Stonewall Jackson, Union Army

Xen

Banned
Here's something we do not see alot of, what if Stonewall Jackson supported the Union in the Civil War? Before anyone says this is impossible, its not as unlikely as it may appear. Jackson was a deeply religious man, who in spite of everything treated blacks fairly well compared to others of his day, and he was born in a part of Virginia which later became West Virginia, even his dear sister supported the Union during the war. Let us assume Jackson believes the way the rest of western Virginia does, and accepts a post to the Army of the Potomac in the wars beginning.

Even though the Army of the Potomac is poorly led, Jackson is still brilliant enough to stand out, lets again assume McClellan is canned by Lincoln, who then turns his hopes to Jackson, promoting him to Major General and giving him command of the Army of the Potomac in late 1862, how does the war play out with General Jackson leading the Union Army and General Lee leading the Confederate Army?
 
Gen. Jackson was also known to be a member of the Southern Methodist Church which was one of the more anti-slavery churches in the south. Jackson was even known to send money from the field to help support sunday school for black children. Under these circumstances It is concievable that if the Union had taken a more anti-slavery stance from the get go, that Jackson could have sided with the Union.
 
Here's something we do not see alot of, what if Stonewall Jackson supported the Union in the Civil War? Before anyone says this is impossible, its not as unlikely as it may appear. Jackson was a deeply religious man, who in spite of everything treated blacks fairly well compared to others of his day, and he was born in a part of Virginia which later became West Virginia, even his dear sister supported the Union during the war. Let us assume Jackson believes the way the rest of western Virginia does, and accepts a post to the Army of the Potomac in the wars beginning.

Even though the Army of the Potomac is poorly led, Jackson is still brilliant enough to stand out, lets again assume McClellan is canned by Lincoln, who then turns his hopes to Jackson, promoting him to Major General and giving him command of the Army of the Potomac in late 1862, how does the war play out with General Jackson leading the Union Army and General Lee leading the Confederate Army?
West Virginia was not as anti-Confederacy as you seem to believe as the number of men who served in the ACW was about equal on each side in the State. WV was not an area where Slavery was profitable,but their main gripe with Eastern Virginia was over the Tidewaters control of Richmond.
Jackson was born in Clarksburg but lived in Lexington and was fully devoted to VMI. He also believed strongly that the US government did not have the right to invade a state. You must remember that Virginia did not leave the Union until Lincoln ordered the States to provide Volunteers to retake the Lower South.

As for Jackson taking command of the AOP not going to happen he will not be trusted as a Virginian until late in the war. Take Phillip St George Cooke Jeb Stuarts Father in law as your guide in how a Virginian was treated in the East. Now if he is sent west he may lead there like Thomas did.
 
Gen. Jackson was also known to be a member of the Southern Methodist Church which was one of the more anti-slavery churches in the south. Jackson was even known to send money from the field to help support sunday school for black children. Under these circumstances It is concievable that if the Union had taken a more anti-slavery stance from the get go, that Jackson could have sided with the Union.
Sorry he was Presbyterian.

Also he owned slaves prior to the ACW although at least two asked him to purchase them, one so that he could work toward his own freedom.

His Zeal for teaching Black children was more to "save their souls" than anything else. His views on Slavery were complicated. He seems to believed through his religious beliefs that Slavery was acceptable to God, but may not be in the best interest of America.
 

burmafrd

Banned
Jackson was a great aggressive commander who occasionaly seemed to fall asleep for some reason. He needed someone like Lee as his superior. I agree he probably would have been sent out west. Whether Grant would be able to cope with him or not would be the question.

More to the point is his loss to the CSA would be very telling early in the war.
 

67th Tigers

Banned
Jackson was a great aggressive commander who occasionaly seemed to fall asleep for some reason. He needed someone like Lee as his superior. I agree he probably would have been sent out west. Whether Grant would be able to cope with him or not would be the question.

More to the point is his loss to the CSA would be very telling early in the war.

Really? Jackson had a hash of prettymuch every battle he was involved in. I suspect that a Union Jackson actually advantages the Confederates (maybe Ewell gets Jacksons post, and he's a far more capable General that Lee wanted as a Corps commander but couldn't because DH Hill was senior, so if Lee created a 3rd Corps, as he wanted, he'd have to give it to DH Hill. Indeed, it wasn't Jacksons death, but DH Hills posting to SC and GA that allowed Lee to promote Ewell to Corps Command). Jackson meanwhile is likely to become an undistingished and short lived Brigade or Division Commander who gets shunted out of the field army.
 
