Stonewall lives.

[Reggie Bartlett]

For whatever reason, General Jackson decides not to go riding out after the Battle of Chancellorsville. He doesn't get shot, he never loses his arm or dies.

So, how does the Civil War turn out with Longstreet and Jackson being the Corps commanders of the ANV during the 1863 campaigns onward?

Is Gettysburg prevented?

 

[KG "Cagey"]

Thomas J Jackson

Is Gettysburg prevented?

Jackson alive does not change the strategic choice that Davis made post- Chancellorsville. Longstreet and the Sec. of War wanted to send a Corps West to save besieged Vicksburg Miss --or-- aid Bragg's Army of Tenn. while Bragg send a force to Miss. Lee insisted [correctly] that any force would arrive too late to save Pemberton and the Miss. garrison. Lee gained Davis' approval to "invade" the North again. Jackson alive does not change Davis' decision.

So, how does the Civil War turn out with Longstreet and Jackson being the Corps commanders of the ANV during the 1863 campaigns onward?

Prior to the campaign Lee is not forced to re-organize into 3 Corps [Longstreet's and then promoting AP Hill and Dick Ewell]. Instead, Lee marches North to Gettysburg with his proven Corps-level commanders Longstreet and Jackson.

Is Gettysburg prevented?

If you mean does Jackson magically take Ewell's place and "take the high ground just south of the town...;" MAYBE...
But the campaign is still likely to fail for reasons broader than the death or life of Jackson and the South is still likely to loose the war.

 

[Elfwine]

Lee may have been contemplating reorganization into three corps anyway, but with both his existing corps commanders on bad terms with Hill, I can't see him making Hill that man - Ewell (also Hill's senior) might get it, which I think is a plus.

 

[Snake Featherston]

Jackson alive means that in the OTL circumstances of Gettysburg he'll balk just as much as Longstreet did at simply attacking the enemy in a meeting engagement without intelligence. And unlike Longstreet if Jackson balked, Jackson would deliberately fuck over the rest of the CS high command. After all we're talking someone with Braxton Bragg's level of turnover of his division, hardly a sign that he was averse to the kind of dumbfuckery that he'd do in a Gettysburg campaign.

The crude reality of the OTL battle was that only one CS general was actually involved in his job as required by the logistics-communication network of the time: Longstreet. If Longstreet and Jackson both tell Lee "Um, Bob, this ain't gonna work", Lee will go ballistic.

 

[robertp6165]

Jackson alive does not change the strategic choice that Davis made post- Chancellorsville. Longstreet and the Sec. of War wanted to send a Corps West to save besieged Vicksburg Miss --or-- aid Bragg's Army of Tenn. while Bragg send a force to Miss. Lee insisted [correctly] that any force would arrive too late to save Pemberton and the Miss. garrison. Lee gained Davis' approval to "invade" the North again. Jackson alive does not change Davis' decision.

An invasion of the North did not have to end with a battle at Gettysburg. The decisive battle of the campaign could just as easily have been fought elsewhere, and with Jackson present, probably would have. Quite possibly someplace where the Confederates, rather than the Union, have the advantage of standing on the defensive on excellent defensive terrain.

Prior to the campaign Lee is not forced to re-organize into 3 Corps [Longstreet's and then promoting AP Hill and Dick Ewell]. Instead, Lee marches North to Gettysburg with his proven Corps-level commanders Longstreet and Jackson.

Most likely true.

Jackson alive means that in the OTL circumstances of Gettysburg he'll balk just as much as Longstreet did at simply attacking the enemy in a meeting engagement without intelligence. And unlike Longstreet if Jackson balked, Jackson would deliberately fuck over the rest of the CS high command. After all we're talking someone with Braxton Bragg's level of turnover of his division, hardly a sign that he was averse to the kind of dumbfuckery that he'd do in a Gettysburg campaign.

