Starving Britain into Submission

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Its a sub section of this book (my dad has the subsection by itself that he bought when he was living in linz) http://www.amazon.com/Carrier-Admiral-Joseph-James-Clark/dp/B0006BR3HQ

Goering was a captain, with no general staff experience either. Osterkamp was setting up flight schools later... my suggested POD would be in the 20's for him to become and early follower and close friend (maybe personal pilot?) of Hitler as opposed to Goering. Raeder himself was no stranger to going to Hitler directly for stuff anyway; that's how the whole X fleigkorps thing came about in the first place

I didn't say Wever was unviable to make things better, I'm just dubious that he would make things significantly better vis a vis the KM if only because his personality as a top man could be more abrasive against Raeder since they would be equals as service chiefs as opposed to Raeder being a superior officer and Wever having to bootlick some. You are suggesting a modest change here; to get a large butterflied result which I think borders on pretty unlikely... Osterkamp is much lower hanging fruit and you don't have to create a backdrop of him learning about the effects of air power on naval warfare or him putting his own (substantial) ego aside and yielding operational control of units to the KM and not pissing off Raeder too much

Mine was to say you are making your proposed TL harder than it needs to be :D

Thank for the link. Any chance you can post some sources for the Wever-Raeder relationship in the meantime? I won't be able to interlibrary loan the book for a while. I'm more concerned that Osterkamp would be far more of a liability than benefit, as Wever MADE the Luftwaffe; without him it would be dead in the water. I still fail to see what makes Wever's ego so large, as he was able to easily work with Milch, despite being ostensibly equal to him. Especially if Wever wanted something he could be very charming.
 

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I can't see Roosevelt sitting still whilst Britain starves. At the least there will be lend-lease times ten.

It had to be approved by Congress first, which was the major problem and delay in passing it. Also 'starve' is misleading, as literal food starvation is not the goal or possible, considering Ireland (neutral) is so close and a major food producer, not to mention things like victory gardens or fallow lands that could be farmed. The goal is to stop the flow of war goods like fuel, oil, metals, rubber, etc. none of which are made at home and need to be imported, without which the war could not be fought or weapons produced.
It is also about political will; what level of disruption would cause the fall of Churchill's government (or if he is dead someone else's) and cause a peace deal to result. Full on 'starvation' is not necessary so long as the Brits morale falters.
 
As long as the Germans don't have a powerful navy and amphibious landing vessels to invade across the English channel, and with the British continually increasing their output of fighter planes, Britain can't be conquered. To prevent goods from reaching them in, say, 1941, the Germans would have to be prepared to torpedo U.S. ships on a significant scale, meaning war with the U.S. beginning at about the time of Barbarossa. British priority in production would go to ASW airplanes and escort carriers, not strategic bombers. Just take all the money and talent wasted on strategic bombers, put it into destroying submarines. A lot of technologies for ASW would come on line earlier. Makeshift escort carriers could be built fast by putting a deck on top of merchant ships--and the craft rules at British shipyards would be put aside, forcefully, to get the job done. Also, the situation would be serious enough that the Brits would seize one of the Azores and operate out of there against the submarine threat. They might even have gone in and taken back those naval bases in Eire.

Also, there would be the possibility of giant airlifts, from Newfoundland to Greenland to Iceland to northern Ireland if all else fails. Or commando suicide raids against submarine pens on the French coast.

On bombing to destroy Britain's capacity to build ships and planes, it didn't work very well when the U.S. and Britain together did it to the Germans--on a scale that it would be impossible for Germany to duplicate. And the new priorities for the anti-sub war might just have caused the Brits to use some of the wasted strategic bombing resources into building up an impenetrable wall of fighter, and to speed up the development of night fighters.
 
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OTL Liverpool was bombed for a weak during the Blitz and lost 80% of its capacity, but shifting priorities (every week some other target was focused on: a factory, a city, a port, etc.) constantly diluted the effect. Plus with a reduced shipment rate the Brits will have a harder time building up than IOTL and won't be able to shift on a dime to confront the disruption. Every day it takes to confront this threat means less materials to fight the war.

Liverpool was the major port for supplies coming into Britain, and the Liverpool area was bombed for far more than a week. After London, it was the most heavily bombed city in the country, although the British went to great lengths to hide the amount of damage the city and port facilities suffered. My mother was born and raised in Liverpool and lived through the bombing, which lasted for months. She spent so many nights in the bomb shelters she had her own sleeping space.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liverpool_Blitz

The fact that the port continued to operate despite almost constant attacks indicates that any attempt to cut off Britain from outside supplies would really have to happen at sea, through submarine and air attacks. Yet German efforts to ramp up the Luftwaffe and Kreigsmarine forces would not have happened in a vacuum -- the British would have countered with stronger ASW forces and more escort carriers and long-range fighters. It would have been a move and counter-move game, with the Germans at a geographical disadvantage over the long run.
 
