Stalin listens to warning of Barbarrossa in 1941

[Deleted member 1487]

BTW for anyone who hasn't read David Glantz's Stumbling Colossus please do, it dispels all sorts of notions raised in this thread about 'what if the Soviets mobilized'. I haven't read it in years, but have been going through it today and forget how bad things were for the Red Army in 1941. Turns out they did mobilize in April 1941 and couldn't even get ready by June 22nd! The entire chapter on the the combat readiness of the ground forces and the chapter on the war plan and mobilization is utterly damning about the ability of the USSR to mobilize, it basically was incapable of doing so fully. They were supposed to have 99 infantry divisions fully combat ready on the border by June 1941 and this was ordered in April, yet on June 22nd none were combat ready. 2 months later and they couldn't even get 99 divisions up to strength or have enough equipment for them. That was less than half the divisions in the Soviet military!!! And they were supposed to be the first line of defense in case of invasion!

If anyone wants I can scan a page or two to show a bit of what I mean.

All this really does explain so much about why 1941 was such an utter mess and does remove quite a bit of 'luster' from the Wehrmacht's performance.

 

[alexmilman]

That's kind of the point, why fight in a way that your army is incapable of? That's begging for a disaster. The CoS of STAVKA should have known what his own forces capabilities were. His May 1941 offensive proposal would have even resulted in a worse disaster than OTL 1941!
Even his offensives against Japan in 1939 shows a distinctly underwhelming result for the forces at his disposal with the limitations his enemy labored under. That said he did have the handicap of lack of experience and improved over time, but that at his best he still was only a middling commander.

But the obvious problem was in the fact that they did not and could not know that their prevailing doctrine is not going to work. Even if the Polish experience could be shrugged off, the Franco-British experience demonstrated that emphasis upon the defense is not working either. Not that, taking into an account the length of the Soviet Western border, an effective and successful defense could be guaranteed.

As for the “plan of May 1941”, AFAIK the main (and only?) source on the subject is “Suvorov”, which brings serious doubts regarding its existence. Zhukov was promoted to the head of the General Staff after he won two staff games against Pavlov. According to Vasilevsky, “The victory of Zhukov's Red Troops was widely publicized, which created a popular illusion of easy success for a preemptive offensive. On 1 February 1941, Zhukov became chief of the Red Army's General Staff.” IMO, during the war Zhukov gained enough of experience to become a competent, on a butchery side, general and while his successes were over-advertised, his failures were usually kept in shadow. Surely, in 1941 as a chief of the General Staff he was out of his depth. Shaposhnikov and then Vasilevsky had been much more qualified.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

But the obvious problem was in the fact that they did not and could not know that their prevailing doctrine is not going to work. Even if the Polish experience could be shrugged off, the Franco-British experience demonstrated that emphasis upon the defense is not working either. Not that, taking into an account the length of the Soviet Western border, an effective and successful defense could be guaranteed.

Unless they were shockingly ignorant of the material and training deficits of their forces, which is damning enough if they were, then it should have been clear that all their defensive plans were utterly out of touch with reality. Seriously check out Stumbling Colossus. P.103 covers how there wasn't even enough transportation to mobilize the divisions at the border even with orders to do so in May. There were different orders than bringing them up to strength issued in April that I mentioned in a different post.

As for the “plan of May 1941”, AFAIK the main (and only?) source on the subject is “Suvorov”, which brings serious doubts regarding its existence. Zhukov was promoted to the head of the General Staff after he won two staff games against Pavlov. According to Vasilevsky, “The victory of Zhukov's Red Troops was widely publicized, which created a popular illusion of easy success for a preemptive offensive. On 1 February 1941, Zhukov became chief of the Red Army's General Staff.” IMO, during the war Zhukov gained enough of experience to become a competent, on a butchery side, general and while his successes were over-advertised, his failures were usually kept in shadow. Surely, in 1941 as a chief of the General Staff he was out of his depth. Shaposhnikov and then Vasilevsky had been much more qualified.

The May 1941 plan is available online and Stalin's writing is on it disapproving it. Suvoruv's claim came before Zhukov's proposal came out IIRC.

Zhukov

Marshal Georgi Konstantinovich Zhukov, hero of Leningrad, defender of Moscow and Stalingrad, commander of the victorious Red Army at Berlin, was the most decorated soldier in Soviet history. Yet for many years Zhukov was relegated to the status of "unperson" in his homeland. Now, following...

books.google.com

 

[Captain Homicide]

If anyone wants I can scan a page or two to show a bit of what I mean.

I would appreciate it if you did this.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

I would appreciate it if you did this.

