Starving Britain into Submission

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Deleted member 1487

Hypothetically the Germans are able to set aside their inter-service bickering to come to a inter-service plan on starving Britain into submission, how would this play out? This would replace Sea Lion as the primary plan to bring Britain to the table, assuming that it was ever seriously considered.

My proposal: The Germans set up a purpose trained combined service (Luftwaffe-Kriegsmarine) air unit that handles the air component (aerial mining, torpedo attacks, reconnaissance work for subs, etc.), as Helmuth Felmy advocated prewar, while the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine have their own tasks. LW bombs ports exclusively, especially Liverpool, which was the primary port for intercontinental shipping. Obviously the KM focuses on sub and surface raider attacks that pass north of Ireland (the primary route for convoys).

There are several changes though: FW 187 is chosen instead of the Me 110 for long range escort work http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fw_187 , there are purpose build torpedo bombers built for this unit http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fieseler_Fi_167 plus He 111's and Do 17's at aside for mine laying and torpedo bombing operations, there are long range recon craft available for work with subs (I'm thinking Do217 and various flying boats with 2,000+ mile range like the Do 22 and BV 136) specially trained for open sea navigation/vectoring. The Ju 88 is only used for bombing operations, including those at night if losses during the day are too high.

Also there are tactical changes: the magnetic mine (first produced in 1939) is not introduced until 20,000 can be build (i.e. mid 1940) and are only deployed as part of a concerted effort by planes, subs, surface ships once bases in the Low Lands and France are available, concentrating their use in the Thames Estuary and near Liverpool. Previously only contact mines are dropped by aerial units/laid by ship. Also the full plan doesn't go into effect until at least France is dealt with. No switch in focus, just unrelenting pressure in closing British ports and shipping.

What is the outcome if such an effort is undertaken in August 1940? Personally I think it would strike directly at the heart of British vulnerability and could cut off the most critical resource that would force Britain to the table: fuel. A focused effort to destroy trade will be bloody for both sides, but the pay off is substantial. The big problem is whether losses can be sustained for long enough to fully bite into the British before attrition loosens the vice grip, allowing the Brits to stay in the war.
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
If the Germans keep this up rather than turn on the Soviet Union a year later, I do not see how the British could have survived indefinitely.
 
If the Germans keep this up rather than turn on the Soviet Union a year later, I do not see how the British could have survived indefinitely.

Assuming that America still enters the war Britain can not starve. I think with America out of the war it still will be fine.
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
Assuming that America still enters the war Britain can not starve. I think with America out of the war it still will be fine.

If a fair chunk of the resources that were poured into the invasion of the Soviet Union were instead diverted to the campaign to starve and bomb Britain into submission, then I do not see how the entry of the United States into the war will do much good. IOTL, it wasn't until the middle of 1943 that the U-boat campaign faltered. ITTL, it would be a good deal worse.
 
Don't forget Britain will respond differently with a worse Battle of the Atlantic. Simply telling Bomber Command that they must divert planes from their ineffectual night time bombing in 1940-1942 to supporting ASW operations, and the British ASW effort is much improved. Or boosting production of relatively cheap and quickly built escort carriers or minsweepers whether through their own production or through Lend Lease.

Also, while 1943 is when the Battle of the Atlantic was decisively won, the Germans had more or less reached their limit against the British by late 1941. Their successes in 1942 was by shifting U-Boat operations against the US coasts as the US had not prepared for ASW to any extent they should have. When the US finally caught up to the British, the U-Boat war was over.

So there is plenty of slack for the British to pick up if needed. I suspect more sleepless nights for a lot of people and a reduction of the war effort in other areas, but nothing that really changes the conduct of the war.
 
If a fair chunk of the resources that were poured into the invasion of the Soviet Union were instead diverted to the campaign to starve and bomb Britain into submission, then I do not see how the entry of the United States into the war will do much good. IOTL, it wasn't until the middle of 1943 that the U-boat campaign faltered. ITTL, it would be a good deal worse.

If Germany delays an invasion of the USSR in order to starve the UK then The Soviets would become too strong for Germany to attack. Hitler wanted the East not the West.
 

