Strategic Production - Tanks

[ryackov]

While I read quite a few TLs, few of them seriously factors in strategic production.

The French had a hundred engine/automakers, which hindered logistics for their motor vehicles.

The US Sherman is undervalued, since despite being inferior in the late war, it was a major source of firepower. US infantry divisions had their own quantity of Shermans, and I've read that the entire US army had enough Shermans to equip 50 armored divisions.

While I'm sure heavy tanks are quite phallic, the sole purpose of a tank isn't to destroy other tanks.

Heavy tanks have a few other disadantages as well, fuel refining wasn't quite up to the standards we have today, and engines were relatively inefficient. The lighter Sherman (than the Panther) used a radial aircraft engine, and most US tanks during WWII used high performance aircraft engines fueled with gasoline (partly due to economies of scale). In comparison to the Panther, the Sherman was excellent at climbing hills, although the small tracks would make muddy terrain more difficult.

 

[Riain]

Is this another thread about how all other major armies were wrong because the US didn't build a heavy tank?

 

[Corbell Mark IV]

While I read quite a few TLs, few of them seriously factors in strategic production....

Well, this is obviously true,

...
While I'm sure heavy tanks are quite phallic, the sole purpose of a tank isn't to destroy other tanks.

THis is obviously overstated.

While it is true that tanks "sole purpose" was NOT to destroy other tanks, tanks could not perform any of those other purposes if they had been destroyed by another tank.

 

[NORGCO]

Is this another thread about how all other major armies were wrong because the US didn't build a heavy tank?

Honestly I've always tended to see this as being about playing to your strengths and minimising your weaknesses. Germany couldn't have found the crews or fuel for a dramatically larger panzer force, they had to get the most combat power out of every man and drop of petrol. I believe the numbers are 10,000 or so Tiger tanks produced in the whole war VS 30,000 Sherman in 1943 alone?

The US had the automotive industry to produce huge numbers of a basically adequate vehicle like the Sherman and the population and oil industry to support them. They didn't have the experience on the Russian Front to create demand for a heavy tank, that demand really started in Normandy, didn't it?


By 1944 80% of German Army transport vehicles were horse drawn wagons and the Normandy defences were being manned by battalions of men with stomach problems and others who were all partly deaf. They came up with different solutions to the US army because their problems and resources were different.

 

[SAVORYapple]

Honestly I've always tended to see this as being about playing to your strengths and minimising your weaknesses. Germany couldn't have found the crews or fuel for a dramatically larger panzer force, they had to get the most combat power out of every man and drop of petrol.

Much like what the japanese tried to do with their navy. Interesting, I never considered it that way. Your right, though. If you only have enough fuel for one tank, you might as well build it so that you get the most bang for your bucks, especially when said bucks were more plentiful than fuel (no pun intended).

 

[machine3589]

Honestly I've always tended to see this as being about playing to your strengths and minimising your weaknesses. Germany couldn't have found the crews or fuel for a dramatically larger panzer force, they had to get the most combat power out of every man and drop of petrol. I believe the numbers are 10,000 or so Tiger tanks produced in the whole war VS 30,000 Sherman in 1943 alone?

10,000 Tigers? Try 1,600 during the entire course of the war. Until Barbarossa, German tank forces consisted largely out of Panzer IIs, and from Barbarossa to Kursk they consisted mostly out of Panzer IIIs.

 

[bsmart]

The U.S. didn't build produce heavy tanks in volume during WWII for several reasons

1) Up until mid 1944 they were very concerned about shipping capacity across the North Atlantic. Medium tanks are a much more efficient use of limited shipping capacity than Heavy tanks

2) The U.S. realized that most port facilities in Europe would be destroyed and that ships would have to be 'self unloading'. In the pacific it wasn't that the facilities would be destroyed. There just plain were none in many places. Unloading 50+ ton Heavy tanks was a difficult job. Most cargo ships could handle the 30-35 ton medium tanks using their own gear

3) The US knew that they would be fighting a war 'on the far side of the world' and that maintenance was a major concern. Most German tanks were never more than 1000 miles from their factories and for major work could be returned to well established depots. In many cases U.S. tanks were shipped 1000 miles just to their port of embarkation! Since the U.S. planned on such a long supply chain they placed a very high value on reliability and ease of maintenance. The had a heavy tank in early 1942 but it did not meet the very tough American standards of reliability. The M6 was as reliable as any heavy tank in the world but it did not meet the American standards of durability to be standardized. By 1944 it had been modified to mount a 105mm gun (a gun not a howitzer) and offered to SHAEF for use in Europe but it was decided that the limited number available would be a logistic nightmare. The test vehicles (M6A2E1) were used as test beds for the T29 series of Heavy tanks then under development

 

[Kevin Renner]

Another factor that is all too commonly overlooked is US Army tactical doctrine that called for Shermans to be designed as infantry support tanks while Tank Destroyers were tasked with killing tanks. Any flaws of the Sherman derive from this doctrine. Plus the Sherman's used more than just radial aircraft type engines. The marines used deisel powered versions and Ford supplied DOHC V-8s derived from their still born answer to the Merlin, the XV-1650

 

[ryackov]

Another factor that is all too commonly overlooked is US Army tactical doctrine that called for Shermans to be designed as infantry support tanks while Tank Destroyers were tasked with killing tanks. Any flaws of the Sherman derive from this doctrine. Plus the Sherman's used more than just radial aircraft type engines. The marines used deisel powered versions and Ford supplied DOHC V-8s derived from their still born answer to the Merlin, the XV-1650

I believe the tank destroyer doctrine came about as a result of the sudden appearance of German heavy tanks. Those tank destroyers were pretty much mobile guns with no armor.

