Starting the USA Better prepared for WWII v2.0

[Naval Aviation Fan]

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Poll closes Dec 7th, 2022.
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Ok, so awhile back, I was younger and healthier, and had ambitions to write some really good ATL's, but now I honestly think that I will never get them done, or even started. That being said, I do want to do what I still can, and so reference the Original thread, but scaled down to just one thing.

Original Thread.

In this new, much more modest thread, I'm just going to go with a sketchy little highlights type framework.

For background, look over the first thread, and then we can go on...

Sep 7th, 1939.
Congress gets a move on, and forms American Volunteer forces, so serve abroad and learn how things actually work (or don't) in modern combat situations. Initial forces will serve in foreign military/defense organizations, for a period of just one year, and then will be replaced by new personal and rotated home to bring their expertise to bear on American preparedness.

Because I want this thread to focus just on one thing, let us limit ourselves to everything air-defense related, and posit that the USA has folks serving in all aspects of the UK's air defense, from Observer corps folks, Chain Home operators, Fighter Command personnel, Fighter Pilots, Ground crew, airbase/AA personnel, as well as the supply and logistics folks. In short, the goal is to provide the USA with a complete picture of how the UK is defending itself in early WWII from air attack, and is meant to include everything needed to get the USA to start to put these lessons into practical use, before we ourselves get dragged into the war.

I want to flesh out what might have been possible, and will make and remake this thread as often as needed to try to eventually 'get there' to a spot where the USA is better prepared for WWII.

That being said...

Sep 7th, 1939.
Congress enacts legislation creating American Volunteer forces to learn about modern combat, and rapidly return to the USA and report things they discover. This initial force will deploy from say Sep 22nd, 1939 to Sep 22nd, 1940. The expectation will be that these lessons learned will need to lead to changes in the way the USA is doing things, and must be implemented in a timely manner, so the usual way the US bureaucracy works must be replaced by an emergency program, and to pave the way for being able to rapidly improve things at home, a civilian governmental agency, along with an inter-service military command, and including manufacturing/logistics elements has to be formed. Fact finding missions need to also be sent out to US aircraft manufacturers, military airbases, and the shipping and receiving folks, to determine the exact state of out aircraft industry's ability to both build, and maintain operation squadrons (including spare parts, tools, and trained ground crews), but also the needed shipping methods of getting these to the forward bases in both a timely manner and in sufficient numbers to not only supply the current numbers of aircraft stationed there, but to rapidly grow huge stockpiles such, while planning for expanding not just the numbers of aircraft stationed there, but for their operational training needs to be as close to 100% flying, every day as can be, and the actual (air defense) missions being conducted are to be as realistic as possible, as soon as possible.

 

[vl100butch]

A functional radar net and operational command and control in Hawaii would have had a great impact...that being said, keep Short out of Hawaii...

My pet rock in this type of scenario is a National Defense Infrastructure Act, which would modernize and electrify railroads (think Boston in the north to Atlanta in the South and west to St Louis and Chicago....out west electrify the lines going through the mountains and tunnels)

as a pilot project extend US 61 as a 4 lane highway from Baton Rouge to Memphis and perhaps up to Chicago...

 

[marathag]

A functional radar net and operational command and control in Hawaii would have had a great impact...that being said, keep Short out of Hawaii...

My pet rock in this type of scenario is a National Defense Infrastructure Act, which would modernize and electrify railroads (think Boston in the north to Atlanta in the South and west to St Louis and Chicago....out west electrify the lines going through the mountains and tunnels)

as a pilot project extend US 61 as a 4 lane highway from Baton Rouge to Memphis and perhaps up to Chicago...

Going to Diesel over steam would help greatly.

 

[vl100butch]

Going to Diesel over steam would help greatly.

That would be another good thing....

Another idea...construction of the "Big Inch" pipeline...reduce the need for tankers to support the East Coast.

 

[marathag]

It's a war about logistics, so bring in earlier usage of pallets and containers.
Chicago Great Western RR was already doing Trailer on Flatcar service before the War.
Expand on this.