This is just the tip of the iceberg:

Honestly the entire book is worth buying sight unseen, but you can get it via the library.

 

[alexmilman]

Unless they were shockingly ignorant of the material and training deficits of their forces, which is damning enough if they were, then it should have been clear that all their defensive plans were utterly out of touch with reality. Seriously check out Stumbling Colossus. P.103 covers how there wasn't even enough transportation to mobilize the divisions at the border even with orders to do so in May. There were different orders than bringing them up to strength issued in April that I mentioned in a different post.

Plenty of modern Russian sources are available on the status of the Red Army by 1941 (not to mention that quite a few things had been available from the survivors of that period). The picture is quite depressing even without Glantz.

Now, regarding your point of the top level personages being “shockingly ignorant of the material and training deficits of their forces”. They were most probably ignorant and there is nothing “shocking” in that fact if you are even remotely familiar with the Soviet system. It was based on cheating from bottom to the top and, strictly speaking, it is not a duty of the Minister of Defense or the Chief of the General Staff to conduct a personal inspection of the battalion or even regiment level units. They are all being issued the proper instructions written by somebody in the Defense Ministry and approved on the top (with or without reading). There would be (time permitting) regular formal inspections (“we are going to conduct the scheduled unexpected inspections ”) which, as often as not, are very superficial (especially if the following “reception” is good) but in the worst case scenario the unit commander would be ordered to improve performance blahblahblah. Probably the best known case of the inspection conducted by a high level person was Zhukov’s visit of an air regiment: he was extremely pissed off by the fact that on a parade ground the pilots had been without the sabres (which they should have).

Commander also could be removed and replaced .... by another nincompoop. But, as far as information coming from the units had been involved, everything was most probably just peachy with the possible complaints about not getting some equipment (but not too panicky).

Not too long before the German attack the air defense exercises in Belorussian Military district demonstrated a complete incompetence of the chief of fighter aviation. When asked what he is going to do if the enemy attack is real, he answered “I’ll shot myself”. Which he did, after squandering most of the aviation under his command. Could he be dismissed by the district’s commander? Nope, because he was directly appointed by the Boss (with a promotion directly to lieutenant-general from lieutenant or captain, the guy got his fame as an ace and never commanded anything bigger than a squadron.

In general, passing a negative picture up the ladder was not a good thing for one’s career and, with a cheating being prevalent modus operandi everywhere, the military sphere was not an exception.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Plenty of modern Russian sources are available on the status of the Red Army by 1941 (not to mention that quite a few things had been available from the survivors of that period). The picture is quite depressing even without Glantz.

Now, regarding your point of the top level personages being “shockingly ignorant of the material and training deficits of their forces”. They were most probably ignorant and there is nothing “shocking” in that fact if you are even remotely familiar with the Soviet system. It was based on cheating from bottom to the top and, strictly speaking, it is not a duty of the Minister of Defense or the Chief of the General Staff to conduct a personal inspection of the battalion or even regiment level units. They are all being issued the proper instructions written by somebody in the Defense Ministry and approved on the top (with or without reading). There would be (time permitting) regular formal inspections (“we are going to conduct the scheduled unexpected inspections ”) which, as often as not, are very superficial (especially if the following “reception” is good) but in the worst case scenario the unit commander would be ordered to improve performance blahblahblah. Probably the best known case of the inspection conducted by a high level person was Zhukov’s visit of an air regiment: he was extremely pissed off by the fact that on a parade ground the pilots had been without the sabres (which they should have).

Commander also could be removed and replaced .... by another nincompoop. But, as far as information coming from the units had been involved, everything was most probably just peachy with the possible complaints about not getting some equipment (but not too panicky).

Not too long before the German attack the air defense exercises in Belorussian Military district demonstrated a complete incompetence of the chief of fighter aviation. When asked what he is going to do if the enemy attack is real, he answered “I’ll shot myself”. Which he did, after squandering most of the aviation under his command. Could he be dismissed by the district’s commander? Nope, because he was directly appointed by the Boss (with a promotion directly to lieutenant-general from lieutenant or captain, the guy got his fame as an ace and never commanded anything bigger than a squadron.

In general, passing a negative picture up the ladder was not a good thing for one’s career and, with a cheating being prevalent modus operandi everywhere, the military sphere was not an exception.

But shouldn't someone in Zhukov's position given his experience with the system know that the reports about everything were BS then? Glantz does include some choice quotes from combat vets that utterly hated Zhukov and basically said he did not give a shit about soldiers' lives and contrasts him and his clique with commanders who actively tried to minimize casualties and realize what was going on at the front like Rokossovsky. Though as the pages I scanned above do state there was incorrect assessments of general staff of rail capacity as well, so they did apparently make some serious mistakes themselves.

