Starting the USA Better prepared for WWII.

[Crowbar Six]

That round, being used in a Gatling mount, would have been near the equal of Phalanx in manual mode.
as it was, that 20mm is just that 1.1" round necked down and electrically primed. A few of them being director controlled in a powered mount, is better than all the 20mm Oerlikons taking up deckspace and crew using the mk1 Eyeball for aiming

When they came to develop the M61 gatlling, they had all sorts of problems getting it to work right. You cannot just add a electric motor to a manually operated gattling and expect it to work, waterproofing the electrics would have been challenging too.

 

[marathag]

When they came to develop the M61 gatlling, they had all sorts of problems getting it to work right. You cannot just add a electric motor to a manually operated gattling and expect it to work, waterproofing the electrics would have been challenging too.

USN has been waterproofing electric motors since the 1890, right after they were invented

and adding an electri motor to an original 1870s 45-70 Gatling actually worked really well when it was done in 1893

Getting a 4000rpm Vulcan to work in an compact mount in a Jet Fighter that operates in -35 degree temps of 40,000 feet is a lot more difficult than a Deck Mount at sea level

 

[McPherson]

Dive bombing was pioneered by the USMC assisting the Somoza family to remain in power against the original Sandinistas under Sandino himself. Marine biplanes successfully (as far as hitting targets and doing damage was concerned, as usual in asymmetrical counterinsurgency war, it is hard to judge how much traditional military metrics apply in terms of success) attacked Sandinista positions. This was in the 1920s; American aviators of all services were quite enthused about dive bombing, especially Marines and Navy.

The Army Air Corps like the RAF was more dominated by advocates of "strategic air power," which whatever it might mean in a more sober, combat tested assessment, meant in the interwar years the theory that enemy civil populations would curl up in fear at terror bombing that strikes without warning out of the sky, and either politically demand an end to the war or anyway derange enemy capabilities with riotous disorder and general paralysis. This form of "victory through air power" was much touted in Italy, UK and USA, though not so much by the Third Reich or even Japan, nor did the Soviets ever seem to believe this thesis. In fact of course it was the experience of both sides that mass bombing of cities to spread this kind of terror did damage and killed people but never caused that sort of collapse. One simply cannot surrender to bombs after all; the survivors are left with a portion of the same society that was fighting the war before the bombing around them as the enforcers of order after the bombing, any defeatist talk would meet with little sympathy and much anger from people who redirect their grief and pain at the foes who dropped the bombs. WWII era factories could generally be put back into operation quite soon after being bombed.

So, American Army Air Corps/ USAAF types in the bomber mafia, like the British RAF Bomber Command mafia, wanted long range, high capacity, high altitude bombers that could drop big bomb loads (they fondly hoped, on target) a long way away, and somehow survive the gauntlet of interceptors and ground AA flying in and returning home--initially it was hoped that with multiple engines big bombers would be as fast or faster than the enemy's interceptors and so "the bomber will get through."

Such designs are not well suited for dive bombing of course, though the German commander Udet believed big planes could serve in that role too. But the Luftwaffe concept of a "big" bomber was more like the Anglo-American one of a "medium" bomber.

Dive bombing has never gone out of fashion entirely; my father, who flew 100+ combat missions out of Takhli in Thailand over North Vietnam in 1968, has mentioned dive bombing with his F-105 "Thud" more than once. But I believe it proved not to be the panacea interwar enthusiasts assumed, and other approaches were developed.

I believe a method called "skip-bombing" turned out to work better in sea applications, IIRC it involves the plane coming toward the target fast and low, and dropping bombs at the right height and moment, they tend to bounce off the water surface, lobbing them up and hopefully onto the target deck. This would involve the plane breaking course after releasing the bomb to roll and bank left or right, which as with dive bombing leaves the plane exposed to AA as it approaches and as it recedes, but I suppose coming in low on the deck offers some cover over the horizon, then the retreat hopefully involves the defender having aim spoiled by being bombed, and anyway the plane is not climbing, or climbing just a bit, and thus receding toward the horizon more rapidly, and perhaps a bit better able to jink. Dive bombing would be better for accuracy but aside from enemy efforts to get a bead on your fast approaching plane, and a sluggish escape vector if one attempts to climb rapidly again, it seems overall more likely the pilot will crash the plane--"target fascination" is a hazard.

So one hears about feats of dive-bombing but by and large I gather other methods have been more favored in practice. Still it was definitely something American warplane pilots had heard of and often practiced, and I suppose its major application was in tactical air support on the ground, which is one of the most important air power roles anyway--gaining air superiority over the battlefield is in service of enabling such uses.

