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alternatehistory.com
Here's another timeline I'm working on. This is the first chapter. It's mostly an introduction and mostly contains real history. If you already know this stuff you can skip it.
It was 1940 and the war between France and Britain on one side and Germany on the other was in full swing. The war had started because of Hitler’s gambling. He had risen to power in the early thirties as a result of widespread discontent in Germany because of the Treaty of Versailles, the economic crisis and out of fear for the communist threat. In 1933 Marinus van der Lubbe, a Dutch communist, allegedly set fire to the Reichstag inciting fear among the German population. Even now Hitler didn’t get a majority of votes in German parliament. He received 44% of votes and became chancellor of Germany. He quickly started absorbing power and combined his function with that of president Hindenburg after the latter’s death in 1934 and created the position of Führer. He immediately set out to make Germany strong again and to cast off the Treaty of Versailles. He almost immediately stated that he would increase the army to 550.000 men. It would become even bigger than that in years to come. In 1935 he reintroduced conscription which Germany wasn’t suppose to have according to the Treaty of Versailles. His first great gamble came when he remilitarized the Rhineland in 1936. It paid off as the western powers did nothing. He went further and annexed Austria and the Sudetenland in 1938 without a shot being fired. He annexed the rest of Czechia and turned Slovakia into a puppet in 1939. In the meantime he also tested his army in the Spanish civil war. His war machine became progressively stronger but Hitler wasn’t unstoppable. France and Britain however decided to do nothing.
Hitler’s annexation of Bohemia and Moravia was proof that Hitler couldn’t be trusted and the French and British started to oppose the Germans more. In 1939 the USSR and the Nazi-Germany signed the Molotov-Von Ribbentrop pact which had a secret clause in it detailing the division of Poland and the creation of spheres of influence. Hitler started demanding that the Polish handed over Danzig. The Polish stubbornly refused and were backed by Britain and France who threatened to declare war should Hitler try anything. Hitler, believing that the French and British were bluffing, ordered the invasion of Poland. German panzers rolled across the border on September 1st 1939. Britain and France kept to their word and declared war a few days later. Stukas and panzer IIIs crushed the weak Polish army and air force. The Poles planned to retreat to the Romanian Bridgehead which had natural defensive lines. The Polish army leaders expected to be able to defend this area until the promised French offensive. About twenty divisions which were still cohesive retreated towards Lvov under orders of Polish commander in chief, marshal Edward Rydz-Smigly. This plan was made obsolete when Soviet forces invaded Poland from the east on September 17th 1939 in accordance with the Molotov-Von Ribbentrop pact which only added to Poland’s misery. The country was overrun within 36 days. After that Hitler turned his attention away from his eastern border. A phony war ensued. Neither side did anything and waited for the other to make a move. Hitler made the first move and invaded Denmark and Norway in April 1940 in a daring operation which would become known as operation Weserübung. The Wehrmacht immediately started preparing for operations against the west. The plan was devised by general Erich von Manstein and it was quite a daring plan.
Whilst von Manstein was formulating the new plans in Koblenz, it so happened that Lieutenant-General Heinz Guderian, commander of the XIXth Army Corps, Germany's elite armored formation, was lodged in a nearby hotel. Von Manstein now considered that, should he involve Guderian in his planning, the tank general may come up with some role for his Army Corps to play in it, and this might then be used as a decisive argument to relocate XIXth Army Corps from Army Group B to Army Group A, much to the delight of Von Rundstedt. At this time von Manstein's plan consisted in a move from Sedan to the north, right in the rear of the main Allied forces, to engage them directly from the south in full battle. When Guderian was invited to contribute to the plan during informal discussions, he proposed a radical and new idea: not only his army corps, but the entire Panzerwaffe should be concentrated at Sedan. And this concentration of armor should not move to the north but to the west, to execute a swift, deep, independent strategic penetration towards the English Channel without waiting for the main body of infantry divisions. This could lead to a strategic collapse of the enemy, avoiding the relatively high number of casualties normally caused by a classic Kesselschlacht or "annihilation battle". Such a risky independent strategic use of armor had been widely discussed in Germany before the war but had not at all been accepted as received doctrine. The large number of officers serving in the infantry, which was the dominant arm of service, had successfully prevented this. Von Manstein had to admit that in this special case, however, it might be just the thing needed. His main objection was that it would create an open flank of over 300 kilometres, vulnerable to French counterattacks. Guderian convinced him that this could be prevented by launching simultaneous spoiling attacks to the south by small armored units. However, this would be a departure from the basic concept of the Führer-Directive N°6.