I doubt anyone else in the Confederate Army could swing anything like the Shenandoah Campaign of 1862- so it's possible that there might be some more Union forces in the Peninsula, although with McClellan's mentality, it's debatable if it would make a difference.
 

67th Tigers

Banned
I doubt anyone else in the Confederate Army could swing anything like the Shenandoah Campaign of 1862- so it's possible that there might be some more Union forces in the Peninsula, although with McClellan's mentality, it's debatable if it would make a difference.

Both Ewell and AP Hill strongly criticised Jackson for poor command and staffwork, and being generally slow to react.

See Wood for a very good discussion on Jackson's failings: http://www.amazon.com/Civil-War-Generalship-Art-Command/dp/0306809737
 
Okay, let's look at this chronologically.

Certainly Jackson will immediately receive at least a regimental command in some eastern Union army in 1861, if not brigadier, although being a competent lower-level commander (see 1861 Shenandoah and 1st Manassas) will ensure him Brigade command by the end of the year.

On the other hand, the Confederacy had a large number of good brigade commanders in 1861, so the immediate effects will not be much - still a southern victory at Manassas.

It is a striking fact that most Virginian officers that sided with the North were sent to the Western theatre. The interesting question is how would Jackson and Thomas perceive each other, if they were in the same army at all. Probably they would be separated to decrease the chances of any treason within a single army. It all depends on who Jackson has as a commander. If someone like Grant, he will demonstrate his aggressive skill immediately in 1862. If someone like Buell, he will be chomping at the bit and infuriated. However, since insubordination goes against his grain, Jackson will probably be transferred. No matter what happens, he will wind up at Shiloh as a Brigade commander and he will fight well.

With so many reputations tarnished the question is whether he will be promoted to Division commander. Probably he will, only to be placed under Buell and sent to Perryville, to again chafe at the bit and not be allowed to do much of anything.

Or, here's a good one, how does the name "Rock of Murfreesboro" sound, or maybe he will become "Stonewall" then - it is a perfect opportunity. Then, staying with the Army of the Cumberland, after Chickamauga and the dismissal of every high-ranking officer save Thomas, he will probably assume Corps command along with Granger, and stay there for the Atlanta campaign. Then he will be fought over by Sherman and Thomas. If the former wins, he will join the march to Savannah, and end the war in North Carolina. If the latter, he will probably have the command that Stanley did in OTL, and lead the raid into Alabama. In either case, he will end the war as a moderately successful corps commander in the Army of the Cumberland.

In Virginia, meanwhile, his command in the Valley will probably be taken over by Ewell, who might not destroy all the Union forces in 1862, but will do an able enough job, certainly to recall McDowell, and wind up in Richmond in time. After the 7 Days Battles, Lee will agonize over who to place in Wing command besides Longstreet. Probably he shall pick A. P. Hill - he commanded the next largest # of troops and had done an able job of leading them. His own division will probably be taken over by Pender, leapfrogging over Heth. The rest of the 1862 campaign will procede similarly to OTL, except that Ewell shall be promoted to corps commander at least in time for Chancellorsville, and maybe Fredericksburg.

Recall that Chancellorsville not only demonstrated Hooker's lack of confidence, but there was also some bad luck for the Union side - specifcally the messanger not getting to Reynolds and telling him to post the Ist corps on the far right, re-inforcing Howard. On the other hand, w/o Jackson to lead the force it is doubtful whether Lee will make such a big move around the Union right. He will know that the flank is in the air. Probably he shall send a division or two as a demonstration, have them smash Howard's first division, but not roll up the entire line - then as re-inforcements move to support him, the rest of Lee's force will conduct the main attack against the IIIrd and IInd corps facing east. This is more typical of Lee's style of deception. Probably the double surprise will even work, though it will be even more of a bloodbath than in OTL. This may change parts of the campaign in 1864, though I will not go into that now.
 

