Sputniks... an Alternate Space Race
- Thread starter neopeius
- Start date
that was one of first Apollo Direct landing proposal.
there were several proposals like landing the Apollo CSM like aircraft on skirts on lunar surface.
in the end it was design like this: (Douglas Lunar Gemini proposal )
Lunar retrograde module
it brings Capsule and Earth return stage in lunar orbit and then down near lunar surface.
with rest speed of 200 meter/seconds and several kilometer over lunar surface, the Lunar retrograde module is drop.
Terminal landing module take over and land the spacecraft on Moon.
the TLM with it landing gear forms a launch platform were ERS&capsule rest on.
Douglas made several study for use of Gemini spacecraft and 2 men Apollo craft for direct lunar landing.
note on picture that astronaut sit upright during landing and use a "periscope" to see
on ERS were two fuel under consideration, liquid storable fuel or solid rocket fuel.
in last several solid rocket fires in sequence and bring the capsule to earth.
it had the advance to build ERS shorter and Astronaut had les to climb up an down the spacecraft
1961 General Dynamics M-1 lunar spacecraft proposal with solid rockets
Last edited:
I'd have to reread what happened, because I don't remember many of the details and also wasn't able to read a big central chunk of the timeline. However, my gut feeling is that the Titan III and derivatives are versatile and reasonably capable craft, so that you could do rather a lot merely by improving the upper stage(s) (for instance, stretching the second stage and making it hydrolox) and modifying the boosters (7-segment being the most straightforward mod). At worst, you could always build the larger-diameter core studied in the 1960s, which would give you something capable of lifting around 50-100% as much as the Saturn IB, but would have common infrastructure with the Titan IIIB and Titan IIIC for national security payloads. That seems rather economical to me.
Hm, now I kinda want to do an "all-Titan" timeline...
My timeline has a lot of Titan in it.
You should catch up Regarding direct-ascent/EOR lunar missions, I have a few pictures to use for the next update. If you read further up, you'll see McDonnell-Douglas dropped the ball on lunar gemini (Delphi) in this timeline. Just a bad roll of the dice.
Just so's you know, I am hard at work on updates. Yes, plural. My wife and I are recovering from the flu, but my nomination for the Turtledoves is inspiring me to work through it.
For 1970, I'm trying something a little different. It may or may not work. Instead of giving you the year piecemeal from the perspective of the different agencies, I'm trying a chronological approach. It means far more prep time to start updating, but quicker updates once I start. The only thing I worry about is decreasing the dramatic tension (since readers will have kind of a Godlike view of the world) but on the other hand, it's exciting to have an *as it happens* sort of feel.
I'll try it, and if we like it, awesome.
For 1970, I'm trying something a little different. It may or may not work. Instead of giving you the year piecemeal from the perspective of the different agencies, I'm trying a chronological approach. It means far more prep time to start updating, but quicker updates once I start. The only thing I worry about is decreasing the dramatic tension (since readers will have kind of a Godlike view of the world) but on the other hand, it's exciting to have an *as it happens* sort of feel.
I'll try it, and if we like it, awesome.
Update #35 Starting the new year, American-style
This update is a bit of an experiment, approaching 1970 holistically rather than piecemeal. It means a longer prep time, but then regular updates.
The Soviet moon landing meant a new breath of life for the American space budget. A Congress that had sharpened its knives and licked its chops at the chance to cut space pork and hand it over to welfare recipients (as proposed by many Democrats), more worthy defense projects (proposed by many Republicans), or back to the People, themselves (proposed by an overshouted minority in both parties), now had to reevaluate their plans.
The Space Race wasn't over, and there was concern that, despite the rise of detente in the past couple of years, America's soft stance on Communism had given the Soviets time to regroup and surpass the West. Moreover, it wasn't just about prestige anymore--it was about seizing the higher ground.