Thank for the link. Any chance you can post some sources for the Wever-Raeder relationship in the meantime? I won't be able to interlibrary loan the book for a while. I'm more concerned that Osterkamp would be far more of a liability than benefit, as Wever MADE the Luftwaffe; without him it would be dead in the water. I still fail to see what makes Wever's ego so large, as he was able to easily work with Milch, despite being ostensibly equal to him. Especially if Wever wanted something he could be very charming.

ill have to have a look through the collection for some more sources... my grandfather was tight with nicolas von below who was hitler's lw adjudant from 1937-45... i would highly recommend his memoirs for inner lw workings of the pre war and during the war period http://www.amazon.com/At-Hitlers-Si...=dp_db_cm_cr_acr_txt?ie=UTF8&showViewpoints=1

wever was a technocrat and a well trained staff officer; he was not utterly unreplaceable; germany was full of such people; his position in the LW was less signficant than Donut in the KM and only slightly more important than Guderian in the panzerwaffe

wever would not be as good at getting things as fat boy Hermann... Goering was Hitler's close personal confident; wever is just another technocrat clamoring for his service; he would find it difficult to procure the funds that the LW enjoyed in otl

hitler appreciated highly decorated ww1 service; rommel, fat boy. schoerner etc it held a special place in his heart (not required for administrative positions like wever or milch) BUT its the kind of thing that a LW chief should have in order to secure the maximum funds for his service... the ideal for what your looking for IMO is to have Osterkamp become an early nazi in the top circle AND to have wever survive to be continuing chief of staff; it plays to both men's talents; osterkamp was a natural and charming leader and would be an excellent propaganda tool
 

Deleted member 1487

ill have to have a look through the collection for some more sources... my grandfather was tight with nicolas von below who was hitler's lw adjudant from 1937-45... i would highly recommend his memoirs for inner lw workings of the pre war and during the war period http://www.amazon.com/At-Hitlers-Si...=dp_db_cm_cr_acr_txt?ie=UTF8&showViewpoints=1
Thanks again, any help is greatly appreciated.

wever was a technocrat and a well trained staff officer; he was not utterly unreplaceable; germany was full of such people; his position in the LW was less signficant than Donut in the KM and only slightly more important than Guderian in the panzerwaffe
If he were so dispensable why did not someone of equal caliber replace him after his death? Read Corum, Hooten, and Suchenwirth including the link I posted. Milch and Goering deemed him total irreplaceable, as did most of his contemporaries, especially Blomberg in the army, who upon signing his transfer to the LW declared that he had just given up the future CoS of the Heer. Pretty much every Luftwaffe historian worth his salt has stated Wever was totally and utterly irreplaceable and his death doomed the Luftwaffe, especially after what came after.

wever would not be as good at getting things as fat boy Hermann... Goering was Hitler's close personal confident; wever is just another technocrat clamoring for his service; he would find it difficult to procure the funds that the LW enjoyed in otl
http://www.geocities.com/~orion47/WEHRMACHT/LUFTWAFFE/Generalleutnant/WEVER_WALTHER.html
Wever had both classes of the Iron Cross earned in 1914. Wever was a declared Nazi, a personal friend of Ludendorff, who was an early ally of Hitler, who Hitler admired. Corum and Hooten indicate that Wever and Hitler were acquainted personally and Hitler expressed his admiration of Wever and that he was indispensable. While you're right that no one would be able to get out of Hitler what Goering did, Wever was far more than a technocrat. Milch was most certainly a technocrat, even with this front line service in WW1 on the Eastern Front (his bio has some gruesome descriptions of the fighting there). Wever seems to have been part of the NS clique in the Reichwehr that supported Hitler and was specifically requested for the 'Nazi' service of the Luftwaffe, because of his friendliness to NS and had Hitler's respect. There are several photos of Hitler and Wever together with and without Goering, that seem to suggest a relationship that was friendlier than Wever just being another faceless technocrat. Also Milch did have a personal relationship with Hitler thanks to providing free Lufthansa flights to Hitler during his political campaigns. Goering was constantly in fear that Hitler would replace him with the much more competent man. If not Wever, then Milch did have pull with Hitler if something happened to Goering. Milch would probably get the RLM if Goering died.

hitler appreciated highly decorated ww1 service; rommel, fat boy. schoerner etc it held a special place in his heart (not required for administrative positions like wever or milch) BUT its the kind of thing that a LW chief should have in order to secure the maximum funds for his service... the ideal for what your looking for IMO is to have Osterkamp become an early nazi in the top circle AND to have wever survive to be continuing chief of staff; it plays to both men's talents; osterkamp was a natural and charming leader and would be an excellent propaganda tool
Indeed Wever and Milch both had front line service, with Wever getting both classes of the Iron Cross. Against Hitler expressed personal admiration and respect for Wever, especially as Wever was an earlier Reichswehr convert to NS and because he was hand picked by Ludendorff, Hitler's early ally. Hitler may well have owed Milch his election in 1932 thanks to the free personal plane he provided him for his campaign.
Hitler enjoyed much more the attention he received as each service jockeyed for his attention and would love to have all these distinguished military men lobbying him. Though with Goering dead, Hitler will be missing a major political heavy that actually got things done for him, especially in Nazi-fying the economy. A dead Goering means a Hitler that is disoriented and vulnerable, and who is probably looking for someone to lean on. Wever, known for his ability to manage strong personalities (Goering, Milch) could well capitalize on the situation.
I do agree that it will be very hard to top the influence that the fat man had, as he was literally Hitler's right hand. The Luftwaffe won't have as many resources, but the lack of Goering's interference that came in 1936 onward, not to mention Wever remaining on board and organizing well with Milch what was OTL terribly mismanaged and wasted from 1936 onward may well make up for whatever is lost or even ensure something even better and more efficient.