It is amazing that it took so long for the air power disciples to understand that the accuracy problem is solved in the weapon and not the launch platform.

 

[McPherson]

USN has been waterproofing electric motors since the 1890, right after they were invented

and adding an electri motor to an original 1870s 45-70 Gatling actually worked really well when it was done in 1893

Getting a 4000rpm Vulcan to work in an compact mount in a Jet Fighter that operates in -35 degree temps of 40,000 feet is a lot more difficult than a Deck Mount at sea level

You just gave me that AAA Gatling gun I've been trying to justify in an ATL to replace the ineffective 1.1 inch!

 

[Spencersj345.346]

It is amazing that it took so long for the air power disciples to understand that the accuracy problem is solved in the weapon and not the launch platform.

To be fair given the technology of the 20s and early to mid 30s guided munitions weren't really possible let alone the planes capable of carrying them

 

[AJE]

You cannot just add a electric motor to a manually operated gattling and expect it to work

That's exactly what they did, and it worked.

While researching prior work, ordnance engineers recalled the experimental electrically driven Gatling weapons of the turn of the 20th century. In 1946, a Model 1903 Gatling gun borrowed from a museum was set up with an electric motor drive and test-fired by General Electric engineers. The 40-year-old design briefly managed a rate of fire of 5,000 rounds per minute.

 

[McPherson]

USN stuff, mostly aircraft & aircraft-related gear & procedures:
- navalize the P-36
- have both Grumman and Vought design a fighter around a big radial by 1940 (the XF4U-1 needs to enter production with minimal changes)
- train hard the radar-assisted interception
- test the darned torpedoes, then improve them wrt. their own speed and launching speed & height
- invent skip- and/or mast-height bombing?

a. P-36 lacks the altitude edge and robustness in era to last long as a frontline fighter. I generally hate Curtiss flying garbage past 1935 anyway, but the P-36 will not evolve or underlay ANY line of naval aircraft development. The airframe is not suitable.
b. There might be a case for a liquid cooled engine fighter, though radials are supply and maintenance simpler and have the added benefit of being able to eat bullets and still work (If they are Pratts. Wrights? Might want a rabbit's foot.)
c. Radar interception is at best a 1940 innovation. It is hard to use observer corps GCI vector intercept in a carrier task force. That is what you can do on land prior to 1937.
d. The USN began a 2 decade long search for an electric battery powered torpedo. It was a tremendous waste of resources. It could have better relied on private industry to develop further the wet heater with a binary candle based propellant with its own oxidizer coupled in either a liquid (Otto fuel) or GEL. But what the Murph. That alcohol and bottled air wetheater Bliss Leavitt developed would have worked just as well. BUT the rigid adherence to the 1890s Whitehead control logics for a torpedo robbed the USN of the advanced auto-pilot feedback PID controller (Sperry invented.) that could have combined steer and depth control in a 2-d nose point that could have been mated to an acoustic seeker early. No keel breakers, but sure could blow their props off by 1938.
e. Or steal the Army air farce retarded fall bomb kits and just let the parachutes ballute upon release and drop on the IJN ship. BOOM!

No Wildcat.

Hunh? No Wildcat leaves you with the Buffalo or a bunch of obsolete Hawks. The USNAS will be slaughtered. Of course if John Tower has an accident and his predecessor develops brains? You have a better chance at the Skyrocket.

Some observations/suggestions from my own experience for you to take or leave.

I wasted a lot of time (and research) until I created a specific definition of "better outcome" for my timeline. "Better performance" can be measured in many ways over short, intermediate and long time periods. Tactical performance? Strategic objectives? Shortening the war? Fewer casualties?

Comments will follow.

IMHO a lot of time and discussion is wasted on "which gadget is best" (take your pick of weapon type) for things that did not have a large impact on the outcome or timeline for WWII. For example, US drops the BAR and adopts the Bren Gun in 1939. So how much does that shorten the war? How important is a better RPG/bazooka/LAW...? Extremely important to the grunt trying to stop an enemy tank or silence a bunker, but personally I would rather have a tank or three.

Here are some hard facts in the macro.

The US will be the attacker. As my grandpappy used to say when I asked him about "the big one", he told me that the biggest problem was the enemy was over there and we had to get at them. Now I did not understand then what he meant as he was operations, BUT as I began to deal with similar problems, it dawned on me in his day it came down to crossing two big oceans and gearing the tools to the transportation limits and to the objectives. A tank and a dozen men might be nice to clear a pillbox, but if that same dozen men and a bazooka with a supply of rockets can get her done in bunker busting after travelling the 10,000 kilometers to reach the bunker, then you want the BEST bazooka you can manage for your infantry cause that tank might not be able to crawl up Mount Suribachi. More on the tank in a bit.