Von Manstein wrote his first memorandum outlining the alternative plan on 31 October. In it he carefully avoided mentioning Guderian's name and downplayed the strategic part of the armored units, in order not to generate unnecessary resistance. On 6 November, 21 November, 30 November, 6 December, 18 December1939 and 12 January1940, a further six memoranda followed, slowly growing more radical in outline. All were rejected by the OKH; nothing of their content reached Hitler. On 10 January1940 a German Messerschmitt Bf 108 made a forced landing at Maasmechelen, north of Maastricht, in Belgium (the so-called "Mechelen Incident"). Among the occupants was a Luftwaffe major, Hellmuth Reinberger, who was carrying a copy of the latest version of Aufmarschanweisung N°2. Although the aircraft landed safely, Reinberger was unable to destroy the documents, which quickly fell into the hands of the Belgian intelligence services. It has often been suggested this incident was the cause of a drastic change in German plans, but this is incorrect; in fact a reformulation of them on 30 January, Aufmarschanweisung N°3, Fall Gelb, basically conformed to the earlier versions. On 27 January, von Manstein was appointed commander of an army corps in Prussia, to begin his command in Stettin on 9 February. This move was instigated by Halder to remove von Manstein from influence. Von Manstein's indignant staff then brought his case to the attention of Hitler, who was informed of it on 2 February. Von Manstein was invited to explain his proposal to the Führer personally in Berlin on 17 February; much impressed by it, Hitler the next day ordered the plans to be changed in accordance with von Manstein's ideas. They appealed to Hitler mainly because they at last offered some real hope of a cheap victory.
The man who had to carry out the change was again Franz Halder, Von Manstein was not further involved. Halder consented to shifting the main effort, the Schwerpunkt, to the south. Von Manstein's plan had the virtue of being unlikely from a defensive point of view since the Ardennes were heavily wooded and because of their poor road network, they were implausible as a route for an invasion. An element of surprise would therefore be present. It would be essential that the Allies respond as envisaged in the original plans, namely that the main body of French and British elite troops be drawn north to defend Belgium. To help to ensure this condition, German Army Group B had to execute a holding attack in Belgium and the Netherlands, giving the impression of being the main German effort, in order to draw Allied forces eastward into the developing encirclement and hold them there. To accomplish this, three of the ten available armored divisions were still allocated to Army Group B. However, Halder had no intention of deviating from established doctrine by allowing an independent strategic penetration by the seven armored divisions of Army Group A. Much to the outrage of Guderian this element was at first completely removed from the new plan, Aufmarschanweisung N°4, Fall Gelb, issued on 24 February. The crossings of the River Meuse at Sedan should be forced by infantry divisions on the eighth day of the invasion. Only after much debate was this changed in this respect that the motorized infantry regiments of the armored divisions would establish bridgeheads on the fourth day, to gain four days. Even now the breakout and drive to the English Channel would start only on the ninth day, after a delay of five days during which a sufficient number of infantry divisions had to be built up in order to advance together with the armored units in a coherent mass.
Even when adapted to more conventional methods, the new strategy provoked a storm of protest from the majority of German generals. They thought it utterly irresponsible to create a concentration of forces in a position where they could not possibly be sufficiently supplied, while such inadequate supply routes as there were, could easily be cut off by the French. If the Allies did not react as expected the German offensive could end in catastrophe. Their objections were ignored however; Halder argued that, as Germany's strategic position seemed hopeless anyway, even the slightest chance of a decisive victory outweighed the certainty of ultimate defeat implied by inaction. The adaptation also implied that it would be easier for the Allied forces to escape to the south. Halder pointed out that if so, Germany's victory would be even cheaper, while it would be an enormous blow to the reputation of the Entente, as the Anglo-French alliance was still commonly known in 1940, to have abandoned the Low Countries. Moreover Germany's fighting power would then still be intact, so that it might be considered to immediately afterwards execute Fall Rot, the attack on France. However, a decision to this effect would have to be postponed until after a possible successful completion of Fall Gelb. Indeed German detailed operational planning only covered the first nine days; there was no fixed timetable established for the advance to the Channel. In accordance with the tradition of the Auftragstaktik, much would be left to the judgment and initiative of the field commanders. This indetermination would have an enormous effect on the actual course of events.