With Milch not having to deal with Goering's prohibitions, plus being in charge of the RLM, he won't have to pussy foot around with industry and getting fixed price contracts implemented in 1936, which means major gains come 1940.

Raeder is going to be a bitch to deal with though for anyone, even Osterkamp. Giving Raeder any aviation unit is pointless because he did nothing with the resources the LW gave him in 1934 (IIRC). When Goering OTL wrested the naval bombers back, Raeder had made no progress and held on to the magnetic mines and minimal torpedo research. The LW will have to make the progress there. Perhaps Wever could lobby to have Raeder removed before the war and replaced with Doenitz....
 
Thanks again, any help is greatly appreciated.


If he were so dispensable why did not someone of equal caliber replace him after his death? Read Corum, Hooten, and Suchenwirth including the link I posted. Milch and Goering deemed him total irreplaceable, as did most of his contemporaries, especially Blomberg in the army, who upon signing his transfer to the LW declared that he had just given up the future CoS of the Heer. Pretty much every Luftwaffe historian worth his salt has stated Wever was totally and utterly irreplaceable and his death doomed the Luftwaffe, especially after what came after.


http://www.geocities.com/~orion47/WEHRMACHT/LUFTWAFFE/Generalleutnant/WEVER_WALTHER.html
Wever had both classes of the Iron Cross earned in 1914. Wever was a declared Nazi, a personal friend of Ludendorff, who was an early ally of Hitler, who Hitler admired. Corum and Hooten indicate that Wever and Hitler were acquainted personally and Hitler expressed his admiration of Wever and that he was indispensable. While you're right that no one would be able to get out of Hitler what Goering did, Wever was far more than a technocrat. Milch was most certainly a technocrat, even with this front line service in WW1 on the Eastern Front (his bio has some gruesome descriptions of the fighting there). Wever seems to have been part of the NS clique in the Reichwehr that supported Hitler and was specifically requested for the 'Nazi' service of the Luftwaffe, because of his friendliness to NS and had Hitler's respect. There are several photos of Hitler and Wever together with and without Goering, that seem to suggest a relationship that was friendlier than Wever just being another faceless technocrat. Also Milch did have a personal relationship with Hitler thanks to providing free Lufthansa flights to Hitler during his political campaigns. Goering was constantly in fear that Hitler would replace him with the much more competent man. If not Wever, then Milch did have pull with Hitler if something happened to Goering. Milch would probably get the RLM if Goering died.


Indeed Wever and Milch both had front line service, with Wever getting both classes of the Iron Cross. Against Hitler expressed personal admiration and respect for Wever, especially as Wever was an earlier Reichswehr convert to NS and because he was hand picked by Ludendorff, Hitler's early ally. Hitler may well have owed Milch his election in 1932 thanks to the free personal plane he provided him for his campaign.
Hitler enjoyed much more the attention he received as each service jockeyed for his attention and would love to have all these distinguished military men lobbying him. Though with Goering dead, Hitler will be missing a major political heavy that actually got things done for him, especially in Nazi-fying the economy. A dead Goering means a Hitler that is disoriented and vulnerable, and who is probably looking for someone to lean on. Wever, known for his ability to manage strong personalities (Goering, Milch) could well capitalize on the situation.
I do agree that it will be very hard to top the influence that the fat man had, as he was literally Hitler's right hand. The Luftwaffe won't have as many resources, but the lack of Goering's interference that came in 1936 onward, not to mention Wever remaining on board and organizing well with Milch what was OTL terribly mismanaged and wasted from 1936 onward may well make up for whatever is lost or even ensure something even better and more efficient.

With Milch not having to deal with Goering's prohibitions, plus being in charge of the RLM, he won't have to pussy foot around with industry and getting fixed price contracts implemented in 1936, which means major gains come 1940.

Raeder is going to be a bitch to deal with though for anyone, even Osterkamp. Giving Raeder any aviation unit is pointless because he did nothing with the resources the LW gave him in 1934 (IIRC). When Goering OTL wrested the naval bombers back, Raeder had made no progress and held on to the magnetic mines and minimal torpedo research. The LW will have to make the progress there. Perhaps Wever could lobby to have Raeder removed before the war and replaced with Doenitz....


