Stalingrad

Was the factor that doomed the Germans after Stalingrad:

-the loss of men;

-the loss of materiel;

-the loss of the initiative;

-the loss of land;

-or the loss of time?
 
The Germans lost the strategic initiative after Stalingrad. The loss of several armies (not just the German 6th, but the remnants of minor Axis armies also destroyed in the first part of the battle) robbed it of the ability to do a real strategic offensive (as opposed to the limited offensive at Kursk), but it proved beyond all doubt that the Soviet Union would not collapse, and that it could survive anything the Germans would throw at it.

Everything listed is related, but it all comes down to that before Stalingrad the Germans held the initiative and the Soviets reacted to it, after Stalingrad, the Soviets held the initiative.
 
Focusing on Soviet November 42 counterattack:

The worst loss was the trained German men lost in the pocket, new equipment can be produced (and equipment goes obsolete by itself after a while i.e. all those 37mm PAKs). Thats why a breakout should have been ordered as soon as possible.

Initiative was lost already (you can argue it was lost when Typhoon was defeated in December 1941) and would have been lost in 1942 regardless of what the Germans did strategy wise.

Land was kind of important, taking away more agricultural areas hurt the Soviets in 1942 (there was some famine), by November 1942 the Germans had taken and ruined these areas so the land was less important to hold in November 1942.

Time, not really by that point, Smolensk 41, Kiev 41 and such you can argue about lost time, maybe even some of the July 42 decisions were about lost time, but by November 1942 the initiative had been lost.

Politically the loss of the Italian army really hurt Mussolini politically, perhaps more than anything else.

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The best case scenerio is Germany gets most of the soldiers out of the pocket, beats Mars as in OTL, without a convicing victory, the Germans negotiate a peace somewhere between the 1939 and 1941 boundries

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Medium case scenerio, the Germans are only partially sucessfull getting out of the the pocket (sort of a Falaise pocket scenerio)

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Worst case, the breakout is botched, Stalingrad falls early, Army group A is cut off as well, war ends early.
 

Deleted member 1487

Was the factor that doomed the Germans after Stalingrad:

-the loss of men;

-the loss of materiel;

The land was pretty worthless to the Germans and difficult to hold, the loss was everything beyond the Don river line. That hurt, but was also a function of the loss of the above.

Honestly we could say that bogging down in Stalingrad and losing so many men there prior to the Soviet counter offensive was pretty bad too and a major reason the for German loss of initiative, but by that point in the war there really wasn't any farther the Germans could logistically go. In fact logically the only stopping line was the Don river. It put German bombers in range of Soviet oil production in the Caucasus and let gave them a strong defensive line for the coming winter, while also economizing manpower.

The loss of material was pretty bad, but as others have stated it could be replaced eventually; still the loss of all that artillery, tanks, trucks, aircraft, supplies, etc. was all still very hard to replace.

But the manpower was the biggest loss of all: pilots, including a critically large number of instructors, experienced and trained infantry, tankers, and various other specialists was devastating to the German war effort. The tide was already turning manpower-wise as the Soviets put more and more men into uniform, but it was not yet overwhelming and the loss of so many men helped turn the tide that much quicker. Without their loss, even saving 150k more men than IOTL and preventing the insane airlift, would have been extremely helpful in 1943 as the Soviets followed up on their counteroffensive over the Don deep into Ukraine. Even without their equipment that manpower would have been useful. At very least it prevents the loss of morale and the increase of Soviet morale. Plus if the breakout happens early in the pocket closing, the Soviets would have likely lost their spearhead units and suffered as a result, as a lot of their mobile strength would have been swept away.
 
What doomed Germany was the Soviet getting its act together and letting the professionals run the war. After that the Soviet superiority in almost all kinds of resources - manpower, oil, foodstuff, construction capacity etc. - would win the war. Especially with the WAllies sending Lend-Lease, strategic bombing and invading Europe step by step.

But the most clear direct impact from Stalingrad was the loss of experienced soldiers. Just as the British had shown by Dunkirk equipment is possible to replace fairly quickly, but not the soldiers and whole units.

On the third hand Germany was already lacking in forces before reaching the suburbs of Stalingrad. 1941 they attacked on three fronts. 1942 they could only attack on one front (the southern) due to losses and a stronger Red Army. And 1943 they could only attack on a small piece of one front (Kursk). The whole war in the east assumed high tactical skill of Wermacht, and an incompetent Red Army. Both had been eroded before, but Stalingrad was a big chunk of the assumptions that simply dissapered.

Then it was the moral aspect of Stalingrad, which was very big.
 

sharlin

Banned
The loss of manpower was the most severe thing along the a significant chunk of the Luftwaffes transport capacity trying to get soldiers out in the airlift.

Folks always seem to think that if the 6th army had escaped it would have helped, the 6th army was doomed even with the rescue effort mounted. It had no fuel to move its tanks, those that could get out of Stalingrad more than a dozen miles, its men were starving, low on ammunition and starting to suffer from a host of illnesses (typhus, dissentry etc) and trying to retreat utterly exhausted and mostly on foot across relatively open ground (covered in deep snow) it would have been a turkey shoot. By staying in Stalingrad the 6th army did serve a purpose after an effect, the Soviets wanted to destroy them before moving on and that delay, bought at a terrible cost of lives bought time for the Germans to try and re-organise.
 
By staying in Stalingrad the 6th army did serve a purpose after an effect, the Soviets wanted to destroy them before moving on and that delay, bought at a terrible cost of lives bought time for the Germans to try and re-organise.

I think so to. And Soviets made an error in keeping their own forces tied up around the Kassel for too long. They could have used those forces to cut off entire AG A, or at least a better part of it.
 

sharlin

Banned
I'd say the Soviets did the right thing, perhaps with far too many forces but they wanted to be sure, even with the German withdrawl the Wermacht was really reeling from Stalingrad although it took Kursk to really drive home the point its over and Bagatron to smash what was left.
 
I think the morale effect on the soviets was huge, and partly why they fought so hard to deny the Germans complete occupation of the city even before Operation Uranus, (along with the obvious benefit of keeping the 6th army tied up and in position).

IMHO the irony of Stalingrad is that it removed the possibility of ultimate victory from the Germans but also gave the soviets hope of not needing a negotiated peace to eventually eject the Germans.
 
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