Stop the Einsatzgruppen

Late October 1941,

Moscow

As the Partisan official expected, the survivor's account moved everyboy in the room. What the SS and local collaborators did at Babi Yar in September was monsterous and sickening - even by well, NKVD standards.

Not wanting to dwell on the latter, the partisan coordinator allowed himself some self congratulation. He needed an eyewitness to give life to the fragmented intelligence reports from the occupied zone. Thus, he had a survivor identified and brought from Kiev by partisans to a clandestine airstrip and then to the Soviet side.

Now, through his efforts, things were happening. For both humanitarian reasons, a desire to save as many Soviet jews as possible and for more prosaic reasons- a need to refurbish the image of the Soviet Government to western allies and the need to show a human face towards Soviet citizens, his lone voice was being heard by Senior officials.

The senior offical turned towards him: "I want stopping these Einsatzgruppen and their helpers made a priority for Soviet partisans. You can support them with whatever material and specialists that can be airdropped"

What could realistically be done that would hinder the Einsatzgruppen as much as possible?
 

sharlin

Banned
Thing is any Soviet reprisals against the Germans from Partisans tended to react in German reprisals against nearby towns/villages, if they went after the Einsatz in a big way they could well start exterminating the populace of towns as revenge.
 
Thing is any Soviet reprisals against the Germans from Partisans tended to react in German reprisals against nearby towns/villages, if they went after the Einsatz in a big way they could well start exterminating the populace of towns as revenge.

I agree, but perhaps for starters the partisans could systematically target indivdual members of pro German militias who supported the Einstatzgruppen (in some cases, local SS militiamen out numbered the German Einsatz at the killing sites).

That might make locals hesitant to support the Einstazgruppen and reduce their efficiency.

And... order partisans to destroy as many registrar books, census information and birth records as possible (make it harder to identify non Jewish looking Jews)
 
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Thing is any Soviet reprisals against the Germans from Partisans tended to react in German reprisals against nearby towns/villages, if they went after the Einsatz in a big way they could well start exterminating the populace of towns as revenge.

Wouldn't that happen anyway, so long as the Partisans did anything at all?
 
If you ask me, I could see the problem as being this:

So, the Soviets start diverting resources to support the Partisans against the EG. If the Germans start seeing a sudden influx of support for the partisan cells, they could begin to focus more resources on crushing the partisans, potentially drawing resources away from the Ostheer and the Waffen SS. While this could pay off for the Soviets (Germans focus more resources into crushing the partisans), the Germans COULD, hypothetically, destroy many of the larger groups if they put enough effort in, leaving behind just the smaller groups to blow up the odd train and carry out hit and run missions. Yes, a diversion of resources by the Germans, could benefit the Red Army, but not much, and it could see the larger Partisan groups reduced to impotency, weakening their ability to support the red Army in 1943-44 when the Red Army is finally on the offensive. Look at how important the Partisans were in weakening Army Group Center on the eve of operation Bagration! Imagine if those efforts had been weaker, or non-existent. Army Group Center could've been much stronger in facing the Soviets, even if it still had little effect on the outcome of the operation.

But that's just my two cents.
 
Thing is any Soviet reprisals against the Germans from Partisans tended to react in German reprisals against nearby towns/villages, if they went after the Einsatz in a big way they could well start exterminating the populace of towns as revenge.

They were doing that anyway so really it's a question of getting hung for a sheep or hung for a lamb.

Would the SS expend more resources on protecting the Einsatzgruppen if it became clear the partisans were making a point of going after them? Would Himmler demand the Waffen SS be used primarily as an anti-partisan force as a consequence? If that happens removing Waffen SS units from the line will have an impact on campaigns in the Eastern Front and when the WAllies land in Normandy. While the Waffen SS weren't uniformly the elite force they were held up to be (many units were, in fact, worse in quality than regular Heer troops) not having those men on the front lines will have an impact on how the war unfolds.

There's also the issue the Germans are facing of limited troops, supplies, and resources. Anything they use to crush partisans in the rear is stuff they can't use against the Red Army.
 
Another question that should be asked: would Stalin, Zhukov, Beria et al really have given a damn about the Soviet Jews? Considering that such a thing as proposed here obviously didn't occur OTL.
 
Partisan direction was headed by the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement, commanded by Ponomarenko, but only from 1942 onwards. For much of the war until the Soviet winter counteroffensive the partisan movement was only partially coordinated by the highest levels of the NKO. Most of it's actions during this initial period, when the Einsatzgruppen were most active, were disparate and while disruptive did not involve a single operational goal besides the disruption of the German rear area. Most groups, formed from NKVD operatives or Red Army stay behind groups along with local sympathizers, operated independently of one another. Without radios and supples the mass partisan offensives as seen from 1942 onwards couldn't happen.

So, in 1941 at least, outside of independent action there's no way to organize a partisan offensive against the Einsatzgruppen.
 

katchen

Banned
The problem was that killing Jews was overwhelmingly popular amongst the Polish, Belorussian and Ukrainian public. If the partisans had targeted the Einsatzrgruppen openly, support for Communist partisans would have dropped considerably. It was hard enough to get Communist partisans to work with Jewish partisan groups like those of "Uncle Miisha)" Dyudeh Misha" Gildenman later in WWII once they had formed.
Covertly poisoning the liquor that the Einsatzgruppen drank with HbCl4 might have worked.
 
So, in 1941 at least, outside of independent action there's no way to organize a partisan offensive against the Einsatzgruppen.

What about psychological measures?

Perhaps instruct partisans to forward the names of locals serving in SS militias to Moscow. These names could then be read over radio Moscow with the particular "actions" they had participated in. Of course, severe punishment following a Soviet victory would be promised. After the Moscow counter offensive, German victory was no longer totally assured and some SS supporters might get cold feet.

Most (or all) of these guys were cowards. It might not take many radio broadcasts coupled with a few examples - pro Soviet Partisans make a particular SS militiaman "disappear" while off duty to take away their enthusiasm. Then, starting in 1942, it might be possible to do a series of mini "Heydrich" operations against individual Einsatzgruppen officers.
 
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