His replacement was Kesselring; a highly effective and distinguished officer of supreme talent...then Stumpff who didn't display himself to be incompetent; then Jeschonnek; who was highly regarded by Kesselring and Sperlle as the brightest mind in the LW (he and Goering had a stormy relationship because Jeschonnek had to deliver a lot of bad news)...then Gunther Korten, another competent officer...then Kreipe, a distinguished veteran of the war then Koller who was a solid talent as well

in all honesty the LW chief of staff position, even after Wever's death was filled with very capable men

the army would have been better off if Wever became chief of staff... Beck was an idiot;

if your killing off Goering (depending on the date) it will not necessarily mean a Wever command... there is symbolism in that post; plus the branch/fleet chiefs will want someone who could procure lots of money and resources... Milch is probably not viable in that role, because the whole jew ancesterory thing will come again... also, if you are killing off Goering in the late 30's a lot of permanent decisions have been made that Wever will be unable to alter significantly even if he wanted to... nor will Wever be necessarily able to crowd out or get rid of Udet. Not every decision Wever may or may not make is garuanteed to be more effective than OTL either

particularly in regards to heavy bombers; in your other thread, i argued that once he bypassed the do-19 and set the program back, it lost its viability and usefulness... you would have 4 engine bombers rolling off the line when Germany already has lost the initiative and has no hope of recapturing it

and by 1937-38 some of the really stupid decisions about training of fighter and bomber pilots and the scale of which that was done and the resources committed couldn't be reversed easily

Donut is not exactly the smartest and most worldly guy to ever put on a uniform either... and Raeder's unyielding conservatism and pride will not exactly rub well with Wever either. Raeder at least knew Osterkamp from a comradery type role; a relationship there might not be perfect, but its probably the best possible (compared to wever or fat boy); Osterkamp is more minded to find naval solutions than Wever, just based on his life experience
 

Deleted member 1487

His replacement was Kesselring; a highly effective and distinguished officer of supreme talent...then Stumpff who didn't display himself to be incompetent; then Jeschonnek; who was highly regarded by Kesselring and Sperlle as the brightest mind in the LW (he and Goering had a stormy relationship because Jeschonnek had to deliver a lot of bad news)...then Gunther Korten, another competent officer...then Kreipe, a distinguished veteran of the war then Koller who was a solid talent as well
Korten was the best of the bunch. Honestly though all of the above had problems that Wever did not. Kesselring lasted barely a year because of constant struggles with Milch and Goering, Stumpff was over promoted and knew it, which is why he bailed as quickly as possible, and Jeschonnek was a disaster for the service. He was bright and a favorite of Wever's, but he was too young, inexperienced and a sycophant. He hated staff work, constantly raided the flight schools for all of the instructors and training aircraft, yet failed to take advantage of simple solutions to replace both. I blindly followed Hitler and Goering, even when Milch told him such plans were fiscally and materially insane. Read Suchenwirth on him, that was probably the worst thing that happened to the LW leadership-wise.

Korten was very good, but he was far too junior in 1936 for the position, both experientially and by age. Too bad he died so young, but there was not much he could do in 1944.

in all honesty the LW chief of staff position, even after Wever's death was filled with very capable men
See above, no it was not. Milch and Goering stated that after Wever's death everything went tits up. Corum, Suchenwirth, Hooten, and Homze, all the leading English language scholars on the LW have categorically stated that the mortal wound inflicted by Wever's death started the spiral downwards of the LW. Everyone lacked the people skills of Wever, who could manage the personalities of the RLM and LW, despite the atrocious organization that left no one in charge except for the absentee chief Goering.

the army would have been better off if Wever became chief of staff... Beck was an idiot;
Not necessarily, it would have been fine with Blomberg, the problem was Hitler who wanted a loyal service instead of independent brilliance. Though ultimately Wever could have handled Hitler better than Blomberg...

if your killing off Goering (depending on the date) it will not necessarily mean a Wever command... there is symbolism in that post; plus the branch/fleet chiefs will want someone who could procure lots of money and resources... Milch is probably not viable in that role, because the whole jew ancesterory thing will come again... also, if you are killing off Goering in the late 30's a lot of permanent decisions have been made that Wever will be unable to alter significantly even if he wanted to... nor will Wever be necessarily able to crowd out or get rid of Udet. Not every decision Wever may or may not make is garuanteed to be more effective than OTL either
Milch was a civilian that would get the RLM, that much is virtually certain, considering the high regard Hitler had for him, Jewish roots or not. Similar situation with Wever. With Goering dead Hitler would be reeling. He would need a competent man he could trust as the head of the LW, which would be Wever. If you have a realistic political appointee to the role let me know, because I haven't found anyone more likely than Wever.

Udet was a Goering appointee and only reached his position due to the patronage of Goering. When Wever died, he got promoted to take over the technical department because Wever's guy, Wimmer, was no longer protected by his CoS. Wimmer was very competent, but Goering found him boring. He owed Udet and promoted him to the role as a favor. Without Goering, no one wanted Udet there, and Hitler didn't really care. He would pass into the testing branch as a test pilot (probably the chief one, a role he was best suited for).

As to decisions that Wever could/could not change, depending on when the death occurs quite a lot could be changed, but the big difference will be to prevent command fragmentation and not allow the duplication, waste, and misuse of resources that resulted from his death. The man was not a demigod by any means, which means he could have made mistakes later on, but prior to his death in his role as CoS of the LW he made none and even though Wimmer was indulgent of certain projects that should not have been supported, he was a indescribably more effective technical chief than Udet, who would not get Wimmer's job without Wever dying. That alone, through no effort on Wever's part, would mean tremendously beneficial things for the LW.
particularly in regards to heavy bombers; in your other thread, i argued that once he bypassed the do-19 and set the program back, it lost its viability and usefulness... you would have 4 engine bombers rolling off the line when Germany already has lost the initiative and has no hope of recapturing it
The strategic bomber question is the least of the benefits that would come from Wever surviving and Goering living/dying. Wever may well decide to forgo the 4 engine bombers if they only become ready during the war, something that Goering and Jeschonnek were incapable of deciding, ultimately ending with vast resources being wasted on a bad project.

and by 1937-38 some of the really stupid decisions about training of fighter and bomber pilots and the scale of which that was done and the resources committed couldn't be reversed easily
Indeed, all Jeschonnek's fault.

