Stalin listens to warning of Barbarrossa in 1941

The only nonsense comes from you, when you talk about things that were never written.

Oil is needed for industry overall, oil is used in many different products and for transportation, if transportation slows down so does industry

Each and every drop of less oil means less production and less military performans, this is 100% obvious. Your whole statement is ironic since you not only fabricate words that were never written then respond to your own fabrications you also can not understand basic logic.
Romanian oil wasn't as useful as you say it was.
Romanian oil refineries were operating under their capacity OTL, and despite the Bombing of Polesti, the Germans still held on until the end of war.
 
Romanian oil wasn't as useful as you say it was.
Romanian oil refineries were operating under their capacity OTL, and despite the Bombing of Polesti, the Germans still held on until the end of war.

These are Hitlers words in 1942

“I always feared - that Russia suddenly would attack Romania in the late fall - and occupy the petroleum wells, and we would have not been ready in the late fall of 1940. If Russia indeed had taken Romanian petroleum wells, than Germany would have been lost. It would have required - just 60 Russian divisions to handle that matter.

In Romania we had of course - at that time - no major units. The Romanian government had turned to us only recently - and what we did have there was laughable. They only had to occupy the petroleum wells. Of course, with our weapons I could not start a, war in September or October. That was out of the question. Naturally, the transfer to the east wasn't that far advanced yet. Of course, the units first had to reconsolidate in the west. First the armaments had to be taken care of because we too had - yes, we also had losses in our campaign in the west. It would have been impossible to attack - before the spring of 19, 41. And if the Russians at that time - in the fall of 1940 - had occupied Romania - taken the petroleum wells, then we would have been, helpless in 1941.

Another Voice In Background: Without petroleum...

Hitler: (Interrupting) We had huge German production: however, the demands of the air force, our Panzer divisions - they are really huge. It is level of consumption that surpasses the imagination. And without the addition of four to five million tons of Romanian petroleum, we could not have fought the war - and would have had to let it be - and that was my big worry. ”
 
When you write about ASB scenarios in a non-ASB forum it's kind of hard to engage with from a historical record based position


Again, can you show where Romanian oil was used in the German economy?


Not all oil is used for the same things and historically Germany never had an oil deficit before the bombings of 1944, so while the loss of Romanian oil, assuming that was even possible to the degree you think, wouldn't be nearly as crippling as you think, especially given that production was mostly based on coal output rather than natural oil and transportation internally was nearly exclusively based on trains and coal. If push came to shove in terms of powering motor vehicles there is always this option:


Bundesarchiv_Bild_183-V00670%2C_Berlin%2C_Pkw_mit_Holzgasantrieb.jpg

You can not touch the argument so you attack the messenger. It is only and has always been your reasoning that is ASB

You cut and paste things ignoring what is written and inventing words that were never said.

I explained it all in my first post and have to copy it again, you ask "Again, can you show where Romanian oil was used in the German economy?"

So I have to re say things that have already been said. But of course it proves you completely and absolutely wrong so perhaps that is why you choose to forget it.

These are Hitlers words

“I always feared - that Russia suddenly would attack Romania in the late fall - and occupy the petroleum wells, and we would have not been ready in the late fall of 1940. If Russia indeed had taken Romanian petroleum wells, than Germany would have been lost. It would have required - just 60 Russian divisions to handle that matter.

In Romania we had of course - at that time - no major units. The Romanian government had turned to us only recently - and what we did have there was laughable. They only had to occupy the petroleum wells. Of course, with our weapons I could not start a, war in September or October. That was out of the question. Naturally, the transfer to the east wasn't that far advanced yet. Of course, the units first had to reconsolidate in the west. First the armaments had to be taken care of because we too had - yes, we also had losses in our campaign in the west. It would have been impossible to attack - before the spring of 19, 41. And if the Russians at that time - in the fall of 1940 - had occupied Romania - taken the petroleum wells, then we would have been, helpless in 1941.

Another Voice In Background: Without petroleum...

