Stalin Approves Zhukov's Pre-emptive Strike

In Fateful Choices, Ian Kershaw writes the following in the context of the choices available to Stalin after the Nazi victories in the West. What if Stalin had approved Zhukov's plan? Certainly the time for manoeuvre was limited (although they did not know this for certain at the time) and any preparations would impact on Barbarossa, not a Soviet offensive. However, the consequences still would be significant.

Furthermore, is there any scenario in which this attack could go ahead without being interrupted by Barbarossa, and what would be the results?

By 15 May Timoshenko and Zhukov were ready to present the new plan to Stalin. Though building directly on the earlier plans, it differed in one striking respect. It now envisaged a major pre-emptive strike, as Zhukov later acknowledged, to forestall the enemy by attacking the German army before it was ready to launch its own offensive. As before, the main directional thrust was towards southern Poland, where the enemy would be destroyed by a ‘sudden blow’ on land and from the air. The advance included the conquest of Warsaw, and subsequently the destruction of German forces in northern Poland and the overrunning of East Prussia...

Worried as they were by the incessant flow of intelligence reports on troop movements together with indications (if not always consistent) of hostile German intent towards the Soviet Union, Timoshenko and Zhukov nevertheless most probably thought, like Stalin, that the German attack was not imminent. Red Army estimates indicated that the German build-up in the east had not been great in recent weeks, and that a far larger concentration of strength would have to occur before any attack took place. And, as the Soviet military leaders were only too well aware, the forces available to the Red Army nowhere approached those required under the 15 May plan, and major deficiencies were still obvious in transport and supplies. The plan also encompassed the construction of huge defensive fortifications, which were nowhere near completion. As a blueprint for action in the near future, therefore, the plan was utterly unrealistic. Most probably, Timoshenko and Zhukov had in mind an offensive at some stage in the more distant future, probably at the earliest during the summer of 1942.

It's important to note this section in regards to Icebreaker and other assorted works;
The plan has given succour to those anxious to assert that Hitler, as he claimed, launched ‘Barbarossa’ to head off a Soviet pre-emptive strike which was under preparation. But nothing supports such a far-fetched interpretation. The Nazi leadership knew, of course, that they were not invading the Soviet Union to head off a pre-emptive strike. ‘Barbarossa’ had been instigated months earlier, and for aggressive, not defensive, reasons. And the Soviet plan of 15 May provides no ‘smoking gun’. Certainly, it proposed a pre-emptive strike. In this, it converted the traditional emphasis on the rapid transition from ‘deep defence’ to offence into a stress on attack as a form of defence. Unlike the German fiction of a Soviet threat, the menace from Hitler’s forces was evident to the Soviet military leadership as daily reports of the build-up of troops and violations of the borders for aerial reconnaissance poured in. The idea of the pre-emptive strike contained in the 15 May plan arose directly from the need to protect the Soviet Union, and was inspired by Stalin’s speech ten days earlier. That is, it was an offensive plan born out of defensive necessity.
 
Ian Kershaw doubts that Zhukov and Timoshenko had an immediate pre-emptive strike in mind: "Worried as they were by the incessant flow of intelligence reports on troop movements together with indications (if not always consistent) of hostile German intent towards the Soviet Union, Timoshenko and Zhukov nevertheless most probably thought, like Stalin, that the German attack was not imminent. Red Army estimates indicated that the German buildup in the east had not been great in recent weeks, and that a far larger concentration of strength would have to occur before any attack took place... And, as the Soviet military leaders were only too well aware, the forces available to the Red Army nowhere approached those required under the 15 May plan, and major deficiencies were still obvious in transport and supplies. The plan also encompassed the construction of huge defensive fortifications, which were nowhere near completion. As a blueprint for action in the near future, therefore, the plan was utterly unrealistic... Most probably, Timoshenko and Zhukov had in mind an offensive at some stage in the more distant future, probably at the earliest during the summer of 1942." https://books.google.com/books?id=6J0_vJKLzsgC&pg=PA279
 
Ian Kershaw doubts that Zhukov and Timoshenko had an immediate pre-emptive strike in mind: "Worried as they were by the incessant flow of intelligence reports on troop movements together with indications (if not always consistent) of hostile German intent towards the Soviet Union, Timoshenko and Zhukov nevertheless most probably thought, like Stalin, that the German attack was not imminent. Red Army estimates indicated that the German buildup in the east had not been great in recent weeks, and that a far larger concentration of strength would have to occur before any attack took place... And, as the Soviet military leaders were only too well aware, the forces available to the Red Army nowhere approached those required under the 15 May plan, and major deficiencies were still obvious in transport and supplies. The plan also encompassed the construction of huge defensive fortifications, which were nowhere near completion. As a blueprint for action in the near future, therefore, the plan was utterly unrealistic... Most probably, Timoshenko and Zhukov had in mind an offensive at some stage in the more distant future, probably at the earliest during the summer of 1942." https://books.google.com/books?id=6J0_vJKLzsgC&pg=PA279
Oh yeah I understand that, I was more asking - what if they went ahead with preparations?
 