NASA was quick to capitalize on the short-lived new phase of Moon Fever. If the civilian program was to survive well into the 70s, it was going to have to evolve beyond annual expensive moon shots. To that end, Director Webb concentrated on enhancements to the Saturn line. In addition to the Saturn II, a modular successor to both the IB and V lines, work was also done on the truly massive Saturn V Mark 4, which would throw 500,000 kg into orbit in a single throw. The mammoth rocket would require an overhaul of the entire Canaveral infrastructure but would actually be more efficient, ultimately, than the launch of three or four contemporary Saturn Vs. The plan was to be able to launch really big space station components by mid-decade, design of which began in 1970.
And there is no question that NASA was committed to its station program. In addition to maintaining its successful (if utilitarian) Asgard stations, NASA contracted Boeing set to work on a successor. It would be a modular system for easy upgrading. The first module designed was a fuel station, so Artemis support could be maintained. This modular station was designed to be compatible with the ministations concurrently being developed (though by a different and, unfortunately, slower contractor--McDonnell Douglas). Part of the ministation's delay was the result of emphasis being put on adaptability for its role as part of a Martian spacecraft.
Boeing also began designing 15-ton lunar base modules along similar lines to its space station components. Essentially, NASA's station policy mirrored its Saturn policy--maximum modularity for maximum cost efficiency.
Supporting the station was a follow-on design of Artemis with a cargo bay and manipulator arms instead of the big SM fuel tank. Even with the budget boom, this project was a design too far, especially given the flexibility and relative inexpensiveness of the Delphi-derived Thor. Cargo Artemis ("Ceres") never went beyond the initial plan stage, and it quietly disappeared from the 1971 budget.
One promising plan evolution of existing hardware, however, as an unmanned Artemis derivative designed to bring 15 tons of supplies or a 15 ton base component to the moon. Because the vessel did not have to support astronauts or return to Earth, a mission could be launched with a single Saturn V.
The last big project started by NASA was a study of a reusable winged spaceplane. Excitement for the project was rather lukewarm, but a cheap multi-mission alternative to the Artemis and aging Delphi was a good idea, at least on paper. Max Faget's stubby-winged concept was the most popular configuration at the time.
***
Coasting the wave of increased funding that resulted from the Soviet moon landing, the Department of Defense diversified its pursuits. The thinking was that, if their eggs were put in enough baskets, at least some of the programs would survive a future budget cut.
One of the most ambitious projects was Argo, a follow-on spaceplane utilizing technology pioneered by the X-20 programs, but involving a whole new design. The goal was to develop a partially or fully reusable spaceplane which would combine heavy lift capability with the flexibility of the Dynasoar. It would hopefully be cheaper than anything NASA could build, potentially replacing Artemis and Delphi derivatives. It could deploy satellites and retrieve (friendly and enemy) satellites for inspection back home. Initial plans involved a two-plane, fully reusable system. Both would be liquid fueled and piloted. The first stage would take off with the second on its back and then return to Earth, while the second, roughly a scaled up S-23, would head off into orbit.
It was undoubtedly an ambitious project, one designed to replace the Titan booster family (and potentially cripple competitors using them) and to deliver large numbers of people into orbit. In addition to being able to carry seven passengers, the initial Argo design was usually depicted with a squad of "space marines" in the cargo bay.
Two mission profiles were to be unique to the new vessel. One was a single-orbit "once around." This would allow the spaceplane to do on-orbit work and deorbit before the Soviets could intercept. The Argo would have some 2000km of cross-range capability on landing.
The other profile involve carrying space-based weaponry into orbit for testing. This was completely illegal pursuant to the Outer Space Treaty of 1968, but it would also be difficult to confirm absolutely.
Most attractively, the Argo would be able to fly at least twelve times per year.
Another ambitious project, one that returned from the shelf, was the Phoenix 2-man space station to be launched into polar orbit optimized for constant visual and radar surveillance. Resolution of station cameras would be as good as .2m--better than the NRO's satellites of the time.
