ships was certainly a waste of effort, a 150 more U-boats in 1940 and the British might well have been forced to seek terms. That being said Bismarck & Tirpitz did not cause the Reich's defeat. If anything Tirpitz was the best single investment by the Reich throughout the war measured by the remarkable degree of effort the WAllies dedicated to its mere presence and the threat it represented.

Losses in the BoB were significant, but far from crippling, representing around two-four months production, depending on type.

The CBO was a major contribution to the Allied victory, probably more than the eventual land offensive in France, but it did not begin to really take effect until the Soviets had, in retrospect, totally turned the tide against the Reich, something that can be realistically traced to the destruction of the 6th Army and the failure of the thrust into the Caucasus region, a campaign that ended, permanently, any realistic hope for Reich offensive success. That was confirmed by the Heer's disaster at Kursk, which put the Heer, with localized exceptions, on the retreat for the next 21 months. Both of these critical points took place prior to the arrival of the admittedly enormous material support of Lend-Lease.

Lend-Lease to the Soviets, looked at from a realistic perspective, was a matter of sending U.S. production to save U.S. blood (an excellent exchange to be sure, at least from Washington's perspective). It does not, in any way, denigrate the efforts of the WAllies in the ETO to accept that the heavy lifting in destroying the Heer was done by the Red Army
 

jahenders

Banned
The Soviets engaged the vast majority of the Wehrmacht throughout the war from Barbarossa onward. WW II was very much an Allied effort with each partner providing a critical element. However, the land combat element, which was what had to be done to actually win the war, was provided by the Red Army. The CBO would never have defeated the Reich on its own, it is also almost impossible to see any point in time that the WAllies would be able to bring sufficient forces to bear to successfully invade Europe without roughly 75% of the Heer being engaged in a futile effort to keep the Red Army from ending the War in Berlin, if not on the Rhine. On June 6, 1944 the Heer had 2.2 MILLION troops in the East.

The breakdown of Heer dispositions in June of 1944 by area is extremely revealing. The Eastern Front had 150 divisions assigned (plus 8 in Finland), the Western Front had 56 (many of these were below strength and were reconstituting in the West), there were 12 divisions in Norway (throwing snowballs) which is only three less than were deployed into Italy, with and additional 9 in the Balkans/Greece and 7 divisions in Inner Germany.

The decision to engage in North Africa was indeed idiotic on the part of the Reich, arguably it led to the failure to take Moscow, with all the myriad butterflies that would engender, but it did not lead to the defeat of the Reich in and of itself.

Reich resources to the U-boat campaign was actually very low, the decision by the Nazis to build heavy surface ships was certainly a waste of effort, a 150 more U-boats in 1940 and the British might well have been forced to seek terms. That being said Bismarck & Tirpitz did not cause the Reich's defeat. If anything Tirpitz was the best single investment by the Reich throughout the war measured by the remarkable degree of effort the WAllies dedicated to its mere presence and the threat it represented.

Losses in the BoB were significant, but far from crippling, representing around two-four months production, depending on type.

The CBO was a major contribution to the Allied victory, probably more than the eventual land offensive in France, but it did not begin to really take effect until the Soviets had, in retrospect, totally turned the tide against the Reich, something that can be realistically traced to the destruction of the 6th Army and the failure of the thrust into the Caucasus region, a campaign that ended, permanently, any realistic hope for Reich offensive success. That was confirmed by the Heer's disaster at Kursk, which put the Heer, with localized exceptions, on the retreat for the next 21 months. Both of these critical points took place prior to the arrival of the admittedly enormous material support of Lend-Lease.