The lack of a squad automatic weapon that could double as a machine gun (ZB30 or Ruger T23E1) HURT.

During WWII, the number one killer and cause of non-fatal wounds in allied soldiers is ARTILLERY (including mortars). Period.

The Russians believed in mortars the way the Germans believed in machine guns. The Russians were right and the Germans paid for their mistakes. As an artillery aside, barrage rocket systems make a lot of American sense since the tubes are light, the munitions easy (for Americans) to make and the integration into American tactics almost ideal as to ARTILLERY shock action and ASSAULT as a one two punch.

I believe the biggest change is ground force performance is combined arms warfare (and its myriad subcomponents). Many evolutions and call it what you may. In 1939, the Germans are on the neonatal side of it, but they move the bulk of their guns and supply with horses (and many other immature concepts) and the bulk of their army is foot mobile beyond the nearest railhead. That is a doctrine battle. Everyone has some idea of the concept, but none (including the Germans) have gone far enough. All the fire control arguments (e.g., British versus American) are not nearly as important as using tanks and air support to better effect (and training). Decentralization is very important and inter-branch conflicts (which is a money battle at a fundamental level). Push the tanks, tank destroyers (if you keep them) and heavy weapons forward and train in their use at the company level. Train tank-infantry teams and improve coordination.

RADIOS... Teach everyone who is able to read and write how to orient a map by terrain features, how to grid read and how to radio back to Arty and up to Rupert where to drop the stuff you want on the enemy's heads. Tank/infantry is mostly the infantry being the tanks' eyes to threats the tankers cannot see and bodyguards against enemy infantry, while the tankers talk to Arty and Rupert on that radio. A Sherman's deadliest weapon is a tank commander who can read a map and use his tank radio to call in that CAP of rocket firing and bomb dropping Thunderbolts. The infantry is there to keep HIM alive so he can do that thing.

Both the British and Americans need to throw serious cold water on strategic bombing. Again, serious doctrine fight on both sides of the Atlantic. Better bombers only make it worse in my opinion. Bombers consume workers, crew, aluminum, steel, engines and money well in excess to their value. NEITHER SIDE can hit the broad side of a barn with technology available in the next several decades. The need for large numbers of aircraft (even if they adopt a more rational doctrine) results in numerous trans-Atlantic problems. Need puts a lot of trash in production, but the primary limiting factor on both sides of the Atlantic is engines.

COBRA showed that area bombing has its uses. Four engine bombers are the most efficient payload carriers for really LONG RANGE anti-ship/anti-infrastructure strikes. Mining is a suitable long range bomber mission. I can see the city terror bombing campaign as being a bit of a non-starter, but as long as you know you have to saturation bomb an area target like an open pit coal mine, a series of hydro-power houses or railroad marshalling yards or power plants or enemy airfields and troop lagers, or synthetic oil or chemical plants it is a tool you have to have in quantity. You also have to KILL the enemy air force and strategic bombing is the ONLY way you can force the fighter battle you want to KILL his pilots.

From a technology aspect, solve the HORSEPOWER-TO-WEIGHT (HTW) problem everyone faces. That will shorten the war, but requires a serious infusion of money a lot earlier. I love the discussions about "get the XXX wonder fighter into production in 194x". Powered with what? The Merlin engine (not the 1940 version) solves the high altitude interceptor problem, but not the ground attack fighter problem.

Watts is solvable in radials up to 1500 kW but the real problem is HEAT. The sheer problem of heat is what causes the He177 and B29 fiascos. Even the liquid cooled P38s with their Allisons can be traced to HEAT (turbochargers). Solve the cooling problem in US radial aero engines and that solves the FIGHTER problem.

