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In Fateful Choices, Ian Kershaw writes the following in the context of the choices available to Stalin after the Nazi victories in the West. What if Stalin had approved Zhukov's plan? Certainly the time for manoeuvre was limited (although they did not know this for certain at the time) and any preparations would impact on Barbarossa, not a Soviet offensive. However, the consequences still would be significant.

Furthermore, is there any scenario in which this attack could go ahead without being interrupted by Barbarossa, and what would be the results?

By 15 May Timoshenko and Zhukov were ready to present the new plan to Stalin. Though building directly on the earlier plans, it differed in one striking respect. It now envisaged a major pre-emptive strike, as Zhukov later acknowledged, to forestall the enemy by attacking the German army before it was ready to launch its own offensive. As before, the main directional thrust was towards southern Poland, where the enemy would be destroyed by a ‘sudden blow’ on land and from the air. The advance included the conquest of Warsaw, and subsequently the destruction of German forces in northern Poland and the overrunning of East Prussia...

Worried as they were by the incessant flow of intelligence reports on troop movements together with indications (if not always consistent) of hostile German intent towards the Soviet Union, Timoshenko and Zhukov nevertheless most probably thought, like Stalin, that the German attack was not imminent. Red Army estimates indicated that the German build-up in the east had not been great in recent weeks, and that a far larger concentration of strength would have to occur before any attack took place. And, as the Soviet military leaders were only too well aware, the forces available to the Red Army nowhere approached those required under the 15 May plan, and major deficiencies were still obvious in transport and supplies. The plan also encompassed the construction of huge defensive fortifications, which were nowhere near completion. As a blueprint for action in the near future, therefore, the plan was utterly unrealistic. Most probably, Timoshenko and Zhukov had in mind an offensive at some stage in the more distant future, probably at the earliest during the summer of 1942.

It's important to note this section in regards to Icebreaker and other assorted works;
The plan has given succour to those anxious to assert that Hitler, as he claimed, launched ‘Barbarossa’ to head off a Soviet pre-emptive strike which was under preparation. But nothing supports such a far-fetched interpretation. The Nazi leadership knew, of course, that they were not invading the Soviet Union to head off a pre-emptive strike. ‘Barbarossa’ had been instigated months earlier, and for aggressive, not defensive, reasons. And the Soviet plan of 15 May provides no ‘smoking gun’. Certainly, it proposed a pre-emptive strike. In this, it converted the traditional emphasis on the rapid transition from ‘deep defence’ to offence into a stress on attack as a form of defence. Unlike the German fiction of a Soviet threat, the menace from Hitler’s forces was evident to the Soviet military leadership as daily reports of the build-up of troops and violations of the borders for aerial reconnaissance poured in. The idea of the pre-emptive strike contained in the 15 May plan arose directly from the need to protect the Soviet Union, and was inspired by Stalin’s speech ten days earlier. That is, it was an offensive plan born out of defensive necessity.
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