Also Glantz is dealing with internal documents to write Stumbling Colossus, so clearly the documentation exists and are in the archives...though you're probably right it either didn't reach the top or was ignored as some point. It does also seem there were reports to figure out what went wrong at the time too.

 

[alexmilman]

But shouldn't someone in Zhukov's position given his experience with the system know that the reports about everything were BS then? Glantz does include some choice quotes from combat vets that utterly hated Zhukov and basically said he did not give a shit about soldiers' lives and contrasts him and his clique with commanders who actively tried to minimize casualties and realize what was going on at the front like Rokossovsky.

Also Glantz is dealing with internal documents to write Stumbling Colossus, so clearly the documentation exists and are in the archives...though you're probably right it either didn't reach the top or was ignored as some point. It does also seem there were reports to figure out what went wrong at the time too.

Well, everybody else who during that (and later) period raised in the status should presumably know about the BS but was using BS from the lower level to send BS to the higher level. Anyway, by the time Zhukov reached the 1941 level, why would he care about something few levels below?

Surely, there should be plenty of documentation (CYA is not the American invention) but how far any specific item was going is a different story. And don’t forget that the issues which had been popping up and reaching the higher levels when the war started were not necessarily making their way too far up at the time of peace. Reports regarding conditions of the mechanized units written by the spring of 1941 were terribly depressing but there was a peace and a chance that the things would be better at some point in a future so why panic? OTOH, a panicky report written by commander of one of the newly created tank corps almost immediately before Stalingrad counter-offensive made it all the way to Stalin’s table and got a resolution that it should be OK because the corps is going to act against the Romanians.

Basically, the German attack caught the whole system with its collective pants down not because it was so unexpected but because to a great degree the system existed on paper. Of course, there were shortages of pretty much everything even before the war, they just became obvious when the system started functioning.

The photo below are “lapty”. When the war started, my late father (who was by education a military communication officer) had been put in charge of the platoon of the infantry trainees. They did not have the uniforms and military boots so he had to give them money to buy lapty on a local market. And, because there were no rifles, they had to be trained with the pieces of wood. You can imagine a psychological effect this unit made upon the local population when marching to and from their training ground (what their training amounted to I have no idea). As an additional piece of knowledge I found from the story is that the lapty, which should be long gone, still had been widely used in 1941.

 

[Vanguard45]

I would argue the Soviet Air Force has a harder time reforming than it did. One of the good things about Barbarossa for the Soviets was their fighters and bombers were caught on the ground. If the Germans catch the planes and their valuable pilots in the air with their better tactics and planes, the Red Air Force might not really make a comeback until 1944!

(Source: Attack: Attack of the Airacobras)

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Well, everybody else who during that (and later) period raised in the status should presumably know about the BS but was using BS from the lower level to send BS to the higher level. Anyway, by the time Zhukov reached the 1941 level, why would he care about something few levels below?

Because if the system was that broken Russia would lose the war and his head would be in the noose?

Surely, there should be plenty of documentation (CYA is not the American invention) but how far any specific item was going is a different story. And don’t forget that the issues which had been popping up and reaching the higher levels when the war started were not necessarily making their way too far up at the time of peace. Reports regarding conditions of the mechanized units written by the spring of 1941 were terribly depressing but there was a peace and a chance that the things would be better at some point in a future so why panic? OTOH, a panicky report written by commander of one of the newly created tank corps almost immediately before Stalingrad counter-offensive made it all the way to Stalin’s table and got a resolution that it should be OK because the corps is going to act against the Romanians.

Fair enough, especially since it was supposed to be rectified in the next year or two and Stalin anticipated he had at least until 1942 to prepare, but then that doesn't really squared with Zhukov's May proposal to attack in summer 1941 given how unprepared to defend the USSR was. Stalin was then at least more aware enough to say absolutely not to the proposal.

Basically, the German attack caught the whole system with its collective pants down not because it was so unexpected but because to a great degree the system existed on paper. Of course, there were shortages of pretty much everything even before the war, they just became obvious when the system started functioning.

Without question. However MP-41 was written up with the 1941 situation in mind as the general staff understood it. BTW it was supposed to only be completed in July 1941, so wasn't even a functional mobilization plan when the war started. This is per the chapter on Soviet war planning in the "Cambridge history the second world war. This indicated to me that they really didn't know what the heck was going on with their own forces if they drew that up and still thought it was viable. Not only that, but Zhukov et al were working on offensive plans from February to May when Zhukov presented the plan to Stalin, which really indicates they were completely out of touch or really just didn't care what was going in the in military at the time if they seriously thought a preemptive invasion was remotely viable.