HTW (weight and size being a trade-off) is also the limiting factor on the tank (and truck) side of the equation. The push to build quantity rapidly creates a lot of mistakes. So, my two cents on the Sherman tank - what should one switch to in late 1941 when you are lining up production for 1942? One needs a lot of post-combat understanding to build a better tank in 1942. Remember, at this time the British are "up-gunning" to the 6pdr and German tanks with a short-barreled 75 are appearing in the desert.

a. Steal the Russian T-34 tank diesel engine and stuff it into a T2X. refer to b. for what comes next.
b. Look to the 9.0cmL50 gun because there ain't any reason to fart around when going to replace the Sherman. Expeditionary tank? BIG gun, reasonable armor package for 30 tonnes and roomy turret so the three man crew and the 9.0L50 gun can cohabitate. Forget the bow MG because you need ammo stowage. Forget the bow machine gunner, too. His spot is worth 18 shells.
c. As for replacing the Sherman? WHY? It is a world beater. It has many things going for it. It's shippable, it runs, it is easy to make and fix, it is easy to upgrade and convert into funnies and it is THERE. Plus as battle RTL proves, it can handle ANYTHING the Germans throw at it. Big bad Panthers and Tigers die under its pop gun quite ridiculously because the Sherman just circles around them faster than the damned German tanks can rotate their turrets and it is a 6 o'clock shot into the German's behind and watch him brew up and cook. Exchange rates between the Germans and Wallies in Shermans are about EVEN. Didn't know that?

Centimetric (and X band) radar is an obvious technological need. Don't forget counterbattery, even with teething problems it beats sound. Reality hits with a multitude of needs.

Counterbattery is much better with the Mark 1 eyeball attached to a scout who knows how to read a map and use a RADIO. Rangers up front. KISS.

Improved ASW doctrine needs a lot of help if you want it early. Many years of lessons to be learned. When does the US start building escorts and what precipitates a change that puts ASW on par with the need for battleships, cruisers, fleet destroyers and carriers? How do the allies come to realize that sonar/ASDIC has some significant limitation. What precipitates the early introduction of escort carriers for ASW patrol? The British aren't there until 1941 and their early attempts met with disaster. The move to convoys without adequate escorts was met with higher losses. The RN's hard look at real analytics did not happen until 1943. Should the Americans have sent their crews through the British ASW training? Absolutely, but the British barely had the capacity to train their own.

a. Sonobuoy is possible in 1940. Just adapt the coast guard and USN weather buoy progenitors starting in 1938 instead of 1942.
b. FIDO was a 12 month miracle. Get her cranking as soon as the war is on, instead of waiting for KING to take the HUSL idea and push it.
c. Fire Stark so that a and b get cranking.
d. ASW CVEs rely on C.
e. Nothing wrong with USN ASW training, but a lot wrong with C. Train with the RCN. They know what they are doing by 1940.

Oh, and I must comment on the idea of "better" US escorts. Bethlehem Hingham fulfilled a British order for 12 Buckley class DEs in late '43, laying the first keel on 15 September and delivering the last ship on 8 February (total build times ranging from 96 to 121 days). Granted, not their first rodeo for this ship type, but escorts were needed in big numbers. Hard to improve on "good enough" built quickly. In all fairness, the first two DEs build in their yard took 283 and 324 days, respectively but they were at ~180 days or less by their 12th build (2Q43).

MOUSETRAP. A rocket boosted unitary, hit to kill fused depth charge, fired from a trainable mount, is quicker cheaper, lighter and installable on a !@# !@#$ed freighter STUFT taken into service as an adhoc escort. Same goes for the dipping sonar head that can be paravaned off the same freighter.

On the production side, the US (and British) created significant unexpected consequences by planning on a larger ground force than needed. If you peel several layers off the US onion concerning decisions made about weapons, ponder the impact of believing you need to equip 200 divisions and transport them across the ocean. Oh f*ck! Now, pile on the stated desire to conduct a cross-channel attack sometime between 3Q42 and 2Q43. Stuff needs to get made most Rikki-tic and Army Ground Forces needs to make tough decisions in a hurry (with the currently available doctrine). Replace Lesley McNair any time you want and the next poor bastard is pretty much under the same constraints. Might make one or two better decisions, but he will be forced to rapidly build a large Army with what he can put into mass production in 1942. And, he will be forced to consider every cubic foot and short ton of cargo ship space.

BINGO. KISS it all and make sure that the equipment shipped meets the mission objective because your army is going to be LIGHT INFANTRY. Joe Infantry is going to need the basics and he will be lucky if he even gets that.

No argument from me about canning MacArthur, but one needs a massive "go fund me" to stand-up and train the Philippine Army in early to mid 1940 or send US troops who are not available (or able to be adequately supplied half-way around the world). Problems always meet with financial reality and conflicting requirements.

WRITE THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS OFF and be prepared from the start to fight from Australia and Western Indonesia, especially as you understand that the British in the western Pacific are COMPLETELY CLUELESS militarily and politically. That means an American stand in New Ireland and New Guinea, NOT Luzon.

