Stalin anticipated Barbarossa

Right, and not only did he ignore the warnings, he actively compelled everyone else to do so. The POD argued in the OP is that Stalin doesn't stick his fingers in his ears like a three year old and chant " not happening" over and over, and then hide in his room for the first month of the war when he realizes it is happening, and all the warnings weren't a capitalist plot.

Maybe not likely, but at least plausible, and it changes the war in the east dramatically.
 
Right, and not only did he ignore the warnings, he actively compelled everyone else to do so. The POD argued in the OP is that Stalin doesn't stick his fingers in his ears like a three year old and chant " not happening" over and over, and then hide in his room for the first month of the war when he realizes it is happening, and all the warnings weren't a capitalist plot.

Maybe not likely, but at least plausible, and it changes the war in the east dramatically.


In the end I think the biggest question is not whether or not the Germans would do better in the east(arguably the answer is no), but whether or not harder going in the east at the early stages of Barbarossa would make hitler and the german high command more pragmatic or not, or would "victory disease" have already fully gripped them by the time barbarossa got kicked off?

If the answer is that you have a more pragmatic german leadership. then the scene is set for a seperate peace with the Soviets in the east after the war there grinds to a stalemate, probably with added german territory in eastern europe. Whether or not this keeps hitler from declaring war on the US after pearl harbor is not as clear cut as it may seem though. While it would appear to be a clear decision from our perspective, it is possible that even a more shrewd Hitler may be so desperate to get the Japanese to distract the Russians that he would be willing to declare war on the US in spite of his troubles, and then expect to have the war in the East wrapped up by the time the Americans can mobilize and get any kind of major forces to the European theatre. He may also assume that the US concentrates most of its forces on the pacific as anyone could see how the US would view Japan as the bigger threat being that they actually attacked the US whereas Germany merely made a symbolic declaration of war.

Actually I tend to think that the assumption that the decision to declare war on the US after Pearl Harbor was a major boneheaded decision relies far too much on hindsight. One must remember that from the German perspective that even without the outrageous success of early Barbarossa and the invasions of France, Poland, Denmark, etc. it is entirely plausible to believe that the US would not be much of a factor in the war for quite some time, and that in fact the British could have been driven to peace before the US could even get major numbers of troops to the European theater before such a peace could occur.

The following factors bring me to this conclusion. First is that the US military at the time (on land anyway), was in piss poor condition, for the population of the US it was a pretty small army, it was also poorly equipped in many aspects, the m1 garand, sherman tank, jeep, and bazooka were all on the drawing board still. The state of training and discipline in much of the US army was also in a very poor state, it took a lot of bloody fighting in north Africa before the US army actually became a decent fighting force, prior to that it was a joke in comparison to the modern armies of Europe. Second is the fact that the logistical issue of transporting and supplying even a moderately sized army across the entire atlantic ocean would be a nightmare. This is only compounded by the fact that at the start of the war the US navy was hardly using the most common sense when it came to dealing with the threat of U-boats (see the happy time), which would only make it harder to get troops and supplies across the atlantic. Fourth is the fact that in spite of being more pragmatic in its decision making, the German leadership was still governed by ridiculous racially based ideology, and as such in spite of realizing that it is not invincible, the image of a US which is populated by soft, undisciplined hooligans who have been weakened due to mixing with mongrel untermench(especially jews). From the German perspective it is easy to see that they may assume that the US populace may be clamoring for peace after the first major defeat at the hands of the German supermen. Fifth is that neither hitler nor the rest of his generals had no way of knowing just how quickly the US could gear up its industry for war, especially considering that the US was still technically suffering the effects of the depression at the time. And finally, as I have said before, it is perfectly reasonable from just about any perspective to see that the US would be willing to largely ignore the European theatre and concentrate on fighting the Japanese at first, being that the Japanese actually directly attacked the US and the Germans merely made a symbolic declaration of war.

Of course with the benefit of hindsight it is easy to say that Hitlers decision to declare war on the US after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was one of his biggest blunders. However we must remember that at the time the US was not that big a threat to the third reich, and most likely would not be for some time.
 
