Strategic withdrawal before Bagration

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Deleted member 1487

I know, I know, rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic. What if the Germans withdrew from Belarus and the expose areas of the Baltic states before the Soviets launched Bagration in July 1944? I was discussing this operation recently and looked at a map and was pretty shocked how crazy it was that a bulge that deep in their lines was allowed, even if the Pripyet marshes helped cover the flank and the area was pretty defensible. IIRC several generals were begging to be allowed to pull back too, but Hitler forebayed it. What if he was successfully removed or just died of heart failure or something a few months before and whomever replaced him was more rational and said abandon Belarus and pull back the lines to straightening things and save on manpower?
252ad75b2665739c3827b7fb5aba92a4.jpg


They would do scorched earth and pull back AG-North and Center to Riga straight down to link up with AG-South. How do the Soviets react and how does that impact Axis operations going forward? With a step back in say June after the Normandy landings to converse manpower and shorten the line they would disjoint Soviet offensive plans so that offensive against AG-South in July is not deprived of Panzers to support AG-Center as per OTL, so they'd be far more able to resist, while the Soviets move up in Belarus and aren't able to attack while they get their logistics in order.

The Axis save about 400k men and hundreds of AFVs and aircraft, but then have the Soviets move up that much closer to Poland and Germany. Thoughts?
 
For such a move to have any lasting, postwar, impact it would have to be accompanied by negotiation with the Allies, otherwise, as you say it is just shuffling the chairs on the Titanic. The Soviets will conduct a rapid, casualty free administrative move to Poland/Germany and kick off an offensive from there.
 

Deleted member 1487

For such a move to have any lasting, postwar, impact it would have to be accompanied by negotiation with the Allies, otherwise, as you say it is just shuffling the chairs on the Titanic. The Soviets will conduct a rapid, casualty free administrative move to Poland/Germany and kick off an offensive from there.
I was more asking about the military implications for the rest of the conflict in the East. Here AG-North isn't cut off in the aftermath of the offensive at Courland and the front line is much more well manned thanks to pulling back in an ordered manner (plus of course 400k extra men), while the Soviets now lack friendly partisans to attack German supply lines and provide intel, while German supply lines are shortened and the Soviet ones are longer while having to deal with scorched earth destruction.
 
I think the Red Army is so superior by this point that the Germans are going to get a smashing no matter what. Personally I'd prefer to get that smashing on Soviet territory rather than home territory.
 

Deleted member 1487

I think the Red Army is so superior by this point that the Germans are going to get a smashing no matter what. Personally I'd prefer to get that smashing on Soviet territory rather than home territory.
Given the huge problems with the stretched out front line (cutting it by at least half) enabling Soviet victory in Bagration that wouldn't be a problem on home turf, plus no partisans causing major problems, the Soviets wouldn't be able to pull off the destruction of an army group like they did IOTL in Belarus. Also German supply lines and infrastructure are far superior in Poland than in Belarus, while the Soviets would be that much further away from their supply hubs and have to use messed up Belarussian infrastructure. And the Germans wouldn't be wedded to fixed positions now and highly vulnerable to Soviet artillery.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Bagration#Operations_Rail_War_and_Concert
The start of Operation Bagration involved the many partisan formations in the Belorussian SSR, which were instructed to resume their attacks on railways and communications. From 19 June large numbers of explosive charges were placed on rail tracks and though many were cleared, they had a significant disruptive effect. The partisans were also used to mop up encircled German forces once the breakthrough and exploitation phases of the operation were completed.[42]

Part of it too would be pulling out and leaving the Soviets only with wrecked airbases, while falling back on their pre-war, all weather, high quality ones.
 
> IIRC several generals were begging to be allowed to pull back too

No. North army group has been staying in place for months or years in a highly defensible area (rivers and forests).
>, but Hitler forebayed it.
No, thy didn't ask for that (before Bagration). This is an urban legend.

> What if he was successfully removed or just died of heart failure or something a few months before and whomever replaced him was more rational and said abandon Belarus and pull back the lines to straightening things and save on manpower?

Rational?

Retreating and allowing your enemy to be close enough to bomb your coal/iol convering plants... Save on manpower? Same thing for the soviets.

Retreating when NOBODY was expecting an attack there? (it was expected north Ukraine).

>while the Soviets would be that much further away from their supply hubs and have to use messed up Belarussian infrastructure.

So they wouldn't have attacked before having been able to open good supply lines...
>And the Germans wouldn't be wedded to fixed positions now and highly vulnerable to Soviet artillery.
No, they still don't have any mobile units. Lack of trucks, horses.



Part of it too would be pulling out and leaving the Soviets only with wrecked airbases, while falling back on their pre-war, all weather, high quality ones.