Concerning an early butt kicking. I have seriously pondered whether this is necessary. Name a western military organization that would actually adopt someone the equipment and doctrine of an ally in the 1930s. Don't hold your breath. Find a democratic government that would agree to pay royalties on equipment rather than fund their own designs. Now, go on to examine WWII in practice. Virtually all significant changes accelerate in the face of tough lessons. Arguments for A versus B are overly subject to opinion until the selection does not perform. Furthermore, consistent with human nature bad decisions need to result in significant failure before change becomes imperative. Improvements get labeled as incremental, etc. This is a human, not American problem. Sadly, there is no substitute for direct combat experience. None. Advice, observation, WWI experience are nearly universally of minimal value in preparation for WWII (again, applicable to all the allied powers).

The British were actually prepared to adopt Czech small arms of a sort. They were in negotiations to build French tanks. (A mistake.) French were prepared to use anything American with wings. Americans adopted Swedish and British auto-cannons and wanted the French HS404 early. British wound up with a huge infusion of American equipment, so war does kind of put NIH out and NEED IT NOW (NIN) in. In retrospect, it is ammunition confliction that fubars American adoption of superior foreign operating cyclics in the realm of machine guns and auto cannons. Native American designs (Ruger machine gun and the Browning short recoils in 2 and 3 cm bore sizes) could have filled those roles.
Most of the small arms equipment bolos IF the need was foreseen and funded, could have been short circuited by:

a. going metric all the way in military equipment.
b. stealing all the Holek brothers small arms work (ZK383, ZB30, ZB50, ZB53) and adopting the Mauser bullet.
c. combat experience existed... It was called THE BANANA WARS. NIH. The American army needed to listen to this outfit called the USMC about patrolling, scouting, infiltration, small unit infantry tactics, fighting in jungles and swamps, executing assaults across rivers, close air support, how to use RADIOS to call in Arty (naval gun fire support.) etc.

I personally believe the Japanese suffered significantly later in the war because they didn't get their butt kicking until it was too late. They were lucky beyond rational expectation in early 1942, feeding all their faulty concepts. Any failure was simply attributed to the field commander and their real issues were not recognized until it was way too late to help.

To bring about the butt-kicking the IJA/IJN deserved early, the choice of ground, sea and air fight must be carefully selected that maximizes American advantages and Japanese disadvantages. This was foreseen. Read Hector Bywater. And be prepared to recruit a bigger Marine Corps pre-war.

So, a loss like Kasserine Pass opens eyes in a hurry. Was the prior lack of accepting British advice purely stupid Anglophobia? That is obviously a factor, but put yourself in Marshall's shoes in 1941. Your current doctrine and training methods conflict with the advice you are receiving from the British. Most of the fatherly advice was accompanied by the suggestion that the British be put in command. One can argue that the US response was Anglophobic; however examine the situation to date. RAF Fighter Command aside, how well have the British performed in the field. Is that not the ultimate test of weapons and doctrine? France, North Africa (after the Germans arrive), Greece and Crete is not a strong endorsement. While they have learned a lot of hard lessons, the evidence that they have reached the proper conclusion is still lacking. Noting that reaching the proper conclusion is the key to gaining value from observation of prior battles. Everyone views circumstances through a lens filtered by their own beliefs. Just a human thing. (Note that the IJA thinks they are shit hot)

Anderson was as incompetent as Fredendall. I figure if the advice came from Monty, though, it was clearly probably worth adhering because he had the definite proof of result. The RAF can go to hello for the advice they can give in North Africa prior to Monty sorting them out. The USAAF has a good one in Doolittle, so I think it could go the other way.

The IJA actually ARE hot shit. They will be quite tough right to the bitter end.

In addition to doctrine changes, the early war allied problems are in part related to the whole concept of a run-up with time to "mobilize" before fighting. While this worked (somewhat) in WWI, it did not work at all in WWII for any allied nation. When I speak of "mobilization" I am referring to the centuries old practice of having a small peacetime Army and then quickly fill divisions with reservists and draftees who have a minimum of training (as well as outdated equipment). This creates a multitude of problems and was clearly obsolete (see Battle of France).

Well. There are battle drills and then there is OJT and then there is the replacement system and other problems. Once the Americans committed their infantry to combat, there was no British style rotation system to take a division out of contact to rest, replenish, recuperate, reman. (R4). The replacements went into the units as strangers fresh from basic, were slotted into the unit individually with the veterans and were so green they were a danger to the veterans and themselves and target practice for the enemy. It did not work and STILL does not work. Units have to be pulled out for refresher training, cohort casualty replacement and TIME for the newbs and veterans to get to know each other and figure it out so that Fumbles McGurk and Joe Infantry read off the same sheet music and it is the enemy who has taps playing over his dead carcass.