The photo below are “lapty”. When the war started, my late father (who was by education a military communication officer) had been put in charge of the platoon of the infantry trainees. They did not have the uniforms and military boots so he had to give them money to buy lapty on a local market. And, because there were no rifles, they had to be trained with the pieces of wood. You can imagine a psychological effect this unit made upon the local population when marching to and from their training ground (what their training amounted to I have no idea). As an additional piece of knowledge I found from the story is that the lapty, which should be long gone, still had been widely used in 1941.

Thanks for sharing. That story confirms quite a bit from translated PoW interrogations the Germans did in early July 1941 I've read; soldiers talked about not being fed for days, not issued weapons or ammo, not being trained or even provisioned with sleeping quarters. One of the guys said he would have deserted if he wasn't sure he'd be shot for sure. Its hard to know what to believe from German reports of the period given how much racism colored their views of Soviets troops and the system.
Regardless I have all the sympathy for the plight of the Soviet soldier who had to try and defend their country in that situation. It would also help explain why PoW/desertion hauls dropped off a cliff by mid-1943, conditions probably improved dramatically by then relative to 1941-42.

To be fair it was not only a Soviet problem to have to made do with not enough equipment in 1941.
This was from the American Louisiana Maneuvers:

SaltOfAmerica Article - PRELUDE TO WAR, 1938-1941

​

Soldiers training with a fake wooden machine gun.

Wooden Machine Gun - Kid's Toy or 1941 Maneuvers?

I had visions of this 42 1/2" long wooden gun maybe being one of the fabled dummy guns of the 1941 Louisiana Maneuvers - but beginning to lean towards Toy Gun. It certainly looks old enough, though ... Any thoughts?

www.usmilitariaforum.com

I would argue the Soviet Air Force has a harder time reforming than it did. One of the good things about Barbarossa for the Soviets was their fighters and bombers were caught on the ground. If the Germans catch the planes and their valuable pilots in the air with their better tactics and planes, the Red Air Force might not really make a comeback until 1944!

(Source: Attack: Attack of the Airacobras)

That is also mentioned by Christer Bergstrom in his book on the air war during Barbarossa and the book "Red Phoneix" about the history of the Red Air Force in WW2.
Not sure about them not recovering until 1944 given that the Soviets lost over 20k aircraft in 1941 alone, so likely most of the pre-war pilots died that year anyway, just later than June or July like they would have had they been in combat with their I-16s.

 

[Vanguard45]

Because if the system was that broken Russia would lose the war and his head would be in the noose?


Fair enough, especially since it was supposed to be rectified in the next year or two and Stalin anticipated he had at least until 1942 to prepare, but then that doesn't really squared with Zhukov's May proposal to attack in summer 1941 given how unprepared to defend the USSR was. Stalin was then at least more aware enough to say absolutely not to the proposal.


Without question. However MP-41 was written up with the 1941 situation in mind as the general staff understood it. BTW it was supposed to only be completed in July 1941, so wasn't even a functional mobilization plan when the war started. This is per the chapter on Soviet war planning in the "Cambridge history the second world war. This indicated to me that they really didn't know what the heck was going on with their own forces if they drew that up and still thought it was viable. Not only that, but Zhukov et al were working on offensive plans from February to May when Zhukov presented the plan to Stalin, which really indicates they were completely out of touch or really just didn't care what was going in the in military at the time if they seriously thought a preemptive invasion was remotely viable.


Thanks for sharing. That story confirms quite a bit from translated PoW interrogations the Germans did in early July 1941 I've read; soldiers talked about not being fed for days, not issued weapons or ammo, not being trained or even provisioned with sleeping quarters. One of the guys said he would have deserted if he wasn't sure he'd be shot for sure. Its hard to know what to believe from German reports of the period given how much racism colored their views of Soviets troops and the system.
Regardless I have all the sympathy for the plight of the Soviet soldier who had to try and defend their country in that situation. It would also help explain why PoW/desertion hauls dropped off a cliff by mid-1943, conditions probably improved dramatically by then relative to 1941-42.

To be fair it was not only a Soviet problem to have to made do with not enough equipment in 1941.
This was from the American Louisiana Maneuvers:

SaltOfAmerica Article - PRELUDE TO WAR, 1938-1941

View attachment 565345

https://www.usmilitariaforum.com/fo...ve had they been in combat with their I-16s.

http://The book I read suggests mos... the carnage of the first few days and escape

 

[Deleted member 1487]

http://The book I read suggests mos... the carnage of the first few days and escape

Your link is broken.

