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A Game of Tsars - III.
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OTL version
'To Moscow I came seeking fortune
But they’re making me work til I’m dead
The bourgeoisie have it so easy
The Tsar’s putting gold on his bread
The people of Moscow are hungry
But think what a feast there could be
If we could create a socialist state
That cared for the people like me:
I am the man who arranges the blocks
That descend upon me from up above.
They come down and I spin them around
Til they fit in the ground like hand in glove.
Sometimes it seems that to move blocks is fine
And the lines will be formed as they fall -
Then I see that I have misjudged it!
I should not have nudged it after all.
Can I have a long one please?
Why must these infernal blocks tease?
I am the man who arranges the blocks
That continue to fall from up above.
Come Muscovite! Let the workers unite!
A collective regime of peace and love.
I work so hard in arranging the blocks
But the landlord and taxman bleed me dry
But the workers will rise! We will not compromise
For we know that the old regime must die.
Long live Lenin, kill the tsar!
We salute the sickle and star!
I am the man who arranges the blocks
That continue to fall from up above.
The food on your plate now belongs to the state
A collective regime of peace and love.
I have no choice in arranging the blocks
Under Bolshevik rule, what they say goes.
The rule of the game is we all are the same
And my blocks must create unbroken rows.
Long live Stalin! He loves you!
Sing these words, or you know what he’ll do...
I am the man who arranges the blocks
That are made by the men in Kazakhstan.
They come two weeks late and they don’t tessellate
But we’re working to Stalin’s five year plan.
I am the man who arranges the tanks
That will make all the Nazis keep away
The Fuhrer is dead, and Europe is Red!
Let us point all our guns at the USA.
We shall live forever more!
We can start a nuclear war!
I am the man who arranges the blocks
That are building a highly secret base.
Hip hip hurrah for the USSR!
We are sending our men to outer space.
I work so hard in arranging the blocks
But each night I go home to my wife in tears -
What’s the point of it all, when you’re building a wall
And in front of your eyes it disappears?
Pointless work for pointless pay
This is one game I shall not play.
I am the man who arranges the blocks!
But tomorrow I think I’ll stay in bed.
The winter is cold, I’ve got plenty of gold
And I’m standing in line for a loaf of bread
Maybe we’d be better off
If we brought down Gorbachev
I am the man who arranges the blocks
That continue to fall from up above.
The markets are free! So much money for me!
Tell me, why should I care for peace and love?
The markets are free! So much money for me!
Tell me, why should I care for peace and love?
Peace and love, peace and love!
And now the wall is down, the Marxists frown
There’s foreign shops all over town
When in Red Square, well don’t despair
There’s Levi’s and McDonald’s there
The US gave us crystal meth
And Yeltsin drank himself to death
There is widespread lootin'
And the politicians are feudin'
Nobody knows who's in charge
Should I kneel'n sing a dirge?
I am the man who watches the blocks
That continue to fall from up above.
Everything we've built is rotten.
Will I resign and hit rock bottom? NO!
I am the man who watches the blocks
Fall down no more for I am energized!
I am the man who rearranges the blocks
They've divided but will be united.
From the blocks of old, better ones will rise
So we reject free enterprise
And once again the men will rise.
Prepare the flags to be unfurled
For we’re seceding from the world:
We shall regain the Georgian soil
We shall obtain the Arctic oil
We shall arrange the blocks and toil
Forever and a day.
Game over.
A Complete History of the Soviet Union As Told By A Humble Worker, Arranged To The Melody Of Tetris
--Pig with the Face of A Boy, 2010
[1]
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'At least in Soviet Union we all agreed whom to blame.'
--a common graffiti seen in Moscow, 1992
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The Third Tsar
The recently deceased Yeltsin would be remembered as the first and the last president of Russia when that position actually meant something. His successor, the 36-year-old president of Russia, Yegor Gaidar, openly admitted that he never aspired to become the president. Unfortunately, he was just old enough to qualify for the position of president.
Gaidar was perfectly fine being prime minister, a post that would allow him to introduce the necessary shock therapy before the Russian economy hit the ground and collapsed while Yeltsin would actually manage the myriad problems facing Russia. The unfortunate fiasco with Yeltsin's coma cost the nation nearly half a year and reversed reformist efforts in some areas to 1991. Gaidar nevertheless ended up being the president of Russia, a post he neither wanted nor was qualified for, but could not abandon.
The real "president" was actually Gennady Burbulis, officially only Minister of Defense, Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister and a special advisor/envoy/chief of staff in multiple areas for president Gaidar. The media mocked his plethora of titles by calling him "Deputy Everything" and "Mr Deputy." Burbulis was the only person who could aspire to hold the Yeltsinites together and rebuild Yeltsin's authority. It was said that Gaidar pre-signed on a number of his documents in order to streamline the leadership process along with naming him with enough responsibilities to shame even an elderly member of
the nomenklatura.