So they would have constructed them again, as they did...

I fully expect you not to listen and not being able to understand that your logic is fundamentally flawed: you assume the the soviets won't be able to do something intelligent before attacking...



https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Bagration#cite_note-FOOTNOTEAdair200469.E2.80.9380-42
 

Deleted member 1487

No. North army group has been staying in place for months or years in a highly defensible area (rivers and forests).
No, thy didn't ask for that (before Bagration). This is an urban legend.
AG-North did sure, but with the supply situation, the need to defend the lake, and the vulnerable flank of AG-Center that position was untenable.


Retreating and allowing your enemy to be close enough to bomb your coal/iol convering plants... Save on manpower? Same thing for the soviets.
The Soviets didn't engage in strategic bombing after the failure of the 1941 bombing, plus the USAAF was doing that already, so the VVS stuck to army support operations.

Retreating when NOBODY was expecting an attack there? (it was expected north Ukraine).
The retreat would be the free up reserves to support AG-South and have extra manpower now that the situation in France sucked in so many of Germany's reserves.

So they wouldn't have attacked before having been able to open good supply lines...
Right, kind of hard to attack when you need to move your infrastructure forward.

No, they still don't have any mobile units. Lack of trucks, horses.
They had some mobile units, the less mobile infantry can hold certain positions or march as needed as a reserve, while the Panzers and motorized units can still travel as needed as a counterattack force.

So they would have constructed them again, as they did...
To a point sure, but the roads were pre-war and unpaved and the work to build up rail and landing strips would have taken months.

I fully expect you not to listen and not being able to understand that your logic is fundamentally flawed: you assume the the soviets won't be able to do something intelligent before attacking...
I imagine they would do many intelligent things before attacking, like moving up infrastructure. The strategic 'step back' would be to free up units to support AG-North Ukraine, while eliminating any chance of a Soviet attack for months while they moved up forces, supplies, and infrastructure in the north and center, meaning even greater reserves could be accumulated to counter the expected offensive in Ukraine.
 

Deleted member 1487

Any other thoughts about how the rest of the war would play out militarily assuming there is no peace deal reached between the post-Hitler German regime and the Allies? Clearly it would still be a loss, but in terms of the Soviets moving ahead in Ukraine after the step back and 3rd Panzer army is freed up to support AG-North Ukraine against the Soviet July offensive?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lvov–Sandomierz_Offensive
 
Cracou is half right: while there were calls to withdraw, most of them were about falling back to the Berezina or a similar new line, not evacuating Belarus entirely, nor were there any calls to abandon AGNs on the border between the RSFSR and the Baltic States prior to Bagration. Such voices were also a distinct minority: the overwhelming bulk of the German military leadership didn't think a major Soviet advance was going to come through Belarus and thus didn't see any point in pulling back.

In any case: the answer is that wherever the Germans fall back too, the Soviets move up to the new line, take a month to rebuild the railroads and get the forward depots set-up, and then smash through roughly as easily as they did OTL. Withdrawals don't change the ratios either: having to defend along a shorter front is offset by the fact that the Soviets can now concentrate even more forces along a narrow front.

Your attempt to cite Lvov-Sandomierz is a nice case-in-point. There the German Army Group North Ukraine had everything they didn't in Belarus: a solidly manned front, multiple defense lines, reasonable mobile reserves to act as a backstop.

1st Ukrainian took them apart just as easily as its northern comrades did AGC. The simple reality is that the Soviets in 1944 reached a level of operational expertise beyond anything the Germans had at any point in the war. No amount of withdrawing will change that. By the end of summer, the Soviets will probably overrun much of Poland and made significant inroads into East Prussia along with their OTL gains in the Balkans. Casualties will be roughly the same as OTL for both sides.
 
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Soviets move up to the new line, take a month to rebuild the railroads and get the depots set-up, and then smash through roughly as easily as they did OTL.

483ef0911f5e27073a015b45aee7a288b9c8d3bfa104f8bfe6625572f97cfa52.jpg


IOTL, the Soviets couldn't attack again in the Center (i.e. Poland) until Feb 1945 because logistics were so messed up. Now, in fantasy land, they are going to fix all of these things in one month and attacking where they did in Feb 1945 in Aug 1944. Not going to happen.

However, Wiking's plan has butterflies in the premature abandonment of the Baltic states.

This leads to Finland dropping out earlier (and that sucked up a lot of Russian fighting power with 189K casualties before Finland capitulating). It also screws the Balts, who fought far above their weight. They were enlisting in 1944 to fight the Russians and performed very well. In the Battle of Narva the Axis exacted 480,000 Russian casualties in exchange for 68,000 of their own. Bagration even according to Soviet estimates still cost more Russians then Germans (550K Axis, 780K USSR casualties).