Yes, the Shermans used any engine available, since there was even a shortage of aircraft engines for it.

By 1944 80% of German Army transport vehicles were horse drawn wagons and the Normandy defences were being manned by battalions of men with stomach problems and others who were all partly deaf. They came up with different solutions to the US army because their problems and resources were different.

Much of the German army's forces were on the Eastern front. They didn't have a shortage of men, arguably one man in a tank is more effective then two in the field, and a smaller tank would consume less fuel. While you would end up with more then one tank, at least according to lancaster's formulas you'd have more firepower.

 

[AdA]

10,000 Tigers? Try 1,600 during the entire course of the war. Until Barbarossa, German tank forces consisted largely out of Panzer IIs, and from Barbarossa to Kursk they consisted mostly out of Panzer IIIs.

1354 Tiger I and 489 Tiger II. We might factor in 90 Ferdinand and 77 Jagd Tigers. The Russians produced 2210 IS2 and 2510 ISU 122/152 in 1944 alone...

 

[Riain]

So it is another thread rationalising away the failure of the US to produce the T1/M6 despite the other major powers producing heavy tanks.

Can I place money on the outcome of this thread?

 

[Aelita]

So it is another thread rationalising away the failure of the US to produce the T1/M6 despite the other major powers producing heavy tanks.

Can I place money on the outcome of this thread?

The reasons why have all been stated. Heavy tanks would have been counterproductive to the American war effort, thanks to the logistical strains. Shermans still had good combat records against Panthers and Tigers in Northern France, where their strengths played well to the terrain.

 

[Riain]

The reasons why have all been stated. Heavy tanks would have been counterproductive to the American war effort, thanks to the logistical strains. Shermans still had good combat records against Panthers and Tigers in Northern France, where their strengths played well to the terrain.

That neatly encapsulates the standard US view on the subject.

Now all we need is the opposing view, most probably from a non-US person, and this thread will be done and dusted!

 

[AdA]

There's two and I'll provide both so we can be done with it. One is that heavy tanks provided a dedicated long range antitank/breakthrough capability that can be a force multiplier making them worth every ounce of steel they costed (as demonstrated by the "firefighter" role the tiger units played for the Germans and the "icebreaker" role the IS2 played for the Russians) and the other is that the US could and should have replaced/improved the Sherman during the war.
OK, I think we've done it again.

 

[Gunnarnz]

That neatly encapsulates the standard US view on the subject.

Now all we need is the opposing view, most probably from a non-US person, and this thread will be done and dusted!

You know, there's probably a way to make a script that runs on the server to do this. Every 6 months the timer goes "ding" and it randomly generates 1/2 a dozen names, then copies and pastes the usual arguments into a fresh thread called something innovative like "Sherman tank: threat or menace?".
It would save a lot of time and frothing, and we could all go back to concentrating on finding new ways for the Germans to win WW2.

 

[historyfool]

Each fighting nation had its own set of conditions, experiences and economic realities which influenced and sometime forced their decisions. Since the problems were individual, the solutions were as well, each with different advantages and problems:

The Germans had two serious problems:

For one Germany after the economic crisis of the 1870s took industrially a rather different way from most other nations. Since a contributing factor for its problems was low quality they developed away from true mass-production. Instead German had a cluster-based industry, that means the majority of coorporations are middle or small-sized and produce a limited amount of high-quality goods with highly-skilled workers for a slightly higher price. Despite DIN-Norms the German industry was therefore not really up to mass-producing perfectly standardised equipment, a problem aggreviated by the necessary use of factories in occupied nations, namely Czech ones. The nazis tried to change to mass-production during the war, which was partially sucessful, not least with the help of slave labour, but led to a grave reduction of quality control. Logically West Germany turned again to the old ways, something which later helped to preserve the German industry better compared to other industrial countries.

The second problem is easier explained. Germany simply had amuch smaller population than its enemies and had to get the most out of its smaller numbers.

Their solution to those conditions was a number of rather specialised vehicles, if necessary even several ones with the same function. If possible those should have higher combat value than comparable hostile tanks to offset superior numbers. During the course of the war failing quality control, dwindeling resources and bad design decisions hastened the logical step to build heavier tanks culminating in the super-heavies of the late war. Still, fundamentally it was the only strategy with even a chance to succeed. With neither the ability to build higher numbers nor to man them they had to have better tanks, improving standardisation once it becomes possible. And with the majority of fighting in wide, open terrain per doctrine under at least contested sky the logical choice was concentrating on good protection and a long ranged gun. Of course under hostile sky and in close quarters those features can be a liability.