Deleted member 1487

Don't forget Britain will respond differently with a worse Battle of the Atlantic. Simply telling Bomber Command that they must divert planes from their ineffectual night time bombing in 1940-1942 to supporting ASW operations, and the British ASW effort is much improved. Or boosting production of relatively cheap and quickly built escort carriers or minsweepers whether through their own production or through Lend Lease.
Its not like flipping a switch. Bomber command has no training in ASW. Also Britain did not have a useful depth charge until 1941. If anything I see them getting used to bomb German airfields to get the bombers to stop. They won't give up on bombing German cities, probably hoping to divert German resources away from the SW campaign. Escort carriers and minesweepers I'll give you, but there is an upper limit of what they will do there, as they have other commitments. The more they spend on defense, the less then can spend on offensive warfighting.

Also, while 1943 is when the Battle of the Atlantic was decisively won, the Germans had more or less reached their limit against the British by late 1941. Their successes in 1942 was by shifting U-Boat operations against the US coasts as the US had not prepared for ASW to any extent they should have. When the US finally caught up to the British, the U-Boat war was over.
Because of their commitment to fighting the Soviets. If they have a plan that is working, why wouldn't they stick it out instead of getting involved in the Mediterranean or even Russia? Agree about the Uboat successes in 1942, but realize that is also the time that Fliegerfüherer Atlantik really came into the fight. In 1939 and 1940 the British did not have their game together at all and I am suggesting that the Germans plan out a campaign that would take them to a 1942 level organization from 1939 instead of having no plan, to cut through red tape and interservice rivalry, and constantly shift goals, priorities, and misuse what they did have.
The goal is to knock out Britain before the US gets involved and if all the Luftwaffe is used in a concerted strike against the British vulnerabilities for prolonged periods, things which never happened in OTL.

OTL Liverpool was bombed for a weak during the Blitz and lost 80% of its capacity, but shifting priorities (every week some other target was focused on: a factory, a city, a port, etc.) constantly diluted the effect. Plus with a reduced shipment rate the Brits will have a harder time building up than IOTL and won't be able to shift on a dime to confront the disruption. Every day it takes to confront this threat means less materials to fight the war.

So there is plenty of slack for the British to pick up if needed. I suspect more sleepless nights for a lot of people and a reduction of the war effort in other areas, but nothing that really changes the conduct of the war.
Again cannot disagree more. Everyone thinks this about the German war effort too, they must have had some slack somewhere right?, wrong. Everything was utilized to the max. What changes are priorities. If more resources are used fighting the Luftwaffe and subs, then fewer bombers and capital ships. Fewer tanks, infantry, artillery, which all impacts north Africa. Remember too that Lend-Lease didn't kick in until March 1941, so until then Britain is all cash and carry. There is no credit.

Ultimately the Germans don't have to starve Britain into submission, they just need to topple Churchill's government. What point would it reach to get there? The people worrying that the US isn't coming? Rations getting smaller? Their houses bombed continuously for nights on end (which never happened OTL because of shifting priorities). Even sinkings are not the end all of the campaign, because it comes down to disruption of deliveries. Can deliveries be disrupted enough to prevent factories from working at capacity?
 

Thande

Donor
It could have worked, but it's not a guarantor of German victory. This was tried during the Seven Years' War and the Napoleonic Wars as well, causing food shortages and rationing far worse than the Battle of the Atlantic in WW2. The government responded with martial law against the food riots. Of course, by the 20th century things are different and there's more possibility of some sort of popular revolution. Might make an interesting TL. But I'm not convinced the Germans had the capability to pull it off.
 
this strategy weakens Britain; but in the long run I can't see it being ultimately successful unless there is a political collapse

if LW aircraft are really making a nuisance of themselves in the atlantic; the British will detatch fleet carriers to fly top cover for the convoys until proper escort carriers are built up at which point it is a game of diminishing returns

you need other pod's for this to be a war winner

maybe japan jumping on the british (without going after the us) and tying up a lot of their fleet assets in the pacific plus a more successful and aggressive regia marina to prevent large scale reinforcement of the home fleet

holding back the magnetic mines would be a good idea; another helpful pod is figuring out the problem with the magnetic contact pistols on their torpedoes
 

Deleted member 1487

another helpful pod is figuring out the problem with the magnetic contact pistols on their torpedoes
This is probably the most important POD. Churchill was almost killed with the leadership of the fleet when the HMS Nelson was torpedoed but the three contacting torpedoes did not detonate thanks to the faulty pistols.
The early death of Churchill in 1939 and the resulting weaker government in 1940 would virtually ensure a greater potential for a peace deal in 1940-1.
 
