STALIN's AGGRESSIVE PLAN in 1941


Soviet assault landing brigades made their first parachute landings in combat conditions in June 1940. The 201st and 204th Brigades landed in Romania, and the 214th in Lithuania, near its frontier with East Prussia. Both assault landings seriously worried Hitler, especially the landing in Romania. The entire German Army was concentrated in France at the time, and Romania was the source of its oil supplies. Had Soviet transport aircraft gone 200 kilometers further before discharging their loads, Germany would have been left without oil, the very life-blood of war.
In April 1941 five airborne corps were secretly deployed in the Soviet Union. All five were set up in the western regions of the country. In order to appreciate the magnitude of this development, it must be remembered that even today there is not one formation in existence anywhere which has the full right to bear the title of airborne corps. A corps is too large and too expensive to maintain in peacetime.
The airborne corps was not intended as a response to the German invasion, for it is quite impossible to use paratroopers in such massive numbers in a defensive war. Of all the corps, not one fought in the war in its proper function. Of all the corps, only one corps was used as intended and on only one occasion, in the course of a counteroffensive in front of Moscow. A third series of airborne corps came later, and one of these corps made an air assault landing in 1943.
By the beginning of the war, the Soviet Union had more than one million trained paratroopers - 200 times more than all other countries in the world put together, including Germany.
No country in history, or indeed all countries in the world put together, including the Soviet Union, has ever had so many paratroopers and air assault landing sub-units as Stalin had in 1941. If one counts up all the airborne troops in the world, including the Soviet airborne troops in existence at the end of the twentieth century, the total comes to only thirteen divisions, of which eight are Soviet.

"In the battles to come, we shall operate on the
territory of the enemy. That is prescribed by our
rules. We are military people, and we live according to these rules."
COLONEL A. I. RODIMTSEV
(from his speech at the i8th Congress of the Party, 1939)
 
Soviet assault landing brigades made their first parachute landings in combat conditions in June 1940. The 201st and 204th Brigades landed in Romania, and the 214th in Lithuania, near its frontier with East Prussia. Both assault landings seriously worried Hitler, especially the landing in Romania. The entire German Army was concentrated in France at the time, and Romania was the source of its oil supplies. Had Soviet transport aircraft gone 200 kilometers further before discharging their loads, Germany would have been left without oil, the very life-blood of
Witohut enemies fighters and Anti-aircraft forces. And airborners had losses.
 

Sachyriel

Banned
You knew we used to see trolls like this guy on 7chan all the time, talking about some Chinese super-missile they were designing to take out Aircraft Carriers of the USA. I don't really know what to say to most of the regular posters, but Cheshire Cat if you don't play nice no one will want to play with you.
 
The scariest thing about this thread is that he has reminded me that Bard32 was never banned- he just drifted away. He could return at any time.:eek:
 
Don't blame me, Paulo! I said we needed stronger defenses and a proper retaliatory mechanism but some of the other board members just went on and on about international law and how massive retaliation without regard for innocents within a small nation's radius never made anything better...



Tuhachevskey versus Cheshire Cat! Oh, yes, there will be blood.:cool:
 
The difference between me and you guys is that I’m using facts and clear logic. You are using only your sick imagination and soviet propaganda, like comrade Tuhachevsky.
At least you don't argue that USSR took Berlin and captured half of Europe, thanks for that.


In September 1939, as a result of the Red Army’s “war of liberation” in Poland, the new western border of the Soviet Union advanced in such a way that the so-called Belostok bulge formed in Byelorussia- a powerful wedge that, like a ship’s bow, broke into the territory occupied by Germany. The same thing happened in the Lvov region – there, another powerful wedge of Soviet territory formed. The Belostok and Lvov bulges were like two Soviet peninsulas in the German sea. Basic military logic dictated: if the Red Army intended to defend itself, it could not keep troops in the Belostok and Lvov bulges. Already, in peacetime, enemy troops surrounded the Soviet army on three sides in the bulges. The Soviet flanks were open and vulnerable. A sudden and decisive German attack on the flanks in these bulges would have cut off the best sections of the Red Army from the main forces and supply bases. In the event of an enemy invasion, such an alignment of Soviet troops inevitably and immediately would have led to catastrophe.