If the answer is that you have a more pragmatic german leadership. then the scene is set for a seperate peace with the Soviets in the east after the war there grinds to a stalemate, probably with added german territory in eastern europe.

You're assuming there would be a stalemate and that the Soviets would agree to loss of territory in light of their own performance (likely better). Those are both separate points that need good evidence.
 
You're assuming there would be a stalemate and that the Soviets would agree to loss of territory in light of their own performance (likely better). Those are both separate points that need good evidence.


True, there is no guarantee of a stalemate in the east, however the possibility is quite likely. As the germans could have (somewhat)plausibly forced a stalemate IOTL even after Stalingrad. With a POD before Barbarossa even kicks off, and it knocks some sense into the German leadership, the likelihood of a stalemate being achieved at some point in the east is considerably higher. Also, what is your definition of "loss of territory"? I was thinking somewhere along the lines of the germans getting most or all of Poland, not any big chunks of the pre-war USSR. Also, any stalemate would be more or less conditional upon both sides being unable to make any additional gains due to exhaustion.

And what evidence are you looking for? I'm talking about a hypothetical scenario which takes place in all likelihood several years after a POD which drastically changes the course of the war, I'm not sure you could find evidence to argue for or against such a thing.
 
I've said what I'm about to say here in many ways over the last week or so. I'll try it one more time because I think that until you answer this question the discussion is meaningless.

In early to mid May 1941, the historic Stalin realizes that the Germans are going to invade sometime in the summer of 1941, no matter what he does, no matter what political maneuverings he performs. That's the POD we're discussing.

Now, here is the crucial question: He reaches that epiphany and does what exactly? What would the historic Stalin do in those circumstances and when precisely would he do it?

Keep in mind that as of early to mid-May he won't have an exact date for the attack. Well, actually he'll have several exact dates from various sources, ranging from May 15 out into late June.

Keep in mind that nothing Stalin does is without its cost.

Want to send factories east en mass starting in mid-May?
The sequence is: (a) Shut down production in that factory for an extended period of time while the machinery is packed up. (b) Tie up scarce railroad tonnage to send it east, which disrupts the flow of material to the factories you aren't shipping east. (c) Unpack it and get it set up again. Oh, and add in the cost of building the new factory buildings in the east and setting up housing for the workers you've uprooted. The process takes months. How long did it take uprooted factories to get going again historically? Four months? Six months? While we're at it, add in the cost of building a transportation infrastructure in the east and transporting raw and partially finished materials there. And, add in the wear and tear on a Soviet rail system that was rickety and inadequate to begin with.

Bottom line: Start sending factories east in May and you don't have as much of the crucially needed production in the summer and early fall of 1941. Granted, you potentially have more production late in the year and in early 1942, but you've got to get through the summer first.

Want to mobilize more troops in mid-to-late May 1941?
Okay, so the process is: you take the peasant out of his field (in planting season) or the factory worker out of his factory (while you're frantically trying to increase production to supply the armies you already have), you hand him a uniform and maybe a gun if you have any to spare and send him into your already overloaded training system. So, you've reduced food production-not a good idea since the Soviet Union was chronically short of food for the first couple of years of the war, or you've reduced industrial production by whatever the mobilized soldiers would have made.

You've made the Red Army bigger. Have you made it stronger? Not unless you have enough trained officers to tell the guy with the rifle what to do, enough trained logistics people to get food and ammunition to him in a fast-moving, chaotic situation, and enough transportation to keep all of the necessary logistics coming to him. Starving guys with empty rifles aren't going to stop a panzer division.

Stalin's Reluctant Soldiers claims that the Soviets didn't have enough rail or truck capacity to supply the troops they already had at the front on an ongoing basis, which is probably why they stockpiled large amounts of ammo and parts near the front.

Want to put troops on a war footing?
When is he going to do that? Mid-May? He doesn't know the exact timing of the attack yet, and as soon as he changes something substantial we no longer know it either. Put the troops on high alert in mid-May and if the attack comes on June 22 the front-line troops have lost a month of much needed training. They've also been in the field for a month or more, anticipating an invasion at any time, which means they're going to lose some of their edge. Having him wait until mid-June to put them on alert is a cheat. The historic Stalin could not know the timing of the attack well enough to get the timing of his response correct. Granted, in this case the lost training time might be worth it, but as we add in a plus for the Soviets for being on the alert we shouldn't ignore the associated minuses.