Hitler: (Interrupting) We had huge German production: however, the demands of the air force, our Panzer divisions - they are really huge. It is level of consumption that surpasses the imagination. And without the addition of four to five million tons of Romanian petroleum, we could not have fought the war - and would have had to let it be - and that was my big worry. ”
 
One possible knock-on. Thanks to ULTRA, British intelligence had compiled a complete order of battle for BARBAROSSA, which they presented to the Soviets in early June 1941. But by Stalin's decree, this information was rejected as British "provocation". I don't know whether after 22 June the Stavka actually received thjs information and used it; I suspect not.

If Stalin thinks Germany really is going to attack, then perhaps he directs Stavka to pay close attention. Soviet preparations in 1941 would go much better in that case, I think.
 

Deleted member 1487

I recall seeing images of woodgas powered Tiger I tanks used for training.
Tank Encyclopedia, I believe.
Looks like it was:

Not sure what the point of the turretless one was other than driver training or proofing the production model works before adding the turret.

There were several SS and Wehrmacht units composed of "volunteers" from occupied territories like the USSR, Balkans, Baltics, etc.
Most of them fought poorly, especially if they were in the Western Front. Many simply surrendered to the Allies in hopes of better treatment, which they did get for a time before they were deported back to the USSR at the end of the war as part of OP Keelhaul.
Desertions were common, especially after Stalingrad.
There were several mutinies in different units as well, that had to be put down with difficulty.
Overall, foreign units in the Wehrmacht and SS were a failure, with a few exceptions like the Cossacks, Kalmyks, and the Baltic legions.

ITTL ain't going to be much different.
I'm not sure I'd go that far. The Ukrainian units were not a bad division and did no worse than their German counterparts in the Battle of Brody. They just had the misfortune to be the focus of a massive Soviet air bombardment and ground assault shortly thereafter. The Soviets took them for easy meat and found out the hard way they weren't going to collapse.

That said there were several very bad SS divisions based on 'volunteers', but even units like the Dutch, Scandinavians, and Belgians fought quite well. Even the French SS fought quite well in Berlin after their early 1945 combat debut disaster (frankly no division would have done well in that situation, especially when at only half strength to start).

One possible knock-on. Thanks to ULTRA, British intelligence had compiled a complete order of battle for BARBAROSSA, which they presented to the Soviets in early June 1941. But by Stalin's decree, this information was rejected as British "provocation". I don't know whether after 22 June the Stavka actually received thjs information and used it; I suspect not.

If Stalin thinks Germany really is going to attack, then perhaps he directs Stavka to pay close attention. Soviet preparations in 1941 would go much better in that case, I think.
IOTL it wouldn't have done much good by the time Stalin really accepted the invasion was underway. ITTL it might help somewhat, but really Stalin and the Soviet general staff really needed different operational/strategic concepts for something like that to matter enough to change things; deploying at the border was a disaster, same with trying to make the Molotov Line out of the Stalin Line.
 
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CalBear

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Yeah you still can not read what is written.

Without the Romanian oil, less armaments can be produced because the whole industry is suffering

Fewer weapons means less damage that can be done on the ground, in the air and at sea

Less damage that can be done means the Soviets suffer less
I'm not engaging with nonsense.


Really? How so? German industry was based on domestic coal production, not Romanian oil.


Were that the case then sure, but you haven't established than Romanian oil would actually do that.


Sure, we see that from the transfer of equipment off of the Ostheer from 1942 on. But again you haven't established that it was Romanian oil that would actually do that. Or that the Soviets even could 100% shut down Romanian production when the best bombing efforts of the WAllies took until 1944 to achieve any results.
Not sure why it took until today for someone to report this, but it did.

You both need, not just in this thread, but going forward to play the Ball.
 
I'm not sure I'd go that far. The Ukrainian units were not a bad division and did no worse than their German counterparts in the Battle of Brody. They just had the misfortune to be the focus of a massive Soviet air bombardment and ground assault shortly thereafter. The Soviets took them for easy meat and found out the hard way they weren't going to collapse.