There would also be an attached spaceplane that could be used for bombing, surveillance, anti-satellite duties, etc. A geosynchronous station was also a possibility
Planned operational life for the station was 40 days. An S-23 Pegasus could bring enough provisions for an additional 40 days.
The Department even secured funding for a parallel lunar project. With each NASA landing requiring two giant Saturn Vs, it stood to reason (so Clark Clifford urged) that if one could put everything on a single Saturn V, or perhaps two cheaper Titan 3Ls, one could launch a very inexpensive lunar mission indeed. To do so would require a complete redesign of the lunar spacecraft, involving a version of the Lunar Orbit Rendezvous proposed almost a decade before. Lockheed and TRW were awarded contracts to develop a small lunar lander to attach to a stripped-down Artemis or some other craft. It was not quite a spacecraft without a mission--the Air Force liked the idea of a dedicated and cheap in-space vehicle for repair and station construction.
Work also continued on the Titan 3M, the Adonis space fighter as well as a transstage to make the Dynasoar family more flexible, and the Orpheus geosynchronous communications satellite.
Of course, DoD couldn't have everything, even in a boom year. And thus, the S-22 made its quiet final exit from the lists of extant military spaceplanes. No examples survive, all of the parts of existing or in-production vessels being recycled for S-21 use or scrapped.
***
Perhaps the biggest budget increase (percentage-based) in the wake of the Soviet moon landing went to the Office of Space Science. NASA's unmanned program had already shown it was on the way toward, if not directly turning a profit, increasing the profitability of the nation. The suspension of the Orbital Observatories program also freed up some funds.
In development at the OSS were the Advanced Exploratory Spacecraft: Solar (AES), the Mercury flyby probe, and two Martian-aimed endeavours: an improved Valkyrie orbiter and a bus-and-lander revival of the canceled Thurisoz based on the lunar Isa.
The lynchpin to OSS' success was its partnership with the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). Using shared technology, the OSS' Earth Resources Technology Satellite (ERTS) and Lunar Geological Observer (LGO) satellites had already proven their worth. Director's Fletcher and Flax (OSS and NRO, respectively) watched each other's backs when Secretary of Defense Clifford argued for more manned flights (though even their best efforts could not defeat the tremendous publicity DoD would receive in latter 1970).
***
The NRO's paramount goal was determining whether or not the Soviets planned to return to the moon, and when. Resources were poured into intelligence programs both terrestrial and space-bound. At least one Soviet agent was turned into a valuable double (see "Checkmate", Knopf Press 1994). American attempts to infiltrate agents into the Soviet space and missile industries proved less fruitful--Andropov was still circling all the tents to keep America clueless about the Soviet's slow development of 2nd-strike nuclear weapons
Development continued on the geosynchronous versions of the Creon ELINT probe as well as the Ares orbital launch detection satellite. Work progressed on the next-generation Hebe satellite, which monitored nuclear tests. The ill-fated Athena real-time reconnaissance satellite continued to have troubles in development.
This update is a bit of an experiment, approaching 1970 holistically rather than piecemeal. It means a longer prep time, but then regular updates.
The Soviet moon landing meant a new breath of life for the American space budget. A Congress that had sharpened its knives and licked its chops at the chance to cut space pork and hand it over to welfare recipients (as proposed by many Democrats), more worthy defense projects (proposed by many Republicans), or back to the People, themselves (proposed by an overshouted minority in both parties), now had to reevaluate their plans.
The Space Race wasn't over, and there was concern that, despite the rise of detente in the past couple of years, America's soft stance on Communism had given the Soviets time to regroup and surpass the West. Moreover, it wasn't just about prestige anymore--it was about seizing the higher ground.
NASA was quick to capitalize on the short-lived new phase of Moon Fever. If the civilian program was to survive well into the 70s, it was going to have to evolve beyond annual expensive moon shots. To that end, Director Webb concentrated on enhancements to the Saturn line. In addition to the Saturn II, a modular successor to both the IB and V lines, work was also done on the truly massive Saturn V Mark 4, which would throw 500,000 kg into orbit in a single throw. The mammoth rocket would require an overhaul of the entire Canaveral infrastructure but would actually be more efficient, ultimately, than the launch of three or four contemporary Saturn Vs. The plan was to be able to launch really big space station components by mid-decade, design of which began in 1970.