This is probably the most important POD. Churchill was almost killed with the leadership of the fleet when the HMS Nelson was torpedoed but the three contacting torpedoes did not detonate thanks to the faulty pistols.
The early death of Churchill in 1939 and the resulting weaker government in 1940 would virtually ensure a greater potential for a peace deal in 1940-1.

ark royal was also saved by faulty torpedoes... U-39 had a perfect shot and launched 2 fish at her which detonated prematurely; her position was given away and she was nailed by furious destroyers... hello butterflies for bismarck
 
I would think that a more focused and supported Regina Marina would help out a lot. I remember reading a timeline where El Duce gave the navy a lot more support and allowed a naval airforce along with a carrier. They had good torpedos, fast destroyers, and they did fairly in the original timeline despite all the issues facing them. They just lacked resources, focus, and aircraft carriers. Radar as well but there are debates on how much of a game changer it really was in the early stages.

This could cause all kinds of problems for the British in the Mediterranean. At the very least causing them to divide their limited resources and men even further. Especially if they manage to threaten Gibralter or Malta, maybe even a joint invasion with the Germans.
 
Its not like flipping a switch. Bomber command has no training in ASW.

The mere presence of an airplane changes sub warfare a lot. The submarines in WWII were not true submarines that could stay underwater most of the time. They were submersibles that spent most of their time above water. Having more airplanes in the Atlantic identifies threats, alerts convoys, forces enemy subs to submerge. It greatly reduces the effectiveness of U-Boats. It's such an obvious move, it's really head slapping that the British didn't do this. In this scenario, it's certainly an easy action that can be taken, and one that will be brought up once losses start mounting.

If anything I see them getting used to bomb German airfields to get the bombers to stop. They won't give up on bombing German cities, probably hoping to divert German resources away from the SW campaign.

British night time bombing of German cities was utterly ineffective in this period. Cancelling it, or limiting it to a few token propaganda efforts, won't have any impact to the war. Better to divert them to the Atlantic or directly targetting the German assets on the French Atlantic. You may not see them cancelling it, but I do.

In 1939 and 1940 the British did not have their game together at all and I am suggesting that the Germans plan out a campaign that would take them to a 1942 level organization from 1939 instead of having no plan, to cut through red tape and interservice rivalry, and constantly shift goals, priorities, and misuse what they did have.

This won't matter from 1939 to first half of 1940 though, not until the French Atlantic becomes available to Germany. So you are really only talking about a struggle from late 1940 to 1941, by which time the British are rapidly getting their act together.

Again cannot disagree more. Everyone thinks this about the German war effort too, they must have had some slack somewhere right?, wrong. Everything was utilized to the max. What changes are priorities. If more resources are used fighting the Luftwaffe and subs, then fewer bombers and capital ships. Fewer tanks, infantry, artillery, which all impacts north Africa. Remember too that Lend-Lease didn't kick in until March 1941, so until then Britain is all cash and carry. There is no credit.

This is true, and I should have worded it better. What I meant was cancelling the less priority stuff which was having no real impact (like city bombing) and switching to more productive actions. There are some easy priorities to make. The Atlantic is the top priority. The Mediterranean is likely the second. The British can meet those commitments. If the Far East is starved of any more resources, it's not going to matter, and as previously mentioned the bombing attacks should be the first to go. They can wait until the Americans arrive in 1943 for a real bomber offensive.

Ultimately the Germans don't have to starve Britain into submission, they just need to topple Churchill's government.

Not only do I think this can't be done, I question whether by 1941 if Churchill is the only politician who is committed to fighting the war. Your improved startegy can't really have an impact by May-June 1940 which is the only time Britain's will to keep fighting was really in play. After the Soviet Union is attacked in June 1941, the British would be fools to bow out before they see how Stalin does. By December 1941, the US is now in the war, and there is no question about continuing.

So while your strategy would hurt the British more, it's not going to be decisive.
 

sharlin

Banned
Also you can't just handwave away the German inter-service rivalries. for one thing you would either need Goering to have an 'accident' or have Hitler talk (IE YELL) some sense into him. Then you've got to get Hitler interested in naval matters.
 