Jackson never did anything remotely like what you're suggesting in OTL. Indeed, Lee and Jackson made such a good team because Lee could count on Jackson to interpret his (sometimes not clearly written) orders correctly and to carry them out to the best of his ability (the only major time that didn't happen was during the Seven Days, and that wasn't a willful failure on Jackson's part, it was due to Jackson simply being exhausted after force-marching his army from the Valley to the Richmond area to be there in time for Lee's attacks on McClellan...he was so exhausted he literally fell asleep and so was unable to carry out Lee's orders in those instances).

The crude reality of the OTL battle was that only one CS general was actually involved in his job as required by the logistics-communication network of the time: Longstreet. If Longstreet and Jackson both tell Lee "Um, Bob, this ain't gonna work", Lee will go ballistic.

I seriously doubt Lee would "go ballistic." On the contrary, if the army even ends up at Gettysburg...which, with Jackson there, that becomes much less likely simply because Jackson being at the war councils of the army would likely have led to it being in a different place on July 1, 1863...Jackson's voice added to Longstreet's would probably sway Lee to reconsider his impulsive decision to get involved in a meeting engagement there. Lee tended to listen to Jackson in a way he never did listen to Longstreet.

 

[robertp6165]

Lee may have been contemplating reorganization into three corps anyway, but with both his existing corps commanders on bad terms with Hill, I can't see him making Hill that man - Ewell (also Hill's senior) might get it, which I think is a plus.

That's possible, and indeed probable, assuming the reorganization still happens at this time. Reorganizing the army on the eve of a major operation like that was not the greatest idea, and if Lee hadn't been forced to it by the death of Jackson, he probably wouldn't have done it at that time. More likely he'd wait until the army was in quarters for the winter of 1863-1864.

 

[Snake Featherston]

An invasion of the North did not have to end with a battle at Gettysburg. The decisive battle of the campaign could just as easily have been fought elsewhere, and with Jackson present, probably would have. Quite possibly someplace where the Confederates, rather than the Union, have the advantage of standing on the defensive on excellent defensive terrain.

Given that after weeks of rampaging through PA the CSA was blindsided by the completely shocking and unprecedented concept that the Army of the Potomac might fight a CS Army that invaded Northern soil, I highly doubt that Jackson's presence erases Lee's hubris. It if anything makes it much, much worse to a point where the CSA will be having not an idiot ball but an idiot sporting goods store.

Jackson never did anything remotely like what you're suggesting in OTL. Indeed, Lee and Jackson made such a good team because Lee could count on Jackson to interpret his (sometimes not clearly written) orders correctly and to carry them out to the best of his ability (the only major time that didn't happen was during the Seven Days, and that wasn't a willful failure on Jackson's part, it was due to Jackson simply being exhausted after force-marching his army from the Valley to the Richmond area to be there in time for Lee's attacks on McClellan...he was so exhausted he literally fell asleep and so was unable to carry out Lee's orders in those instances).

They made such a good team that Lee never went to see Jackson over the week it took Jackson to die, even when he had ample time to spare with that if he wanted to. Jackson repeatedly turned over his generals, to a point where like Braxton Bragg he never fought a campaign with the same set of subordinates, and was a hypocritical ass to the point of denying his officers chances to see their wives when their wives were in labor, but not holding himself to that standard when *his* wife had his daughter. Jackson was the first hero-worshiping subject of CS "history" and he deserves it much less than the rest do.

I seriously doubt Lee would "go ballistic." On the contrary, if the army even ends up at Gettysburg...which, with Jackson there, that becomes much less likely simply because Jackson being at the war councils of the army would likely have led to it being in a different place on July 1, 1863...Jackson's voice added to Longstreet's would probably sway Lee to reconsider his impulsive decision to get involved in a meeting engagement there. Lee tended to listen to Jackson in a way he never did listen to Longstreet.

I don't see how. And Lee never listened to Jackson any more thoroughly. Jackson was entirely opposed to Antietam happening as it did, and did not go along with it happily. Jackson made tactical errors in every battle he fought, up to Chancellorsville. Add in that the factors leading to the CSA being surprised that in July it might actually have to fight the Union Army on Union soil are independent of which people Lee commands......and if you're sincerely thinking Jackson, the same religious fanatic who loved fighting to a great extent, would dare tell Marble Bob to back out of a meeting engagement........