67th Tigers

Banned
In Virginia, meanwhile, his command in the Valley will probably be taken over by Ewell, who might not destroy all the Union forces in 1862, but will do an able enough job, certainly to recall McDowell, and wind up in Richmond in time. After the 7 Days Battles, Lee will agonize over who to place in Wing command besides Longstreet. Probably he shall pick A. P. Hill - he commanded the next largest # of troops and had done an able job of leading them. His own division will probably be taken over by Pender, leapfrogging over Heth. The rest of the 1862 campaign will procede similarly to OTL, except that Ewell shall be promoted to corps commander at least in time for Chancellorsville, and maybe Fredericksburg.

If nothing else changes, it'll be Longstreet, DH Hill and Ewell as his Corps Commanders, as per their seniority. However, Lee hates DH Hill and will do anything to be rid of him, or at least keep him out of Corps command, possibly including not organising Corps.


On the other hand, w/o Jackson to lead the force it is doubtful whether Lee will make such a big move around the Union right. He will know that the flank is in the air. Probably he shall send a division or two as a demonstration, have them smash Howard's first division, but not roll up the entire line - then as re-inforcements move to support him, the rest of Lee's force will conduct the main attack against the IIIrd and IInd corps facing east. This is more typical of Lee's style of deception. Probably the double surprise will even work, though it will be even more of a bloodbath than in OTL. This may change parts of the campaign in 1864, though I will not go into that now.

Ignoring butterflies, OTL Jackson is slow to move round the flank (his march still isn't completed when impending nightfall forces him to attack), and disposes of his forces badly (3 divisions, each in line one behind the other, robbing all command and control from the division commanders). In fact, better results can be expected from a single division (since it will move faster and attack with the same combat power, earlier in the day).

What you've described is a typical maneouvre sur la derrieres. I'm not sure Lee ever attempted one.
 
If nothing else changes, it'll be Longstreet, DH Hill and Ewell as his Corps Commanders, as per their seniority. However, Lee hates DH Hill and will do anything to be rid of him, or at least keep him out of Corps command, possibly including not organising Corps.




Ignoring butterflies, OTL Jackson is slow to move round the flank (his march still isn't completed when impending nightfall forces him to attack), and disposes of his forces badly (3 divisions, each in line one behind the other, robbing all command and control from the division commanders). In fact, better results can be expected from a single division (since it will move faster and attack with the same combat power, earlier in the day).

What you've described is a typical maneouvre sur la derrieres. I'm not sure Lee ever attempted one.
One Question for you on this last part. Could you have moved 28,000 men 19 Kilometers thru heavy woods with access to only one narrow road, undetected. Also Jackson attacked as he did because there was not enough room, time, or need to spread his Corp out more, as is he drove the Union Army back two miles before darkness set in.
Earlier you said he screwed up every campaign he was in. I beg to differ. In the Valley "*It was a classic military campaign of surprise and maneuver. Jackson pressed his army to travel 646 miles (1,040 km) in 48 days of marching and won five significant victories with a force of about 17,000 against a combined force of 60,000." I lived in the Valley for a while in 1972-3 and I followed where he led his men and it wasn't and isn't gentle terrain. So aside from the Seven Days where he did not preform well every other battle he excelled in. Now I will grant you at times his opponents weren't the brightest, but Jackson was an outstanding leader.
By Leader I mean someone who could motivate his solders to accomplish feats that are considered amazing, and instill an esprit de corps that was matched by few other units in the ACW.

* stole this line from wiki but it reflects all I have heard about the marches in the Valley.
 

67th Tigers

Banned
One Question for you on this last part. Could you have moved 28,000 men 19 Kilometers thru heavy woods with access to only one narrow road, undetected. Also Jackson attacked as he did because there was not enough room, time, or need to spread his Corp out more, as is he drove the Union Army back two miles before darkness set in.

In 9.5 hours? This is a very slow movement by the standards of the time.

Earlier you said he screwed up every campaign he was in. I beg to differ. In the Valley "*It was a classic military campaign of surprise and maneuver. Jackson pressed his army to travel 646 miles (1,040 km) in 48 days of marching and won five significant victories with a force of about 17,000 against a combined force of 60,000."

First, the 646 miles is between 11th March and 26th June, and includes a stretch on the Virginia Central Railroad (only about the last 100 miles or so). So about 550 odd miles in 107 days, which oddly fits with his army moving at about 5 miles a day (a fairly typical marching rate at the time, limited by the speed of wagons).