Lend-Lease to the Soviets, looked at from a realistic perspective, was a matter of sending U.S. production to save U.S. blood (an excellent exchange to be sure, at least from Washington's perspective). It does not, in any way, denigrate the efforts of the WAllies in the ETO to accept that the heavy lifting in destroying the Heer was done by the Red Army

Agreed. Certainly the Red Army was the major destructor of the Heer. I was just pointing out that they didn't do it alone and could not have. In a way, Lend-Lease (from US and UK) was production that saved blood, but it was production they could send before they were ready to commit large numbers of troops. So, especially the UK stuff arrived at a critical time, with a substantial portion of the tanks the Russians had defending Moscow being British.
 
except that a single torpedo bomber squadron from a carrier achieved a mission kill on the Bismark, rendering it crippled and helplessly vulnerable and the Tirpitz was hardly likely to do much better without air cover.

That's a slight misrepresentation, given that many attacks were made before the critical hit occurred. But it does demonstrate the nature of the problem for raiders - by mid 1941 air cover, HF-DF and ASV radar were vastly shrinking the Atlantic and removing the hiding spaces or the raiders. And this is with two fleet carriers being sunk earlier in the war!

The problem is that Germany needs a way of forcing the UK from the war. After the Battle of Britain, the only way to do this is by closing the convoy routes. U-boats alone can't do this - a tonnage war is too slow and will just draw the US in. Surface units are needed in the critical winter of 1940-1. I mean, it's almost certain to fail, given the disparity in naval forces and the implausibility of Germany expecting this situation to arise, but it's one of the few possible routes to a German victory.
 
The Soviets engaged the vast majority of the Wehrmacht throughout the war from Barbarossa onward. WW II was very much an Allied effort with each partner providing a critical element. However, the land combat element, which was what had to be done to actually win the war, was provided by the Red Army. The CBO would never have defeated the Reich on its own, it is also almost impossible to see any point in time that the WAllies would be able to bring sufficient forces to bear to successfully invade Europe without roughly 75% of the Heer being engaged in a futile effort to keep the Red Army from ending the War in Berlin, if not on the Rhine. On June 6, 1944 the Heer had 2.2 MILLION troops in the East.
2.2 million sounds like a lot, but the allies deployed over a million to Normandy, and by the time of the advance to the Rhine were up to about 4.5 MILLION troops (plus ~1.3 million in Italy). The Germans had lesser numbers to oppose them, of course, but still in the millions range. The disparity in June 1944 is because the West was not an active front.

Of course that still means for a good long time the Russians had the only big active front, but with that many WAllied troops actually active in Europe I don't see why it'd be impossible to bring to bear the forces to match or defeat Germany's (which, by my estimate/addition, could amount to about 10 million if there was no Russian front ever and Russia vanished to not require any garrisons/border guards either, but more likely similar numbers around 6 million with a deeper reserves pool).

So to strangle the automotive metaphor and then beating it after it's dead, I'd think the Soviets were at least 3 of the 4 cylinders pounding the German army, but the WAllies could certainly have made up 1 more and maybe 3, with 3 cylinders probably being enough given the WAllied superiority in the air and at sea (it would just be much more painful with 3).
 
The eastern front was the big meatgrinder for the Heer. Had there not been LL the price in blood would have been much higher for the Red Army, and the lines at the end of the war would have been quite different. While I won't go in to the argument as to what effect the Soviet DoW against Japan had after Hiroshima, the reality is that the USA and UK/Empire did 99% of the fighting against Japan, and because of the nature of this war and the distances both from the metropoles and between islands/theaters, the logistical effort was proportionally much greater in the Pacific. Whatever the effectiveness of the bombing offensive, it did suck up German resources for defense, moving factories, and repairs.
 

Dorozhand

Banned
Lend-Lease was the difference between the Red Army in Berlin and the Red Army at the Oder, or perhaps the war ending in 1945 or 1946. Nothing was ever going to stop the Red Army once its full might was rolling. After Kursk the whole rotten edifice of Germany was in freefall.
 

Dorozhand

Banned
...It may, or may not, have been realistic tactically when approved. In any case, it was extremely poorly carried out -- slow planning and development, poor operational security, horrible logistics ... terrible communications and leadership for the landings, continued effort after it was clear it was doomed, etc.

So, I wouldn't call it strategically pointless, though it was ultimately pointless in result.