So, if the Germans simply withdraw from the defensible territory they were on, they lose all of the fighting power of the Balts (who held out until Finland capitulated and the Germans withdrew fearing being out flanked), and likely force a huge Russian offensive in Poland in which the Germans lose big like they did from Bagration, just due to sheer numbers.

Ironically, the Germans played their hand right. Their hand sucked. However, it does show how even by mid 1944, the Germans were able to exact brutalizing casualties on the Soviets. If there was not a Western Front, the war would have ended in a bloody stalemate as soon the Eastern front started hitting pre-Barbarossa borders sans the Baltic states. These guys fought hard and did not want Russian occupation.


Here's some fun Battle Scenes of the Battle of Narva from the movie 1944 (2015):

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vBDuO2zq1Zc
 
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Deleted member 1487

You know all you're doing it tempting me to do more threads like this to see that cat more often, its pretty cute.


This leads to Finland dropping out earlier (and that sucked up a lot of Russian lives before Finland capitulating). It also screws the Balts, who fought far above their weight. They were enlisting in 1944 to fight the Russians and performed very well. In the Battle of Narva the Axis exacted 480,000 Russian casualties in exchange for 68,000 of their own. Bagration even according to Soviet estimates still cost more Russians then Germans (550K Axis, 780K USSR casualties).
IIRC German official numbers are just under 400k and the Soviet ones are nearly 800k. About 2:1. The problem is Germany couldn't afford those losses and could have gotten a better exchange rate in different circumstances if they stepped back or at least didn't have to defend the 'Festerplätze' like Hitler demanded.

So, if the Germans simply withdraw from the defensible territory they were on, they lose all of the fighting power of the Balts (who held out until Finland capitulated and the Germans withdrew fearing being out flanked), and likely force a huge Russian offensive in Poland in which the Germans lose big like they did from Bagration, just due to sheer numbers.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Continuation_War#Soviet_strategic_offensive
The Finns BTW were almost out of the war anyway and Narwa was lost due to Bagration too. Its not like the Germans couldn't evacuate and arm military age Balts from the evacuated territory or do a leave behind partisan force to mess up Soviet logistics.

There are a few advantages from stepping back, not least of which is freeing up 3rd Panzer army to aid AG-North Ukraine for the July offensive, it also concentrates the lines so there are far less gaps for the Soviets just to plow through, it gives the Germans a much better infrastructure behind the lines and eliminates the serious partisan threat that was messing up their logistics and providing intel for the Soviets. It also then keeps the Soviets from attacking anywhere but AG-South until mid/late Autumn, so they can focus reserves in one sector and maximize their ability to fight there.

Ironically, the Germans played their hand right. Their hand sucked. However, it does show how even by mid 1944, the Germans were able to exact brutalizing casualties on the Soviets. If there were no Western Front, the war would have ended in a bloody stalemate as soon the Eastern front started hitting pre-Barbarossa borders sans the Baltic states. These guys fought hard and did not want Russian occupation.
I mean given the heinous warcrimes on both sides they knew what defeat and occupation meant. The thing is without Hitler's meddling in 1944 they could have exacted an even higher price.
 
IOTL, the Soviets couldn't attack again in the Center (i.e. Poland) until Feb 1945 because logistics were so messed up

January 1945 actually. And they could have attacked a lot sooner had they prioritized. Also they had to spend a number of those months fighting forward instead of extending up their supply chain. Not the case IATL.

Now, in fantasy land, they are going to fix all of these things in one month and attacking where they did in Feb 1945 in Aug 1944. Not going to happen.

Actually, their still starting a fair bit further east then that. About ~200 kilometers.

Bagration even according to Soviet estimates still cost more Russians then Germans (550K Axis, 780K USSR casualties).

Of those Russian casualties, 2/3rds were sanitary and hence were back in the frontlines just a few months later. Of the German casualties, almost all were irrecoverable, with no chance on getting back in the line.

If there were no Western Front, the war would have ended in a bloody stalemate as soon the Eastern front started hitting pre-Barbarossa borders sans the Baltic states. These guys fought hard and did not want Russian occupation.

Now that is fantasy talk. The Soviets inflicted twice as many irrecoverable losses upon the Germans in Bagration as the Germans even deployed in the entire Battle of Normandy. And the Fermans can not want Soviet occupation as much as they want and fight as hard as they like. They'll still lose.
 