 

[KG "Cagey"]

To Robertp6165

Originally Posted by KG "Cagey"
Jackson alive does not change the strategic choice that Davis made post- Chancellorsville. Longstreet and the Sec. of War wanted to send a Corps West to save besieged Vicksburg Miss --or-- aid Bragg's Army of Tenn. while Bragg send a force to Miss. Lee insisted [correctly] that any force would arrive too late to save Pemberton and the Miss. garrison. Lee gained Davis' approval to "invade" the North again. Jackson alive does not change Davis' decision.

Originally Posted by Robertp6165 An invasion of the North did not have to end with a battle at Gettysburg. The decisive battle of the campaign could just as easily have been fought elsewhere, and with Jackson present, probably would have. Quite possibly someplace where the Confederates, rather than the Union, have the advantage of standing on the defensive on excellent defensive terrain.

I did not say TJJ living makes the fight at Gettysbrg but indeed the Campaign idea of Lee going into MD/ Penn would remain. I believe you and I agree that Jackson living means no strategic change. The operational and tactical butterflies with Jackson alive are enough that the where and how of the battles become uncertain. The tactical aggressor and defender lost in cloudy timeline shift and in location Gettysbrg [while likely due to the plethora of roads] becomes no more certain than a Battle of Hanover or Emmitsbrg or a Battle of Pipe Creek.

 

[Snake Featherston]

I did not say TJJ living makes the fight at Gettysbrg but indeed the Campaign idea of Lee going into MD/ Penn would remain. I believe you and I agree that Jackson living means no strategic change. The operational and tactical butterflies with Jackson alive are enough that the where and how of the battles become uncertain. The tactical aggressor and defender lost in cloudy timeline shift and in location Gettysbrg [while likely due to the plethora of roads] becomes no more certain than a Battle of Hanover or Emmitsbrg or a Battle of Pipe Creek.

Given that Gettysburg IOTL was a meeting engagement because the CS Army was a failure at adhering to whatever strategy it in theory was operating under.......

If it's a more planned engagement, it will be Meade kicking ANV ass at Pipe Creek, not the other way around. Jackson is not a magical man able to fix the defects the CS Army had through this campaign. He can't teleport the Stuart's cavalry or get Lee to do ITTL what he never did IOTL and use his *already there* cavalry for basic reconnaissance. Jackson won't make the CSA realize that after entering Pennsylvania in the high summer that the AoTP will follow it is as sure as night follows day. Jackson's serial tactical errors will do more damage than Ewell's caution.

 

[KG "Cagey"]

TJJ as oft-overstated panacea for CSA

Originally Posted by Snake Featherston Given that Gettysburg IOTL was a meeting engagement because the CS Army was a failure at adhering to whatever strategy it in theory was operating under.......

If it's a more planned engagement, it will be Meade kicking ANV ass at Pipe Creek, not the other way around.

I agree Snake. I lamented reading the Ging/Forstchen account of the ANV standing on the pre-selected Union Pipe Creek position.

I also agree that too many people praise Jackson too greatly and believe a deus ex machina replaces "Baldy / Badly" Ewell on July1 with Jackson and !viola! the CSA wins the war.

Originally Posted by Snake Featherston They made such a good team that Lee never went to see Jackson over the week it took Jackson to die, even when he had ample time to spare with that if he wanted to.

I am uncertain of Lee's "spare time" that week.
I'll check the sources but if Jackson is on his deathbed at a distant location, and had APHill recovered for his WIA?and had Longstreet returned from SE Va.? AND a Union army that outnumbers the ANV by 5to3 or 2to1 [depending on the status of Longstreet's Corp]. I am uncertain to Lee's spare time and to whom would he entrust command while he was gone.

 

[Snake Featherston]

KG Cagey-

The problem is that if they want a tactical deus ex machina, it should be *Longstreet* encountering the Union army on that day, not Ewell or Hill. Longstreet was the best tactician in the ANV, Jackson was like Sherman: great strategist, lousy combat leader. You don't get these coups with the guys that make the basic errors, you need the guys that really *are* good tacticians.....and even then it's hardly a guarantee in a meeting engagement that any of this matters.