 

[alexmilman]

Because if the system was that broken Russia would lose the war and his head would be in the noose?


Fair enough, especially since it was supposed to be rectified in the next year or two and Stalin anticipated he had at least until 1942 to prepare, but then that doesn't really squared with Zhukov's May proposal to attack in summer 1941 given how unprepared to defend the USSR was. Stalin was then at least more aware enough to say absolutely not to the proposal.


Without question. However MP-41 was written up with the 1941 situation in mind as the general staff understood it. BTW it was supposed to only be completed in July 1941, so wasn't even a functional mobilization plan when the war started. This is per the chapter on Soviet war planning in the "Cambridge history the second world war. This indicated to me that they really didn't know what the heck was going on with their own forces if they drew that up and still thought it was viable. Not only that, but Zhukov et al were working on offensive plans from February to May when Zhukov presented the plan to Stalin, which really indicates they were completely out of touch or really just didn't care what was going in the in military at the time if they seriously thought a preemptive invasion was remotely viable.


Thanks for sharing. That story confirms quite a bit from translated PoW interrogations the Germans did in early July 1941 I've read; soldiers talked about not being fed for days, not issued weapons or ammo, not being trained or even provisioned with sleeping quarters. One of the guys said he would have deserted if he wasn't sure he'd be shot for sure. Its hard to know what to believe from German reports of the period given how much racism colored their views of Soviets troops and the system.
Regardless I have all the sympathy for the plight of the Soviet soldier who had to try and defend their country in that situation. It would also help explain why PoW/desertion hauls dropped off a cliff by mid-1943, conditions probably improved dramatically by then relative to 1941-42.

To be fair it was not only a Soviet problem to have to made do with not enough equipment in 1941.
This was from the American Louisiana Maneuvers:

SaltOfAmerica Article - PRELUDE TO WAR, 1938-1941

View attachment 565345

Wooden Machine Gun - Kid's Toy or 1941 Maneuvers?

I had visions of this 42 1/2" long wooden gun maybe being one of the fabled dummy guns of the 1941 Louisiana Maneuvers - but beginning to lean towards Toy Gun. It certainly looks old enough, though ... Any thoughts?

www.usmilitariaforum.com

View attachment 565346


That is also mentioned by Christer Bergstrom in his book on the air war during Barbarossa and the book "Red Phoneix" about the history of the Red Air Force in WW2.
Not sure about them not recovering until 1944 given that the Soviets lost over 20k aircraft in 1941 alone, so likely most of the pre-war pilots died that year anyway, just later than June or July like they would have had they been in combat with their I-16s.

To start with, being executed for the condition of the RA hardly was a real threat for Timoshenko and Zhukov because there always would be enough of the underlings to blame. Timoshenko was from the 1st Cavalry Army (a huge bonus) and gained Stalin’s favor by defeating Tukhachevsky in a wrestling match. Zhukov, by whatever reason, gained Stalin’s trust in 1937 and, notwistanding a compromising link to Uborevich, was promoted and after that kept going up. At Khalkin Gol he jumped to the corps commander and then to commander of “army group” with all unpleasant activities like supply issues being dumped on “front group” commander, Stern, and glory going to Zhukov.

As far as the “May plan” is involved, I would not discount a factor of ignorance. Competence of Timoshenko can be considered seriously only in comparison with his predecessor (and the fact that Voroshilov was thoroughly compromised did not prevent Stalin from giving him a top position during WII and, even after he was dismissed from an active command, he was kept at the high positions).

Competence of the General Staff at that time is questionable and their assessments of the situation was faulty: main German attack was expected on South-West and it was assumed that the bulk of the German force is going to be deployed only after the border battles (experience of France was ignored). Situation with the domestic issues also was not good (to put it mildly, look at the screwup with the fortified regions) and, with 4 changes of Chief of the General Staff in 5 years, fear of the personal responsibility and not necessary an overall high competence, this was not a reliable “brain” of the army. Appearance of Zhukov hardly improved the situation because even during the war he was openly expressing opinion that graduates of the General Staff Academy are a bunch of idiots.


Zhukov was just appointed to a position about which he had no clue and he could not physically get up to the level in a couple months even with a 100% correct and completed information in his disposal. Not that he had any relevant experience with the logistics even on army level. Proposing something aggressive was, 1st, in general Zhukov’s style (he was known for his aggressiveness) and 2nd, even if rejected, the authors could be gently reprimanded for the excessive enthusiasm while in a purely defensive scenario they could be suspected in spreading panic. Which option would you prefer?