Deleted member 1487

Cracou is half right: while there were calls to withdraw, most of them were about falling back to the Berezina or a similar new line, not evacuating Belarus entirely, nor were there any calls to abandon AGNs on the border between the RSFSR and the Baltic States prior to Bagration. Such voices were also a distinct minority: the overwhelming bulk of the German military leadership didn't think a major Soviet advance was going to come through Belarus and thus didn't see any point in pulling back.
So what if they fell back to the Berezina?


In any case: the answer is that wherever the Germans fall back too, the Soviets move up to the new line, take a month to rebuild the railroads and get the forward depots set-up, and then smash through roughly as easily as they did OTL. Withdrawals don't change the ratios either: having to defend along a shorter front is offset by the fact that the Soviets can now concentrate even more forces along a narrow front.
It would take a lot longer than 1 month to rebuild the infrastructure given scorch earth, and convert any rail lines and move up a major force of 2 million men plus all their supplies, then build up the roads and do recon of new German positions, plus move up the VVS. It was a vast undertaking that took a long time, months, not weeks. The Soviets can concentrate more reserves behind the line, but there is a limit to how much they can mass on the front line. But so too can the Germans mass their own reserves better behind the line and resist, see the East Prussian campaign for how well a fixed position can be held with a sufficiently contiguous line:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/East_Prussian_Offensive#Opening_of_the_offensive

Your attempt to cite Lvov-Sandomierz is a nice case-in-point. There the German Army Group North Ukraine had everything they didn't in Belarus: a solidly manned front, multiple defense lines, reasonable mobile reserves to act as a backstop.
Not really, forces were stripped down to send reserves to Belarus to aid AG-Center:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lvov–Sandomierz_Offensive#Opposing_forces
Harpe could muster only 420 tanks, StuG's and other assorted armoured vehicles.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Bagration#Aftermath
The offensive cut off Army Group North and Army Group North Ukraine from each other, and weakened them as resources were diverted to the central sector. This forced both Army Groups to withdraw from Soviet territory much more quickly when faced with the following Soviet offensives in their sector


1st Ukrainian took them apart just as easily as its northern comrades did AGC. The simple reality is that the Soviets in 1944 reached a level of operational expertise beyond anything the Germans had at any point in the war. No amount of withdrawing will change that. By the end of summer, the Soviets will probably overrun much of Poland and made significant inroads into East Prussia along with their OTL gains in the Balkans. Casualties will be roughly the same as OTL for both sides.
Right, because German reserves were rushed back and forth and the Soviets have vast numerical and firepower advantages of their foe. By stepping back to free up reserves and make sure there was only one offensive faced at the same time would mean they have all reserves ready to intervene in North Ukraine rather that diverted to Belarus as per OTL, leaving AG- North Ukraine seriously outnumbered and gunned. Its not like it was any special military skill to be able to mass overwhelming forces along the entire front and launch two massive offensive simultaneously, overwhelming the enemy. Deceiving the Germans about which would come first was the icing on the cake, but the fact was they were able to launch two huge offensives at the same time with over 3 million men between them; the scenario I'm proposing is that the Germans step back to ensure they face only one and can focus their full reserves in the East against that one instead of having to try and fight both simultaneously.
 

Deleted member 1487

Of those Russian casualties, 2/3rds were sanitary and hence were back in the frontlines just a few months later. Of the German casualties, almost all were irrecoverable, with no chance on getting back in the line.
Sanitary includes wounded and disabled. We don't know how many were recoverable. On the German side there were wounded that were recoverable too, we don't know how many though without looking into the medical records. Over 100k wounded were evacuated, we don't know how many of them were disabled or recovered.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Bagration#endnote_Bb
 
January 1945 actually. And they could have attacked a lot sooner had they prioritized.

Not really, the Germans destroyed all the rails and burned down many towns and villages, the Russians had to truck in all their supplies.

Actually, their still starting a fair bit further east then that. About ~200 kilometers.

Not really. IOTL they reached the outskirts of Warsaw on Aug 2 1944. They did not take Warsaw until January 17 1945. That's almost a six month pause that it required to get logistics up to snuff to attack again with overwhelming power. So, even if a lull in fighting saves you 1.5 months (the time it took to actually fight it out IOTL). , That still means the soonest the Russians can attack is late November, not "1 month" as you claim.

Of those Russian casualties, 2/3rds were sanitary and hence were back in the frontlines just a few months later. Of the German casualties, almost all were irrecoverable, with no chance on getting back in the line.

I totally agree. However, the point is that the Germans were still ale to throw a few punches as the Titanic is sinking. If the Germans simply withdraw, the same thing happens further East...However, the Axis then loses all the victories they had in the Baltic states.