Deleted member 1487

Also you can't just handwave away the German inter-service rivalries. for one thing you would either need Goering to have an 'accident' or have Hitler talk (IE YELL) some sense into him. Then you've got to get Hitler interested in naval matters.

I have a POD in mind that involves Wever and Goering, but I want to focus on the military aspect of the strategy in this thread.
 
I have a POD in mind that involves Wever and Goering, but I want to focus on the military aspect of the strategy in this thread.

I don't think Wever and Raeder really liked each other either

The greatest fit ever to put in there (if somehow one could butterfly him the proper seniority... maybe make him an early nazi or hitler's personal pilot or something) is Theo Osterkamp who flew lots and lots of cross channel and naval support missions in ww1 and wasn't a tyrant/douche like Goering; hell Wever was pretty abrasive himself
 

Deleted member 1487

I don't think Wever and Raeder really liked each other either

The greatest fit ever to put in there (if somehow one could butterfly him the proper seniority... maybe make him an early nazi or hitler's personal pilot or something) is Theo Osterkamp who flew lots and lots of cross channel and naval support missions in ww1 and wasn't a tyrant/douche like Goering; hell Wever was pretty abrasive himself

Wever and Raeder? I haven't read that and I've read quite a bit about Wever and Raeder recently. Raeder hated Milch and Goering though.

Wever was abrasive to his subordinates, but was still very well respected and down right liked despite this.
As to his peers and bosses, Wever was legendary for his Menschenkenntnis and Sozialkompetenz. He was able to balance the two most difficult personalities in the Third Reich, Milch and Goering, for two years before his death. Raeder is going to be a tough nut to crack, granted, as his desire to protect the independence of the navy was a central theme throughout this. But he also had little understanding of airpower and very little desire to build anything up to do with it, meaning for their POD Wever, who actually had a desire to support naval operations with the Luftwaffe, rather than direct them, also determined before his death that the only way to confront Britain from the air was to go after their ports and support a commerce raiding campaign.

Now if you have some sources that contradict this I would like to know, because information about Wever is very scarce and there has yet to be a bio done of him and I'd like to find every scrap of information I can about it. So far James Corum in his book "The Luftwaffe: Creating the Operational Air War, 1918-1940" seems to be the best source besides Suchenwirth for this information, as Corum actually interviewed the men and families of the men that had first had contact with the man, plus access to their private papers that have not been published or made public yet.

Edit: http://books.google.de/books?id=rQ7...v=onepage&q=walther wever Wilhelmsort&f=false
 
Wever and Raeder? I haven't read that and I've read quite a bit about Wever and Raeder recently. Raeder hated Milch and Goering though.

Wever was abrasive to his subordinates, but was still very well respected and down right liked despite this.
As to his peers and bosses, Wever was legendary for his Menschenkenntnis and Sozialkompetenz. He was able to balance the two most difficult personalities in the Third Reich, Milch and Goering, for two years before his death. Raeder is going to be a tough nut to crack, granted, as his desire to protect the independence of the navy was a central theme throughout this. But he also had little understanding of airpower and very little desire to build anything up to do with it, meaning for their POD Wever, who actually had a desire to support naval operations with the Luftwaffe, rather than direct them, also determined before his death that the only way to confront Britain from the air was to go after their ports and support a commerce raiding campaign.

Now if you have some sources that contradict this I would like to know, because information about Wever is very scarce and there has yet to be a bio done of him and I'd like to find every scrap of information I can about it. So far James Corum in his book "The Luftwaffe: Creating the Operational Air War, 1918-1940" seems to be the best source besides Suchenwirth for this information, as Corum actually interviewed the men and families of the men that had first had contact with the man, plus access to their private papers that have not been published or made public yet.