That is exactly what happened in the 1941. Before the German invasion into the territory of the Kiev military district, the most powerful Soviet front was deployed: the Southwestern Front. The three most powerful armies of that front were in the Lvov bulge. In peacetime, these three armies were already almost surrounded. Hitler only had to shut the trap on them. On June 22, the very weak 1st German Tank Group hit Lutsk, Rovno, and Berdichev, quickly cutting of all three Soviet armies in the Lvov bulge – the 12th (mountain), 6th, and 26th.
The 1st Tank Group, faced with open, unprotected operational space, immediately went through the Soviet rear, crushing air bases, staffs, and hospitals. Here, in the rear, they found tremendous quantities of Soviet weapons, fuel, ammunition, foodstuffs, and medical supplies. The Germans seized truly remarkable trophies. The three Soviet armies in the Lvov bulge were left with a problem that had two solutions, both of which were catastrophic: either remain in the trap and wait for the 1st Tank Group to completely lock the encirclement, or run to the east, abandoning everything that cannot be carried. They ran. Soon, they were left without fuel and ammunition. The entire Soviet Southwestern Front crumbled from one rather weal blow. But that was not all: this same blow threatened the entire Southern Front.
In Byelorussia, the Red Army had an even worse time. The Western Front had four armies. The main forces of the front were concentrated in the Byelostok bulge. Two German tank groups struck the undefended flanks and linked east of Minsk. The 3rd, 10th, and parts of the 4th and 13th armies, all together almost thirty divisions, found themselves in a pocket. The Western Front collapsed even quicker that the Southwestern and the Southern Fronts.
Could it be that before the war General Zhukov did not understand one cannot herd huge numbers of troops into bulges that become trap?

General Vlassov. In a protocol from questioning on August 8, 1942, it was recorded:
“Regarding the question of whether Stalin had intentions to attack Germany, Vlassov declared that such intentions, undoubtedly, existed. The concentration of troops in the Lvov region points to the fact that a strike against Romania was being planned in the direction of the petroleum sources. . . The Red Army was not prepared for the German invasion. Despite all the rumors about the operations conducted by Germany, in the Soviet Union nobody believed in such a possibility. During preparations, the Russians meant only their own offensive.” There is no other explanations for the concentration of Soviet troops in the Lvov and Byelostok bulges.

The consequences of Zhukov’s positioning were catastrophic. In order to divert the attack on Moscow, the Red Army had to send, urgently and under heavy enemy bombers’ raids, railway trains with divisions, corps and armies form the Southwestern Front to the Western Front. There, again under heavy bombing , the trains were unloaded and the troops went straight into battle. What happened was that the 16th Army had just advanced from the Trans-Baikal region to Ukraine, meaning south of Polesye. The army had just begun to unload when the German invasion happened. They were forced to urgently load the 16th Army back into trains and herd it several hundred kilometers to the north. The staff of the 16th Army arrived at Smolensk from Ukraine and began to unload, but the communications battalion could not be found. Without communication, it is impossible to command troops. An entire army found itself without command. And there are plenty more examples.

But Zhukov was not thinking of defense, and was not planning it. There is plenty of testimony that right before the invasion Zhukov, Vatutin, Vasilevsky, and all the generals and officers of the General Staff worked sixteen and seventeen hours a day without weekends and holidays. The areas for the concentration of primary efforts were not chosen by Soviet commanders in the interests of strategic defense operations (such an operation was simply not foreseen and planned), but for entirely different means of action.
 

Sachyriel

Banned
I wonder if he will be back? It was what the Cheshire Cat was known for, the disappearing and reappearing grin.
 
Paulo, and rightly so.:cool:


Alas, and another heroic and noble example of uniting the entire board against one person comes to an end.:(

Alas. Well, we'll always have Thande...:D
 
I note no one answered his last post regarding Soviet dispositions prior to the German invasion.

Although Cheshire Cat is not a fan of John Erickson - in his book The Road to Stalingrad, he makes clear that list of Stalin's demands that Molotov gave were only two weeks from Hitler's decision for war against the Soviet Union (se p.40).

Hitler & Stalin were two sides of the same evil dictatorial coin. War between them was inevitable. Who would start it, when, was anybodies guess.
Just as the US didn't believe the Japanese would attack them, so too the Soviets regard the likely-hood that the Germans would launch an attack against them - though it was 'war gamed'.
 