Now that is fantasy talk. The Soviets inflicted twice as many irrecoverable losses upon the Germans in Bagration as the Germans even deployed in the entire Battle of Normandy. And the Fermans can not want Soviet occupation as much as they want and fight as hard as they like. They'll still lose.

Which they couldn't if the Germans had another 1-2 million men in reserves, which IOTL were tied up in France and Italy.

The Russians had 1 million more men in Belarus in 1944. No western front, now all of the sudden they are equal. That means, no Soviet love fest in Berlin for you to dream about.
 
You know all you're doing it tempting me to do more threads like this to see that cat more often, its pretty cute.

Sweet :)

IIRC German official numbers are just under 400k and the Soviet ones are nearly 800k. About 2:1. The problem is Germany couldn't afford those losses and could have gotten a better exchange rate in different circumstances if they stepped back or at least didn't have to defend the 'Festerplätze' like Hitler demanded.

True, but Germany still loses somewhere. They can't afford their losses anywhere. The best they could have done is kill as much of the enemy in the process. If they withdraw, the lose all the tack on effects in Finland and the Baltic states.

The Finns BTW were almost out of the war anyway and Narwa was lost due to Bagration too.

The Finns left because the Germans had no hope, so this does not change. However, they still exacted a good deal of casualties, as did Narwa. If the Germans withdraw, FInland drops, no narwa happens, and the Russians do not experience 650K casualties total plus at a cost of a bunch of foreigners bearing arms on behalf of Germany. It seems to me bad strategy to, with hindsight, just give that up.

Its not like the Germans couldn't evacuate and arm military age Balts from the evacuated territory or do a leave behind partisan force to mess up Soviet logistics.

They fought hard because there was a chance to get a peace of sorts. This worked for Finland. If Germany simply withdraws, the Balts capitulate and the revolutionaries just go to the forests.
 
So what if they fell back to the Berezina?

There is even less difference. The Berezina is an off-shoot of the D'niepr and only 50-70 kilometers to it's west. The distance is trivial from an operational-strategic perspective. In fact, Pliev's Mechanized-Cavalry Group (which formed the southern pincer for both the encirclement of 9th Army and the drive on Minsk) began it's assault west of it from the center of the Pripyet Marshes.

EDIT: Also, minor nitpick, but in your OP you said "What if the Germans withdrew from Belarus and the expose areas of the Baltic states before the Soviets launched Bagration in July 1944?" Bagration was launched on June 21-23rd. The Soviets were already most of the way to Minsk by the time July rolled around (and indeed, the city was captured on July 3rd).

It would take a lot longer than 1 month to rebuild the infrastructure given scorch earth, and convert any rail lines and move up a major force of 2 million men plus all their supplies, then build up the roads and do recon of new German positions, plus move up the VVS.
The Soviets had already done it before (see below).

Right, because German reserves were rushed back and forth and the Soviets have vast numerical and firepower advantages of their foe.
None of which will change.

By stepping back to free up reserves and make sure there was only one offensive faced at the same time
A fantasy: the Soviets will simply delay L'vov-Sandomierz until Bagration can be executed. At which point the offensives will occur in parrallel (rather then sequentially like OTL). This was basic Soviet operational-strategic practice: multiple offensives executed in parallel and/or sequentially as part of a larger offensive. They didn't really do singular offensives...

would mean they have all reserves ready to intervene in North Ukraine rather that diverted to Belarus as per OTL,
They had considerable reserves left behind anyways.

leaving AG- North Ukraine seriously outnumbered and gunned.
It still will be. Since the Germans have pulled back and generously shortened the line, the Soviets can condense 1st Ukrainians frontage and slot in the left wing of 1st Belarussian Front, adding a ~500-600,000 men and 1,500 AFVs.

Its not like it was any special military skill to be able to mass overwhelming forces along the entire front and launch two massive offensive simultaneously, overwhelming the enemy.
To the militarily ignorant. In reality the preparation, supply, coordination, and maneuvering of such forces is immensely complicated and massive undertaking that requires considerable amount of talent to do.

Deceiving the Germans about which would come first was the icing on the cake, but the fact was they were able to launch two huge offensives at the same time with over 3 million men between them;
3.5 million men, actually.

the scenario I'm proposing is that the Germans step back to ensure they face only one and can focus their full reserves in the East against that one instead of having to try and fight both simultaneously.
A preposterous scenario which relies on both the Soviets abandoning their own SOP on such matters and that the freed up forces on the Soviet side means they don't reinforce to their own offensives.

Sanitary includes wounded and disabled. We don't know how many were recoverable.

No, disabled are included under irrecoverable. That's why their called irrecoverable losses: their casualties that the army cannot recover.