Comparison with the wooden weapons of the US Army is not quite appropriate: at the time these photos had been made the US was not even at war and, anyway, the USArmy did not quite exist as a modern fighting force, was not under attack and was not planned to go to war until the troops are properly raised, equipped and trained. Quite different from the SU in the summer of 1941.

BTW, it is more than just possible that a big loss of the Soviet aircraft at the beginning of war does not directly map into the losses o& personnel. Quite a few planes had been lost on the ground by more than one reason. This being said, it does not mean that majority of the survivors we’re experienced pilots with more than a rudimentary training.

 

[Jkdelta38]

Honestly the entire book is worth buying sight unseen, but you can get it via the library.

Just ordered the book now and will enjoy reading through it, thanks for recommendation.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

To start with, being executed for the condition of the RA hardly was a real threat for Timoshenko and Zhukov because there always would be enough of the underlings to blame. Timoshenko was from the 1st Cavalry Army (a huge bonus) and gained Stalin’s favor by defeating Tukhachevsky in a wrestling match. Zhukov, by whatever reason, gained Stalin’s trust in 1937 and, notwistanding a compromising link to Uborevich, was promoted and after that kept going up. At Khalkin Gol he jumped to the corps commander and then to commander of “army group” with all unpleasant activities like supply issues being dumped on “front group” commander, Stern, and glory going to Zhukov.

Yeah the cavalry clique was a big thing in the USSR's military. Good point about Zhukov being overpromted, I hadn't thought about just how rapid his rise was from 1937 on.

As far as the “May plan” is involved, I would not discount a factor of ignorance. Competence of Timoshenko can be considered seriously only in comparison with his predecessor (and the fact that Voroshilov was thoroughly compromised did not prevent Stalin from giving him a top position during WII and, even after he was dismissed from an active command, he was kept at the high positions).

Competence of the General Staff at that time is questionable and their assessments of the situation was faulty: main German attack was expected on South-West and it was assumed that the bulk of the German force is going to be deployed only after the border battles (experience of France was ignored). Situation with the domestic issues also was not good (to put it mildly, look at the screwup with the fortified regions) and, with 4 changes of Chief of the General Staff in 5 years, fear of the personal responsibility and not necessary an overall high competence, this was not a reliable “brain” of the army. Appearance of Zhukov hardly improved the situation because even during the war he was openly expressing opinion that graduates of the General Staff Academy are a bunch of idiots.

Zhukov was just appointed to a position about which he had no clue and he could not physically get up to the level in a couple months even with a 100% correct and completed information in his disposal. Not that he had any relevant experience with the logistics even on army level. Proposing something aggressive was, 1st, in general Zhukov’s style (he was known for his aggressiveness) and 2nd, even if rejected, the authors could be gently reprimanded for the excessive enthusiasm while in a purely defensive scenario they could be suspected in spreading panic. Which option would you prefer?

You've got good points there. I guess that comes back to Stalin's malignant influence and promoting cronies over competence and promoting them much quicker than anyone should have been, so that they rose well beyond their level of experience. Looking into his history, Zhukov got his first corps command in 1937 and by early 1941 he was chief of the general staff!

Comparison with the wooden weapons of the US Army is not quite appropriate: at the time these photos had been made the US was not even at war and, anyway, the US Army did not quite exist as a modern fighting force, was not under attack and was not planned to go to war until the troops are properly raised, equipped and trained. Quite different from the SU in the summer of 1941.

The US had introduced conscription in 1940, the first time conscription had ever been introduced in peacetime in the US.
In 1939 they had passed one of the largest military peacetime budgets to prepare the military for war:

America Rearms

The passage of the Neutrality Act in 1936 and the strong support recently given in Congress to the Ludlow Resolution (providing that war can be declared only if approved by a national referendum) are merely two manifestations of the great strength not only of American isolationists but of that...

www.foreignaffairs.com

.

But as the United States has sought to withdraw more and more into its shell it has felt the urge to make that shell strong. The pending Army and Navy annual supply bills tentatively call for the expenditure in 1939 of about $980,326,812, an increase of more than $50,000,000 over the national defense budget for 1938. That already constitutes one of the greatest peacetime armaments budgets in American history. On top of this, on January 28 the President urged Congress to authorize a largescale, long-range expansion of the Navy and a further modernization of the Army at a total estimated cost of $1,300,000,000 over and above the regular annual defense budget.