Donut is not exactly the smartest and most worldly guy to ever put on a uniform either... and Raeder's unyielding conservatism and pride will not exactly rub well with Wever either. Raeder at least knew Osterkamp from a comradery type role; a relationship there might not be perfect, but its probably the best possible (compared to wever or fat boy); Osterkamp is more minded to find naval solutions than Wever, just based on his life experience
Regardless of who Raeder confronts, Osterkamp/Wever/Goering, it won't make a difference because of his petty rivalries. Ultimately the LW will have to do something, but without Wever no one (with influence) in the navy or LW was willing to focus on air-naval matters. Half steps were made pre-war, which only bore fruit mid-war, which by then it was too late.
 
Korten was the best of the bunch. Honestly though all of the above had problems that Wever did not. Kesselring lasted barely a year because of constant struggles with Milch and Goering, Stumpff was over promoted and knew it, which is why he bailed as quickly as possible, and Jeschonnek was a disaster for the service. He was bright and a favorite of Wever's, but he was too young, inexperienced and a sycophant. He hated staff work, constantly raided the flight schools for all of the instructors and training aircraft, yet failed to take advantage of simple solutions to replace both. I blindly followed Hitler and Goering, even when Milch told him such plans were fiscally and materially insane. Read Suchenwirth on him, that was probably the worst thing that happened to the LW leadership-wise.

Korten was very good, but he was far too junior in 1936 for the position, both experientially and by age. Too bad he died so young, but there was not much he could do in 1944.


See above, no it was not. Milch and Goering stated that after Wever's death everything went tits up. Corum, Suchenwirth, Hooten, and Homze, all the leading English language scholars on the LW have categorically stated that the mortal wound inflicted by Wever's death started the spiral downwards of the LW. Everyone lacked the people skills of Wever, who could manage the personalities of the RLM and LW, despite the atrocious organization that left no one in charge except for the absentee chief Goering.


Not necessarily, it would have been fine with Blomberg, the problem was Hitler who wanted a loyal service instead of independent brilliance. Though ultimately Wever could have handled Hitler better than Blomberg...


Milch was a civilian that would get the RLM, that much is virtually certain, considering the high regard Hitler had for him, Jewish roots or not. Similar situation with Wever. With Goering dead Hitler would be reeling. He would need a competent man he could trust as the head of the LW, which would be Wever. If you have a realistic political appointee to the role let me know, because I haven't found anyone more likely than Wever.

Udet was a Goering appointee and only reached his position due to the patronage of Goering. When Wever died, he got promoted to take over the technical department because Wever's guy, Wimmer, was no longer protected by his CoS. Wimmer was very competent, but Goering found him boring. He owed Udet and promoted him to the role as a favor. Without Goering, no one wanted Udet there, and Hitler didn't really care. He would pass into the testing branch as a test pilot (probably the chief one, a role he was best suited for).

As to decisions that Wever could/could not change, depending on when the death occurs quite a lot could be changed, but the big difference will be to prevent command fragmentation and not allow the duplication, waste, and misuse of resources that resulted from his death. The man was not a demigod by any means, which means he could have made mistakes later on, but prior to his death in his role as CoS of the LW he made none and even though Wimmer was indulgent of certain projects that should not have been supported, he was a indescribably more effective technical chief than Udet, who would not get Wimmer's job without Wever dying. That alone, through no effort on Wever's part, would mean tremendously beneficial things for the LW.

The strategic bomber question is the least of the benefits that would come from Wever surviving and Goering living/dying. Wever may well decide to forgo the 4 engine bombers if they only become ready during the war, something that Goering and Jeschonnek were incapable of deciding, ultimately ending with vast resources being wasted on a bad project.


Indeed, all Jeschonnek's fault.


Regardless of who Raeder confronts, Osterkamp/Wever/Goering, it won't make a difference because of his petty rivalries. Ultimately the LW will have to do something, but without Wever no one (with influence) in the navy or LW was willing to focus on air-naval matters. Half steps were made pre-war, which only bore fruit mid-war, which by then it was too late.