On the German side there were wounded that were recoverable too, we don't know how many though without looking into the medical records.
Oh, yes. But they were in the vast minority. A simple glance at wikipedia shows that they made up ~100,000 of the 400K lost in Bagration.

The thing is without Hitler's meddling in 1944 they could have exacted an even higher price.
The disasters of summer 1944 were not solely the result of Hitler's meddling. The German military leadership bear just as much responsibility for once again failing to accurately judge the Soviets intentions and capabilities while overestimating their own. And once the Soviet assault had begun, it unfolded with such speed and power that there was nothing they could have done any more then what they did IOTL: even those formations which disobeyed or didn't wait for orders to withdraw and attempted to retreat were still encircled and annihilated. The only difference was it was less costly for the Soviets to destroy those formations since they had left their fortifications and were now in the open, exposed to the full-force of the Red Army's firepower. Once more you unthinkingly regurgitate the "blame Hitler" myth.

I mean, looking at your posts in the rest of your thread, one thing that leaps out at me is that you are positing the Germans perform this withdrawal at just precisely the right time and pace before the Soviets begin the attack: not so early that the Soviets can't simply occupy the ground and begin their offensive roughly on-time (or at least with much less then a month's delay) from further west and not so late that the Soviets don't just launch the offensive and roll over the Germans while their still in the process of withdrawing, catching them in the open. That kind of timing presumes they know precisely when the Soviet offensive is... something not a single German at any level of the Ostheer, from the lowliest landser up to Hitler, had the slightest clue about (beyond the obvious answer of "some time in the summer).

But then I go back up and look at your OP and you say:

What if he [Hitler] was successfully removed or just died of heart failure or something a few months before and whomever replaced him was more rational and said abandon Belarus and pull back the lines to straightening things and save on manpower?
Well then, this means the withdrawal is taking place a few months before Bagration since a more rational actor having no clue when the Soviet attack is coming isn't going to wait until the last minute in the vague of hope of finding out, meaning the Soviets have a ton of time to occupy the abandon territory, get their logistics in order, and prepare to start the operation with only a few days delay at most.

But then you go and say:

With a step back in say June after the Normandy landings to converse manpower and shorten the line they would disjoint Soviet offensive plans so that offensive against AG-South in July is not deprived of Panzers to support AG-Center as per OTL, so they'd be far more able to resist, while the Soviets move up in Belarus and aren't able to attack while they get their logistics in order.
Which is you just hand waving in, since a more rational actor willing to withdraw forces in order to conserve manpower isn't going to wait for Normandy either, but it means the Germans are withdrawing around June 6th. That means the Soviet offensive is going to kick off sometime in the first half of July.

Not really, the Germans destroyed all the rails and burned down many towns and villages, the Russians had to truck in all their supplies.

In Eastern Ukraine in 1943 when the Soviets reached the D'niepr at the end of September: the Germans had conducted a fighting withdrawal (as opposed to just giving up the ground entirely, meaning the Soviet advance was considerably slowed) and systematically destroyed almost everything in their retreat including the entire rail network. Yet the Soviets rapidly rebuilt the rails over the 350 kilometers from their starting point (roughly the same distance as Wiking's proposed withdrawal) during the course of Octobe and at the start of November were already poised to begin a series of offensives which would go through the winter of 1943-44 and straight on into the Spring of '44, carrying them the rest of the way across Western Ukraine. So the Soviets have demonstrated the requisite logistical capability and acumen to do it. They just chose not to exercise it in the autumn of 1944 in favor of supporting the drive through the Balkans.

In fact, given the rate of Soviet advance between August 1943 and August 1944, the Soviets should have been in Berlin by mid-December. That they were not was a function of Stalin's choice to pursue the political objective of conquering the Balkans over ending the war as quickly as possible.

Not really.
Yes really. Wiking is proposing evacuating the Belarussian Balconey, not falling back all the way to the Vistula and the outskirts of Warsaw. That is a difference of 200 kilometers.

EDIT: Actually, now that I went and measured out, it's more like 250-300 kilometers East of where the Soviets were in August 1944.

IOTL they reached the outskirts of Warsaw on Aug 2 1944. They did not take Warsaw until January 17 1945.
Because they chose not too. With the Germans cleared from the European USSR, Stalin reassigned the bulk of STAVKA's logistical assets (which most notably included the Soviet NKPS rail repair corps) to 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Ukrainian Fronts for their offensive into the Balkans. Those assets would slowly be reassigned during the course of autumn 1944 as Soviet objectives in the Balkans were satisfied. The offensive which took Warsaw began some weeks ahead of the original plan. Stalin advanced the schedule because... well, because he could.