 

[marathag]

On above post, also eliminate the restriction on the size of the Trailer that could be on the road, it was 25' and postwar to 30' and rapidly thru 32', 35' and 40' by the early '60s.

Next is planning for synthetic rubber, for tires on those and everything else the Army had on wheels.

 

[marathag]

Another point on logistics, the C Rations were being developed, room for improvement here as well.
In 1939 training/maneuvers, have the troops use just those rations, and improve over 1940 and 41 for what would become the lighter weight K Ration that was shown to be too low in calories OTL, as only short term tested done before put into massive production.
Then work on a lighter stove than the gasoline Coleman.
Copy the prewar German Hexamine stove.

 

[Naval Aviation Fan]

A functional radar net and operational command and control in Hawaii would have had a great impact...that being said, keep Short out of Hawaii...

My unspoken desire is to have the USA getting the right to buy a few CH installations, pay the UK to ship and install them on Oahu, and teach the US crews how to run them. And that as just a part of the detection infrastructure, so also (and probably, sooner) picture wooden 'Ranger Towers' all along the perimeter, each equipped with 2-3 pairs of powerful looking glasses mounted 30' to 60' feet up to aid observers to see small aircraft as far out as possible, and each such tower or radar installation having a direct line to the underground 'fighter command' bunkers, which in turn are linked to every airfield where any fighters (Army, Navy, Marine Corps) might be based, and these airbases are used to scrambling fighters to any incoming flights, just to train up the ability to get directions to make intercepts of such, with as little notice and as great a force as possible, as often as possible, for as long before the war starts as possible.

 

[marathag]

My unspoken desire is to have the USA getting the right to buy a few CH installations, pay the UK to ship and install them on Oahu, and teach the US crews how to run them. And that as just a part of the detection infrastructure, so also (and probably, sooner) picture wooden 'Ranger Towers' all along the perimeter, each equipped with 2-3 pairs of powerful looking glasses mounted 30' to 60' feet up to aid observers to see small aircraft as far out as possible, and each such tower or radar installation having a direct line to the underground 'fighter command' bunkers, which in turn are linked to every airfield where any fighters (Army, Navy, Marine Corps) might be based, and these airbases are used to scrambling fighters to any incoming flights, just to train up the ability to get directions to make intercepts of such, with as little notice and as great a force as possible, as often as possible, for as long before the war starts as possible.

Naval Research Laboratory had already surpassed the Chain Home in ability with the 200Mhz XAF of 1938, that was fitted to USS New York.
It would work fine in a land based instalation
It could detect aircraft to 100 nautical miles, and even 14" shells in flight.
It was in mass production as the CXAM after improvements by RCA, after their 400Mhz CXZ trialed on USS Texas was found not as reliable or as long ranged as the XAF
While Chain Home could also detect to 100 miles, it used 10 times the power to do so and needed the huge towers for the equally huge antenna array, due to the low 20Mhz frequency used., and could not be rotated, but only 'seeing' a fixed 60° arc.
So while the CH Radar itself was nothing great, the CH integrated system, was.
That's what you copy.

 

[Naval Aviation Fan]

Would the proposed start date of unhistorical preparedness be able to have an Oahu air-defense as the UK did by Dec 7th, 1940? If so, the USA could have a year of intensive training of all fighters on Oahu for radar directed intercept missions. I would picture the island serving as THE air-defense training ground for all US forces in the Pacific, as it has a remote enough location to discover the supply difficulties (if on a smaller scale) of what the Flying tigers and FEAF would later have, and first solving Oahu's supply issues would be a good test of what would be needed for all the various commands scattered around the Pacific.

Historically, how many Oahu based fighters were not even in a flyable state when the attack came in. My ever murkier memory says this might have been up to 1/2 the aircraft present on the day, but that may or may not turn out to be true. Anyone know how bad the supply and logistics situation was on Oahu? What about the Philippines?

Not sure if the USA could achieve combat readiness, meaning stockpiles at all forward airbases sufficient for all aircraft to be operational, and to be able to be kept that way for several months with nothing but what they had on hand at the opening of hostilities to draw from, but in this thread I really want to see what can be done for Pearl Harbor/Oahu.