And there is no question that NASA was committed to its station program. In addition to maintaining its successful (if utilitarian) Asgard stations, NASA contracted Boeing set to work on a successor. It would be a modular system for easy upgrading. The first module designed was a fuel station, so Artemis support could be maintained. This modular station was designed to be compatible with the ministations concurrently being developed (though by a different and, unfortunately, slower contractor--McDonnell Douglas). Part of the ministation's delay was the result of emphasis being put on adaptability for its role as part of a Martian spacecraft.
Boeing also began designing 15-ton lunar base modules along similar lines to its space station components. Essentially, NASA's station policy mirrored its Saturn policy--maximum modularity for maximum cost efficiency.
Supporting the station was a follow-on design of Artemis with a cargo bay and manipulator arms instead of the big SM fuel tank. Even with the budget boom, this project was a design too far, especially given the flexibility and relative inexpensiveness of the Delphi-derived Thor. Cargo Artemis ("Ceres") never went beyond the initial plan stage, and it quietly disappeared from the 1971 budget.
One promising plan evolution of existing hardware, however, as an unmanned Artemis derivative designed to bring 15 tons of supplies or a 15 ton base component to the moon. Because the vessel did not have to support astronauts or return to Earth, a mission could be launched with a single Saturn V.
The last big project started by NASA was a study of a reusable winged spaceplane. Excitement for the project was rather lukewarm, but a cheap multi-mission alternative to the Artemis and aging Delphi was a good idea, at least on paper. Max Faget's stubby-winged concept was the most popular configuration at the time.
***
Coasting the wave of increased funding that resulted from the Soviet moon landing, the Department of Defense diversified its pursuits. The thinking was that, if their eggs were put in enough baskets, at least some of the programs would survive a future budget cut.
One of the most ambitious projects was Argo, a follow-on spaceplane utilizing technology pioneered by the X-20 programs, but involving a whole new design. The goal was to develop a partially or fully reusable spaceplane which would combine heavy lift capability with the flexibility of the Dynasoar. It would hopefully be cheaper than anything NASA could build, potentially replacing Artemis and Delphi derivatives. It could deploy satellites and retrieve (friendly and enemy) satellites for inspection back home. Initial plans involved a two-plane, fully reusable system. Both would be liquid fueled and piloted. The first stage would take off with the second on its back and then return to Earth, while the second, roughly a scaled up S-23, would head off into orbit.
It was undoubtedly an ambitious project, one designed to replace the Titan booster family (and potentially cripple competitors using them) and to deliver large numbers of people into orbit. In addition to being able to carry seven passengers, the initial Argo design was usually depicted with a squad of "space marines" in the cargo bay.
Two mission profiles were to be unique to the new vessel. One was a single-orbit "once around." This would allow the spaceplane to do on-orbit work and deorbit before the Soviets could intercept. The Argo would have some 2000km of cross-range capability on landing.
The other profile involve carrying space-based weaponry into orbit for testing. This was completely illegal pursuant to the Outer Space Treaty of 1968, but it would also be difficult to confirm absolutely.
Most attractively, the Argo would be able to fly at least twelve times per year.
Another ambitious project, one that returned from the shelf, was the Phoenix 2-man space station to be launched into polar orbit optimized for constant visual and radar surveillance. Resolution of station cameras would be as good as .2m--better than the NRO's satellites of the time.
There would also be an attached spaceplane that could be used for bombing, surveillance, anti-satellite duties, etc. A geosynchronous station was also a possibility
Planned operational life for the station was 40 days. An S-23 Pegasus could bring enough provisions for an additional 40 days.