However, the point is that the Germans were still ale to throw a few punches as the Titanic is sinking.
Those casualties meant nothing to the Soviets. They replaced them almost instantly. When it comes to equipment, the losses the Germans inflicted were even more inconsequential: for example the Soviet tank inventory actually grew by 4,000 vehicles over the course of 1944.

So sure, Germany was able to throw a few punches while getting totally hammered. But that doesn't mean anything if they aren't capable of actually hurting your opponent.

Which they couldn't if the Germans had another 1-2 million men in reserves, which IOTL were tied up in France and Italy.
What nonsense numbers. Total German forces committed to the Western Fronts (both the Italian and Normandy fronts) on July 1st 1944 comes out too 892,000 men. Those forces getting sent eastward wouldn't even be enough to make up for their losses over the course of that summer (which come out to some 2 million total casualties, of which nearly half were irrecoverable). The same is true for equipment: as an example the Germans committed 2,200 AFVs to Normandy and a few hundred in Italy. They lost 3,000 in the east during the same period.

The Russians had 1 million more men in Belarus in 1944. No western front, now all of the sudden they are equal.
I don't know what you hit your head upon: the total number of men deployed across the four Army Fronts committed to Bagration comes out too 2.3 million against 700,000 men in Army Group Center (Soviet Blitzkrieg: The Battle for White Russia, 1944). If we pull back to account for the entire Soviet Summer Strategic Offensive Operation, the number jumps to nearly 5 million men against 1.5 million Germans deployed between the Northern Carpathians and the Baltic Sea. And if we pull back once more and look at the entirety of the Eastern Front, from the Baltic to the Black Sea, the numbers were 6.5 million against 2.16 million. Adding those 892,000 men still leaves the Soviets with more then 2:1 superiority in manpower and nearly 4:1 superiority in armor.
 
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In Eastern Ukraine in 1943 when the Soviets reached the D'niepr at the end of September: the Germans had conducted a fighting withdrawal (as opposed to just giving up the ground entirely, meaning the Soviet advance was considerably slowed) and systematically destroyed almost everything in their retreat including the entire rail network. Yet the Soviets rapidly rebuilt the rails over the 350 kilometers from their starting point (roughly the same distance as Wiking's proposed withdrawal) during the course of Octobe and at the start of November were already poised to begin a series of offensives which would go through the winter of 1943-44 and straight on into the Spring of '44, carrying them the rest of the way across Western Ukraine.

Between August to late December, the Russians moved maybe 80 KM westward. Obviously the Dnieper River was in the way. Further, there was the reason of logistics. So, the idea that it takes about 4.5 months to get the logisitics over that distance fixed up seems right, instead of your figure of "1 month."

In fact, given the rate of Soviet advance between August 1943 and August 1944, the Soviets should have been in Berlin by mid-December. That they were not was a function of Stalin's choice to pursue the political objective of conquering the Balkans over ending the war as quickly as possible.

Again, the Balkans were collapsing while he did not have the logistics to press the issue on German soil yet.

That is a difference of 200 kilometers.

I'm not hear defending Wiking's idea, and he plans on abandoning the Balts and Finns, which I have argued, is a net gain for the Russians.

Because they chose not too. With the Germans cleared from the European USSR, Stalin reassigned the bulk of STAVKA's logistical assets (which most notably included the Soviet NKPS rail repair corps) to 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Ukrainian Fronts for their offensive into the Balkans.

So? All you are showing that unless Stalin purposely did not advance as fast as he could have in the south, could they have fixed things up quicker. But then again, which rail corps were assigned to the center? Were there limitations on having too much in one area?

Those casualties meant nothing to the Soviets.

Of course they meant something, the point is Wiking is asking for a POD that takes as many people down with the sinking Titanic as possible. So, I am not hear arguing how replacable the guys were.

What nonsense numbers. Total German forces committed to the Western Fronts (both the Italian and Normandy fronts) on July 1st 1944 comes out too 892,000 men

Thanks for making this more exact, I was just guessing.

Those forces getting sent eastward wouldn't even be enough to make up for their losses over the course of that summer (which come out to some 2 million total casualties, of which nearly half were irrecoverable).

They would have made the difference in Bagration. The Russians would have had numerical superiority in only one front, they would not be able to hold a simultaneous offensive. Further, you are not including that 55% of Germans guns were being used for domestic air defense, so we have tons of military assets being used against the west, where if moved east would have been the difference maker.

Sorry, no Russian love fest in Berlin without the West.

The same is true for equipment: as an example the Germans committed 2,200 AFVs to Normandy and a few hundred in Italy. They lost 3,000 in the east during the same period.

Well, it almost helps replace all of them. Without the West, now you have no lend lease...what kind of superiority would the Russians have?