Another addition to the problem list is convincing civilian manufacturers to dedicate space, people and dollars to war production. Very hard to do during OTL. Government money only solves part of the problem as reallocation of square footage and personnel is risky business relative to the whims of Congress. Expansion is also a risk to the existing businesses, so someone needs to come up with the idea of the government-owned, civilian-operated plant for aircraft and AFV. Otherwise the government gets in the aircraft and transportation business which would result in a radical shift of campaign funds to the other party.

OR you figure out in government tech institutions how to make a prototype item that can be turned over to a civilian industry that it can make with its current civilian technology. Locomotive makers can make tanks. WHY? They know how to cast large structures for locomotives and build trucks (in the railroad car sense) and they have experience with traction assemblies such as transmissions and power trains. The result =s a Sherman tank. The turret and the gun? Weeelll, that is what the Naval Gun Factory is for.

Last problem is R&D. Imagination is fairly easy to solve by creating an innovator, but getting practical specifications and avoiding capability creep is always an issue. One needs to innovate and go beyond what many will believe is feasible. IMHO that requires someone to take the financial risk to produce the innovation and then sell it to the military.

Mail planes for the fighters. Flying boats are for transoceanic traffic. Float planes are for the Forest Service. Airliners = long range bombers. The navy is going to have to have special needs met, so say hello to a subsidized manufacturer base. Used to be Curtiss, but you better feed LOCKHEED, Douglas and GRUMMAN.

Some potential solutions I have imagined. The reader must judge the quantity of alcohol involved in these conclusions.

My perspective is that logistics is 90% of the problem, human factors 8% and the actual fighting 2%.

From a purely American perspective, two changes could potentially have a positive impact on training. This assumes improvement in doctrine and the availability of those fiddly bits like rifles, boots, housing, ammunition, etc. BTW, infantry doctrine was already quite similar to Britain. First, allocate draftees (and recruits to the extent possible) to branches and schools after a common basic training. During OTL branch/school assignments were made at induction centers, even for draftees. Add some infantry training (including field exercises) to all members post boot camp (like the USMC). During OTL, troops were trained (from basic on) in either a branch school or infantry division. The first issue (allocation at induction) created a real problem with talent (physical and mental) distribution. The second resulted in all types of disparities in training methods and quality.

Can we be honest?

The navy and the air farces are going to get the cream. They have to have the best of the best. It is the nature of those technology intensive services that the top 40% are skimmed off. Then the marines are going to get the best of the middle (volunteers or 10%). What is left?

The army will sort the remainder out according to its needs.
a. Tankers, artillerymen, medical, signalers, mechanics, supply guys and clerks, engineers and assorted paper pushers. Even truck drivers. That is 2/3 of the recruit base
b. What is left will be Joe Infantry if he lives long enough.
c. Training will be "minimal" because riflemen will be needed like yesterday when the shooting starts. Even the replacement "officers" will be drawn from this pool. 90 day wonder is as much reality as sarcastic joke.

An ABSOLUTE MUST (along with the change in training methods) is to build training facilities to handle the load. Too much "training time" was spent on infrastructural and cadre issues during OTL. Lots of troops sitting around getting bored during 1940-1941.

If you are going to do basic the right way, the future rifleman must be exposed to the kind of conditions immediately that he should expect in battle. Little barracks time, lots of marching, lots of mock war games and lots of "patrolling, scouting, infiltrating and "school of the soldier". He will have to get used to mother nature, loud noises, confusion and to that little thing we talked about earlier called map reading, calling for help over the radio and learning how to use whatever weapons his squad was issued by actually USING them in a simulated war environment. He will not be bored, because mock war if done right can be as dangerous as real war.

The War Department MUST be willing to stand-up fewer divisions until the pipeline gets rolling. This requires a recognition that they can achieve better combat power with proper application of better doctrine.

How is the unit going to administratively train its operations section, logistics people and unit commanders and their staffs if they don't stand up? It takes a YEAR to do it right.

To have any hope of moving away from the "mobilization" mode of action, the US needs to agree to having a much larger standing Army in the mid 1930s. Good luck with that, however fixing the training program will help. One could potentially argue that the US relied too much on large scale maneuvers and not enough on small unit tactics and individual skills (again, universal Western issue factored to local scale).

a. Use the CCC more intensively as shadow training for the army.
b. School of the soldier is more a Marine thing. Start sending army DIs to Paris Island.
c. NTC everybody from General Goof to Fumbles McGurk

Improved engines need an incentive (i.e., money) as well as knowledge that 1,000hp is inadequate for combat aircraft. Perhaps prize money for air races? Tractor pulls? Probably crazy, but how does one get to the need for a 2,000hp radial engine?