The Department even secured funding for a parallel lunar project. With each NASA landing requiring two giant Saturn Vs, it stood to reason (so Clark Clifford urged) that if one could put everything on a single Saturn V, or perhaps two cheaper Titan 3Ls, one could launch a very inexpensive lunar mission indeed. To do so would require a complete redesign of the lunar spacecraft, involving a version of the Lunar Orbit Rendezvous proposed almost a decade before. Lockheed and TRW were awarded contracts to develop a small lunar lander to attach to a stripped-down Artemis or some other craft. It was not quite a spacecraft without a mission--the Air Force liked the idea of a dedicated and cheap in-space vehicle for repair and station construction.
Work also continued on the Titan 3M, the Adonis space fighter as well as a transstage to make the Dynasoar family more flexible, and the Orpheus geosynchronous communications satellite.
Of course, DoD couldn't have everything, even in a boom year. And thus, the S-22 made its quiet final exit from the lists of extant military spaceplanes. No examples survive, all of the parts of existing or in-production vessels being recycled for S-21 use or scrapped.
***
Perhaps the biggest budget increase (percentage-based) in the wake of the Soviet moon landing went to the Office of Space Science. NASA's unmanned program had already shown it was on the way toward, if not directly turning a profit, increasing the profitability of the nation. The suspension of the Orbital Observatories program also freed up some funds.
In development at the OSS were the Advanced Exploratory Spacecraft: Solar (AES), the Mercury flyby probe, and two Martian-aimed endeavours: an improved Valkyrie orbiter and a bus-and-lander revival of the canceled Thurisoz based on the lunar Isa.
The lynchpin to OSS' success was its partnership with the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). Using shared technology, the OSS' Earth Resources Technology Satellite (ERTS) and Lunar Geological Observer (LGO) satellites had already proven their worth. Director's Fletcher and Flax (OSS and NRO, respectively) watched each other's backs when Secretary of Defense Clifford argued for more manned flights (though even their best efforts could not defeat the tremendous publicity DoD would receive in latter 1970).
***
The NRO's paramount goal was determining whether or not the Soviets planned to return to the moon, and when. Resources were poured into intelligence programs both terrestrial and space-bound. At least one Soviet agent was turned into a valuable double (see "Checkmate", Knopf Press 1994). American attempts to infiltrate agents into the Soviet space and missile industries proved less fruitful--Andropov was still circling all the tents to keep America clueless about the Soviet's slow development of 2nd-strike nuclear weapons
Development continued on the geosynchronous versions of the Creon ELINT probe as well as the Ares orbital launch detection satellite. Work progressed on the next-generation Hebe satellite, which monitored nuclear tests. The ill-fated Athena real-time reconnaissance satellite continued to have troubles in development.
Only because you asked..
This new method of making updates means I actually have the next two already in the can. Yay, weekly updates.
Storm, what's got you so excited?
Humor, my friend. Just humor. And no one fires Andropov unless Andropov wants to be fired...
HELL YES ! Saturn V Ruels
To keep the production cost on Saturn Family low,
there was advance J-2S and F-1A engine program. it was design for more payload AND reduction on Saturn V systems.
What making the Rocket cheaper,
Also were cost analyst indicating that there is considerable cost reduction with production of 4 Saturn V/Year.
under the assumption of total production of 40 Saturn V units. from 1969 to 1979
More info about this here
http://www.secretprojects.co.uk/forum/index.php/topic,2881.0.html
To keep the production cost on Saturn Family low,
there was advance J-2S and F-1A engine program. it was design for more payload AND reduction on Saturn V systems.