Oh yeah I understand that, I was more asking - what if they went ahead with preparations?

This seems like it would involve more Soviet forces closer to the front at the time of Barbarossa. Which probably means more Soviet losses in the early phases of the operation, though probably not enough to make a difference in the outcome. Or, at least, the Germans probably wouldn't have advanced any further in the initial push, since they seem to have been stopped by their supply lines being stretched too far rather than by Soviet opposition. I suppose if it meant the Soviets had slightly less available for the subsequent counter-offensive, that could have been good for the Germans, but I still say probably not enough to change anything significantly.
 
This seems like it would involve more Soviet forces closer to the front at the time of Barbarossa. Which probably means more Soviet losses in the early phases of the operation, though probably not enough to make a difference in the outcome. Or, at least, the Germans probably wouldn't have advanced any further in the initial push, since they seem to have been stopped by their supply lines being stretched too far rather than by Soviet opposition. I suppose if it meant the Soviets had slightly less available for the subsequent counter-offensive, that could have been good for the Germans, but I still say probably not enough to change anything significantly.
I was thinking that a very significant outcome would be Zhukov's inevitable dismissal. He had gone against Stalin's judgement and his plan had failed (Stalin may even believe that he had provoked the Germans); the best he could hope for at this point is a nice retirement hovel in Siberia.
 
Stephen Kotkin's harsh judgment on Zhukov and Timoshenko: "We're not going to hear about Stalin's supposed failure on the eve of the war to move troops up to the front in order to be ready for the German onslaught. He was urged to do so by his two top commanders Zhukov and Timoshenko and that's because they were idiots. They didn't understand blitzkrieg. Blitzkrieg was not about capturing territory--it was about destroying the fighting capacity of your enemy, so the more troops you move to the frontier, the more of those troops are destroyed in the initial onslaught, the less fighting capacity you have and the more likely you'll be defeated. So Stalin's refusal to move even more troops to the frontier zone was absolutely correct."--Stephen Kotkn, Stalin at War: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1NV-hq2akCQ&fbclid=IwAR3T5or7R5E7qSXLC8pv4KRj1CoeF7nEGai0fpL34D3N8RqzSCqavynz_C8 (the quote starts at 12:44)
 
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Strphen Kotkin's harsh judgment on Zhukov and Timoshenko: "We're not going to hear about Stalin's supposed failure on the eve of the war to move troops up to the front in order to be ready for the German onslaught. He was urged to do so by his two top commanders Zhukov and Timoshenko and that's because they were idiots. They didn't understand blitzkrieg. Blitzkrieg was not about capturing territory--it was about destroying the fighting capacity of your enemy, so the more troops you move to the frontier, the more of those troops are destroyed in the initial onslaught, the less fighting capacity you have and the more likely you'll be defeated. So Stalin's refusal to move even more troops to the frontier zone was absolutely correct."--Stephen Kotkn, Stalin at War: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1NV-hq2akCQ&fbclid=IwAR3T5or7R5E7qSXLC8pv4KRj1CoeF7nEGai0fpL34D3N8RqzSCqavynz_C8 (the quote starts at 12:44)
So I understand that Kotkin is far more learned than me on this, but I feel that his assessment is rather unfair here from what I've listened to so far. Any positive outcome from Stalin's refusal to move troops to the front was out of his fear of provoking the Germans, not anticipation of blitzkrieg. If he was anticipating it, there were many things he could have done better.
Furthermore, Zhukov and Timoshenko were not idiots. Inexperienced yes, but to dismiss such a man as Zhukov as an idiot is totally outlandish.
 
The main problem of the Soviet preemptive strike is that the density of the road network west of the USSR’s border is higher than in the east. Therefore, the Germans are likely to have time to deploy their troops earlier.

Zhukov's plan
Although Zhukov described the apocalyptic results of a preemptive strike in censored memoirs, informally he compared the result with the Battle of Kharkiv in 1942. That is, the result of the Soviet strike would be a major defeat in Ukraine, but not a catastrophe like the Kyiv battle in 1941 or the start of the Soviet-German war in Belarus
 
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