Multiple former Yeltsinites have confirmed that their initial impulse was to make Burbulis, (whom Yeltsin had illegally named his vice-president) the president by having Gaidar resign after naming Burbulis the prime minister. This was declared impossible in a suspiciously specifically worded ruling by the Constitutional Court which meant Burbulis was stuck as Deputy Prime Minister and outside the chain of succession without the confirmation of the Supreme Soviet.
Yeltsinites, now granted a fresh new mandate, tried to gain public support by making Yeltsin into a martyr but this had mixed results. Boris Yeltsin of 1991 to early 1992 was not known for specific policies while the Yeltsin after the recovery and before death was known as an impulsive man blatantly circumventing the law and forcing through his will, who may have been impeached successfully by the Supreme Soviet if he had lived.
[2] The old-new Gaidar government (Council of Ministers) tried to sell itself on continuity while substituting the popular authority of Yeltsin by presenting multiple members of the government as able and modern men. Ordinary Russians saw in this internal division and an overwhelming lack of experience across the board.
Burbulis and Gaidar have been the only Yeltsinites involving themselves with every aspect of leading Russia. Gaidar was much more performative in his duties, dutifully visiting foreign countries, talking in the Supreme Soviet, giving statements, while Burbulis was quite proactive, easily making him the actual driving force behind the government.
Gaidar and Burbulis in the Supreme Soviet, 1992
Publicly, the Gaidar-Burbulis team received major international support. Western media portrayed Gaidar as young a modern voice of democratic reform while domestic media mocked him as an entitled and inexperienced boy way over his head. Burbulis was recognized as a sort of an equivalent to American Secretary of State James Baker, but domestic media mocked him by portraying as the puppeteer behind Gaidar.
Domestic issues were continuing to be a disaster, mostly to the Supreme Soviet-controlled Central bank (under Geraschenko) still printing roubles and issuing guarantees while efforts to resolve the
sputnik issue constantly failed due to strong cronyism and distrust. Russia joined IMF and the World Bank in the summer of 1992
[3] although loans received for stabilization were far from the help needed and decried domestically as pittance from the "would-be-masters."
In the area of foreign affairs, Gaidar's government was a mixed success. In the case of Ukraine, Burbulis and Kozyrev received the blame for the actions of Rutskoy, Supreme Soviet and even Yeltsin. Thousands of Russians ended up being banished from Ukraine through indirect and sometimes direct pressure although many more continued to live in eastern Ukraine as before. Ukraine was getting rid of any Russians in high positions considered to be a political risk and
de facto withdrew from CIS. The most pressing concern was Ukraine announcing it is ignoring previous agreements on the military denuclearization by citing violations of Belavezha records and other CIS agreements.
Burbulis attempted to freeze the situation until Ukraine agreed again to return all the nuclear weapons in return for a Hong Kong style agreement on Crimea, but the near success was sunk when Supreme Soviet affirmed Crimea as an "indivisible" territory of Russia.
In the case of CIS Khasbulatov used his discretionary fund to strengthen ties with Kazakhstan and new Central Asian states, hinting that time to renegotiate the CIS future would be in 1993 when Supreme Soviet had control of the executive branch. The new republics were encouraged to continue making use of the Russian rouble while Burbulis tried to force some kind of economic coordination to prevent Russia from running out of foreign currency amidst rampant inflation. Successful emergency injections by IMF and various other organizations that were negotiated by Gaidar, Kozyrev and Aven would only feed the arguments Russia has willingly become an economic vassal of the West.
Yeltsin's directive to stop Lebed's offensive in Moldova prevented the young country from being destroyed by the experienced and well equipped Soviet Army, but produced Lebed in Moscow who was now the most popular general in the country.
[4] Burbulis tried to co-opt him to support the government but something happened between them and Lebed started criticizing the government's failure to protect Russians while avoiding endorsing the Soviet. Deputy foreign minister Kozyrev was especially the target of criticism.
Kozyrev had previously managed to become the Soviet foreign minister in 1990 and joined Yeltsin's reformers as a rising star of a diplomat who argued that Russia has nothing to fear from democracies. The overtly conciliatory stance infuriated the Supreme Soviet when Kozyrev endorsed NATO intervention against renegade Yugoslav general Adzic. Yeltsin removed him from the post in January 1992 to appease the Soviet, although Kozyrev remained
de facto chief Russian diplomat due to the sheer number of special missions he remained appointed on.