Wasn’t it daft to believe soviets comrades and to waste tons of paper in order to write thousands of books and dissertations based on fairytales which have been made up by communists.
NO, it wasn’t, but unfortunately only in one case, if such “history” was, and for some of them probably still is, convenient for the both parties.
Initially I felt pity for historians like John Erickson, under the assumption that they were just treacherously deceived by those who were representing regime which seemed to be such a philanthropic, pacific and truthful ever, that it is simply indecent not to believe soviet comrades and everything they were saying.
But wait a minute. Were John Erickson and his colleagues deaf and blind? Never heard about cold war and evil empire. Don’t think so.
And truth, as usually, sometimes can be very nasty. The history they wrote was convenient, suitable, excusatory and even profitable for both parties.
For one (USSR) - impunity, for another - general recognition of historical society, orders, glory and money, and, of course, mass publications rubbish.

Western historians stupidly followed the Soviet Union's interpretation of WW II. In spite of all the freedom to research the past most western scholars became lazy and let Soviet’s historians do their thinking for them.
A lot of these “brilliant” historians were invited by USSR, treated like a girl on the first date, with drinks, sweets and promises. They melted and believed in every piece of fabricated information. I wonder if these guys ever ask themselves why Soviet comrades were so anxious about their historical careers.
One of the important aspects of Communist Party policy was lie. To cover crimes they lied to its own population, lied themselves, because the truth was never in favour of communism. So, why they would tell the truth to their sworn enemies?????


It is time now to shed some light on the “professional historians” I refer to here. Who are they? Well, to my best understanding, it seems there is a group of friends at the top including, David Glantz, John Erickson, Gabriel Gorodetskey, Jonathan House. This core is also highly supported by other famous names, such as Jonathan Haslem, Robin Edmonds, Roger Reese, John Lukacs, among many others. If you read their works, their articles, their interviews you will immediately notice their tendency to praise each others works. Those from the outer circle, usually not military historians, would contribute by a praising book review of their works in renowned journals, such as Foreign Affairs is.

In case you want to understand the historiography of WWII, make sure to read BOTH SIDES OF THE STORY and make up your own mind about it! Only then you will begin to understand the whole complexity of the problem.

Next you'll say is that David Irving is right in regards to the Holocaust.
 
Wasn’t it daft to believe soviets comrades and to waste tons of paper in order to write thousands of books and dissertations based on fairytales which have been made up by communists.
NO, it wasn’t, but unfortunately only in one case, if such “history” was, and for some of them probably still is, convenient for the both parties.
Initially I felt pity for historians like John Erickson, under the assumption that they were just treacherously deceived by those who were representing regime which seemed to be such a philanthropic, pacific and truthful ever, that it is simply indecent not to believe soviet comrades and everything they were saying.
But wait a minute. Were John Erickson and his colleagues deaf and blind? Never heard about cold war and evil empire. Don’t think so.
And truth, as usually, sometimes can be very nasty. The history they wrote was convenient, suitable, excusatory and even profitable for both parties.
For one (USSR) - impunity, for another - general recognition of historical society, orders, glory and money, and, of course, mass publications rubbish.

Western historians stupidly followed the Soviet Union's interpretation of WW II. In spite of all the freedom to research the past most western scholars became lazy and let Soviet’s historians do their thinking for them.
A lot of these “brilliant” historians were invited by USSR, treated like a girl on the first date, with drinks, sweets and promises. They melted and believed in every piece of fabricated information. I wonder if these guys ever ask themselves why Soviet comrades were so anxious about their historical careers.
One of the important aspects of Communist Party policy was lie. To cover crimes they lied to its own population, lied themselves, because the truth was never in favour of communism. So, why they would tell the truth to their sworn enemies?????

It is time now to shed some light on the “professional historians” I refer to here. Who are they? Well, to my best understanding, it seems there is a group of friends at the top including, David Glantz, John Erickson, Gabriel Gorodetskey, Jonathan House. This core is also highly supported by other famous names, such as Jonathan Haslem, Robin Edmonds, Roger Reese, John Lukacs, among many others. If you read their works, their articles, their interviews you will immediately notice their tendency to praise each others works. Those from the outer circle, usually not military historians, would contribute by a praising book review of their works in renowned journals, such as Foreign Affairs is.

In case you want to understand the historiography of WWII, make sure to read BOTH SIDES OF THE STORY and make up your own mind about it! Only then you will begin to understand the whole complexity of the problem.

Next you'll say is that David Irving is right in regards to the Holocaust.
 
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