The plan was daring indeed and most of Germany’s forces were committed to this operation. A grand total of 141 divisions, 7.378 guns, 2445 tanks and 5638 aircraft were to be used to defeat France. Operations commenced on May 10th 1940 when German forces invaded the Low Countries. The speed with which the Germans advanced was astonishing. The Netherlands surrendered after only five days of combat on May 14th 1940. Holland’s southern neighbor Belgium wasn’t in a much better situation. The Aeronautique Militaire, the Belgian air force, lost 83 out of 179 aircraft, almost 50%, within 24 hours. This German success can largely be contributed to good intelligence. The Luftwaffe had conducted many reconnaissance flights into Belgium. One of the most daring moves in this campaign was the capture of the Belgian fortress Eben-Emael. In the early hours of May 10th gliders landed on the roof of Fort Eben-Emael unloading assault teams that disabled the fortress’ main guns with hollow charges. The bridges over the canal were seized by German paratroopers. Shocked by a breach in its defenses just where they had seemed the strongest, the Belgian Supreme Command withdrew its divisions to the KW-line five days earlier than planned. At that moment however the BEF and the French 1st Army were not yet entrenched. When Erich Hoepner's XVI Panzer Corps, consisting of 3rd and 4thPanzer Divisions was over the bridges launched in the direction of the Gembloux Gap, this seemed to confirm the expectations of the French Supreme Command that here would be the German Schwerpunkt. The two French Cavalry armoured divisions, the 2nd DLM and 3rd DLMs (Division Légère Mécanique, "Mechanised Light Division") were ordered forward to meet the German armor and cover the entrenchment of 1st Army.
The resulting Battle of Hannut on 12 May-13 May was, with about 1,500 AFVs participating, the largest tank battle until that date. The French claim about 160 disabled German tanks for 91 French Hotchkiss H35 and 30 Somua S35 tanks destroyed or captured. However, as the Germans controlled the battlefield area afterwards, they recovered and eventually repaired or rebuilt many of their panzers. German irreparable losses amounted to 49 tanks. German armor sustained substantial breakdown rates making it impossible to ascertain the exact number of tanks disabled by French action. On the second day the Germans managed to breach the screen of French tanks, which on 14 May were successfully withdrawn after having gained enough time for the 1st Army to dig in. Hoepner against orders tried on 15 May to break the French line, the only time in the campaign when German armor frontally attacked a strongly held fortified position; the attempt was repelled by the 1st Moroccan Infantry Division costing 42 tanks 26 of which were irreparable. This defensive success for the French was however already made irrelevant by other events such as the Belgian capitulation on May 27th.
The Dutch had already surrendered at this point. The Luftwaffe was guaranteed air superiority over the Netherlands. The Dutch Air Force, the Militaire Luchtvaartafdeling (ML), had a strength of 144 combat aircraft, half of which were destroyed within the first day of operations. The remainder was dispersed and accounted for only a handful of Luftwaffe aircraft shot down. In total the ML flew a mere 332 sorties losing 110 of its aircraft.
The German 18th Army secured all the strategically vital bridges in and toward Rotterdam, which penetrated Fortress Holland and bypassed the New Water Line from the south. However, an operation organised separately by the Luftwaffe to seize the Dutch seat of government, known as the Battle for The Hague, ended in complete failure. The airfields surrounding the city, Ypenburg, Ockenburg, and Valkenburg, were taken with heavy casualties and transport aircraft losses, only to be lost that same day to counterattacks by the two Dutch reserve infantry divisions. The Dutch captured or killed 1.745 paratroopers, shipping 1,200 prisoners to England. The Luftwaffe's transport groups also suffered heavily. Transporting the German paratroops had cost it 125 Ju 52 destroyed and 47 were damaged, representing 50 percent of the fleet's strength. Most of these transports were destroyed on the ground, and some whilst trying to land under fire, as German forces had not properly secured the airfields and landing zones. The French 7th Army failed to block German armored reinforcements of the 9th Panzer Division; they reached Rotterdam on 13 May. That same day in the east the Dutch retreated from the Grebbe line to the New Water Line, when a counter-offensive to contain a German breach had failed. The Dutch Army, still largely intact, surrendered in the evening of 14 May after the Bombing of Rotterdam by Heinkel He-111s of Kampfgeschwader 54. It considered its strategic situation to have become hopeless and feared a further destruction of the major Dutch cities. The capitulation document was signed on 15 May. However, the Dutch troops in Zeeland and the colonies continued the fight while Queen Wilhelmina established a government-in-exile in Britain. The speedy German advance continued and on May 16th the situation in northwestern France looked like this:
And on May 21st the situation was like the map below. It is obvious that the German battle plan was working. The French, British and Belgians couldn’t stop the German advance. It seemed like Germany was actually going to pull it off and defeat the French. Fortunately we’ll never know whether or not the allies could have turned the tide. In the east Europe’s other great dictator was about to make his move.