That said there were several very bad SS divisions based on 'volunteers', but even units like the Dutch, Scandinavians, and Belgians fought quite well. Even the French SS fought quite well in Berlin after their early 1945 combat debut disaster (frankly no division would have done well in that situation, especially when at only half strength to start).
Russian Liberation Army (from wiki):
Following the German defeats in the summer of 1943 the units began to disintegrate. On 12 September for example, 2nd Army had to withdraw Sturm-Btl. AOK 2 in order to deal with what was described as "several mutinies and desertions of Eastern units". A 14 September communication from the army states that in the recent period, Hiwi absenteeism had risen considerably.[4] Following a series of attempted or successful mutinies, and a surge in desertions,[5] the Germans decided in September 1942 that the reliability of the units had fallen to a level where they were more a liability than an asset. In an October 1943 report, the 8th Army concluded grimly: "All local volunteers are unreliable during enemy contact. Principal reason of unreliability is the employment of these volunteers in the East."[6] Two days previously, the German army had given permission to the KTB to take harsh measures in the event of further cases of rebellion or unreliability, investing regimental commanders with far-reaching powers to hold summary courts and execute the verdicts.

Since it was felt that the reliability of Russian volunteers would improve if they were removed from contact with the local population, it was decided to send them to the Western Front,[7] and the majority of them were re-deployed in late 1943 or early 1944.[8]

Many of these battalions were integrated into the divisions in the West. A number of the Russian soldiers were on guard in Normandy on D-Day but, without the equipment or motivation to fight the Allies, most promptly surrendered. However, there were instances of bitter fighting to the very end, triggered by counter-productive propaganda from the Allies that promised quick repatriation of soldiers to the Soviet Union after they gave up.

Georgian Legion straight up mutinied at Texel.

21st SS Mountain Division was so bad it was disbanded in 1944.

13st SS Mountain Division suffered heavy desertion rates in 1944.

23rd SS Mountain Division was also disbanded in 1944 following mass desertions and mutinies.

29th SS Division "RONA" were so undisciplined and unreliable, it was disbanded after it's terrible atrocities in the Warsaw Uprising.

Part of the 30th SS Division mutinied and deserted, join the French Resistance and turned on their former comrades in the division in 1944.

Most of these unreliable troops were from the USSR, which highlights how unreliable these Hiwi formed units were in general.
Others were reliable and capable, though they suffered desertions as well, especially in the late days of the war.
 
These are Hitlers words in 1942

“I always feared - that Russia suddenly would attack Romania in the late fall - and occupy the petroleum wells, and we would have not been ready in the late fall of 1940. If Russia indeed had taken Romanian petroleum wells, than Germany would have been lost. It would have required - just 60 Russian divisions to handle that matter.

In Romania we had of course - at that time - no major units. The Romanian government had turned to us only recently - and what we did have there was laughable. They only had to occupy the petroleum wells. Of course, with our weapons I could not start a, war in September or October. That was out of the question. Naturally, the transfer to the east wasn't that far advanced yet. Of course, the units first had to reconsolidate in the west. First the armaments had to be taken care of because we too had - yes, we also had losses in our campaign in the west. It would have been impossible to attack - before the spring of 19, 41. And if the Russians at that time - in the fall of 1940 - had occupied Romania - taken the petroleum wells, then we would have been, helpless in 1941.

Another Voice In Background: Without petroleum...

Hitler: (Interrupting) We had huge German production: however, the demands of the air force, our Panzer divisions - they are really huge. It is level of consumption that surpasses the imagination. And without the addition of four to five million tons of Romanian petroleum, we could not have fought the war - and would have had to let it be - and that was my big worry. ”
And it would become Finland all over again.
Except this time the Germans are taking part too.

If Stalin invades Romania, the those troops will not have any defensive advantages, they will be in hostile territory and if the Germans can encircle them properly then they are toast.
Can't fix an army in 6 months, especially one of that size.
 

Deleted member 1487

Russian Liberation Army (from wiki):
Following the German defeats in the summer of 1943 the units began to disintegrate. On 12 September for example, 2nd Army had to withdraw Sturm-Btl. AOK 2 in order to deal with what was described as "several mutinies and desertions of Eastern units". A 14 September communication from the army states that in the recent period, Hiwi absenteeism had risen considerably.[4] Following a series of attempted or successful mutinies, and a surge in desertions,[5] the Germans decided in September 1942 that the reliability of the units had fallen to a level where they were more a liability than an asset. In an October 1943 report, the 8th Army concluded grimly: "All local volunteers are unreliable during enemy contact. Principal reason of unreliability is the employment of these volunteers in the East."[6] Two days previously, the German army had given permission to the KTB to take harsh measures in the event of further cases of rebellion or unreliability, investing regimental commanders with far-reaching powers to hold summary courts and execute the verdicts.

