When Yugoslavia fell apart in constituent states, war engulfed the region. In Slovenia and Croatia the situation stabilised relatively quickly, but in Bosnia a drawn-out war was developing between Bosnian-Muslims and Bosnian-Serbs, the latter being supported by Serbian artillery and airforce, as well as irregular Serbian units. The international community, chiefly the European Community and the United Nations, got involved by negotiating cease-fires and truces, but none held up. Nonetheless, an international peacekeeping force - UNPROFOR (United Nations PROtection FORce) - was sent to the region.
UNPROFOR's tasks in the disputed areas of Croatia were of simple peacekeeping kind. Its personnel was strictly neutral, while the local parties agreed to its presence in a buffer zone. In Bosnia, however, both the tasks of UNPROFOR and the prevailing situation were different. First of all, there was no peace to keep. Second, UNPROFOR's presence was not welcomed by all parties. Even its neutral role was questioned as, according to the logic of ethnic war, bringing humanitarian aid to the civilians of an other ethnic community, was equated to augmenting the stamina of the enemy. Consequently, in Bosnia, UNPROFOR was hardly tolerated by the stronger party. In the end, it was simply brushed aside when this party decided to eliminate the civilians UNPROFOR was supposed to help.
In Bosnia UNPROFOR was certainly not keeping the peace, and it was not enforcing one either. The international community, however, was too divided to redress this unfortunate situation.
UNPROFOR units were sent to Bosnian-Muslim enclaves in Bosnian-Serb territory. These enclaves were nominally demilitarised and were called "safe areas" by the UN. Srebrenica was once such safe area. The main UNPROFOR presence in Srebrenica was a Dutch military unit, about 300 strong, called DUTCHBAT. It had to be supplied through Bosnian-Serb territory though...
Early in the morning of July 6th, 1995, a Bosnian-Serb army (BSA) attacked Srebrenica. The Bosnian-Serbs had up to 12000 soldiers, about 3000 of which from Serbia. The Bosnian-Muslim Army (BIH) had 3000 men defending. DUTCHBAT, as mentioned, had a total of about 500 men spread through the enclave. Their situation was difficult though, as Metselaar explains:
"The Dutch UN battalion was no real contester, handicapped as it was that some 150 of its members were unable to return to the enclave as a result of a well-planned blockade of the BSA, that only 16% of the operational requirement for ammunition was available, that its fuel supplies were mostly exhausted, that there was a structural lack of fresh food, drinking water, and (partly as a result of all these problems) that the morale of the battalion had become low."
Another problem was the complicated structure of UN command in the region. At the end of July 6th, the UNPROFOR force commander reported to the UN administration that it was "overall a quiet day militarily". Evidently the severity of the situation wasn't clear yet at UNPROFOR HQ. This is probably because communication from DUTCHBAT in Srebrenica had to routed through Sector North East in Tuzla, via Bosnia Herzegovina Command in Sarajevo, to UNPROFOR in Zagreb. Of course it didn't help that DUTCHBAT just hours before the attack (and after observing a convoy of tanks and APCs!) reported that "the situation is calm and stable. We expect no major changes for the next 24 hours."
In the morning of July 6th, the BSA conducted three infantry attacks in the south-eastern corner of the enclave. These were all repelled by the BIH. The BSA responded with heavy artillery fire, hitting a DUTCHBAT observation post in the process. The BSA infantry attacks continued in the east of the enclave; the BIH commander asked for assistance from DUTCHBAT, but that was refused. This angered the BIH, as they had understood the UN presence as meaning that the UN forces would help defend the enclave. However, politicians had severely restricted UNPROFOR's ability to (re)act by imposing strict Rules of Engagement - DUTCHBAT could only use their weapons for self-defence.
For instance, the Dutch commander Karremans did request Close Air Support (i.e. air bombardment) after the attack on the observation post. UNPROFOR command refused the request, since the rules of engagement stipulated that air support could only provided if UN forces were under fire. Since the observation post was no longer being fired upon (it was already heavily damaged), no air support could be provided.