When Yeltsin returned to power from coma, Kozyrev was restored to the post of Deputy Foreign Minister. This angered the Supreme Soviet, but Yeltsin could argue that he acknowledged criticism by "demoting" Kozyrev. Kozyrev allegedly privately resented the fact that Burbulis ended up as the Foreign Minister, given that he was already the Deputy Prime Minister although this might be a compromise solution. Burbulis was to salvage the CIS (given that he was one of the facilitators of the Belavezha accords), while Kozyrev would continue to deal mainly with the West.
The Yeltsinites faced further increasing internal division over what to do, with only half a year to implement free market reforms. Anatoly Chubais, the new prime minister, was unsatisfied that he, a prime minister, was being sidelined by Burbulis who was supposed to be subordinated to him. Chubais pushed for rapid privatization (the so-called Hungarian model), while Burbulis favored the original multistage plan of gradual privatization over several years, accepted by the Supreme Soviet in 1991. Burbulis believed he could use Yeltsin's death and prior Soviet resolutions to make it politically untenable to disrupt the process, but Gaidar moved to the camp of Chubais, partially because Yeltsin was considering it prior to his death, and partially because it was certain many of them will lose their posts come January.
Another influential Yeltsinite faction was that of Korzhakov, Yeltsin's former bodyguard, who in June ended up being both minister of interior and deputy minister of defense. Korzhakov was described as "ideologically fluid" and allegedly in possession of closely guarded secrets known only to Yeltsin. He was known to have been implicated in the cover-up of several violent crimes against political rivals, although some of the former Yeltsinites would claim Korzhakov vastly overplayed his alleged danger.
Korzhakov pushed for an authoritarian approach to the issue of conflict and claimed Yeltsin endorsed making plans to dismiss the Soviet in case another attempt to impeach him succeeded.
[5] Korzhakov believed that the Supreme Soviet was not well liked by the people or the military and an emergency situation could be declared for a year or a two during which new institutions would be built and reforms introduced. In essence, Korzhakov believed actual democratic processes are not a priority right now.
Korzhakov ended up being the most feared Yeltsinite, as he formed an alliance with the Minister of Security, Mikhail Ivanovich Barsukov, whose ministries shared overlapping authorities due to Yeltsin's incomplete reform of the former KGB and the police. It was no secret Korzhakov aimed to become the Minister of Defense, a post that Yeltsin kept for himself. Korzhakov's previous main rival was Pavel Grachev, commander of Soviet Airborne Troops who refused joined Yeltsin after the First August Coup. However, Grachev ended up as Defense Minister under Rutskoi and was unable to return to Yeltsin's circle after that, especially after Korzhakov allegedly leaked out additional evidence over Grachev's illegal dealings in former East Germany.
As a result, Yeltsinites continued to be a heterogeneous group without a strong unifying figure, undecided on even what should be their immediate priority. Saving CIS from collapse? Pushing for privatization? Seeking accommodation with the Supreme Soviet? Dealing with the military concerned over cuts and reshuffling under Rutskoi? Achieving the crucial Federation Treaty? Early elections?
At the beginning of August, it seemed that distrust towards the West was in full swing and Yeltsinites could not count on national support if they tried to force an early election. Gaidar, Chubais and the rest believed that by pushing for rapid privatization, they could claim an achievement and create a block of new private owners that would be keen to support them against the communists in future elections. This was a concern because many of the democrats have already opportunistically converted to hard-core nationalism by summer of 1992.
[6]
Gaidar would privately note that the deciding factor was Viktor Geraschenko being appointed to Rutskoy's government by the Supreme Soviet. Geraschenko continued his inflationary politics throughout 1992 which were pushing Russia towards hyperinflation (which would reach the 50% threshold the very August of 1992). If privatization was not pushed as soon as possible, Geraschenko would ruin the economy and stop any substantial free-market reform. By pushing forward privatization, vouchers would be at worst distributed by the end of 1992 and major companies in private hands.
It is unclear what was the plan exactly and who supported it among the Yeltsinites, but Burbulis opposed it, warning that a quick privatization will only further anger the Supreme Soviet and ordinary Russians who would see it as a looting power grab, especially with Gaidar in control of countless billions confiscated from the CPSU by Yeltsin. But by August of 1992, most of the vouchers have already been printed or in print.
--
The Year of the Four Tsars, 2007
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'Reform for all or reform for none'
--protest sign seen frequently in Moscow during the Second August Coup
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'We are mad as hell and we are not taking it anymore' [7]
MOSCOW, - I've been asked by my friends and family back in the states what is happening in Russia. The situation looks confusing to outsiders, the country has changed the person in charge four times in less than a year. It may seem like only seven months have passed, but even to me, it seems that it has been seven years. And it seems to the common folk as well.