Lets examine these battles:

Kernstown: Jackson has 3,087 infantry, 290 cavalry and 27 guns (by his own report), Shields has ca 4,500 infantry, maybe 750 cavalry and 24 guns (by his own report). Jackson tries a head on assault, fails, moves around to an un-recce'd flank, is fixed by an ambush, and is then flanked by the force he initially hit head on and quits the field, leaving several hundred stragglers to be captured.

McDowell: Jackson has ca 17,000 men vs 2,268 men engaged out of 3,318 present, excluding artillery (Schenck's after action report in the OR). The Federals surprise Jackson while he's deploying, completely disrupt him, inflict a hit ratio of nearly 4:1 and withdraw before he can react (leaving him in possession of the field, hence a CS "victory")

Front Royal: Jackson, with 16,500 men overruns a supply depot with 1,063 men present without much of a fight (they weren't really combatants)

Winchester: Jackson, with 16,000 men attacks Banks head on. Banks has 3 brigades (maybe 3,000 men?) and 16 guns. After repulses trying to go head on, Jackson deploys his greatly superior numbers to gain the heights on the Federal flanks, the Federals countercharge both thrusts, throwing them back, and Jackson throws in reserves to countercharge. The remainder of the Federal Army in good order, having achieved their objective of blocking further advances in that direction. Jackson leaves a screening force, but does not pursue.

Cross Keys: A great CS victory, but one commanded by Ewell

Port Republic: ca 10,000 Confederates (PFD) under Jackson hit 2 brigades under Shields (2,000 effectives?). They hit them head on, the Union advances, is flanked, the reserves are committed to push the flanking brigade back, Jackson throws another two brigades in head on and simply overwhelms the Federals.


If we're kind, Jackson defeated about 15,000 men, although in fact the men at Cross Keys (not counted) and Port Republic were at previous engagements, and thus would be double counted.
 
In 9.5 hours? This is a very slow movement by the standards of the time.



First, the 646 miles is between 11th March and 26th June, and includes a stretch on the Virginia Central Railroad (only about the last 100 miles or so). So about 550 odd miles in 107 days, which oddly fits with his army moving at about 5 miles a day (a fairly typical marching rate at the time, limited by the speed of wagons).

Lets examine these battles:

Kernstown: Jackson has 3,087 infantry, 290 cavalry and 27 guns (by his own report), Shields has ca 4,500 infantry, maybe 750 cavalry and 24 guns (by his own report). Jackson tries a head on assault, fails, moves around to an un-recce'd flank, is fixed by an ambush, and is then flanked by the force he initially hit head on and quits the field, leaving several hundred stragglers to be captured.

McDowell: Jackson has ca 17,000 men vs 2,268 men engaged out of 3,318 present, excluding artillery (Schenck's after action report in the OR). The Federals surprise Jackson while he's deploying, completely disrupt him, inflict a hit ratio of nearly 4:1 and withdraw before he can react (leaving him in possession of the field, hence a CS "victory")

Front Royal: Jackson, with 16,500 men overruns a supply depot with 1,063 men present without much of a fight (they weren't really combatants)

Winchester: Jackson, with 16,000 men attacks Banks head on. Banks has 3 brigades (maybe 3,000 men?) and 16 guns. After repulses trying to go head on, Jackson deploys his greatly superior numbers to gain the heights on the Federal flanks, the Federals countercharge both thrusts, throwing them back, and Jackson throws in reserves to countercharge. The remainder of the Federal Army in good order, having achieved their objective of blocking further advances in that direction. Jackson leaves a screening force, but does not pursue.

Cross Keys: A great CS victory, but one commanded by Ewell

Port Republic: ca 10,000 Confederates (PFD) under Jackson hit 2 brigades under Shields (2,000 effectives?). They hit them head on, the Union advances, is flanked, the reserves are committed to push the flanking brigade back, Jackson throws another two brigades in head on and simply overwhelms the Federals.


If we're kind, Jackson defeated about 15,000 men, although in fact the men at Cross Keys (not counted) and Port Republic were at previous engagements, and thus would be double counted.

He occupied 50,000+ that could have gone to McClellan. The movement portion of the Campaign was 48 days in May and June there was no movement after Kernstown till Jackson moved to McDowell. It was during this move that he road trains for at most 20 miles between Meachums Station and Staunton,Having traveled roughly the same route many times I am positive of this.