Torpedo boat contests.

My prior research into the subject of engines for tanks indicates that ~750hp is the maximum for a naturally aspirated (no ECM) diesel that will fit in an armored vehicle. Obviously there are diesels that fit in submarines and locomotives that are more powerful. This is a massive achievement for the time. Does anyone even believe it is feasible? PS, don't forget the "bridge problem" - 40t is a serious challenge for bridges in Europe (most everywhere for that matter). It is also an issue for assault bridging and ferry operations of the OTL variety.

Here we talk that tank that can climb Mount Suribachi...

a. Aim for a 30 tonne tank with a 9.0cmL50 MV gun. Ground flotation? 0.8 kg/cm^2. That puts your glacis, upper and lower at about 5cm sloped at 45 degrees and mantlet at 7.5 cm sloped at 30 degrees. Your hull sides are 5.0cm at the flat (no help for it.), Turret top, sides (20 degree curve as it will be half egg shaped) and rear are about 5.0 cm. Hull deck and keel are 2.5 cm. Engine and powertrain at the drive sprockets has to deliver 350 kW to meet an expected torsion bar suspension track laying speed over ground of 10 m/s continuous. Hard turn is by dead track pivot or else by differentiated clutching. Or you can build the Sherman and thank Rock Island that they spent 2 decades getting it right. b. While you are building your common traction vehicle that will not only be your MBT, tank destroyer and self propelled artillery, might as well build the tank transporter, railroad flatcars and bridging equipment to handle it.

Testing money from Congress and somehow enforce outside objective review by someone without a vested interest. Very difficult to accomplish in a representative democracy of free market capitalists (or any other ilk for that matter). This could solve a myriad of problems.

Bureau of Standards and Measures in those days. Have them supervise WEAPON and equipment proofs for CONGRESS. !@#$ the War Department and the Navy.

Another BSC idea is for the US to have a war in the mid-1930s to gain the experience (i.e., failures) necessary to drive improvements. I am unable to imagine where or against whom.

Pick a largish banana republic and let Chiquita or Dole go whining to Congress.

I personally like the "gun porn" on these forums as much as anyone else, but a better LMG or switching to an intermediate round at an earlier date really doesn't change that much. Definitely better decisions, but I'd rather have ground-breaking doctrine and well-trained troops with a BAR. Want to help the grunt? Improve his web gear and lighten his frigging load! I would mention better rations, but that would strain even a powerful ASB (historically speaking anyway).

It comes down to the lightest simplest equipment that can do the job, using existing manufacture and effective training that can be quickly learned by the dumbest most accident prone human beings imaginable in how to use the gear against an opposition that in our time line made some incredibly terrible choices in those same categories them selves.

Hope this musing helps a little. Maybe reaffirms what you have already considered.

As always MOO and YMMV and it SHOULD.

 

[PMN1]

b. FIDO was a 12 month miracle. Get her cranking as soon as the war is on, instead of waiting for KING to take the HUSL idea and push it.

HUSL?​

 

[marathag]

You just gave me that AAA Gatling gun I've been trying to justify in an ATL to replace the ineffective 1.1 inch!

All the pieces were there. Could use the original non-predicting optical Director the original 1.1" mount was using, till later in the war when they were upgraded.

Now wouldn't be as fast as the Vulcan, since would be using impact primers and linked ammo.
But with it running at 1000rpm, vs the Chicago Piano running at 130rpm per barrel, that's faster and easier on loading cartridges than the gas/long recoil system of the original. More reliable, more cartridges

 

[marathag]

MOUSETRAP. A rocket boosted unitary, hit to kill fused depth charge, fired from a trainable mount, is quicker cheaper, lighter and installable on a !@# !@#$ed freighter STUFT taken into service as an adhoc escort. Same goes for the dipping sonar head that can be paravaned off the same freighter.

Add the Brodie launch system to almost any freighter to add ability to launch and recover L-4 Cubs and L-5 Sentinels to do aerial recon.

 

[Driftless]

Requires a much earlier POD (1800's.?), but have the US go full metric. It would simplify many things in the long run.

 

[173rd LRRP]

Agreed. For the most part a country prioritizing the civilian economy over the military is laudable and the smart and moral decision at the time the US had enough economic and industrial slack that it easily could have put more resources into the military. And thats factoring in spending and resources allocated to New Deal Programs.