Getting the parts, fuel, ammo, and whatnot, to where we want to base our various airforces, is a problem pre-war America didn't achieve historically, so what would we need to change with respect to getting (and keeping) our forward deployed airforces properly supplied?

For instance, what about laying down fast tankers, but alter their design to include large amounts of avgas, aircraft parts and spares, and a flying off deck to make it possible to send the fighters in before reaching port?

 

[CV12Hornet]

While you could certainly have the US more prepared for war by Pearl Harbor, IMO the disaster that was Pearl Harbor is not something that’s going to be averted by better training and kit, because the problem wasn’t really about of those things. The problem was that the commanders on the ground made faulty assumptions of the threat, assuming sabotage or a drive-by shelling by battleships to be the primary threats. I don’t see how any of this changes that, so you still have aircraft parked in neat rows on the airfields when the Japanese arrive and the battleships still anchored with cold boilers.

Even with early warning, there just wouldn’t be time to get planes aloft and ships manned and moving before the first wave hits.

 

[CV12Hornet]

For instance, what about laying down fast tankers, but alter their design to include large amounts of avgas, aircraft parts and spares, and a flying off deck to make it possible to send the fighters in before reaching port

So… the Sangamon-class escort carriers, basically? Not ready by Pearl Harbor. And yes, they were laid down in 1939.

 

[RanulfC]

While you could certainly have the US more prepared for war by Pearl Harbor, IMO the disaster that was Pearl Harbor is not something that’s going to be averted by better training and kit, because the problem wasn’t really about of those things. The problem was that the commanders on the ground made faulty assumptions of the threat, assuming sabotage or a drive-by shelling by battleships to be the primary threats. I don’t see how any of this changes that, so you still have aircraft parked in neat rows on the airfields when the Japanese arrive and the battleships still anchored with cold boilers.

Even with early warning, there just wouldn’t be time to get planes aloft and ships manned and moving before the first wave hits.

Caveat on this: They HAD been on alert for almost a week already and part of the problem with the men and material was they were tired and worn out. Even though hitting Hawaii was a low probability it made sense to prepare they just leaned to far forward to soon and picked the wrong day to relax. That being said a better and more coordinated early warning system and a more "war-ready" attitude (they "thought" they were ready but really were not) and training would have helped a lot.

They'd been expecting some sort of action but instead of pacing themselves they were on high alert the whole week which again wore out the equipment and the men. And nothing happened so complacency set in. In the suggested scenario a LOT of the issues were that the US simply wasn't really ready to fight a war. Our doctrine on many things was out of date and in several key areas the doctrine, (let alone training and equipping) was lacking because there was no actual 'experience' to base any of it off of.

Kit is going to help but it's the training (or lack thereof) that's going to be an issue early on.

Randy

 

[Naval Aviation Fan]

While you could certainly have the US more prepared for war by Pearl Harbor, IMO the disaster that was Pearl Harbor is not something that’s going to be averted by better training and kit, because the problem wasn’t really about of those things.

Well, I have to disagree here, which is not to say all the blame was on training & kit, but how much better would the US air-defense have done if they had well drilled fighter squadrons that had been routinely flying radar directed intercept missions, 2-3 times a day, over a period of months, before the war?

Historically, Oahu had what, one single radar operating, and when the guys reported the incoming 1st wave, they were told that it was probably a friendly flight, and to go ahead and shut down the radar and head to chow. The situation in the Philippines was scarcely better, what with the fighters taking off, and under directions of the radar guy's, scrambled but couldn't find the incoming air-raid, and so they RTB, and got caught on the ground.

The purpose of this thread is to work out what the USA could have done, if Congress had enacted emergency preparedness measures, starting on Sep 7th, 1939, and going on right up to Dec 7th, 1941, with respect to general improvements in air-defenses for overseas deployed air forces, and Oahu/Pearl Harbor specifically.

The problem was that the commanders on the ground made faulty assumptions of the threat, assuming sabotage or a drive-by shelling by battleships to be the primary threats.

The POD throws out all the historical garbage thinking, and the new thought is get our guys ready, before the shooting starts. This would not function going through normal, peace time, inter-service rivalry infested bureaucracy, but instead by a mission focused agency.

