Graehame
Banned
In 1861 the Confederates won the Battle of Wilson's Creek SW of Springfield, Mo., in the process killing Gen. Lyon, the Union commander. Union forces withdrew in disarray to Rolla, Missouri.
The smart move at this point would have been for the Confeds to pursue all the way to St. Louis, to assault the city, take it, & to heavily fortify it. There are several reasons why this didn't happen.
1. During his march pursuing the Confeds to Springfield, Gen. Lyon seized the capital at Jeff City, drove out the Confed sympathizers, & installed a Union gov't by force. This prevented Gov. Jackson from getting a secession resolution passed, & Gen. McCullough-- commanding Confed forces from Arkansas & Texas making up half of the Confed force at Wilson's Creek-- didn't want to risk his forces on behalf of a state that hadn't even joined the Confederacy.
2. Gen. Lyon had also seized most of the firearms & other supplies that had been intended to equip the Confed Missouri State Guard. Consequently the State Guard, under command of Gen. Price, wore ragged civilian clothing & were armed with whatever hunting rifles & shotguns they'd brought with them from home-- about half of them being unarmed. McCullough was very unimpressed with their appearance, their discipline, & their performance, & he didn't want to have to rely on them so far from his base in NW Arkansas.
3. In McCullough's mind, the deeper he penetrated into Missouri the more he created a salient, with Union Illinois & Indiana to the E, Union Iowa & Wisconsin to the N, & Union Kansas & Nebraska to the W. St. Louis, to him, looked untenable. (Although, in point of fact, even half of the 140 guns that were used to fortify Columbus, Ky. at this stage of the war would have served nicely to strengthen St. Louis without appreciably weakening Columbus.)
Had McCullough marched on St. Louis, then the Union forces retreating from Wilson's Creek would probably have been reinforced from the St. Louis garrison, & possibly by Iowa & Illinois militia rushed into the breech. It is likely that the battle-proven Confeds would have defeated such a hastily scratched-together force & continued on to St. Louis, which would have fallen. This would have rung loud alarm bells from Springfield, Il. all the way to Washington DC, & orders would have been issued to recapture St. Louis at all costs. Nevertheless, it would have taken time for the Union to assemble a suitable force-- say a month or two-- during which period volunteers could have been armed from the St. Louis arsenal, cannon & Confed regulars could have been brought up from Columbus, & the city-- at least the portions lying W of the Mississippi R, S of the Missouri, & N of the Meramec, which is almost all of it-- made virtually impregnable. To this extent St. Louis is a natural fortress.
St. Louis would be supplied, not from NW Arkansas, but from NE Arkansas, on roads that ran up the W bank of the Mississippi R. It would therefore be necessary to establish heavily defended garrisons at or near Labadie, Ste. Genevieve, Cape Girardeau, & Columbus-Belmont Landing. Confed control of the Mississippi R between Columbus & St. Louis would probably rule out Union offensives vs Belmont Landing, Fts. Henry & Donelson, & possibly even Paducah, Ky unless & until St. Louis was recaptured. (Wilson's Creek was fought on 10 Aug, Paducah on 3 Sep, & Belmont on 7 Nov. By 3 Sep it would have been obvious that St. Louis was seriously threatened, even if it hadn't yet fallen. By 7 Nov St. Louis is firmly in Confed hands & fortified.) The task of recapturing St. Louis would probably involve the services of Gen. U.S. Grant, although this early in the war he'd almost certainly be working for either Halleck or his replacement.
Confed control of St. Louis secures Missouri for the Confederacy, threatens Illinois, & anchors the Confed defensive line of the Mississippi R. This is not to say that the Union can't take it-- they probably will, but doing so against an adequate Confed defense will take 6 to 12 months, prolonging the war by at least that period of time. In particular, Confed control of St. Louis gives the Missouri State Guard increased legitimacy & allows them to arm & train, releasing the Artkansas-Texas troops for other duties.