At the time the regular US army was something like 100K men. Considering the unemployment rate at the time that could have easily been doubled or even tripled over a period of several years. Add in an expansion and modernization of the reserves and NG too boot.

I'm not talking about starting full blown WW2 mobilization in 1935. Just what would be a fairly moderate expansion of the Army considering the size of other nations armed forces and the resources available to the US. Perhaps have an enlargened and more militaryesque form of the CCC. The actual work of the corps would have been largely civilian oriented but there would have been at least some basic military training. Enlistees would potentially be enrolled in some form of the reserves after leaving.

The training camps and the like would have been at least slightly overbuilt in terms of capacity with the rational that they could be converted to serve as refugee housing/ disaster relief for Americans effected by natural disasters. In the event of a larger scale war mobilization the camps could be converted to train and organize new troops.

All of these fairly moderate measures would of course be highly difficult to pass in the OTL political enviroment of the time.

Two to three million young Americans went through CCC. The camps were run by the Army since it was the only organization that had the capability to manage and operate such a program. Each camp had regular and reserve officers and enlisted men to lead and manage. They learned to work in a disciplined manner, made money, and had an excellent diet. The graduates had little difficulty transitioning into the services when they either enlisted or were drafted.

 

[Driftless]

Two to three million young Americans went through CCC. The camps were run by the Army since it was the only organization that had the capability to manage and operate such a program. Each camp had regular and reserve officers and enlisted men to lead and manage. They learned to work in a disciplined manner, made money, and had an excellent diet. The graduates had little difficulty transitioning into the services when they either enlisted or were drafted.

That was a win-win for the country. The advantages you cited were real. Also, much of the work done by the CCC's was very useful public service work, and many of those projects are still in existence even today (with appropriate maintenance along the way)

 

[McPherson]

b. FIDO was a 12 month miracle. Get her cranking as soon as the war is on, instead of waiting for KING to take the HUSL idea and push it.

HUSL?

a. Harvard Underwater Sound Lab.

Add the Brodie launch system to almost any freighter to add ability to launch and recover L-4 Cubs and L-5 Sentinels to do aerial recon.

b. KISS.

Requires a much earlier POD (1800's.?), but have the US go full metric. It would simplify many things in the long run.

c. Better late than never. Board of Fortifications (1885) would be my preferred target date since it is about then that the Americans modernize their artillery. Go metric when they choose Krupp over Vickers in an ATL. But failing that, when the Westervelt Board goes French instead of British in the artillery reforms, might as well go whole hog. Or when the Holek brothers get kidnapped in 1935 go all "Mauser" all the time.

All the pieces were there. Could use the original non-predicting optical Director the original 1.1" mount was using, till later in the war when they were upgraded.

Now wouldn't be as fast as the Vulcan, since would be using impact primers and linked ammo.
But with it running at 1000rpm, vs the Chicago Piano running at 130rpm per barrel, that's faster and easier on loading cartridges than the gas/long recoil system of the original. More reliable, more cartridges

We could live with rates of ~ 480 rounds per minute or 8 rounds per second or 2 complete rotation cycles of a 4 barrel mount. Ammunition will be heavy in a 3.0 cmL70.

 

[marathag]

b. KISS.

Sure, but an L-5 has far higher top speed, better range, and 500 pound payload, and is in production and flying in 1942. Could even be armed with bazooka rockets.

 

[McPherson]

Sure, but an L-5 has far higher top speed, better range, and 500 pound payload, and is in production and flying in 1942. Could even be armed with bazooka rockets.

AND cannot land on water. A Seversky helo with gasoline filled pontoons can.

 

[marathag]

No reason a floatplane can't use the Brodie System.
Choppers are great. H-4 in 1943? Not so great.

 

[Dilvish]

Sounds plausible to me. And also perhaps the Gatling concept was superficially regarded as ancient obsolete technology that was quickly dismissed. Too bad as the 20MM cannon could also have been developed as a multi-barrel weapon. I don't think you'd want or need the 6000 RPM the OTL M61 can do but 1500 RPM would make for a very powerful gun. This approach would eliminate the OTL problems with the H/S 20MM that plagued the US in WW2.

But the magazine size and feed design would be a real challenge. And forget about a wing installation. I would agree that the .50 caliber Gatling seems like a more feasible and a better fit for WW2 size airplanes.

I was also thinking the Gatling concept might have been regarded as ancient obsolete technology. Maybe it was obsolete, until the right circumstances and technologies came along to resurrect the Gatling concept? Maybe if the Army Air Corps in the 1930s was wanting a twin-engine attack plane with a heavy gun armament?