The difference between me and you guys is that I’m using facts and clear logic. You are using only your sick imagination and soviet propaganda, like comrade Tuhachevsky.
At least you don't argue that USSR took Berlin and captured half of Europe, thanks for that.
In September 1939, as a result of the Red Army’s “war of liberation” in Poland, the new western border of the Soviet Union advanced in such a way that the so-called Belostok bulge formed in Byelorussia- a powerful wedge that, like a ship’s bow, broke into the territory occupied by Germany. The same thing happened in the Lvov region – there, another powerful wedge of Soviet territory formed. The Belostok and Lvov bulges were like two Soviet peninsulas in the German sea. Basic military logic dictated: if the Red Army intended to defend itself, it could not keep troops in the Belostok and Lvov bulges. Already, in peacetime, enemy troops surrounded the Soviet army on three sides in the bulges. The Soviet flanks were open and vulnerable. A sudden and decisive German attack on the flanks in these bulges would have cut off the best sections of the Red Army from the main forces and supply bases. In the event of an enemy invasion, such an alignment of Soviet troops inevitably and immediately would have led to catastrophe.
That is exactly what happened in the 1941. Before the German invasion into the territory of the Kiev military district, the most powerful Soviet front was deployed: the Southwestern Front. The three most powerful armies of that front were in the Lvov bulge. In peacetime, these three armies were already almost surrounded. Hitler only had to shut the trap on them. On June 22, the very weak 1st German Tank Group hit Lutsk, Rovno, and Berdichev, quickly cutting of all three Soviet armies in the Lvov bulge – the 12th (mountain), 6th, and 26th.
The 1st Tank Group, faced with open, unprotected operational space, immediately went through the Soviet rear, crushing air bases, staffs, and hospitals. Here, in the rear, they found tremendous quantities of Soviet weapons, fuel, ammunition, foodstuffs, and medical supplies. The Germans seized truly remarkable trophies. The three Soviet armies in the Lvov bulge were left with a problem that had two solutions, both of which were catastrophic: either remain in the trap and wait for the 1st Tank Group to completely lock the encirclement, or run to the east, abandoning everything that cannot be carried. They ran. Soon, they were left without fuel and ammunition. The entire Soviet Southwestern Front crumbled from one rather weal blow. But that was not all: this same blow threatened the entire Southern Front.
In Byelorussia, the Red Army had an even worse time. The Western Front had four armies. The main forces of the front were concentrated in the Byelostok bulge. Two German tank groups struck the undefended flanks and linked east of Minsk. The 3rd, 10th, and parts of the 4th and 13th armies, all together almost thirty divisions, found themselves in a pocket. The Western Front collapsed even quicker that the Southwestern and the Southern Fronts.
Could it be that before the war General Zhukov did not understand one cannot herd huge numbers of troops into bulges that become trap?
General Vlassov. In a protocol from questioning on August 8, 1942, it was recorded:
“Regarding the question of whether Stalin had intentions to attack Germany, Vlassov declared that such intentions, undoubtedly, existed. The concentration of troops in the Lvov region points to the fact that a strike against Romania was being planned in the direction of the petroleum sources. . . The Red Army was not prepared for the German invasion. Despite all the rumors about the operations conducted by Germany, in the Soviet Union nobody believed in such a possibility. During preparations, the Russians meant only their own offensive.” There is no other explanations for the concentration of Soviet troops in the Lvov and Byelostok bulges.
The consequences of Zhukov’s positioning were catastrophic. In order to divert the attack on Moscow, the Red Army had to send, urgently and under heavy enemy bombers’ raids, railway trains with divisions, corps and armies form the Southwestern Front to the Western Front. There, again under heavy bombing , the trains were unloaded and the troops went straight into battle. What happened was that the 16th Army had just advanced from the Trans-Baikal region to Ukraine, meaning south of Polesye. The army had just begun to unload when the German invasion happened. They were forced to urgently load the 16th Army back into trains and herd it several hundred kilometers to the north. The staff of the 16th Army arrived at Smolensk from Ukraine and began to unload, but the communications battalion could not be found. Without communication, it is impossible to command troops. An entire army found itself without command. And there are plenty more examples.
But Zhukov was not thinking of defense, and was not planning it. There is plenty of testimony that right before the invasion Zhukov, Vatutin, Vasilevsky, and all the generals and officers of the General Staff worked sixteen and seventeen hours a day without weekends and holidays. The areas for the concentration of primary efforts were not chosen by Soviet commanders in the interests of strategic defense operations (such an operation was simply not foreseen and planned), but for entirely different means of action.