Stalingrad: Change in command

Dale: I agree with you insofar as (hindsight 20/20 vision) leaving Stalingrad alone, probably in the late September time frame, would be the best option.

At that time Stalingrad as a offensive entity was smashed. The Volga had been closed. It would be time to turn to something else.

But it is also clear that it was so close all the time: Just one little push and it would be all over. It takes a very clearheaded individual to realise it ain't happenign and to cut the losses. Not throwing good money after bad is a very difficult decision to make. Any business leader can vouch for that. It gets worse if it is a political decision.

We have just mentioned it but not really touched on it:

1) Would Stalingrad be another "Leningrad"? Surrounded but not offensive material
2) The political fall-out by leaving Stalingrad: Rumainia? Italy?
3) How much could have been freed up? 4th Pz could surely have been used somewhere

Correct me if I am wrong, but the notion that tanks in urban war fare is suicide is not quite correct me think.

Warzaw was not great for tanks, but Warzaw was an old city.

Stalingrad had broad long straight boulevards (as far as I know) and was much more manageable in terms of tanks.

I don't know if the parallel to Bagdad can be used. US army did use tanks in urban battles.

The schwerpunkt is obviously to get someone to tell Hitler.

That said, Stalingrad itself was not part of the original Blau.

Ivan
 
The Germans did pull fighters, bombers, and most importantly transport planes from the Soviet Union to support the response to Operation Torch, airlifting the initial troops to Tunisia and making massive use of transport planes to keep those troops supplied. From old and possibly fallible memory, the number of German transport planes used in the response to Torch was around 400. A lot of those planes made their way back to the Soviet Union to help supply the Stalingrad pocket, but the time it took to move them back, plus maintenance and adapting them from tropical climate to Russian winter was a lot of the reason the Stalingrad airlift got off to such a slow start. Even with the extra planes at the start the airlift wouldn't have been able to supply the 6th army indefinitely anyway, but German combat capability inside the pocket would have declined more slowly, giving more time for a potential rescue and forcing the Soviets to keep more of their combat power facing the German troops in the city rather than blocking the rescuers.
Torch also consumed 2.5 German divisions which would have been useful for winter storm

Case Anton in response to it sucked the leibstandarte and two other panzer divisions out of position instead of they're intended transport zones. Leibstandarte and 6th panzer were already at full strength and in alert for transfer to Russia before torch occurred
 
I've never understood why the Germans went into Stalingrad head-first. They could have just as easily attacked the area BOTH north AND south of the city (mostly open country-side) once it became clear the city itself was teeming with Soviet troops.

Soviet forces defending those areas in the open would be far more vulnerable to German firepower and mobility than those inside the city.

Then, use the areas as a springboard to cross the river (just as they had crossed the Don river weeks before), concentrating fire where needed.

Once across and secure, the two bridgeheads would use superior firepower to sink any remaining soviet ships and to link up, trapping everyone inside the city on the other side of the river.

Thus, the defenders now lack supply, reinforcements and arty support (as well as the already lacking air support), and can be finished off in around two weeks of sustained assault.

The Germans had already taken countless other, even bigger soviet cities packed with troops but cut off from support (e.g. Kiev), so this shouldn't be any different.

Once the city is taken, evacuate the bridgehead east of the Volga, dig in and sent most mobile formations south.

Question: Why didn't they do this ?
 
AFAIK they got sucked in. The city was supposed to be taken effortlessly, but it gained a symbolic status in Soviet eyes and as increasing numbers of the Soviet troops got deployed there, the Germans thought they could bag this concentration and cut the Caucasus from the rest of the country at a stroke. It simply escalated beyond control and initial intention of either side and consumed more and more troops into the grinder. The Germans thought the capture of the city would break the moral fiber of the Red Army and Soviets realized the attrition value of the battle and the fact that they'll ultimately win it and went along.
 
AFAIK they got sucked in. The city was supposed to be taken effortlessly, but it gained a symbolic status in Soviet eyes and as increasing numbers of the Soviet troops got deployed there, the Germans thought they could bag this concentration and cut the Caucasus from the rest of the country at a stroke. It simply escalated beyond control and initial intention of either side and consumed more and more troops into the grinder. The Germans thought the capture of the city would break the moral fiber of the Red Army and Soviets realized the attrition value of the battle and the fact that they'll ultimately win it and went along.

yeah, but they could just as easily have bagged'em by following standard practice and cutting the place off.
 