Again, the crucial question is what would Stalin do and when would he do it?
 
Axis can not do worse, Allies (and especially dirty Commies) cant do any batter, no matter what.

If that was directed at me, you might want to do a little checking before you post. All you have to do is click on the person's name and you can look at all of the threads they've started. The threads I've started are about equally divided between Axis does better and Axis does worse. Among the Axis does worse stuff:

Challenge: A Workable Red Napoleon Scenario ('Dirty Commies' take over as much of the world as possible starting in the late 1920s) https://www.alternatehistory.com/Discussion/showthread.php?t=166899

Germany Runs Out Of Bombs And Bullets Fall 1939
https://www.alternatehistory.com/Discussion/showthread.php?t=161650

Challenge Is That The Best They Could Do - Poland (Find a way for Poland to do better against Germany)
https://www.alternatehistory.com/Discussion/showthread.php?t=144517

Stalin Heads East (While the Germans are occupied with France, Stalin tries to curb-stomp Japan
https://www.alternatehistory.com/Discussion/showthread.php?t=148467

Stalin Goes All Out To Build An A-Bomb In The 1930s
https://www.alternatehistory.com/Discussion/showthread.php?t=148558

Japanese Go On a Kamikaze Naval Building Spree (Japan bankrupts itself trying to out-build the US right after World War I)
https://www.alternatehistory.com/Discussion/showthread.php?t=147734

Chamberlain Dies Early
https://www.alternatehistory.com/Discussion/showthread.php?t=61331


Britain Remains A Great Power
https://www.alternatehistory.com/Discussion/showthread.php?t=62933

I'm open to pretty much any possibility. In my AH Newsletters I have a scenario where the French stop the Germans in 1940 and a couple where the Chinese manage to battle the Japanese to a stalemate. Axis doesn't have to win, and them getting humiliated by speed-bump countries is fine with me. Actually that's my favorite kind of scenario

The problem I'm having with this scenario is not the outcome. If someone can work out what Stalin would do and it turns out that the Soviets would do better, that's fine. This is an intellectual exercise, about people who are long dead and about systems that are long dead. It doesn't matter except as a tool to understand history better.

The problem is that while a lot of people are willing to step forward and talk in generalities, nobody seems to be willing to answer a simple question: If Stalin realizes an invasion is coming, what does he do about it? That's not an unreasonable question and until it gets answered we have no idea if knowing the invasion was coming would help the Soviets or hurt them.
 
I think the limitations for Soviet preparation have been well layed out by DaleCoz, but certainly there are effective measures Stalin would have done given ample warning. The most obvious is to stockpile war materiel. Buy and borrow as much as possible. Trucks, petrol/oil/lubricant, steel, aluminum, rubber, chemicals, food stuff, etc.

Second, why not launch a preemptive strike against the German high command? If Stalin is absolutely sure the invasion is imminent, there's nothing to be lost with attempting to assassinate Hitler.

Third, bluff. Make it clear the German plot is exposed and the Soviet Army has made all necessary preparations. Make crazy news reels of 300 Soviet divisions on alert. 2,000th T-34 tank rolled out of the factories - east of the Urals. 100,000 Japanese wiped out at Khalkhin Gol. After all, the Germans don't know if that was true or not.
 

Cook

Banned
I suppose Stalin allowing Zhukov to deploy forces with greater depth and not so close to the border is probably asking for more prescience than would be realistic.
 
Majority of forces wasn't on the border. But since both first line and second line were completely unprepared, first lines were mostly overrun and second lines mostly destroyed in those huge encirclements deep in Soviet territory.

It is a miracle that Soviets actually had enough forces left in late autumn of '41 to stop the tide.
 
Quite a lively discussion here!

This has always been one of my favorite "what-if's", and some very good points have been made, particurally by Dale Coz.

The big question is just how much warning does Stalin get?