In light of the historical dissatisfaction in Northern states over the course of the war 1861-64, a Confed capture of St. Louis in Sep-Oct '61 could have been decisive.
The smart move at this point would have been for the Confeds to pursue all the way to St. Louis, to assault the city, take it, & to heavily fortify it. There are several reasons why this didn't happen.
1. During his march pursuing the Confeds to Springfield, Gen. Lyon seized the capital at Jeff City, drove out the Confed sympathizers, & installed a Union gov't by force. This prevented Gov. Jackson from getting a secession resolution passed, & Gen. McCullough-- commanding Confed forces from Arkansas & Texas making up half of the Confed force at Wilson's Creek-- didn't want to risk his forces on behalf of a state that hadn't even joined the Confederacy.
2. Gen. Lyon had also seized most of the firearms & other supplies that had been intended to equip the Confed Missouri State Guard. Consequently the State Guard, under command of Gen. Price, wore ragged civilian clothing & were armed with whatever hunting rifles & shotguns they'd brought with them from home-- about half of them being unarmed. McCullough was very unimpressed with their appearance, their discipline, & their performance, & he didn't want to have to rely on them so far from his base in NW Arkansas.
3. In McCullough's mind, the deeper he penetrated into Missouri the more he created a salient, with Union Illinois & Indiana to the E, Union Iowa & Wisconsin to the N, & Union Kansas & Nebraska to the W. St. Louis, to him, looked untenable. (Although, in point of fact, even half of the 140 guns that were used to fortify Columbus, Ky. at this stage of the war would have served nicely to strengthen St. Louis without appreciably weakening Columbus.)
Had McCullough marched on St. Louis, then the Union forces retreating from Wilson's Creek would probably have been reinforced from the St. Louis garrison, & possibly by Iowa & Illinois militia rushed into the breech. It is likely that the battle-proven Confeds would have defeated such a hastily scratched-together force & continued on to St. Louis, which would have fallen. This would have rung loud alarm bells from Springfield, Il. all the way to Washington DC, & orders would have been issued to recapture St. Louis at all costs. Nevertheless, it would have taken time for the Union to assemble a suitable force-- say a month or two-- during which period volunteers could have been armed from the St. Louis arsenal, cannon & Confed regulars could have been brought up from Columbus, & the city-- at least the portions lying W of the Mississippi R, S of the Missouri, & N of the Meramec, which is almost all of it-- made virtually impregnable. To this extent St. Louis is a natural fortress.
St. Louis would be supplied, not from NW Arkansas, but from NE Arkansas, on roads that ran up the W bank of the Mississippi R. It would therefore be necessary to establish heavily defended garrisons at or near Labadie, Ste. Genevieve, Cape Girardeau, & Columbus-Belmont Landing. Confed control of the Mississippi R between Columbus & St. Louis would probably rule out Union offensives vs Belmont Landing, Fts. Henry & Donelson, & possibly even Paducah, Ky unless & until St. Louis was recaptured. (Wilson's Creek was fought on 10 Aug, Paducah on 3 Sep, & Belmont on 7 Nov. By 3 Sep it would have been obvious that St. Louis was seriously threatened, even if it hadn't yet fallen. By 7 Nov St. Louis is firmly in Confed hands & fortified.) The task of recapturing St. Louis would probably involve the services of Gen. U.S. Grant, although this early in the war he'd almost certainly be working for either Halleck or his replacement.
Confed control of St. Louis secures Missouri for the Confederacy, threatens Illinois, & anchors the Confed defensive line of the Mississippi R. This is not to say that the Union can't take it-- they probably will, but doing so against an adequate Confed defense will take 6 to 12 months, prolonging the war by at least that period of time. In particular, Confed control of St. Louis gives the Missouri State Guard increased legitimacy & allows them to arm & train, releasing the Artkansas-Texas troops for other duties.
In light of the historical dissatisfaction in Northern states over the course of the war 1861-64, a Confed capture of St. Louis in Sep-Oct '61 could have been decisive.