I don't envy Jeschonnek's position; he was stuck with a lot of shitty decisions prior to his getting there AND HG didn't like giving him the time of day which made command; lets say disjointed, not all his fault but he was the worst of the group agreed

I don't have a suggestion for someone to handle the technocratic duties; my suggestion of Osterkamp was to be the LW chief; because its a leadership, pr and management deal which would fit him very well; also any decision to closely cooperate with the navy or convince hitler to allocate funds for anti shipping aircraft is going to have to come from the top; and Osterkamp could speak to Hitler on these matters in a more effective way given his life experience

Blomberg allowed the branches too much latitude but he was otherwise mostly effective... but Beck was an idiot and made LOTS of enemies and allowed his staff to piss everyone off so nobody would work with him... Wever would at least visably smother the OKH staff from acting like a bunch of douchebags and taking dumps on every technical study

If the POD is that late of course Osterkamp isn't viable... Maybe Robert Ritter Von Greim... Pour Le Merite winner, devout nazi, good organizer; handsome for official portraits, working relationship with most of the LW section chiefs

Udet was a national hero, simply dumping him, or promoting him sideways would be very difficult, even if Hitler didn't particularly care for or about him

Could Wever have stood in to cock block Willi Messerschmidt and Hitler? would he have had the authority to cancel the ME-109 and just give Kurt Tank all the inline engines and factory space? Maybe Wever cancels a few dead ends BUT he might start a few of his own; such things are beyond the scope of easy determination

If your POD is that late; its unlikely the KM/LW rivalry could be repaired; Goring by 1937 had more or less engrained into his subordinates by that point that the KM could go screw themselves, and the attitude was fairly pervasive in all LW departments; I don't see how Wever would be inclined to change that state of affairs, he is competing with those people for funding... and German KM/LW rivalry was hardly unique... look at the service and branch rivalry in the UK, USA, Japan and Italy

edit: You can't have Wever be the LW chief and the chief of staff... its too much responsibility and too much work for one man; when he was alive he was busy as hell (his travel schedule was on par with Werner Von Braun's) so if he is eleveated; he is going to be busy with a lot of political crap, and his time for all the technical stuff he was really effective at will be considerably reduced; hence the more effective outcome with Wever living is for him to stay where he was pulling all the strings as chief of staff and get someone more effective than fat boy in the LW chief spot (Osterkamp presents the most promising butterflies but Greim was plenty competent in his own right)
 
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Deleted member 1487

I don't envy Jeschonnek's position; he was stuck with a lot of shitty decisions prior to his getting there AND HG didn't like giving him the time of day which made command; lets say disjointed, not all his fault but he was the worst of the group agreed

I don't have a suggestion for someone to handle the technocratic duties; my suggestion of Osterkamp was to be the LW chief; because its a leadership, pr and management deal which would fit him very well; also any decision to closely cooperate with the navy or convince hitler to allocate funds for anti shipping aircraft is going to have to come from the top; and Osterkamp could speak to Hitler on these matters in a more effective way given his life experience

Blomberg allowed the branches too much latitude but he was otherwise mostly effective... but Beck was an idiot and made LOTS of enemies and allowed his staff to piss everyone off so nobody would work with him... Wever would at least visably smother the OKH staff from acting like a bunch of douchebags and taking dumps on every technical study

If the POD is that late of course Osterkamp isn't viable... Maybe Robert Ritter Von Greim... Pour Le Merite winner, devout nazi, good organizer; handsome for official portraits, working relationship with most of the LW section chiefs

Udet was a national hero, simply dumping him, or promoting him sideways would be very difficult, even if Hitler didn't particularly care for or about him

Could Wever have stood in to cock block Willi Messerschmidt and Hitler? would he have had the authority to cancel the ME-109 and just give Kurt Tank all the inline engines and factory space? Maybe Wever cancels a few dead ends BUT he might start a few of his own; such things are beyond the scope of easy determination

If your POD is that late; its unlikely the KM/LW rivalry could be repaired; Goring by 1937 had more or less engrained into his subordinates by that point that the KM could go screw themselves, and the attitude was fairly pervasive in all LW departments; I don't see how Wever would be inclined to change that state of affairs, he is competing with those people for funding... and German KM/LW rivalry was hardly unique... look at the service and branch rivalry in the UK, USA, Japan and Italy

edit: You can't have Wever be the LW chief and the chief of staff... its too much responsibility and too much work for one man; when he was alive he was busy as hell (his travel schedule was on par with Werner Von Braun's) so if he is eleveated; he is going to be busy with a lot of political crap, and his time for all the technical stuff he was really effective at will be considerably reduced; hence the more effective outcome with Wever living is for him to stay where he was pulling all the strings as chief of staff and get someone more effective than fat boy in the LW chief spot (Osterkamp presents the most promising butterflies but Greim was plenty competent in his own right)

I can agree with most of this. The POD would be in late 1935/early 1936, but I get your point. Not sure if I totally agree, but the case can be made for sure. Technical matters, such as the Me109 were not his area of responsibility, so I doubt that would come up, especially if he were to be promoted. His important was doctrine and staff work, which would mean his interference in the Bf110 and Zerstoerer concept, which may well mean the Fw187 gets the role instead.