Since it was felt that the reliability of Russian volunteers would improve if they were removed from contact with the local population, it was decided to send them to the Western Front,[7] and the majority of them were re-deployed in late 1943 or early 1944.[8]

Many of these battalions were integrated into the divisions in the West. A number of the Russian soldiers were on guard in Normandy on D-Day but, without the equipment or motivation to fight the Allies, most promptly surrendered. However, there were instances of bitter fighting to the very end, triggered by counter-productive propaganda from the Allies that promised quick repatriation of soldiers to the Soviet Union after they gave up.
RONA units weren't SS until 1944. They were formed years earlier and only after being decimated in 1943 did they get rebuilt as SS units. At that point it was already too late to really make it a combat effective unit.

I'm not disputing any of the above, note that I left all of those out of my reply, but that's what 6 or 7 units about of over 30 divisions? The Slavic units that didn't fight well or mutinied largely did so after it was painfully clear the Axis would lose the war and they had no interest in dying for Hitler.

I just found a book today ("Soviet Russians Under Nazi Occupation") that paints a different picture of Russian cooperation with the Germans especially in 1941-43, which goes against the narrative of Soviet resistance, but does show the decline in cooperation as it became increasingly clear the Soviets were coming back and Stalin wasn't going to play nice with the Soviet citizens trapped behind German lines. Hiwi units mirrored that evolution as well; when it looked like the Axis would win they were largely cooperative, but once it was clear the war turned against the Germans from Summer 1943 on they started deserting and spying much more readily, while desertions to the Axis side virtually stopped.

So it would seem that it was the war fortunes that drove these units to perform poorly or mutiny rather than fight, which is hardly surprising given that most were only formed as a desperation move after the war was already lost.
 
There were several SS and Wehrmacht units composed of "volunteers" from occupied territories like the USSR, Balkans, Baltics, etc.
Most of them fought poorly, especially if they were in the Western Front. Many simply surrendered to the Allies in hopes of better treatment, which they did get for a time before they were deported back to the USSR at the end of the war as part of OP Keelhaul.
Desertions were common, especially after Stalingrad.
There were several mutinies in different units as well, that had to be put down with difficulty.
Overall, foreign units in the Wehrmacht and SS were a failure, with a few exceptions like the Cossacks, Kalmyks, and the Baltic legions.

ITTL ain't going to be much different.

The volunteers i was referring to was also normal laborers and your comment does not actually reflect the point being made.

In this scenario the Axis treat the people better initially and only request "real" volunteers nobody is forced, and by doing so are meet with less resistance than in the OTL.

So in this scenario even though the Soviets initaly hold or even push back the Axis, when the Axis turn the tide they treat the locals better and by doing so the USSR loses. So an initial good performance by the USSR may be actually bad. That is what this scenario is about that you responded to in this comment.
 
And it would become Finland all over again.
Except this time the Germans are taking part too.

If Stalin invades Romania, the those troops will not have any defensive advantages, they will be in hostile territory and if the Germans can encircle them properly then they are toast.
Can't fix an army in 6 months, especially one of that size.

This scenario in 1941 is that the VVS since the 30th of may 1941 has been planning a bombing run on the oil fields and use all bombers that can hit the targets.

Many scenarios going around

This thread is what the USSR can do if Stalin believes the intelligence with a start date of 30th of may 1941

These were my suggestions for this scenario.

The air force is set on full alert, and starts shooting down German air reconnaissance then the Germans will have less information of Soviet deployments. In addition to that, unlike the OTL the Soviet air force will not be caught unprepared and have 2,000 airplanes destroyed on the first day mostly on the ground. The pilots will also have more practical training by flying these 3 weeks, and the mechanics and the whole systems surrounding the air force will have more practical experience.

The soldiers on the ground, can be ordered to dig in and dig deep, thereby decreasing the amount of damage the initial attack does because the soldiers now have better prepared positions.

Some soldiers can be moved back to create a deeper defense.

3 weeks may allow the USSR to move back its soldiers, except some boarder guards, perhaps 20 km or more from the border, the further back they are and the deeper they have dug in, the less the initial bombardment will damage them.

Soldiers that are not fully equipped can be sent back the Stalin line and start reactivating the defenses and/or to the east of the Dnieper river and start digging in there.