July 7th was relatively quiet, but on July 8th the fighting intensified. Heavy artillery fire forced the BIH to fall back. They asked DUTCHBAT to give them access to the weapons which had been collected as part of the demilitarisation effort, but DUTCHBAT refused.
BSA tanks entered the enclave in the south-east. They fired on BIH positions and a DUTCHBAT observation post. BSA soldiers approached the observation post under a white flag, and told the Dutch soldiers that they had 10 minutes to leave. Since several tanks had trained their guns on the observation position, the observation post commander decided to retreat.
As the DUTCHBAT soldiers were retreating from the observation post in an APC, they were stopped by BIH soldiers constructing a barricade just 200 metres away. The BIH soldiers demanded the Dutch soldiers stayed. Not wanting to serve as human shields, the observation post commander ordered the APC to close the hatches and break the barricade. A BIH soldier responded by throwing a hand grenade before the hatches were fully closed, killing one Dutch soldier.
In the afternoon the DUTCHBAT commander once again requested close air support. The request was once again denied, but UNPROFOR did accept a NATO offer to fly a couple of fighter jets over the area as a show of force. An attempt by DUTCHBAT to re-establish an observation post near the lost observation post was stopped by BIH soldiers. In the evening another observation post was lost to the BSA. Civilians all across the enclave started fleeing to the city of Srebrenica proper.
On July 9th the BSA took a total of 30 DUTCHBAT soldiers hostage. DUTCHBAT soldiers at another observation post, who were feeling threatened by BIH soldiers, were happy when they got the opportunity to surrender to the BSA. A fourth observation post was taken by the BSA, with the DUTCHBAT soldiers being allowed to leave in their APC. Again the APC was stopped by BIH soldiers. This time the observation post commander decided to wait it out. After negotiating for a day, they were allowed to continue to the DUTCHBAT compound.
Meanwhile UNPROFOR command had started preparation for close air support. By now though 30 DUTCHBAT soldiers were in Bosnian-Serbian hands and the DUTCHBAT commander didn't want to risk their lives by provoking the BSA with air strikes. Nonetheless, NATO planes would be ready for air strikes the following morning.
Politically and strategically, the international community was still guessing as to what the Serbian intentions were. Srebrenica was of no military value and it was filled with refugees. They would only be a bother for the Bosnian-Serbs to take off. The consensus was that the BSA was only interested in taking the surrounding country-side, leaving a smaller enclave. At the same time though the BSA high command saw that the attack was progressing very well, and they ordered the capture of the entire enclave.
Unaware of the BSA command's decision, the UN and UNPROFOR issued demands to the BSA: they were to return to their original positions and should release all DUTCHBAT soldiers. Moreover, they were told that DUTCHBAT would take up 'blocking positions' near Srebrenica and that if any blocking position were to be attacked, air strikes would follow. The 'blocking position' was a political tool, not a military one. Since the rules of engagement stipulated that weapons could only be using in self-defence, it would be very easy for the BSA to simply walk around the blocking positions. Moreover, any air strikes in response to an attack still would have to be requested through the entire chain of command.
On July 10, DUTCHBAT reluctantly set up the blocking positions. They couldn't even use their anti-tank weapons to give the positions some 'teeth', as the Bosnian-Serbs had blocked necessary supplies for their maintenance and the Dutch government had forbidden DUTCHBAT from firing the anti-tank weapons. A large BIH counter-attack against the BSA complicated the setting up of the blocking positions. Initially the BIH was successful, but BSA reinforcements reversed the tide. There was fighting all around the DUTCHBAT blocking positions. More refugees flocked to the city, which by now was under BSA artillery fire. Early in the evening the BSA was threatening to cut off the blocking positions from the main compound; DUTCHBAT abandoned the blocking positions after firing a brief machine gun salvo.
In the morning DUTCHBAT had requested close air support, but by the time the request was routed to UNPROFOR HQ the BSA advance had stopped. The air support was called off. When the BSA continued their advance in the afternoon a new request was submitted according to the DUTCHBAT commander, but there are no logs of such a request. In the evening, when it was clear that the BSA was trying to take over the city, another request was done. This time UNPROFOR HQ was divided on whether or not the BSA would be taking over the city and if air support would be necessary. Since no decision could be reached, no air support would come that evening.