Now your edit questions are interesting. Kesselring would probably take over the CoS position, which means a technocrat can do the day to day thinks, leaving Wever to set directions and play politics, which is really what set him apart from his peers anyway. Milch and Kesselring won't butt heads here because of Wever being around to deliniate authority, something Goering never did, which directly led to the problems in their relationship in the first place (plus neither was willing to back down, while Wever was willing to 'coddle' Milch, which apparently he liked). Again Wever did not really have a technical role outside of doctrine; that was all up to Wimmer and Richthofen, both of whom were punted out or left because of Udet. Udet may keep his role of inspector for some time, but he will be kept out of the technical area, where he did terrible damage to the LW. That alone is worthy of a TL.
The big thing for the LW CiC was having a politician that could handle Hitler and other services, while a CoS would do the technocratic stuff. Goering as CiC only did part of the job there, as he was also RLM and delegated his roles to Milch and Wever. Basically Wever would keep doing what he was doing, but now include Hitler and the other services in his group of personalities to be managed, while leaving a lot of the technocratic stuff to Kesselring, which he could do on his own, so long as the CiC handled Milch and set authority boundaries. Milch and Wever working together on the role that the LW would have with the RLM would be a vast improvement, especially as Wever could use the Jewish thing to his advantage in negotiations.
 

Deleted member 1487

What about magnetic mines? The British got very lucky early in the war OTL, when they captured a mine dropped on land by accident and were able to neutralize the mines after that by degaussing. Here the mines are hoarded until there are large numbers of them and then are only used by specially trained crews, which did not happen OTL. So how long would it take the Brits to deal with these new mines? What about enmasse? If suddenly the Germans can drop 20,000 unsweepable mines outside London, Bristol, Liverpool and Glasgow, how could the Brits deal with this?
 
What about magnetic mines? The British got very lucky early in the war OTL, when they captured a mine dropped on land by accident and were able to neutralize the mines after that by degaussing. Here the mines are hoarded until there are large numbers of them and then are only used by specially trained crews, which did not happen OTL. So how long would it take the Brits to deal with these new mines? What about enmasse? If suddenly the Germans can drop 20,000 unsweepable mines outside London, Bristol, Liverpool and Glasgow, how could the Brits deal with this?

Wooden hull boats to do the sweeping?

Torqumada
 

Deleted member 1487

Wooden hull boats to do the sweeping?

Torqumada

The German mines were sensitive enough to be detonated by metal equipment on the boats! Which was something not realized until the mine was captured.
 
Sailboats with no metal?

Torqumada

Not all that crazy actually. Much of the british merchant fleet is wood right up to the twentieth century. As long as you can rely on powered tugs to take you into port, sail ships can give coal fired vessels a run for their money when it comes to transport. None of that heavy fuel necessary.

Of course, if the wind drops and there's a U boat about...
 

Deleted member 1487

Interesting things I've discovered:
First of all :http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Starvation
This can be a model for the operation against Britain. The Japanese used sailboats, which were effective against all kinds of mines, but these operated so slowly in mine clearing that they were nearly useless. That is why the British did not use them.

Also the German acoustic mines were ready in 1940 even after being delayed by lack of funding. Double trigger types were used and available to resist clearing methods of one type or the other. It also helped to nullify degaussing.

Pressure mines were ready in 1942, but again suffered from lack of funding and foresight. There never was an effective method developed for sweeping them, so they could have been a brutal weapon if properly funded and available earlier.

Mass air drops of mines and uboat mining operation of British ports by unsweepible mines would shut down traffic for days if not weeks. The limited number of major ports could be targeted and the others could not handle the demands of major shipping.
From another thread on this topic:

Jon G. said:
by Jon G. on Mon Jun 06, 2011 7:12 pm

Quite a lot of planning went into this pre-war. Convoying was something which the British in general and the RN in particular were well prepared for. The main problem with convoys, it appears, wasn't so much that all cargo arrived pretty much at once, but rather having it all removed from docks and quays in a timely and orderly manner. Also, the fall of France and the consequent closure of many east and south coast ports had not been anticipated prior to the war.

Even so, congestion issues pertained mainly to evacuation of imported stores, not so much to the ability of ports to handle many ships arriving at once. Particularly the winter of 1940-1941 was something of a crisis period - the Clyde ports being the most congested of all - but many problems were solved administratively by employing port masters with wide-ranging powers.

A major culprit in pre-war planning was the privately-owned railroad companies who had simply operated with traffic averages for their traffic calculations, not realizing or anticipating that only part of their networks would be strained by greatly increased traffic. Again the Clyde ports serve as a good example because their hinterlands weren't as well developed as other west coast ports; stores had to be unloaded from ships, sometimes by lighter, then removed from quays and into storehouses and warehouses, then all the way across Scotland on frequently single-track rail lines, via Gretna and Carlisle down to England over a rail network which had the added burden of having to deal with coal traffic due to port closures and a general shortage of coastal shipping.

The books to get about this highly interesting subject are C. B. A. Behrens Merchant Shipping and the Demands of War, Martin Doughty's Merchant Shipping and War, and also C. I. Savage Inland Transport
 

Deleted member 1487

Not sure if anyone cares at this point, but here is some more information:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fliegerführer_Atlantik
"The OKL did not view sea communications as the principle target of the air arm. Göring and his chief of the general staff, Hans Jeschonnek thought that an airborne assault on mainland Britain would destroy its armament factories, the Royal Air Force (RAF) and British morale. The air offensive, they hoped, would be enough to convince the British to sue for peace. Göring and his staff hoped that this would avoid a high-risk amphibious landing in Britain, codenamed Operation Sea Lion, from being carried out. Hitler was receptive to this idea, and Directive, No. 17 made sure German efforts went into planning and executing Operation Eagle Attack, which led to a prolonged struggle for air superiority over southern England in the Battle of Britain. In this operation, targeting British shipping came behind destroying the RAF and military industries on land.[9] The strategy demonstrated the extent to which the OKL hoped to win the war purely by the use of air power against land targets.[10]