I don't know what you hit your head upon: the total number of men deployed across the four Army Fronts committed to Bagration comes out too 2.3 million against 700,000 men in Army Group Center (Soviet Blitzkrieg: The Battle for White Russia, 1944).

There are other fiures that bring it to a difference of 1 million men instead of 1.6 million men as you show here. What's the point we ca just pick the guys whose numbers we like?

Adding those 892,000 men still leaves the Soviets with more then 2:1 superiority in manpower and nearly 4:1 superiority in armor.

All I said is that those men can help close the gap in one front. And, as we can see in the Battle of Narwa, the Axis was able to fight quite well when outnumbered. Eventually, the Russians would have been bled white without the west.
 
They would have made the difference in Bagration. The Russians would have had numerical superiority in only one front, they would not be able to hold a simultaneous offensive. Further, you are not including that 55% of Germans guns were being used for domestic air defense, so we have tons of military assets being used against the west, where if moved east would have been the difference maker.

Sorry, no Russian love fest in Berlin without the West.



Well, it almost helps replace all of them. Without the West, now you have no lend lease...what kind of superiority would the Russians have?

Up until this point, I could follow the line of thinking even if ObssessedNuker is far more persuasive in his quoting of figures and facts.

But...umm...why are you even discussing a Bagration situation or wiking's scenario if you are referring to there being no Western Allies involved in the war at all? Until you wrote this last post I figured you were referring to the possibility of Normandy being delayed sufficiently (or better yet for the Germans, for Normandy to be defeated) to allow German reserves to be transferred to the eastern front.

However, no western involvement in the war to the extent that you are now clearly referring to changes the dynamics of the war such that it bears no relevance on the dicussion of Bagration (because events would have been changed from 1941 to the point that 1944 would probably be entirely different) or anything pertaining to the OTL eastern front after 1941. This is going massively off-topic since the topic (and the discussions around it including all of ObssessedNuker's points) is based clearly on a POD at some point in early 1944, by which time the prospect of there being no Anglo-Franco-American involvement in the war in the way that you are referring to is obviously ASB.
 
Between August to late December, the Russians moved maybe 80 KM westward. Obviously the Dnieper River was in the way. Further, there was the reason of logistics. So, the idea that it takes about 4.5 months to get the logisitics over that distance fixed up seems right, instead of your figure of "1 month."

In 1944 or 1943? Because if the latter that is horribly wrong: the Soviets advanced some 4-500 kilometers in that period, clear over the D'niepr river. In 1944, the D'niepr wasn't in the way at all since the Soviets had already left it behind some 5-600 kilometers by then.

Again, the Balkans were collapsing while he did not have the logistics to press the issue on German soil yet.

The Balkans were not yet collapsing at the start of August 1944. Forcing Romania to surrender and pushing the Balkans into collapse required the Soviets to fight through a half-million Germans and another half-million Romanians dug in along favorable defensive lines. It was a challenge the Soviets once again met masterfully: in the course of 9 days the Soviets shattered the Romanians and encircled the Germans.

I'm not hear defending Wiking's idea, and he plans on abandoning the Balts and Finns, which I have argued, is a net gain for the Russians.

True.

But then again, which rail corps were assigned to the center?

Running off of memory at the moment, 4th NKPS and 5th NKPS were reassigned from 1st Ukrainian and 1st Belorussian respectively to 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian in August. This gave the Soviet forces in the Balkans a full half of the Soviets NKPS.

Were there limitations on having too much in one area?

Nope.

Of course they meant something,

Not to the Soviet military leadership. They simply didn't care about casualties unless they negatively impacted the future fighting capacity of the Red Army. The casualties the Soviets sustained in 1944 never did, so they didn't care.

the point is Wiking is asking for a POD that takes as many people down with the sinking Titanic as possible. So, I am not hear arguing how replacable the guys were.

Fair enough.

They would have made the difference in Bagration.

No they wouldn't. To start with, the bulk of those men would go to Army Group North Ukraine, not Army Group Center. The rest would be spread out across the German front from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Army Group Center would only recieve a fraction of them, not remotely enough to close the gap. The Soviets didn't just outnumber the Germans, they also out maneuvered and outgeneralled them.

Chris N already dealt with the rest of this section, so I won't bother to address it any further.

There are other fiures that bring it to a difference of 1 million men instead of 1.6 million men as you show here. What's the point we ca just pick the guys whose numbers we like?

Well, unlike you I actually sourced my numbers from scholarly sources. Plus, the foremost western expert on the Eastern Front (David Glantz) also says 2.3 million.

All I said is that those men can help close the gap in one front.

It isn't remotely enough, particularly given the Germans incapacity to predict Soviet intentions and capabilities.
 
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