Raeder wasn't exactly the nicest person in the German armed services either; Goering was worse but the street ran both ways to a degree

The Hitler's flattop book (can be had on amazon for less than 10 dollars) mentions some of weaver and raeder... not specifically them quarelling, but I get the sense that Raeder didn't like anyone in the luftwaffe (not that I blame him about that either)

The reason I suggest Osterkamp and or Ramcke is that they have experience working with the KM... Osterkamp actually worked with Raeder himself (when Raeder was chief of staff to Hipper and the BC squadron)... Osterkamp and Ramcke actually understood naval warfare (at least a hell of a lot more than Goering or Udet) plus their previous work with the HSF would give them a lot of contacts with Raeder and his staff where they would have a higher chance of being able to work together without degenerating into petty jelousy

Osterkamp was a VERY distinguished person; he was the last winner of the pour le merite in ww1... maybe Goering can throw his lot in with the nationalists in the 20's or join the nazi party later; or maybe Hitler decides he likes Osterkamp (pod Osterkamp becoming an early nazi supporter) more than Goering and gives him the baton
 

Deleted member 1487

Raeder wasn't exactly the nicest person in the German armed services either; Goering was worse but the street ran both ways to a degree

The Hitler's flattop book (can be had on amazon for less than 10 dollars) mentions some of weaver and raeder... not specifically them quarelling, but I get the sense that Raeder didn't like anyone in the luftwaffe (not that I blame him about that either)

The reason I suggest Osterkamp and or Ramcke is that they have experience working with the KM... Osterkamp actually worked with Raeder himself (when Raeder was chief of staff to Hipper and the BC squadron)... Osterkamp and Ramcke actually understood naval warfare (at least a hell of a lot more than Goering or Udet) plus their previous work with the HSF would give them a lot of contacts with Raeder and his staff where they would have a higher chance of being able to work together without degenerating into petty jelousy

Osterkamp was a VERY distinguished person; he was the last winner of the pour le merite in ww1... maybe Goering can throw his lot in with the nationalists in the 20's or join the nazi party later; or maybe Hitler decides he likes Osterkamp (pod Osterkamp becoming an early nazi supporter) more than Goering and gives him the baton

Do you have an author or link for the book, because it didn't show up on amazon. Theo Osterkamp is a no-go. He was a subordinate who was busy setting up flight schools for the Luftwaffe. He's too junior with no general staff experience. In WW1 Wever was on the general staff working with Ludendorff. Though from you response I see no reason to dismiss Wever as a sensible option. With Goering out of the way the existing inter service naval-air unit could have been better integrated, perhaps with Osterkamp serving as the unit's CiC. As it was a string of WW1 naval pilots served in Fliegerkorps X and its predecessor units, but that didn't help Raeder get over anything. Though Goering just going to Hitler and demanding things, with Raeder getting cut out of the debate entirely I am sure didn't help one bit.
 
Do you have an author or link for the book, because it didn't show up on amazon. Theo Osterkamp is a no-go. He was a subordinate who was busy setting up flight schools for the Luftwaffe. He's too junior with no general staff experience. In WW1 Wever was on the general staff working with Ludendorff. Though from you response I see no reason to dismiss Wever as a sensible option. With Goering out of the way the existing inter service naval-air unit could have been better integrated, perhaps with Osterkamp serving as the unit's CiC. As it was a string of WW1 naval pilots served in Fliegerkorps X and its predecessor units, but that didn't help Raeder get over anything. Though Goering just going to Hitler and demanding things, with Raeder getting cut out of the debate entirely I am sure didn't help one bit.

Its a sub section of this book (my dad has the subsection by itself that he bought when he was living in linz) http://www.amazon.com/Carrier-Admiral-Joseph-James-Clark/dp/B0006BR3HQ

Goering was a captain, with no general staff experience either. Osterkamp was setting up flight schools later... my suggested POD would be in the 20's for him to become and early follower and close friend (maybe personal pilot?) of Hitler as opposed to Goering. Raeder himself was no stranger to going to Hitler directly for stuff anyway; that's how the whole X fleigkorps thing came about in the first place

I didn't say Wever was unviable to make things better, I'm just dubious that he would make things significantly better vis a vis the KM if only because his personality as a top man could be more abrasive against Raeder since they would be equals as service chiefs as opposed to Raeder being a superior officer and Wever having to bootlick some. You are suggesting a modest change here; to get a large butterflied result which I think borders on pretty unlikely... Osterkamp is much lower hanging fruit and you don't have to create a backdrop of him learning about the effects of air power on naval warfare or him putting his own (substantial) ego aside and yielding operational control of units to the KM and not pissing off Raeder too much

Mine was to say you are making your proposed TL harder than it needs to be :D
 
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