I don’t see how any of this changes that, so you still have aircraft parked in neat rows on the airfields when the Japanese arrive and the battleships still anchored with cold boilers.

Not at all, nor will a large portion of the assigned fighter strength be in an unflyable state before the shooting starts, as this ATL has them training hard, while getting all the fuel, ammo, and kit that they need to maintain as close to 100% as is humanly possible, due also to having squadrons having 'organic spares' as part of their ToE.

I'll leave the fleet-in-port comments alone, as I need to concentrate on just the air defenses.

Even with early warning, there just wouldn’t be time to get planes aloft and ships manned and moving before the first wave hits.

Just how fast are the 1st wave planes coming in with their torpedoes and 800kg bombs? If the radar catches them at 100 miles, that is an hours warning if they had a heavily laden speed of advance of 100mph, and even if they had a highly improbable 200mph speed of advance, that still gives an alert, war footing command that has been routinely flying multiple radar directed intercepts a day, for months, plenty of time to scramble the ready force fighters.

So… the Sangamon-class escort carriers, basically? Not ready by Pearl Harbor. And yes, they were laid down in 1939.

I looked those ships types up, not the ones converted to aircraft carriers, but the basic T3 Tankers themselves.

USS Sabine, laid down 18 Sep, 1939 and commissioned on 5 Dec, 1940.

The differences between the ships I posited and the one's you linked to are that my ships are not intended to operate as warships, they don't have any facilities to land aircraft aboard, and are meant to deliver aviation specific cargos, like avgas, ammunition, spare parts, tools, ground crew personnel, flight crews, and a handful of fully assembled, fully fueled aircraft loaded as cargo on a notional flying off platform. I don't think you need to have a fully formed idea of exactly where and what your temporary rigged flying off platform is going to be the day you lay down the keel, rather, I think that that is something that is going to be worked out while the ship(s) are under construction, and will probably be changed (likely more than a few times), as more and better ships are built using lessons learned by earlier experiences.

Keep in mind, these first emergency aircraft supply ships are likely to only be slightly modified OTL ships before being pressed into service ASAP, and that redesigned variants are going to start to appear well before Dec 7th, 1941.

 

[Naval Aviation Fan]

Naval Research Laboratory had already surpassed the Chain Home in ability with the 200Mhz XAF of 1938, that was fitted to USS New York.
It would work fine in a land based installation
It could detect aircraft to 100 nautical miles, and even 14" shells in flight.

Nice, how many would be needed to ring Oahu with all around coverage?

It was in mass production as the CXAM after improvements by RCA, after their 400Mhz CXZ trialed on USS Texas was found not as reliable or as long ranged as the XAF

Hmph. Tried to make a better one, and failed?

While Chain Home could also detect to 100 miles, it used 10 times the power to do so and needed the huge towers for the equally huge antenna array, due to the low 20Mhz frequency used., and could not be rotated, but only 'seeing' a fixed 60° arc.

Ahha! didn't know about the power usage, and forgot the stationary thing.

So while the CH Radar itself was nothing great, the CH integrated system, was.
That's what you copy.

Yep, that was the plan, get multiple stations up, get good, reliable coverage, then start using the newly built 'fighter command' infrastructure to start running a robust training program, where all returning scouts are treated as an incoming air raid, and where all the fighters on the island are scrambled to make intercepts, until they can do it in their sleep.

I know that not all fighters are going to go up all at once, nor even everyday, and nothing prevents the exploration of a multi-vector air-attack, and how to counter that, so the righters are going to be going through many more spare parts that the historical pre-war forces, and hence they will need a much stronger commitment of shipping to bring in the materials needed to maintain the higher training tempos.

 

[marathag]

Nice, how many would be needed to ring Oahu with all around coverage?

I would have stations on Kauai, Maui as well as Big Island.
As it was, 6 semi-mobile SCR-270 were on Oahu. One was manned that Sunday.
The SCR-270 was similar in ability to the CXAM, developed in parallel to what the Navy was doing.
It wasn't a joint program, so there was duplication of effort.