 

[KG "Cagey"]

Tactical butterflies

Snake: you are right about the forgetfulness of Tactical butterflies in TLs.

Lee would not have marched north with 3 Corps under 2 men new to the role and both impaired by health and injury recovery [and for Ewell add opium/drugs to the "recovery"]

Too many ignore that Heth's ID is not in APHILL's III Corps in ATL nor is Early's ID in Ewell's II. They wish to deus ex Jackson into afternoon July 1 and all else remained OTL by magic.

For those who lock Lonstreet into the tactical defensive forget 2nd Bull Run.
And before Longstreet detractors pounce, I'll note that Longstreet was no Sherman and that when away from Lee... on his own in SE VA 1863 and at Knoxville TN that winter... Pete did not shine.

 

[robertp6165]

Given that after weeks of rampaging through PA the CSA was blindsided by the completely shocking and unprecedented concept that the Army of the Potomac might fight a CS Army that invaded Northern soil, I highly doubt that Jackson's presence erases Lee's hubris. It if anything makes it much, much worse to a point where the CSA will be having not an idiot ball but an idiot sporting goods store.



They made such a good team that Lee never went to see Jackson over the week it took Jackson to die, even when he had ample time to spare with that if he wanted to. Jackson repeatedly turned over his generals, to a point where like Braxton Bragg he never fought a campaign with the same set of subordinates, and was a hypocritical ass to the point of denying his officers chances to see their wives when their wives were in labor, but not holding himself to that standard when *his* wife had his daughter. Jackson was the first hero-worshiping subject of CS "history" and he deserves it much less than the rest do.



I don't see how. And Lee never listened to Jackson any more thoroughly. Jackson was entirely opposed to Antietam happening as it did, and did not go along with it happily. Jackson made tactical errors in every battle he fought, up to Chancellorsville. Add in that the factors leading to the CSA being surprised that in July it might actually have to fight the Union Army on Union soil are independent of which people Lee commands......and if you're sincerely thinking Jackson, the same religious fanatic who loved fighting to a great extent, would dare tell Marble Bob to back out of a meeting engagement........

Snake, your views of Jackson (and of Lee as well, I should point out) are at variance with those of almost every mainstream historian who has written of the man. Either your hatred of everything Confederate is severely coloring your view of the man, or you simply haven't done very much research. Either way, forgive me if I take your tirades about as seriously as I take the defense of one George B. McClellan by another poster on this site.

 

[Snake Featherston]

Snake, your views of Jackson (and of Lee as well, I should point out) are at variance with those of almost every mainstream historian who has written of the man. Either your hatred of everything Confederate is severely coloring your view of the man, or you simply haven't done very much research. Either way, forgive me if I take your tirades about as seriously as I take the defense of one George B. McClellan by another poster on this site.

Actually these are the studies of more recent biographies of the man that cut out the hagiography and pay closer attention to what he actually did. We're describing a man who nearly got walloped by Nathaniel Banks at Cedar Mountan (and I'm sorry, no matter how you slice it, that's a fail), we're describing a guy whose career is marred with failures on the tactical level.....and who was for all this the single most brilliant (arguably the only) strategist in the ANV. It's no more denigrating him to note this than it is to note that his Union counterpart and fellow apostle of Kill All Burn All Loot All warfare Sherman was equally lousy at the tactical side of war.

People who are good strategists and good at the theory of war generally aren't good at the fighting of multiple units against each other side. There is a huge gap between war's theory and war's practice. My views of Lee, incidentally, are just a harsher version of contemporary revisionism that *also* examines Lee from a military, as opposed to personality cult in all the worst senses, POV. Lee the general had severe flaws that explain why he surrendered and Grant won the war. This is not outside mainstream military history. It may well be outside the view that presents Lee as Confederate Jesus and Longstreet as Confederate Judas.