If it's just a week or two, I don't see much difference. The troops aren't caught flat-footed but with their aircraft and tanks non-operational for lack of spare parts there's not much the Soviets can do. They'll fight harder and a bit more effectively but they're still doomed.

But a month or two warning? Stalin orders non-running tanks and aircraft cannibalized for spare parts so that at least 50% of their OOB is operational within 30 days. As much fuel and supplies that can be moved forward is done. In this scenario the Germans are going to get a bloody nose but the Soviets are still going to get pushed back hard.
 
The problem is that while a lot of people are willing to step forward and talk in generalities, nobody seems to be willing to answer a simple question: If Stalin realizes an invasion is coming, what does he do about it? That's not an unreasonable question and until it gets answered we have no idea if knowing the invasion was coming would help the Soviets or hurt them.

He orders a wider mobilization, probably, second echelons. Whatever other plans, this is likely. Manpower is raised and sent to staging areas, most of them deep within the country. That was standard.

That alone, as well as a month of digging trenches around Briansk and elsewhere where such were lacking, should be enough to better the outcome defensively.

The OP specifically asks for no spoiling attack.

It seems fairly straightforward to me.
 
I mentioned early on that British intelligence thought at one point that a German military demonstration followed by economic demands on the Soviets was more likely than an actual German attack on the Soviet Union. Someone asked for a source. I didn't really go looking for one, but I stumbled across a reference to that in The Road To Stalingrad. Apparently through late May British intelligence thought that the Germans were massing forces in the east to extract more favorable economic conditions from the Soviets. As the buildup continued, they realized that an actual attack was in the works.

The money quote is on page 89: "...the British Joint Intelligence Committee predicted in late May;in an extensive review of Soviet-German relations, the conclusion stood out that 'Germany would have more to gain by negotiations than war' and though Hitler might resort to a show of force during the bargaining, it was unlikely he would wish to go over the brink."

The more I read, the more I see that the Soviet problems were a lot deeper than Stalin sticking his fingers in his ears and chanting "Not going to happen". A little later in Road, they quote the commander of a Soviet mechanized corp at a meeting June 10th. His commander ordered him to disperse command centers in the woods. He said that he had already done that, but that his real problems were that (a) half of his corp was untrained recruits, (b) While they had received artillery, they hadn't received ammunition, and (c) While this was on paper a mechanized corp, they only had enough transport for a quarter of the troops. The rest would have to move on foot.

Stalin was actually in the middle of a mini-purge of the officer corp in the weeks leading up to the German invasion. The targets were veterans of the Soviet intervention in the Spanish Civil War, including several high-ranking airforce officials. Apparently the officers had developed strong ties during their time in Spain and maintained them after they returned. In Stalin's paranoid personal universe that was enough to get them purged.

If the objective is to get the Soviets to do better in the summer of 1941, the logical thing might be to pull back most of their forces to the pre-1939 frontier and just have light forces in the frontier areas. Moving heavy forces into the areas the Soviets took away from Poland, Romania, the Baltic Republics and to a lesser degree Finland meant that (a) They were in areas where the civilian populations were often hostile and were quite willing to pass info on Soviet dispositions to the Germans if they got a chance, and even sabotage Soviet troop movements and communications. (b) The Soviets were defending in areas where they hadn't had time to build up a transportation infrastructure. They hadn't built the rail network in the new areas well enough to supply the troops on the frontier in the event of war, which meant that they had to stockpile supplies in forward areas, where they could easily be overrun. They didn't have enough trucks to make up for the deficiency of the railroads. All of this also meant that troops on the border could for the most part only retreat as fast as they could walk, which is a problem when you are facing panzers. (c) The military infrastructure of the border area wasn't ready. There were too few airports, and many weren't sited for Soviet needs. That meant overcrowded airports that were too close to the border--often within 10 miles. How do you see an air attack coming early enough to get fighters up to protect against it when the border is two or three minutes flying time from your airbase? Realistically you can't, not without radar and filtering centers.

Of course if the Soviets do that (withdraw most forces to the Sept 1939 border), the Germans would presumably react. Their plan called for destroying the bulk of the Soviet forces in their forward positions. If they couldn't do that, they would presumably adjust, though I'm not sure how.
 
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