 

[James Ricker]

Arrange for earlier license belt production of the Merlin engine
Having a Merlin engined P-40 in 1941 would increase Japanese aircraft losses early in the war
That would have catastrophic effects for Japanese air power long-term

Also remove MacArthur from command of the Philippines and replace him with someone who understands defensive doctrine.

 

[Driftless]

Also remove MacArthur from command of the Philippines and replace him with someone who understands defensive doctrine.

Maybe someone with more knowledge than mine can answer this: I've read a number of times that the US Asian fleet was often a kind of a dumping ground for less-than-stellar naval officers. Not universally true, but as a general condition. Was that also true for the US Army units stationed there and also for the US trainers working up the Philippine National Army.?

 

[RanulfC]

This would not function going through normal, peace time, inter-service rivalry infested bureaucracy, but instead by a mission focused agency.

No inter-service rivalry? Hey keep it out of ASB will you?

More seriously that IS actually a problem due to the inter-war build up of said rivalry which a year or so of funding is not going to fully abate. Especially without something (like active combat ongoing) to reduce the focus. Keep in mind that that rivalry was vastly worse post-WWII OTL and didn't really begin to subside until the 1970s OTL! Budget and political support are needed as well as time to 'get-over' earlier conflict which while not at the levels of Japanese "inter-service" rivalry were pretty intense.

Weeding those issues out is going to take time and effort that will in turn detract from the effort to focus on a coming war and probably mean you'd need to fire a good segment of the command structure at a time when you really need them. That "peace-time" thinking is institutionally and individually engrained and it took a while to get it all straightened out OTL, again, with active combat ongoing. Getting that kind of commitment is going to be tough.

Well, I have to disagree here, which is not to say all the blame was on training & kit, but how much better would the US air-defense have done if they had well drilled fighter squadrons that had been routinely flying radar directed intercept missions, 2-3 times a day, over a period of months, before the war?

Depends, because this is so far from 'standard' thinking and doctrine of the time and something neither the Army nor Navy are really 'trained' in at this point. Sure give them an extra year of training is one thing but we'd need a good part of that in writing the doctrine, training it, and then getting to a point where it is actually a working doctrine. That's in ADDITION to getting the kit in place. Things it took months to get down even when fighting an actual war at the time. And that's the Army really because the Navies "doctrine" was vastly worse and started from a worse off position.

Other than the Japanese most Navies (and especially the USN) didn't consider aircraft to be a good 'strike' force and still focused on the Battle Line.

The purpose of this thread is to work out what the USA could have done, if Congress had enacted emergency preparedness measures, starting on Sep 7th, 1939, and going on right up to Dec 7th, 1941, with respect to general improvements in air-defenses for overseas deployed air forces, and Oahu/Pearl Harbor specifically.

I know you want to focus on air defense but realistically I'm not sure that would happen as they didn't consider an air attack on Hawaii a high-probability at the time. The fighters on Hawaii were there to supposedly give more 'eyes-in-the-sky' to spot an incoming battle force which is likely what they'd focus on 'practicing' under the circumstances. Chances are high they are really at this point in the suggested scenario more squadrons of 'waiting-to-ship' replacements and support than actual trained and ready fighter squadrons. Really you'd have minimal training in intercept because you'd plan on them working up with whatever unit they will actually be deploying to. (It'll help but at this point ANYTHING would likely have helped )

And keep in mind that "inter-service rivalry" issue and the lack of coordination that's still going to be in place simply for the fact that change is slow. I'd say the changes overall to operations in Hawaii would be lagging behind places where "they" think an attack is more likely say the Philippines, Guam or Wake.

Now here's another 'question' for the OP and everyone: Assuming the increase in budget and all then how willing is the US to NOT negotiate with Japan at all? In order to reinforce their holdings outside Hawaii (Wake-et-al) the US OTL had to get to the point where negotiations were already breaking down to really push fortification and bolstering the defenses. Pushing this forward (and more) is simply going to give Japan another 'excuse' to drag their feet and is certainly going to push their own timetable forward. How much do they allow the US to 'prepare'?

