Butterfly German bean sprout production back to the 1940s. Increase it on a massive scale. Drop the sprouts over a starving Britain.
For the Kriegsmarine, this was the least desirable strategy. For Raeder and Dönitz, the diversion of the Luftwaffe to these tasks was a wasted opportunity and interfered with the demands of the naval staff for support and reconnaissance in the Atlantic.[11] In July and early August 1940 they had convinced the OKL to strike at shipping and ports by mine-laying[12] and it had proven highly effective. The lack of resources meant these operations could not be decisive,[13] but naval staff hoped by striking at the most important centres of British sea communications, the ports of London, Liverpool and Bristol Channel, on top of mining could have decisive results.[14]"
I don't disagree, but I do wonder if you think Coastal Command couldn't have made up for lack of DDs with better coverage of the Bay of Biscay & (earlier) exits to North Sea, as well as inlets to Irish Sea & the GIUK Gap. As noted, & I agree, change the impact on Britain by Germany changing emphasis, you allow Britain to change her force distributions & priorities. (Yes, I'm a partisan for CC...U-boat production is sustained at prewar planning levels. This results in a load of light surface combatants suitable for fighting naval war in waters in close proximity of Great Britain. German S-boots, torpedo boats and destroyers, while not at their element in ocean waters were very effective against their Allied counterparts in coastal waters up to 1944. This would have further lessened the availability of escorts to Atlantic convoys as destroyers would have been directed to British coastal waters.
I also wonder if this doesn't force an acceleration in corvette construction, in particular in Canada, & also of Canadian-built Liberty ships (or whatever they were called here...Park ships?
).
All these require ASB's for German leadership, though.
Yes, IMHO Germans would have had a reasonable probability of forcing Britain out of war in 1941 if, and both of them are big if's:
1.) U-boat production is sustained at prewar planning levels. This results in a load of light surface combatants suitable for fighting naval war in waters in close proximity of Great Britain. German S-boots, torpedo boats and destroyers, while not at their element in ocean waters were very effective against their Allied counterparts in coastal waters up to 1944. This would have further lessened the availability of escorts to Atlantic convoys as destroyers would have been directed to British coastal waters.
2.) Strategic bombing campaign focusing on British sea lines of communication. No such stupidities as bombing airfields, factories or cities. Massive, pre-planned minelaying based on having prestocked quantity of mines (magnetic mines being held in reserve until significant number of them available) etc. Raids on port factories. Heavily escorted raids on coastal convoys.
The British industrial effort could have been crushed due to lack of coastal convoys alone. Germans would have had a reasonable chance of doing that. On top of this add difficulties of getting in supplies to Britain from overseas, less seapower in Mediterranean and much less well equipped forces in Middle East...
In the immediate threat area around Britain, I'm thinking land-based fighters can do the job.Definitely, but on the other hand it's very hard to cover convoys against aerial attack without carriers.
Even allowing a significant increase in effectiveness of LW air attack, U-boats were the bigger threat; master them with more Coastie a/c, the losses are acceptable. Actually, perhaps lower (more sunk U-boats), so the frantic shipbuilding might be more to increase strength than just replace. The edge in favor of the Brits just keeps climbing as they gain experience & more U-boats are built (lower German crew quality...).On issue of accelerating ship construction I'm not sure if it's possible in 1940-1941 timeframe as the yards were working as fast as they could in OTL. Some improvement might result, but on the other hand if German aerial and naval effort was concentrated against seaborne logistics this will probably outweigh the results.
With that, I entirely agree.All these require ASB's for German leadership, though.
Definitely, but on the other hand it's very hard to cover convoys against aerial attack without carriers. On issue of accelerating ship construction I'm not sure if it's possible in 1940-1941 timeframe as the yards were working as fast as they could in OTL.
Not a feasible scenario
Do the maths.
Donitz reckoned that he needed to sink 600k tons of British merchant shipping per month for at least 12 months. And for that he needed 300 operational U boats.
In 1939 he had 32. He produced a plan to produce 658 boats (to give him the 300 net of losses and training boats) which was rejected as the materials were not available except at by diverting production from that necessary to attack France, mainly ammunition and the 26% increase in the size of the Heer.
But anyway by end 42 he had around 330 with 150 odd losses i.e. net roughly half what he thought was needed with 75% of the planned total of boats. Of these 450 were produced in 1941-42. Or after the Fall of france when the materials were available.
His best sinking rate amounted to 40% of what he believed was necessary and for only 10 months. By summer 41 i.e. with his 300 boats and before major US involvement the sinking rate was 100k tons per month with all the disruption to UK production following the fall of France.
And just to put that in perspective 600k*12 months = 7.2 million tons which with British domestic production would leave the UK with a merchant fleet of merely 2 million tons larger than when the campaign started without chartering and foreign flagged ships.
The supposition behind this thread is that Germany could produce between 1936 and 1939, 20 times the number of boats it actually did and maintain ground force of the size it did, and increase Luftwaffe production and introduce different types, most of which are useless unless operating from bases in France, and that Donitz was right in the first place.
If the German economy is 100% larger than it ever was and if it had access to all the raw materials it needed and if no one noticed and reacted, basically if it was the USA, its plausible. Otherwise – Sealion territory.
Since you are relatively new here let me give you one piece of free advice: Check your numbers and sources or you will get ripped to shreds.
There are numerous faults both with your facts and with your reasoning.
Dönitz had 25 large ocean-going submarines of the Type I, Type VII and Type IX u-boats, as well as 29 coastal submarines of the Type II u-boats available on September 1st 1939. That makes it 54 submarines. Of course not all of them were available for combat operations, and some had to be held back for training purposes.
Of these u-boats, 20 ocean going, and 11 coastal u-boats were available for immediate combat operations on 1/9 -39. (1)
During all of 1940, German u-boats sank a total of 2.462.867 tons worth of tonnage. (2)
During all of 1941, German u-boats sank a total of 2.298.714 tons worth of tonnage. (3)
That's roughly 200.000 tonnage every month, twice your claim.
Now, my source is: Blair, Clay "Hitler's U-boat war - the hunters, 1939-42", 1996.
What is yours?
(1) page 54
(2) page 771, appendix 18
(3) ibid
Those figures actually show that the Germans were losing the BoA
The 1940 figures are of course improved by the near-absence of escorts for 4 months after Dunkirk.
In 41, with a lot more U-boats and French bases, they sunk fewer ships. In fact, less than the Empire was building...!!
That about covers it.Losing? Germany lost the Battle of the Atlantic on 7th September 1939 with the reintroduction of the convoy system.
nor the disruption of having shipping in convoy, which amounted to about a one-third reduction in capacity in itself. (Don't recall where I saw that, tho, & don't have it in front of me....)
The 1/3 reduction of British imports number comes from Churchill, unfortunatly he isn't the most reliable of sources.