Yes, obviously our view of the battle in hindsight is different from the German view at the time, but again, I think you set up a false dichotomy.

The Germans didn't have only the choices of "pull out and admit defeat" or remain on the offensive. From the German point of view (not all completely accurate), Stalingrad was effectively destroyed. Industrial production there had been mostly stopped. The Volga was cut. Soviet forces in the city had been ground down to the point where they weren't a threat to the flanks of the German offensive into the Caucasus. Sure there were pockets of resistance in the rubble, but why not just contain them like the Germans did with the Soviet bridgeheads. Screen the remaining pockets and let the surviving Soviets sit in their rubble. If the remaining Soviets in Stalingrad decided to come out and play, great. That would make them easier to deal with than trying to dig them out of the rubble.

The German declare Stalingrad a victory, go over to the defensive, rest and refit the mobile troops, and get ready for winter. Seems like a reasonable alternative to me.

It's incorrect to present Stalingrad as lacking any military value for several reasons:

1. 62nd Army was still an intact combat entity which, if allowed to remain in the city, tied down 6th Army's resources. Further it sat directly between 6th and 4th Panzer Armies; taking the city would smooth out the frontlines and makes communication/transfer of reserves in the region easier.

2. Going off the above, 62nd Army was still combat capable in September, and its combat value would only continue to grow. Leaving it in such a menacing position would be impractical, and potentially dangerous, for future defensive operations.

3. Even if 62nd Army wasn't combat capable, it sat directly in the rear of XIV Panzer corps, which was nearly encircled and destroyed when it pushed towards the Volga in late August. Leaving the city untaken would mean placing XIV corps in a dangerous salient which would leave it under constant threat of encirclement.

4. 6th Army', despite having some positions overlooking the Volga, wasn't properly able to interdict river traffic. Threaten it certainly, but without taking the city the Volga would still be a useable route.

Those reasons, along with beign assigned to capture the city, are what compelled 6th and 4th Panzer armies to assault it in September to mid October. At the time it was not clear that the cost of taking the city would be greater than the military value gained from its capture. 6th Army didn't reduce the Don bridgeheads because it lacked the strength to do so; but it appeared that it was strong enough to take Stalingrad quickly.

By mid October, after the capture of the Tractor Factory and Spartanovka, Paulus and co certainly realized that the remainder of the city would not fall quickly or easily. But by that stage Stalingrad had gained a political value for both sides which was several orders of magnitude greater than its military value. The status of Stalingrad as a symbol made it impossible for either side to consider halting the struggle to seize it.

Of course the Germans could declare victory and call it a day; but they had already done so at several points from September-October, only to be proven wrong. Further, even if they did halt offensive operations, Chuikov's local counterstrokes would still draw them into the city and keep the fire burning, at the same time proving that the battle was not yet won. At several points during the battle 6th Army attempted to take a break and refit, only to be struck by a counterattack.

So to summarize, from September-mid October Stalingrad still held military value which outweighed the perceived costs of reducing the city. After that, during the struggle it gained political value which made a premature end to the fighting impossible; and even if it was ended, 62nd Army would continue to keep the fire burning.
 
Winter quarters outside Stalingrad - be it West or East - were not great.

It was steppe country and lacked anything in terms of accommodation for 300k men.

But would Stalingrad even have been able to provide shelter for this amount of troops?

I agree with Julian that Stalingrad took on a life of its own, but it could have been stopped.

Was Seydlitz the person to assess the situation and either pull out of Stalingrad or do something better? Don Bend? Proper winter quarters? defensive lines? Caucasus?

Ivan
 
sorry , too fast.

I am not sure about the military value of Stalingrad after the 21 September attacks. That really broke the back of the factory areas and reduced 62 army to a "citadel" force, also according to Werth.

Admitted, Chuikov still got supplies through but by October his ammo supplies were cut down as preparions and stocking of shells for Uranus had priority.

That points to Stalingrad (and by implication 62 army) being used a bait to keep 6th army "in town".

My point here is that Staingrad could have been kept "neutralised" from September. That is where I disagree with Julian.

Another point is the Eastern bank of Volga.

Werth travelled on the railway to Stalingrad on 2 January.

Could that have been interdicted by German operation on the East bank of Volga? Crossing further South? Maybe I am a bit slow on this one, but I have always wondered if Germany could have invested the East bank.