 

[Kevin in Indy]

I think the immediate events following Chancellorsville go about as planned. Lee advocates an invasion of Pennsylvania to gather supplies and give the residents of Virginia a breather (and, if they're very lucky, take some of the sting out of what's happening at Vicksburg). Longstreet and Jackson lead their respective corps on pretty much the same route as in OTL. Stuart still finds himself on the wrong side of a moving AoP and a surprisingly stout Union cavalry arm.

Gettysburg, in that area, is a natural army magnet, so there is a good chance that something happens there. It might end up being a less-than-general engagement (say, Jackson vs. I and XI Corps), and could easily end in a Confederate victory.

I do not think, however, that the butterflies are going to throw the campaign, let alone the war, to the Confederacy. Lee is still on the end of a very long, convoluted supply line, which proved to be very vulnerable in OTL. Meade still has a plan drafted to cover Washington by fortifying along Pipe Creek (south of Gettysburg). Lee cannot afford to forage too long in Pennsylvania - too many Union troops around, and more can be dispatched (not the best quality, to be sure, but Lee cannot ignore them). If you gave Halleck enough time, he could probably scrounge together a force to threaten Richmond without taking away from Meade. Further, Lee cannot resupply - or otherwise acquire - "powder and ball" fast enough to fight multiple battles.

So, the ANV will be forced, sooner or later, to return home. They might not come out any better than, say, 15,000 more men than in OTL. Even with Jackson, that's not going to be enough to make a difference come 1864.

 

[Elfwine]

There is a force to threaten Richmond if it can be goaded into action - 4th and 7th Corps on the peninsula, some 30,000 men.

That's why a division plus worth of troops (two of Pickett's brigades and two under Robert Ransom, although one of the former was released too late to do any good) was kept behind at Richmond - an unreasonable fear it would do something.

I say unreasonable with the benefit of a certain amount of hindsight, but point is, Halleck doesn't have to do very much to get the troops, he just has to do what he does poorly - make generals attack.

As for supplies, the only thing the ANV had to worry about OTL after the battle was long range ammunition for part of its artillery - I wouldn't say its in great shape, but its in no worse shape than it was after Chancellorsville.

 

[Reggie Bartlett]

I think the immediate events following Chancellorsville go about as planned. Lee advocates an invasion of Pennsylvania to gather supplies and give the residents of Virginia a breather (and, if they're very lucky, take some of the sting out of what's happening at Vicksburg). Longstreet and Jackson lead their respective corps on pretty much the same route as in OTL. Stuart still finds himself on the wrong side of a moving AoP and a surprisingly stout Union cavalry arm.

Gettysburg, in that area, is a natural army magnet, so there is a good chance that something happens there. It might end up being a less-than-general engagement (say, Jackson vs. I and XI Corps), and could easily end in a Confederate victory.

I do not think, however, that the butterflies are going to throw the campaign, let alone the war, to the Confederacy. Lee is still on the end of a very long, convoluted supply line, which proved to be very vulnerable in OTL. Meade still has a plan drafted to cover Washington by fortifying along Pipe Creek (south of Gettysburg). Lee cannot afford to forage too long in Pennsylvania - too many Union troops around, and more can be dispatched (not the best quality, to be sure, but Lee cannot ignore them). If you gave Halleck enough time, he could probably scrounge together a force to threaten Richmond without taking away from Meade. Further, Lee cannot resupply - or otherwise acquire - "powder and ball" fast enough to fight multiple battles.

So, the ANV will be forced, sooner or later, to return home. They might not come out any better than, say, 15,000 more men than in OTL. Even with Jackson, that's not going to be enough to make a difference come 1864.

If this is the case, I would like to see how Jackson handles the Union offensives the following year, and whatever seiges (we can assume it's still Richmond-Petersburg) are handled.

 

[Elfwine]

If this is the case, I would like to see how Jackson handles the Union offensives the following year, and whatever seiges (we can assume it's still Richmond-Petersburg) are handled.

Don't forget the offenses later -in- the year.

Jackson at Bristoe Station could be good . . .

for Meade.