What making the Rocket cheaper,
Also were cost analyst indicating that there is considerable cost reduction with production of 4 Saturn V/Year.
under the assumption of total production of 40 Saturn V units. from 1969 to 1979
More info about this here
http://www.secretprojects.co.uk/forum/index.php/topic,2881.0.html
Part 36: Life after a Soviet lunar landing
(sorry for the long wait--the next update is ready except for the pictures)
In early 1970, it seemed the Soviets might land on the moon again at any moment--but it was not to be. Not only was there no profit in the endeavor, with their little lander only able to stay on the moon for a couple of days, but the balky transstage made every moon mission an expensive game of Russian Roulette. All aspects of the lunar program were put on hold and serious consideration was given to revamping the whole line of Soviet spacecraft. At the heart of the conflict was the old Novii Nievo/Moryak rivalry. Moryak was a new machine, but it had also been a killer. Novii Nievo was primitive, but it was also more maneuverable and tough as a tank. Perhaps, OKB-1's Mishin thought, it was time to develop a new spaceship rather than continue with the Moryak.
One of Mishin's first acts after the moon landing was to solidify his alliance with OKB-586's Yangel. He put the resources of Reshnetev's OKB-10 at Yangel's disposal to work out some of the electrical kinks in OKB-1's satellites. Reshnetev's engineers went through the Meteor weather satellite in an attempt to improve telemetry and quality-control, though results were inconclusive.
Speaking of satellites, Mishin also decided to pour resources (finally) into two parallel series of science probes. They would be roughly equivalent to the American Musplheim and Observatory series. OKBs 187 and 412 began development of a second generation lunar orbiter and lander probe. The initiation of this project was accompanied by a great deal of press, and it was touted as a handmaiden to the "Great Soviet Manned Lunar effort."\
Mishin also initiated a modular station project. Work began concurrently on a docking adapter known as "Cemirnii" and a 50-ton living space called "Nebolii Kuznech." The plan was to connect at least six modules together into a kind of super-station. Interestingly enough, it does not appear that the station was designed with a military role in mind.
Despite its reasonably reliable record, the N1 lunar rocket was approaching the end of its lifespan. It compared unfavorably to other, newer rockets in terms of complexity and payload. While the N1 could possibly have been adapted for the purpose of launching space station components, Mishin felt it was better to start from scratch on a newer, bigger design that could lift as much as 100 tons into orbit in a single throw. This rival to the Saturn V was called "Zbezdnii Dvitatel," and would use the same safe propellants as the other rockets in the OKB-1 stable.
By early 1970, Chelomei's start had really begun to wane with Brezhnev, and with it, government support. Chelomei produced no space spectaculars to garner prestige. He made no useful unmanned satellites. His ICBM production has tapered off, and his boosters were explosive and toxic. The only project Brezhnev was willing to fund was a conversion program for the UR rocket series to safer fuels. But even as government investment in OKB-52 began to dwindle, Chelomei found a new ally in the defense industry. With less budget going to 2nd-strike weaponry, Chelomei's rocketplane bombers seemed a good horse to back. As long as Chelomei could guarantee success... This was made further problematic as Chelomei's production deadlines continued to slip inexplicably. Not only was Chelomei being starved of resources, but those he did have were being lost in rampant corruption. An investigation was ordered by the Politburo.
What this meant for the Raketoplan program was a 12-month operational delay. Chelomei bided his time, training a corps of new pilots with suborbital flights. Thanks to the flood of declassified documents that came with the end of the Cold War and the work of historian, Mela Woodruff, we know their names:
Validmir Aleksandrovich Dzhanibekov (Pilot)
Yuri Fedorovich Isaulov (Pilot)
Anatoli Ivanovich Dedkov (Pilot, Belarusian)
Nikolai Nikolayevich Fefelov (Engineer)
Aleksandr Petrushenko (Pilot)
Valeri Vasilyevich Ilarionov (Engineer)
Meanwhile, OKB-586 continued to focus its energies on the development of the R-56 super-booster and the Soviet Union's first interplanetary probe. Work continued on the complete redesign of the early warning satellite designed to track ICBM launches. It was a slow, frustrating process. Yangel also gratefully accepted military funding for the bureau's anti-satellite program as well as resources from an overtaxed OKB-1. The opposite of Chelomei, Yangel was making himself indispensible.