Comments so far?

Ivan
 
sorry , too fast.

I am not sure about the military value of Stalingrad after the 21 September attacks. That really broke the back of the factory areas and reduced 62 army to a "citadel" force, also according to Werth.

Admitted, Chuikov still got supplies through but by October his ammo supplies were cut down as preparions and stocking of shells for Uranus had priority.

That points to Stalingrad (and by implication 62 army) being used a bait to keep 6th army "in town".

My point here is that Staingrad could have been kept "neutralised" from September. That is where I disagree with Julian.

The factory district wasn't seriously assaulted by German forces until October 14-23. The month of September was primarily conducted in southern and central Stalingrad, with the goal of rolling up and destroying Soviet forces in that region from the south. This was mostly successful, with the shattered remnants of 62nd Army's left wing forced into a small corner of central Stalingrad, and along Mamaev Kurgan's southeastern slope.

6th Army then conducted operations until October 4th with the objective or destroying the Orlovka salient that stretched into the rear of XIV panzer corps. Again, the majority of Soviet forces involved were destroyed and 6th Army accomplished all of its objectives, with Seydlitz's corps advancing deep into the workers villages before halting on 10 October to regroup.

However, during this same period Chuikov conducted a series of counterattacks in cooperation with the Kotluban operations in the north, the last one before the German's drive into the tractor factory and Spartanovka from October 8-10. While failures, these attacks demonstrated that 62nd Army was still a combat capable entity and could not be allowed to exist even in a reduced state. Further it appeared that, based off of previous experience, a rapid mobile penetration could eliminate Soviet groupings in the factory district.

It was only after the German drive into the factory district from 14-23 October failed to seize the Barricades and Red October factories that the Germans realized that the time for maneuver was over. By then 6th Army was too heavily invested in the city, politically and military, to not complete its destruction.

So if Seydlitz is in command, it's doubtful that he would recognize that the battle couldn't be decided by a series of maneuver operations, especially since all evidence and experience at the time indicated that it could be done.
 
Technically correct, although the attacks on the Northern part of Stalingrad started 29 September.

I got the dates mixed up a bit there, sorry.

In any event, the early frost in September ought to have been a warning that winter was around the corner and that an assessment of the entire situation was called for.

Winter quarters on the steppe might not be an attractive option; hence Stalingrad had to fall.

OR

pull back to prepared winter quarters.

Was this also a consideration?

Ivan
 
Which makes no sense in the context of how the Soviet command organs and directorates functioned. The NKO and STAVKA controlled everything, even fairly minor details, and plans had the signatures of at least two of the members of the NKO/STAVKA on them. A major deception operation like that would have records on it. Further the NKVD archives, which Glantz has looked through and used frequently, reveal no major deception plan for Mars.

The Soviets were anal about record keeping, which is what makes their archives so useful. If no record of something exists, especially such a major deception operation, it probably never happened.

Except the theory is that it was Stalin and NKVD, and only them, who knew about it. So Stavka, NKO, Zhukov and everybody else on military part of planning had no idea it would be leaked. Once plans were made NKVD, acting on orders from stalin, used their double agent to leak it, without informing anybody.

As for studying NKVD archives, considering Soviets are, shall we say reluctant, to just open everything. That would go double for WW2 and double on top of that for their intel service.

Considering Mars is something of a touchy subject, Russians prefering to pretend it didn't happen at all, I doubt they'll just hand over documents from archives explaining it was in fact leaked by Soviets themselves.;)
 
I've never understood why the Germans went into Stalingrad head-first. They could have just as easily attacked the area BOTH north AND south of the city (mostly open country-side) once it became clear the city itself was teeming with Soviet troops.

Soviet forces defending those areas in the open would be far more vulnerable to German firepower and mobility than those inside the city.

As for advincing you need to consider following:
-Somewhat unique shape of the city. While most cities are roughly circular (or star) shaped Stalingrad was, and still is, narrow and long rectangle. I don't have exact dimensions at hand but I think it was something like 8km W-E and 30km N-S. So rolling it in N-S direction would in fact increase the distance you had to fight through while advancing W-E would allow Germans to cut in several pockets, which in fact happened
-Germans were advancing W-E anyway so rolling it from north would require extensive shifting of forces
-southern regions were defended with 64th army defending Beketovka so Germans were limited in their options as well

And germans did, to a degree destroy Soviets outside of the city. After hammering 62nd took west they were pulling back to the city fast. Germans missed bagging them by a small margin

Then, use the areas as a springboard to cross the river (just as they had crossed the Don river weeks before), concentrating fire where needed.