Meanwhile the BSA had used Dutch hostages to relay a message to DUTCHBAT: under no circumstances should BIH forces or civilians be allowed to enter the DUTCHBAT compound. The BSA offered a safe retreat to DUTCHBAT and any civilians. After this, the UNPROFOR commander had a telephone conversation with the BSA high command.
The DUTCHBAT commander was under the impression that the UNPROFOR commander had given the BSA a strict ultimatum: start leaving the enclave by 0600 hours or air strikes would follow. The DUTCHBAT commander believed some 40 NATO planes were ready for the air strikes. He told the DUTCHBAT soldiers and the BIH as much just after midnight on July 11th.
At 0600 no planes were over the enclave though. Nothing happened. For the first time in 5 days, Bosnian-Serbian artillery was not firing in the morning. Likely they were expected air strikes too. It turns out that NATO planes were over the Adriatic from 0600 onwards, waiting for a target list. Meanwhile the Forward Air Controllers near Srebrenica were waiting for the planes to come to relay targets to them. At 0800 a Dutch officer phoned Sector North East in Tuzla to give them air support request with a target list, but he was told to use the proper form. He filled out the form and faxed it, but it was returned to him because it wasn't filled out completely (you'd hope I'm making this up, but I'm absolutely serious). At this point they decided to send the request directly to UNPROFOR HQ in Sarajevo. The request was denied an hour later, for unclear reasons.
At 1000 hours DUTCHBAT once again sent a close air support request, this time by fax to Sarajevo and by phone Tuzla. Tuzla responded that the request should be made in writing and that NATO planes were no longer available because they had returned to base. The Sarajevo request was recieved there at 1050 hours and approved by 1115 hours, when the approval was sent to Zagreb and to the NATO air base in Italy. The planes still had no target list however..
Meanwhile the BSA had commenced their attack on the city proper. DUTCHBAT soldiers and BIH forces retreated towards the DUTCHBAT compound early in the afternoon. Refugees entered the compound, and a BSA shell hit the compound.
At 1430 hours the first close air support arrived at the enclave. There was a complication however. The regular Dutch Forward Air Controller team was no longer complete because a member had suffered a mental breakdown. Assuming the entire team was no longer able to function, Dutch commando's had taken over the role of Forward Air Controller. The regular Forward Air Controller team was still active though. These two FAC teams were unaware of each other's presence and couldn't hear each other's radios.
Two Dutch planes were the first to arrive at the scene. They were also unaware there were two seperate FAC teams and followed instructions from both of them at the same time, leading to confusion. Once this was resolved, the first bombs were dropped at 1442 hours. Since the FAC were under fire, they couldn't see if the targets were hit. Two American planes arrived slightly later, but they didn't follow the proper procedure of making contact with the FAC team. After a SAM missile was fired, the American planes turned around. Another FAC team located slightly farther away tried to direct them to a target, but since that team wasn't under fire, the rules of engagement didn't allow the American planes to bomb it.
At 1550 hours the Bosnian-Serbs threatened to kill the 30 DUTCHBAT hostages if the air strikes wouldn't stop. Furthermore, the BSA redoubled their efforts to take over the city. All DUTCHBAT forces not yet at the compound outside the city started retreating towards it, some while taking fire. BIH forces had started to retreat towards Tuzla. The city of Srebrenica fell to the BSA.
The DUTCHBAT compound outside of the city was surrounded by refugees, who in turn were surrounded by the BSA. With the city taken the BIH on the run, the BSA turned their attention to the refugees. Bosnian-Serbian soldiers started seperating the women and children from the man. DUTCHBAT soldiers were present and tried to maintain order (without trying to stop the seperation). Any refugees inside the compound were expelled from it and had to join the other refugees. The BSA promised that the civilians would be evacuated, but this was false. The women and children were deported, and the men were quickly executed. DUTCHBAT soldiers didn't see any executions take place, but they did see evidence of them happening. In other areas of the enclave, Bosnian-Serbs attacked refugees and murdered civilians.