Basically by 1941 the US was well into rearmament and the 1941 maneuvers were prepping for war. It involved over 400,000 troops:

Louisiana Maneuvers - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

The only thing that really makes sense for why they were still training on fake equipment was Cash and Carry and Lend Lease were depleting US weapon stockpiles.
FDR had the military sell back it's weapon and ammo stocks to private industry so they could be sold to the Brits:

Chapter X: Aid to Britain versus Rearming of America

Seems pretty analogous to what the the USSR was doing up to and during 1941 minus invading Finland, Poland, the Baltics, and Romania, as well as fighting Japan. The US just didn't border Germany, but was seriously worried about Japan and was prepping to fight them.

BTW, it is more than just possible that a big loss of the Soviet aircraft at the beginning of war does not directly map into the losses o& personnel. Quite a few planes had been lost on the ground by more than one reason. This being said, it does not mean that majority of the survivors we’re experienced pilots with more than a rudimentary training.

In the first week or so sure, but after that...
As to the pilots given the losses of 1941 anyone being saved was a gain.

 

[CalBear]

See Cryhavoc101's first post in the thread




and did you read the bit on the page were it talking about second line already in place and ready to go beyond the Dniepr etc? and yes of course they had an answering strike planned as it's counter offensive strategy from a position of defensive depth! But that's not the same as Zhukovs premptive strike



No it doesn't? its says the 237 would be in the four western military districts. On page 22 it than goes on to talk about how these 237 would themselves be arrayed in successive defensive lines. the one on the frontier being described as "relatively light covering forces" (machine gun and forward regiments in defensive positions backed by NKVD border regiments)







see above



first of all it's your source too? Second yes bescause they were supposed to be in a flexible role. But that's the point of defence in depth. the point being any counter offensive was supposed to be an organised affair from a well positioned and supplied defensive line, not the ad hoc attack the first German you see stuff we say that peicemeal fed millions of Russians into teh grinder. You writing some depth in defence and more importantly reinforcement for counter attacks, doesn't actually mean they would all rush head long into the German guns.



As I said not in an organised and coherently mobilised way as per the plan, but due to the slower and chaotic mobilisation hurriedly put in place to be fed piecemeal at the Germans advanced onto them.



Again read what I said I don't think the plan would have worked as intended, The Red army wasn't even capable of doing it in theory not with the state they were in in 1941 and especially not in practice against the German army as it stood in 1941 and early on it it's initial attack. But that doesn't mean if they weren't better mobilised etc as per teh pl;an they wouldn't have done better than they did (even if "better" just mean not getting captured and destroyed in quite so large numbers) because if nothing else they's been at least a somewhat more cohesive force than they were.



Again see above



I agree, and have said so in several posts now, seriously have you actually read my posts? Don't worry no one's unduly praising the soviets in 1941 and casting implied shade on the mighty Germans here!

I thought for a few moments we might actually have a civilised conversation but seems I was wrong it's straight to NO NO NO nothing can possibly stop the advance of the mighty Germans by one centre meter, not matter what. sorry I bothered.

I agree with Cryhavoc101

Did so well, right up until the end.

Play the ball.

 

[marathag]

The only thing that really makes sense for why they were still training on fake equipment was Cash and Carry and Lend Lease were depleting US weapon stockpiles.
FDR had the military sell back it's weapon and ammo stocks to private industry so they could be sold to the Brits:

But there should have been enough Marlin/Rockwell M1917 and Savage built Lewis leftovers from WWI in the '30s that wooden guns should not have been needed, as well as millions of rounds of M1906 and M1 30-06 that sat in warehouses till being surplussed out to civilians in the '50s

 

[Deleted member 1487]

But there should have been enough Marlin/Rockwell M1917 and Savage built Lewis leftovers from WWI in the '30s that wooden guns should not have been needed, as well as millions of rounds of M1906 and M1 30-06 that sat in warehouses till being surplussed out to civilians in the '50s

I'm pretty sure all that was marked surplus and sold to Britain.
AFAIK the M1 ball ammo built pre-WW2 was all used up in WW2 and the post-WW2 surplus was WW2 vintage. Can't comment on the M1906. Do you have a link with info about those stockpiles?

 

[alexmilman]

Yeah the cavalry clique was a big thing in the USSR's military. Good point about Zhukov being overpromted, I hadn't thought about just how rapid his rise was from 1937 on.


You've got good points there. I guess that comes back to Stalin's malignant influence and promoting cronies over competence and promoting them much quicker than anyone should have been, so that they rose well beyond their level of experience. Looking into his history, Zhukov got his first corps command in 1937 and by early 1941 he was chief of the general staff!