Once across and secure, the two bridgeheads would use superior firepower to sink any remaining soviet ships and to link up, trapping everyone inside the city on the other side of the river.

Thus, the defenders now lack supply, reinforcements and arty support (as well as the already lacking air support), and can be finished off in around two weeks of sustained assault.

Are you aware of size of Volga?

39350_149813235036007_3907320_n.jpg


This is area of jetties

39684_149805601703437_1464975_n.jpg


And from Mamaev Kurgan (both photos by yours truly)

Granted, perspective could be a bit better but you can still see the size of the river. And you are proposing that to cross with good chunk of one or two army groups with eastern bank defended and then supply offensive operations there? Remember, there are no good bridges Germans can use either.

The Germans had already taken countless other, even bigger soviet cities packed with troops but cut off from support (e.g. Kiev), so this shouldn't be any different.

Once the city is taken, evacuate the bridgehead east of the Volga, dig in and sent most mobile formations south.

Question: Why didn't they do this ?

When taking big cities Germans could operate freely while holding bridges further up/downstream and were able to bypass city by forces and surrounded from some distance.

At Stalingrad Germans were already operating on touch-and-go logistics and what you are proposing would require massive engineering effort, shifting of good parts of 2 army groups. And all that with two Soviet armies (62nd and 64th) still operation on western bank and islands in the river still in soviet hands.

There may have be more idiotic ideas on conducting offensive but this would surely be among top 5. ;)
 
Except the theory is that it was Stalin and NKVD, and only them, who knew about it. So Stavka, NKO, Zhukov and everybody else on military part of planning had no idea it would be leaked. Once plans were made NKVD, acting on orders from stalin, used their double agent to leak it, without informing anybody.

As for studying NKVD archives, considering Soviets are, shall we say reluctant, to just open everything. That would go double for WW2 and double on top of that for their intel service.

Considering Mars is something of a touchy subject, Russians prefering to pretend it didn't happen at all, I doubt they'll just hand over documents from archives explaining it was in fact leaked by Soviets themselves.;)

Two things: if only Stalin and a very few NKVD personnel knew, that Mars"s plans were intentionally leaked, then this claim is practically unprovable -at least, without records, documents, etc.
Second, may knowledge is shallow, but i do not remember reading that the OKW, Model or anyone knew the plans for Mars (leaked plans).
In one of the diaries or memoirs there have to be a trace somewhere.
(And it could be still an effort of german intel, no matter how small the chance is).

And its much too complex for my liking regarding real life.
 
Two things: if only Stalin and a very few NKVD personnel knew, that Mars"s plans were intentionally leaked, then this claim is practically unprovable -at least, without records, documents, etc.
Second, may knowledge is shallow, but i do not remember reading that the OKW, Model or anyone knew the plans for Mars (leaked plans).
In one of the diaries or memoirs there have to be a trace somewhere.
(And it could be still an effort of german intel, no matter how small the chance is).

And its much too complex for my liking regarding real life.

The theory is comming from memoirs of Sudoplatov, high ranking NKVD member who was himself involved in several high-profile actions. So think what you want about his reliabity.

I certanly wouldn't dismiss it out of hand
 
Lets try it without hidsgiht.

I think, an able commander should ask himself at a certain level of casualities (or when they could not capture Stalingrad on the move) a few questions:
What could be achieved with the capture of Stalingrad? How would the capture help the primary aim of the whole campaign? What would help the campaign more and what would improve the overall status of his forces?

I think, the captire of Stalingrad would led to not that much. Yes, you need fewer forces to guard the banks than the needs of containing forces in the city, but the losses would somewhat even that out. Hell, even if thy try to break out westward, there is a chance to bag those forces. So, there is no immediate need to capture the city (well, maybe some secret negotiations with neutral countries would justified that, but still, you have time).

Even if you capture the city, i do not think you helped the campaign that much, well, aside you no have the troops. (I do not think, that the city could be used as a transport hub for the caucasus campaign).

On the other hand, strenghtening the northern positions and an attack and maybe the capture of Astrakhan and overall occupation of the Volga banks would have helped.
 
Top