This is basically a description of the whole of operations during the war. So very pointless. Europe descending into a vast nihilist orgy of collective slaughter because dick waving is one of the saddest things in history, that so many people of color died for white pride one of its greatest crimes.
 

jahenders

Banned
Lend-Lease was the difference between the Red Army in Berlin and the Red Army at the Oder, or perhaps the war ending in 1945 or 1946. Nothing was ever going to stop the Red Army once its full might was rolling. After Kursk the whole rotten edifice of Germany was in freefall.

That's true of Lend Lease later in the war. Lend Lease earlier in the war (esp. 1941), might have made the difference between the Russians being defeated at Moscow or pushing the Germans back. For example, the Russians lost HUGE numbers of tanks in Jun-Dec 1941 and had only 700 tanks to defend Moscow in Nov 41. Of those 700, about a quarter were British and even a larger portion of the medium and heavy tanks. Had those British tanks (and other supplies) not been there, things could potentially have gone differently.

So aid that might seem like a drop in the bucket in the larger context of Soviet production for the war played a crucial role in filling gaps at important moments during key periods of time. For example, in 1941, when Soviet industry was in disarray—many of their industrial plants were destroyed or captured by the advancing Nazi troops or in the process of evacuation east—battlefield losses of specific equipment approached or even exceeded the rate at which Soviet domestic production could replace them during this crucial period. Under these circumstances even small quantities of aid took on far greater significance.
 
Lend Lease earlier in the war (esp. 1941), might have made the difference between the Russians being defeated at Moscow or pushing the Germans back.

Except no. Lend-lease in '41 simply didn't reach the front until the defensive action around Moscow had already been decided. It was slightly more significant in the subsequent counter-offensive actions, but not in any decisive manner. To look at your example, the first British tanks didn't even reach the frontline until November 28th 1941, long past the point that the Germans offensive had already exhausted itself and scant days before the Soviet counter-offensive was due. Said counter-offensive relied on infantry and artillery for the heavy lifting, as even with lend-lease armor and aircraft were in too scant supply to be relied upon.

If there's any period where lend-lease might have made the difference between Soviet survival and Soviet defeat... it's really in 1942, not 1941. And even then, one can easily make an argument for the Soviets pulling through without it.
 
Except no. Lend-lease in '41 simply didn't reach the front until the defensive action around Moscow had already been decided. It was slightly more significant in the subsequent counter-offensive actions, but not in any decisive manner. To look at your example, the first British tanks didn't even reach the frontline until November 28th 1941, long past the point that the Germans offensive had already exhausted itself and scant days before the Soviet counter-offensive was due. Said counter-offensive relied on infantry and artillery for the heavy lifting, as even with lend-lease armor and aircraft were in too scant supply to be relied upon.

If there's any period where lend-lease might have made the difference between Soviet survival and Soviet defeat... it's really in 1942, not 1941. And even then, one can easily make an argument for the Soviets pulling through without it.

By 1942, especially after the German offensive at Stalingrad had stalled, the Soviets had already weathered the worst of what Hitler had to dish out. By that point in the war it was almost certain that the USSR was going to survive in one form or another; the big contribution of L-L was helping to facilitate the grand strategic level offensives undertaken by the Red Army in 1943 and beyond that expelled the Wehrmacht from Russian territory.

Because of the sheer size and population of the Soviet Union I don't think the Germans ever had a chance to actually 'win,' but prior to the summer of 1942 there was a real possibility that they'd be able to smash it into military impotence. Unfortunately for them they grossly overestimated their own capabilities in that regard and underestimated the resilience of the opposition.
 
By 1942, especially after the German offensive at Stalingrad had stalled, the Soviets had already weathered the worst of what Hitler had to dish out. By that point in the war it was almost certain that the USSR was going to survive in one form or another; the big contribution of L-L was helping to facilitate the grand strategic level offensives undertaken by the Red Army in 1943 and beyond that expelled the Wehrmacht from Russian territory.

Oh, yeah. I'm aware of the arguments on both sides. Hence the last sentence in my post.
 
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