For the Kriegsmarine, this was the least desirable strategy. For Raeder and Dönitz, the diversion of the Luftwaffe to these tasks was a wasted opportunity and interfered with the demands of the naval staff for support and reconnaissance in the Atlantic.[11] In July and early August 1940 they had convinced the OKL to strike at shipping and ports by mine-laying[12] and it had proven highly effective. The lack of resources meant these operations could not be decisive,[13] but naval staff hoped by striking at the most important centres of British sea communications, the ports of London, Liverpool and Bristol Channel, on top of mining could have decisive results.[14]"
 
Don't forget Britain will respond differently with a worse Battle of the Atlantic. Simply telling Bomber Command that they must divert planes from their ineffectual night time bombing in 1940-1942 to supporting ASW operations, and the British ASW effort is much improved. Or boosting production of relatively cheap and quickly built escort carriers or minsweepers whether through their own production or through Lend Lease.
...
So there is plenty of slack for the British to pick up if needed. I suspect more sleepless nights for a lot of people and a reduction of the war effort in other areas, but nothing that really changes the conduct of the war.
Very good points. It really wasn't necessary, either, for Luftwaffe to create a special command, just agree to more co-operation with BdU (which is a big enough change itself:rolleyes:).

OTOH, it's a pretty big change to get Bomber Command to give up anything...:rolleyes: but just the a/c lost in the futile & stupid bombing of the sub pens in Lorient (IIRC) would totally transform the Battle of the Atlantic: 100 Stirlings on ASW patrol would make Biscay a positive hell for U-boats. Give Coastal Command ASV.I & Leigh Light in '40-1 (technically possible...if politically pretty unlikely:rolleyes::mad:), you drastically ramp up U-boat losses, perhaps enough you could advance D-Day into '43. (Cancel the stupid Italian campaign:mad::mad: after Husky, it becomes certain.:cool:) Even 3 squadrons in Gander would have cut losses way down, too, but TTL, BdU might never get boats that far west:cool::cool: due to lack of numbers.:eek:

I also especially like the idea of oilers converted to *CVEs; flying just 4 TSR Stringbags each, they could provide all the A/S cover a convoy would need, & do it even in 1940. (You'd need to solve the problem of def against FW.200s, still...:()

I'd like to see the impact of Luftwaffe intruders on Coastal Command bases, too. (Yes, this makes the Germans even smarter.:rolleyes:)
They won't give up on bombing German cities, probably hoping to divert German resources away from the SW campaign.
Nor AFAIK is anybody suggesting it. And it was politically impractical anyhow; Winston had to be seen to be doing something for his gov't to survive, & bombing would do that. (IMO, switching to mining rivers & bombing canals & railyards made way more sense,:cool::cool: but nobody in the Air Ministry or Bomber Command seems to have read the statistics supporting that.:rolleyes: Too busy trying to "make the rubble bounce".:rolleyes::eek:)
What changes are priorities. If more resources are used fighting the Luftwaffe and subs, then fewer bombers and capital ships. Fewer tanks, infantry, artillery, which all impacts north Africa. Remember too that Lend-Lease didn't kick in until March 1941, so until then Britain is all cash and carry. There is no credit.
This is actually an argument against bombing cities, not for it.:rolleyes: A/S, & attacks on transport, had drastically lower losses in a/c, so less need to replace, not to mention lower crew losses, which benefits Navy & Army in giving them access to better-qualified men, who don't get snapped up by RAF. Also, notice, very small diversions to Coastal Command have very large impacts on the A/S war. I should also add, the chance of changing bombing priorities having the slightest impact on tanks, let alone capital ships, is zero.
Ultimately the Germans don't have to starve Britain into submission, they just need to topple Churchill's government. ... Even sinkings are not the end all of the campaign, because it comes down to disruption of deliveries. Can deliveries be disrupted enough to prevent factories from working at capacity?
Good points. Look at the state of affairs in around March 1943. The Brits became convinced the losses were prohibitive, even tho, in reality, they were winning. Make that true in 1940 or 1941, before Barbarossa...:eek:
...suddenly the Germans can drop 20,000 unsweepable mines...
They weren't unsweepable. The idea of the magnetic mine wasn't new; it appeared in WW1, & actually inspired the Duplex exploder of RN torpedoes, & the magnetic feature of the godawful USN Mk 6 exploder. Wooden-hull minesweepers existed, & could be built in sufficient numbers (notably in Nova Scotia {Canada} & Newfoundland {not then Canada,:eek::p recall...}, as they were OTL:cool:).

Something else to ponder: the Germans made their magnetic mines too sensitive.:eek::confused: If they'd adjusted the sensitivity the other direction, they'd have made they even harder to sweep.:eek:

I'd love to see a Brit response more in line with what Middlebrook suggested in Convoy: a concerted attack on U-boats right at the start of the war. He suggests the Brits could have crippled BdU at the very outset.:eek::cool::cool:
 
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