The POD throws out all the historical garbage thinking, and the new thought is get our guys ready, before the shooting starts. This would not function going through normal, peace time, inter-service rivalry infested bureaucracy, but instead by a mission focused agency.

That's still a problem because the "Department of War" is simply not that agency. It had numerous flaws and ratholes and was essentially run by whichever service had the 'ear' of the head at any one time. Getting that straightened out took a total post-WWII reorganization and it STILL had serious flaws and issues for another couple of decades, even setting aside the political and budget problems post-war. And again this is going to have butterflies outside of the Pacific and political ones as well.
(I'm thinking that it may be unlikely that places like Wake and Guam actually GET a lot of new 'kit' or training as they were seen as indefensible and therefore you're probably handing stuff to the enemy by doing so)

Not at all, nor will a large portion of the assigned fighter strength be in an unflyable state before the shooting starts, as this ATL has them training hard, while getting all the fuel, ammo, and kit that they need to maintain as close to 100% as is humanly possible, due also to having squadrons having 'organic spares' as part of their ToE.

They had issues OTL because they were 'training' hard for the week prior to December 7th though, so spreading that over several months is going to have an affect both good and bad. Now arguably they are going to start from a different basis where that high state of alert isn't really needed 24/7/7 (as per OTL to get things 'primed') but they are going to have to have down times and stand downs because you can't operate like that 24/7/365. So a lot will depend on the "surge" schedule which really wasn't a "thing" during the inter-war period. We're asking for a 'war-time' footing when six months prior to December 7th most of the military wasn't expecting to get into a war. The US had to learn how to do that DURING the war and we had to re-learn it again after Korea. That's not an easy lesson to teach/train/do.

My guess is you'll see several months of chaos and rates of readiness going up only to crash a week later until both the higher ups and mainline forces get into a rhythm. Depending on when everyone got serious (again it won't be September 7th 1939 but months later at the very least, more likely late-1940, to early 1941 before everyone gets sorted and doctrine evolved enough to push out into the field) and thing started to come together. And that's when things REALLY go downhill because we're assuming some major changes in doctrine, training and operations that will in some case fundamentally fly in the face of previous versions of the same. Accident rates will go up, readiness rates will go down and even with a war looming politics and inertia will still happen.

I'll leave the fleet-in-port comments alone, as I need to concentrate on just the air defenses.

And with your user-name that's actually funny

But, we cant as that was seen as the mainline of both defense and offense and the entire reason the fleet is in Hawaii was to shorten the response time to the assumed attack on the Philippines among other holdings. Realistically with a more 'pro-active' stance then at least part of the fleet will be at sea at any one time and scouting and reconnaissance efforts will be stepped up significantly. (This again will effect the whole planning for the Japanese which would need to be addressed)

Just how fast are the 1st wave planes coming in with their torpedoes and 800kg bombs? If the radar catches them at 100 miles, that is an hours warning if they had a heavily laden speed of advance of 100mph, and even if they had a highly improbable 200mph speed of advance, that still gives an alert, war footing command that has been routinely flying multiple radar directed intercepts a day, for months, plenty of time to scramble the ready force fighters.

According to wiki about 160mph for the 'slowest' plane of the attack force, (which surprised me that it was the Kate rather than the Val) so about 45 minutes assuming everything works pretty much the same. My 'take' is it will take about 30 minutes or so to 'scramble' the alert aircraft and get them in position to make the initial intercept and likely they'd have the rest getting ready but keep in mind this is STILL a 'surprise' because Hawaii isn't supposed to be a target so all the 'good' planes, pilots, and intercept operators have been pushed forward to other places.

Randy

 

[marathag]

Arrange for earlier license belt production of the Merlin engine
Having a Merlin engined P-40 in 1941 would increase Japanese aircraft losses early in the war
That would have catastrophic effects for Japanese air power long-term

Also remove MacArthur from command of the Philippines and replace him with someone who understands defensive doctrine.

Merlin wasn't a magic bullet:
look at P-40F

It was a whole 4mph faster than the Allison P-40E at the same altitude.
That's as that was an early Merlin, singe stage, two speed unit of 1300HP

But yes, in 1939, effort could have been started to work over the supercharger limitation that Allison had baked into the design