As many tankers as possibly and especially those who have not fully be trained, can be given full day training courses, far from the border, and tanks that do not have their guns bored can be used for training further back.

The army can be given orders to immediately shot back if any foreign soldiers cross the border, unlike the OTL where there initially was confusion.

The Soviet generals can be given more leeway how to deploy, unlike the OTL where Stalin had demanded the deployment in a certain way.

Some industries near the border can be evacuated and moved back.

And obviously the Red Air force can be give orders to bomb the Romanian oil fields, which will tremendously hurt the axis military and the German economy, and may cause the whole invasion to falter.

The bombing could be ordered to start when the invasion starts, or maybe even do a preemptive bombing, but a preemptive attack may be used as a valid reason to launch the attack, even though Germany was planning it all along.

The more the oil fields are damaged, the more Germany will be hurt, and may even collapse.
 
This scenario in 1941 is that the VVS since the 30th of may 1941 has been planning a bombing run on the oil fields and use all bombers that can hit the targets.

Many scenarios going around

This thread is what the USSR can do if Stalin believes the intelligence with a start date of 30th of may 1941

These were my suggestions for this scenario.

The air force is set on full alert, and starts shooting down German air reconnaissance then the Germans will have less information of Soviet deployments. In addition to that, unlike the OTL the Soviet air force will not be caught unprepared and have 2,000 airplanes destroyed on the first day mostly on the ground. The pilots will also have more practical training by flying these 3 weeks, and the mechanics and the whole systems surrounding the air force will have more practical experience.

The soldiers on the ground, can be ordered to dig in and dig deep, thereby decreasing the amount of damage the initial attack does because the soldiers now have better prepared positions.

Some soldiers can be moved back to create a deeper defense.

3 weeks may allow the USSR to move back its soldiers, except some boarder guards, perhaps 20 km or more from the border, the further back they are and the deeper they have dug in, the less the initial bombardment will damage them.

Soldiers that are not fully equipped can be sent back the Stalin line and start reactivating the defenses and/or to the east of the Dnieper river and start digging in there.

As many tankers as possibly and especially those who have not fully be trained, can be given full day training courses, far from the border, and tanks that do not have their guns bored can be used for training further back.

The army can be given orders to immediately shot back if any foreign soldiers cross the border, unlike the OTL where there initially was confusion.

The Soviet generals can be given more leeway how to deploy, unlike the OTL where Stalin had demanded the deployment in a certain way.

Some industries near the border can be evacuated and moved back.

And obviously the Red Air force can be give orders to bomb the Romanian oil fields, which will tremendously hurt the axis military and the German economy, and may cause the whole invasion to falter.

The bombing could be ordered to start when the invasion starts, or maybe even do a preemptive bombing, but a preemptive attack may be used as a valid reason to launch the attack, even though Germany was planning it all along.

The more the oil fields are damaged, the more Germany will be hurt, and may even collapse.
Problem with your claims is that the VVS has very few pilots with combat experience in 1941.
There were a whole bunch that went to Spain but they all got purged when they got back in 1938 or 1939.
And the majority of planes used by the Soviets were inferior to the Luftwaffe's aircraft.

The Luftwaffe on the other hand are veterans of Spain, Poland, Scandinavia, France, and UK.
Sure the VVS can inflict some serious casualties initally, but it will be to their detriment as their most experienced pilots will be on the front lines and be killed in the first wave.

And how do you propose to solve the massive ammo and fuel shortage in 3 weeks?
Magic communist gopnik hands?
it will be Pyrrhic victory for the Soviets, and once they are driven back, all those vehicles and men they lost cannot be recovered.
 
The volunteers i was referring to was also normal laborers and your comment does not actually reflect the point being made.

In this scenario the Axis treat the people better initially and only request "real" volunteers nobody is forced, and by doing so are meet with less resistance than in the OTL.

So in this scenario even though the Soviets initaly hold or even push back the Axis, when the Axis turn the tide they treat the locals better and by doing so the USSR loses. So an initial good performance by the USSR may be actually bad. That is what this scenario is about that you responded to in this comment.
Germans will still have to loot Russia for food.
And that destroys any sort of goodwill between the Soviet civilians and the Axis.
 
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