Basically by 1941 the US was well into rearmament and the 1941 maneuvers were prepping for war. It involved over 400,000 troops:

Louisiana Maneuvers - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

The “cavalry clique” is a tricky subject. The real clique was based on the 1st cavalry army: Voroshilov (who was associated with Stalin at least starting from Tsaritsin), Budenny (who made his loyalty to Stalin clear during the Polish War) and, as a “younger generation”, Timoshenko (who had an advantage of learning at least basics of a modern warfare). These people had been unquestionable loyalists and valued as such.

Zhukov also served in the 1st CA and even got the Red Banner (for participation in crushing Tambov Peasant Rebellion) so the loyalty stamp was on his forehead 😉

Rokossovsky and Pavlov had a cavalry background but did not have the same loyalty stamp. Pavlov, IIRC, simply had a wrong cavalry background coming from Primakov’s “Red Cossacks” (rivals of the 1st Cavalry Army). Konev, who was not a cavalryman, got an useful connection to Voroshilov while serving in the Far Eastern Republic and by 1938 was an army commander on the Far East (aka, far away from the power center) but then Zhukov bypassed him in the promotion.

Actually, a potential answer to your question about the general screwup can be quite simple: what could commander of a cavalry division (at least he spent 4 years in that position prior to his fast elevation) who spent a year in Military Academy understand in the area of a general logistics and specifically the aspects involving mechanized transportation? Keep in mind that it was something of a sign of a loyalty in the “clique” to minimize importance of the technical means in general. One of the “jewels” of their military thinking was a proposal to pull the tanks to the front line by horses to avoid a noice and achieve a surprise. At Khalkin Gol these issues were handled by front level personnel leaving Zhukov only with the purely operational issues. Blame for big losses in the tanks had been pushed to the Directorate of the Armored Forces led by Pavlov (who was also present at Khalkin Gol as an advisor in armor deployment). BTW, with all his faults, as early as in 1938 Pavlov requested rearmament of the existing tanks with the 76mm guns and creation of a heavy tank (KV) as a breakthrough weapon.

BTW, the tank corps units with a structure defined by Tukhachevky (*) had been abolished by the results of their performance in Poland in 1939, initiative was supported by pretty much everybody from Shaposhnikov to the commanders of these units. Pavlov’s idea was to preserve the tank battalions, regiments and brigades within the infantry units (which eventually did happen) and create motorized divisions. As a result, instead of 4 cumbersome tank corps there would be 15 mechanized divisions (close in their structure to the German ones), much more flexible and easier to deploy. Plan was not materialized: Pavlov was removed from his position and by the start of the war the huge mechanized corps units had been back and demonstrated their uselessness. Actually, when the structure of a tank force was more or less finalized in 1942, it had even fewer tanks than a proposed Pavlov’s tank division. So there was a need to create tank armies.

Now, I’m afraid that you missed my point about the wooden weapons. The SU in 1941 was under immediate attack while the US was not. It was not an issue of the maneuvered with the fake weapons but a need to provide the troops with elementary rifle practice before they sent to the (crumbling) front. Compare the cute uniforms at the maneuvers with the lapty I told you about and imagine these soldiers from your photo to be sent to the front without seeing a real weapon. The US had time to raise the troops, equip them and train them properly before sending them anywhere.

_____
(*) Structure of the mechanized corps (11th corps) in 1935 included: 2 mechanized brigades (384 tanks and artillery units), infantry brigade, separate reconnaissance tank battalion, communication battalion. Besides the main tanks corps had 63 light tanks, 52 flame throwing tanks, 20 artillery pieces, 1,444 automobiles and 8,965 personnel. Taking into an account the means of communications and general competence, these units were too big and could be used only on front level
In 1941 the reorganized/recreated corps included: 2 tank divisions (70 and 128 tanks, 58 and 72 armored cars) and motorized division (57 tanks and 11 armored cars), communication battalion, battalion of engineers, motorcycle regiment.
Tank corps of March 1942 included: one heavy and two medium tank brigades (150 tanks, 20 76mm guns, 12 45mm antitank guns, 20 AA guns, 66 antitank rifles, 44 mortars and 539 cars. In the following months number of tanks had been increased, the field rockets (katusha) had been added together with the reconnaissance battalion, motorcycle battalion and 20 British personnel carriers.

 

[BlackDragon98]

This is just the tip of the iceberg:
View attachment 565305

Honestly the entire book is worth buying sight unseen, but you can get it via the library.

Is it on Internet Archive?