About 9.5 hours to move his Army here are a couple of pictures of his route. First is Railroad bed defended by 23rd GA. second is part of the route Jackson took. As you can see he would be able to march maybe 4 abreast would mean not counting his artillery his units would be spread for a minimum of two miles.He then had to depoly his men in terrian similar to these photos.
Photos did not show go to:http: http://www.brotherswar.com/Chancellorsville-2.htm
 
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Jackson as a great suboordinate general if his commander knew him well enough to give him the space to work. Lee knew Jackson from the Mexican War and from his working with Jackson in the Valley and thus when he took command of the ANV he was fully prepared to give Jackson all the space and freedom he needed to work as he wanted but also to follow Lee's overall plan. This caused problems later as Lee was too used to working with Jackson and found it harder to work with his replacements.

As a commanding General Jackson was terrible to work with and never told his suboodinates anything. He simply got up one day and told them "were going here" and expected them to go and go with no further instructions. He was a Tactical phenominon but in other areas, crucially Logistical, Strategy and training of suboordinates, he was a total failure.

In truth he only reached the prominance he did in OTL because he had a commander who was prepared to let him fight and command the way he wanted to and then use his forces to its fullest and he could only get that with Lee. No other commander, North or South, would let him do that. Lincoln might have let him command the way he wanted to but without actually stearing all that enthusiasm in the right direction that would be wasted.
 
Jackson as a great suboordinate general if his commander knew him well enough to give him the space to work. Lee knew Jackson from the Mexican War and from his working with Jackson in the Valley and thus when he took command of the ANV he was fully prepared to give Jackson all the space and freedom he needed to work as he wanted but also to follow Lee's overall plan. This caused problems later as Lee was too used to working with Jackson and found it harder to work with his replacements.

As a commanding General Jackson was terrible to work with and never told his suboodinates anything. He simply got up one day and told them "were going here" and expected them to go and go with no further instructions. He was a Tactical phenominon but in other areas, crucially Logistical, Strategy and training of suboordinates, he was a total failure.

In truth he only reached the prominance he did in OTL because he had a commander who was prepared to let him fight and command the way he wanted to and then use his forces to its fullest and he could only get that with Lee. No other commander, North or South, would let him do that. Lincoln might have let him command the way he wanted to but without actually stearing all that enthusiasm in the right direction that would be wasted.
Add his ability to motivate his Troops and you have the Good and the Bad that was Thomas J. Jackson.
 
I am not an expert on the battles of the ACW, I find the politics more interesting, but if I recall correctly in OTL Jackson (I presume no relation of mine) played a crucial role at the 1st Bull Run/ Mannas in rallying troops.

If that had not happened could his absence from the Confederacy have played a key role in events.
 
I am not an expert on the battles of the ACW, I find the politics more interesting, but if I recall correctly in OTL Jackson (I presume no relation of mine) played a crucial role at the 1st Bull Run/ Mannas in rallying troops.

If that had not happened could his absence from the Confederacy have played a key role in events.

Stonewall Jackson is considered the hero of 1st Manassas because of a famous incident that happened during the battle.

As the Union advances and part of Beauregard's Army of the Potomac began to flee Joe Johnston's Army of the Shenandoah, skillfully moved to the battle by its commander, took their positions. General Bee approached Jackson as his forces were in full retreat and shouted to Jackson "The Enemy are driving us" and Jackson replied "Then, Sir, we will give them the bayonet."

General Bee turned to his own troops and shouted "There is Jackson standing like a stone wall. Let us determine to die here, and we will conquer. Follow me."

And from that, whether meant in admiration or scorn, Jackson gets his nickname.

However Joe Johnston had already resolved himself to stand and fight and rally the fleeing parts of Beauregard army to do the same. Jackson's actions were not extraordinary at that battle and he was actually only following his superiors plans and orders.

So his absense from the battle probably wouldn't have changed much. Someone esle would have taken his place in history for this battle.
 
He seems to believed through his religious beliefs that Slavery was acceptable to God, but may not be in the best interest of America.

That seems pretty logical thinking for the time. They contradict today perhaps but at the time I would say that was probably a common thought process. As to him joining the Union I just don't see it ever being a possibility. Much like Lee, I envision Jackson staying loyal to his state over everything else. So unless somehow Virginia stays in the union I don't see Jackson every wearing blue. (Well after 1861 that is) ...
 
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