Since the German part became longer than intended I keep the others rather short:
The USSR had a good access to resources the ability to mass-produce and a huge population. Where it lacked somewhat was in training, both of the work-force and the soldiers. The obvious solution was to build simple, robust, low-maintenance vehicles, capable to run despite not-entirely fitting spare parts or hard treatment by its crews. Of course these tanks still had to be able at least to compete with the German ones in the open. In following these requirments the Red army got some outstanding vehicles, which often at least in some features outclassed their more refined German counterparts.

The Americans had mass-producing industry and a well trained, large population. They did have neither the doctrine nor the experiences to anticipate huge tank on tank engagements. But they knew they would land on a hostile coast at the far end of a long supply line, though only under total air superiority. An easy to transport and not too thirsty tank was called for. Excellent tactical air support, artillery tactics and usually rather confined terrain, which cancelled the strengthes of German tanks and inflated their (many) weaknesses, made the Sherman a good choice at least against German second and third-rate divisions. For the Germans or Russians on the other hand concentrating on a comparable model would have been disastrous.

 

[Riain]

There's two and I'll provide both so we can be done with it. One is that heavy tanks provided a dedicated long range antitank/breakthrough capability that can be a force multiplier making them worth every ounce of steel they costed (as demonstrated by the "firefighter" role the tiger units played for the Germans and the "icebreaker" role the IS2 played for the Russians) and the other is that the US could and should have replaced/improved the Sherman during the war.
OK, I think we've done it again.

Yep, done and dusted, and quicker than usual too!

 

[Riain]

You know, there's probably a way to make a script that runs on the server to do this. Every 6 months the timer goes "ding" and it randomly generates 1/2 a dozen names, then copies and pastes the usual arguments into a fresh thread called something innovative like "Sherman tank: threat or menace?".
It would save a lot of time and frothing, and we could all go back to concentrating on finding new ways for the Germans to win WW2.

That would be the go, perhaps we can organise with Admin to set something up.

What would be a cool challenge would be to see how quickly we can get this one sorted next time it comes up. Perfection would be 3 posts: OP, Sherman-good/Heavy-bad and Sherman-bad/Heavy-good, end of thread!

 

[Flubber]

Perfection would be 3 posts: OP, Sherman-good/Heavy-bad and Sherman-bad/Heavy-good, end of thread!

Perfection would be the topic never arising again or, if it did arise again, that simplistic binary thinking wouldn't be a part of it.

The question isn't Sherman-good/Heavy-bad or Sherman-bad/Heavy-good, it's far more nuanced than that. The question is more along the lines of, but not limited to, "Sherman perceived at the time to be good enough and doesn't derange production, transportation, and logistics' versus "Heavy perceived at the time not to provide enough benefits to be worth deranging production, transportation, and logistics.

 

[BlondieBC]

While I read quite a few TLs, few of them seriously factors in strategic production.

The French had a hundred engine/automakers, which hindered logistics for their motor vehicles.

The US Sherman is undervalued, since despite being inferior in the late war, it was a major source of firepower. US infantry divisions had their own quantity of Shermans, and I've read that the entire US army had enough Shermans to equip 50 armored divisions.

While I'm sure heavy tanks are quite phallic, the sole purpose of a tank isn't to destroy other tanks.

Heavy tanks have a few other disadantages as well, fuel refining wasn't quite up to the standards we have today, and engines were relatively inefficient. The lighter Sherman (than the Panther) used a radial aircraft engine, and most US tanks during WWII used high performance aircraft engines fueled with gasoline (partly due to economies of scale). In comparison to the Panther, the Sherman was excellent at climbing hills, although the small tracks would make muddy terrain more difficult.

The equipment built comes from the doctrine and production capabilities of the various nations. Past experiences are important. Different nations made different decisions. All strategies had benefits and disadvantages. Some of the factors.

1) Germany also started out with only light tanks, and end up having heavy tanks as a part of the mix. The USA entered the war over two years later than the USA, so when we look at the Germans in mid 1944 and compare to the USA in 1944, it is not entire fair. We should also look at the Germans in 1944 with the projected forces of the USA in 1946. Or we should look at the German tank mixture in summer of 1942 to the USA in summer of 1944. The difference are less pronounce. You can see the USA trying to upgun tanks in 1944/45. It would have been more pronounced by 1946 on size of gun and amount of armor.

2) As other mention, the USA had longer logistical lines.

3) As you go to a more defensive war, heavier tanks perform better. In a war of rapid advance, you need speed to exploit the breakouts. Heavier, slower tanks can have issues.

4) The USA knew it could not go into France until it had control of the air, so we could rely on planes to take out heavier tanks and positions more than Germany could. If the USA expected never to gain control of the skies, it likely has different mixture of tanks by 1944 and quite possible different models.

5) As you mention, the USA chose quantity on its tanks over quality. We also were choosing lighter and more reliable tanks.

6) In early North African experiences, we were fighting earlier panzer versions. If the USA had been fighting a German army equipped with T-34's, then we likely make different production decisions. While the USA and other nations had production policies, plans, and doctrine, these were often adjusted by battlefield setbacks.