(sorry for the long wait--the next update is ready except for the pictures)
In early 1970, it seemed the Soviets might land on the moon again at any moment--but it was not to be. Not only was there no profit in the endeavor, with their little lander only able to stay on the moon for a couple of days, but the balky transstage made every moon mission an expensive game of Russian Roulette. All aspects of the lunar program were put on hold and serious consideration was given to revamping the whole line of Soviet spacecraft. At the heart of the conflict was the old Novii Nievo/Moryak rivalry. Moryak was a new machine, but it had also been a killer. Novii Nievo was primitive, but it was also more maneuverable and tough as a tank. Perhaps, OKB-1's Mishin thought, it was time to develop a new spaceship rather than continue with the Moryak.
One of Mishin's first acts after the moon landing was to solidify his alliance with OKB-586's Yangel. He put the resources of Reshnetev's OKB-10 at Yangel's disposal to work out some of the electrical kinks in OKB-1's satellites. Reshnetev's engineers went through the Meteor weather satellite in an attempt to improve telemetry and quality-control, though results were inconclusive.
Speaking of satellites, Mishin also decided to pour resources (finally) into two parallel series of science probes. They would be roughly equivalent to the American Musplheim and Observatory series. OKBs 187 and 412 began development of a second generation lunar orbiter and lander probe. The initiation of this project was accompanied by a great deal of press, and it was touted as a handmaiden to the "Great Soviet Manned Lunar effort."\
Mishin also initiated a modular station project. Work began concurrently on a docking adapter known as "Cemirnii" and a 50-ton living space called "Nebolii Kuznech." The plan was to connect at least six modules together into a kind of super-station. Interestingly enough, it does not appear that the station was designed with a military role in mind.
Despite its reasonably reliable record, the N1 lunar rocket was approaching the end of its lifespan. It compared unfavorably to other, newer rockets in terms of complexity and payload. While the N1 could possibly have been adapted for the purpose of launching space station components, Mishin felt it was better to start from scratch on a newer, bigger design that could lift as much as 100 tons into orbit in a single throw. This rival to the Saturn V was called "Zbezdnii Dvitatel," and would use the same safe propellants as the other rockets in the OKB-1 stable.
By early 1970, Chelomei's start had really begun to wane with Brezhnev, and with it, government support. Chelomei produced no space spectaculars to garner prestige. He made no useful unmanned satellites. His ICBM production has tapered off, and his boosters were explosive and toxic. The only project Brezhnev was willing to fund was a conversion program for the UR rocket series to safer fuels. But even as government investment in OKB-52 began to dwindle, Chelomei found a new ally in the defense industry. With less budget going to 2nd-strike weaponry, Chelomei's rocketplane bombers seemed a good horse to back. As long as Chelomei could guarantee success... This was made further problematic as Chelomei's production deadlines continued to slip inexplicably. Not only was Chelomei being starved of resources, but those he did have were being lost in rampant corruption. An investigation was ordered by the Politburo.
What this meant for the Raketoplan program was a 12-month operational delay. Chelomei bided his time, training a corps of new pilots with suborbital flights. Thanks to the flood of declassified documents that came with the end of the Cold War and the work of historian, Mela Woodruff, we know their names:
Validmir Aleksandrovich Dzhanibekov (Pilot)
Yuri Fedorovich Isaulov (Pilot)
Anatoli Ivanovich Dedkov (Pilot, Belarusian)
Nikolai Nikolayevich Fefelov (Engineer)
Aleksandr Petrushenko (Pilot)
Valeri Vasilyevich Ilarionov (Engineer)
Meanwhile, OKB-586 continued to focus its energies on the development of the R-56 super-booster and the Soviet Union's first interplanetary probe. Work continued on the complete redesign of the early warning satellite designed to track ICBM launches. It was a slow, frustrating process. Yangel also gratefully accepted military funding for the bureau's anti-satellite program as well as resources from an overtaxed OKB-1. The opposite of Chelomei, Yangel was making himself indispensible.