In March 1990, when the trial of the Khalqi officers was about to start, Tanai launched a coup with the help of renegade
mujahideen commander,
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, against the then President
Mohammad Najibullah. He stated that he didn't disagree with President Najibullah's views, but rather with his policy on the military.
Najibullah was transferring all the privileges of the Army to the tribal militias and in particular to his special guard. I was against this because the Afghan Army was losing efficiency. Hekmatyar ordered his fighters to intensify their attacks against the Kabul regime in support of Tanai. The success of the coup was taken for granted.
The Pakistan government's involvement in this abortive affair was transparently obvious. Prime Minister
Benazir Bhutto's plea to the other six party leaders to aid Tanai and Hekmatyar was rebuked as a disgrace to the
jihad. Most of the factions viewed Gral. Tanai as an opportunistic
war criminal and
hardline communist who had been responsible for the carpet-bombing of portions of the major western city of
Herat in March 1979.
The expected uprising by Afghan Army didn't take place: Tanai had no direct control of troops inside
Kabul. He ordered air strikes against government buildings (Air Force Commander Abdul Qadir Aqa was an accomplice who also later fled to Pakistan). The plot misfired and failed because of faulty communications.
President Najibulllad appeared on TV at 10 p.m. the same night to prove that he was physically there and in effective control of the state apparatus. The President gathered the support of important
Parchami militias, including the elite Special Guard to defuse the plot.
Tanai was apparently also supported by those important
Khalqis who remained in the
Politburo, Assadullah Sarwary and Mohammad Gulabzoi, respectively their country's envoys to
Aden and
Moscow, were said to have been intimately connected with the coup and with Gral Tanai.