My best answer it is looking more and more like the Sidney Lumet movie, the Network. As of a few weeks ago, the movie became a runaway hit on various TV stations, despite controversies over its broadcast rights. Ordinary Russians are in love with Howard Beale and I've recently seen at least one reporter trying to emulate it in conjunction with those horrible GAP hours. We've seen pictures of Beale held along with pictures of Lenin or Yeltsin or Rutskoy.
Yes, it sounds strange that the movie satirizing the dangers of unchecked commercialism is the one Russia is taking to the heart. The country has yet to have a working free market, but the sentiment is pretty much here. Many Russians are jobless, not because they lost their jobs but because their employers cannot pay them or pay for the necessary resources. They were promised that inflation will be stopped but it seems all attempts to stop it have failed. The rouble is not yet worthless as it was in Weimar Germany, but the black market is the real free market here. The dollar and the Deutschmark are readily accepted in Moscow.
Not long ago, world leaders around the world including our own president, traveled to Moscow to pay respects to the man who pushed Russia away from communism towards representative democracy. All the while people were once again waiting in lines for food or other items around the city. The general strike was delayed until the funeral was over, not to tarnish Russia's reputation.
The Moscow McDonalds is now secured by the police after multiple incidents with people forcefully breaking into it. Nationalists call it 'Zapadnichenstvo,' crazy obsession with the West, but the truth is that since the Soviet Union ended, McDonalds is the only outlet with a reliable supply of food. I've heard a rumor that the police are not officially stationed there, but they guard it in return for meals.
Not recently ago cameras captured angry citizens shouting at the president
'We've survived communist winters, but you are killing us with your free markets!' The president fumbled, trying to explain that a quick shock will be better for everyone. My friend at the embassy described Gaidar as the worst of both Quayle and Bush. Deputies in the Soviet recently called him a president "for now," a constitutional accident.
Russians have called for reform for a decade, and when it finally arrived it seems they cannot decide if they want to go with it or not. Reformists seem to go away and return like a boomerang, never achieving much. The only thing that has changed in the past few years are that nearly everyone is protesting these days. I've discussed this with Americans who have been here for much longer and they say that Russians have always seemed apathetic until now. Now they are getting mad.
And of whom are they getting mad? They are mad on politicians for bickering until the country ran out of money. They are mad on all those foreign advisors arriving in the country. They are mad at Ukrainians for making trouble. They are mad at nationalists for crying wolf. They are mad at reformists for not caring about the people. They are mad at Rutskoy for squandering his power. They are mad at the communists for ruining the country. They are mad at Yeltsin drinking himself to death. They are mad at Americans for ruining the country. They are mad at strikers for not working. They are mad at managers for not paying workers. They are mad at the Supreme Court for not giving the president or the speaker enough power.
Until several months ago I've never felt in danger. I've been here since 1988 and I never felt quite safe, but I knew that the worst I had to fear from the KGB was deportation. The worst I had experienced was some people occasionally following me and a pickpocket stealing my Moleskin. Now, there is something rotten in the air. We and other countries send help, but a growing group sees as would-be conquerors.
Tourists were often a target for pickpockets and thieves but you've heard the news of people being kidnapped and held for ransom. They target anyone who appears to be important. Just two days ago they kidnapped two IOCC (International Orthodox Christian Charities) members, asking for a large supply of food and medicine in return. My friend Clarice - back in the main office - said that a week ago she ran in heels towards her apartment after she noticed a suspicious van following her. It is hard to say if the police are unwilling or unable to help, but the deputy police chief said on television that paying ransom may be a prudent choice.
We've celebrated Independence Day recently at the embassy. During the celebration a dozen or two of Russians tried throwing bricks at the embassy, chanting 'Take Gaidar with you and leave.' I've only heard about this later, chatting with the guards. One of them said that they are more worried by the people than the police and it was the other way around a year ago.
The people in Moscow are mad as hell. It remains to see how long will they take it.
--
The New Yorker, July, 1992
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'The more money there was, the more production there would be.'
--Ruslan Khasbulatov, May 1990
[8]
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The Tsar-in-waiting
Ruslan Khasbulatov
Ruslan Khasbulatov, the man who would be elected speaker of the Supreme Soviet in 1991 only after Yeltsin lent him his support, was less than a year later on track to destroy the same reform coalition he once belonged to. Ruslan stood for the Chair of the Supreme Soviet at the 5th Congress in the summer of 1991, but the fierce voting between two contenders, Khasbulatov, and Sergey Baburin failed to produce a clear winner. Baburin received 412 votes and Khasbulatov 409. Khasbulatov became the acting chairman with the support of the reformists but his brave stance against the First August Coup led to him winning outright in October of 1991 with 539 votes (closest was Baburin with 274 votes).
By the summer of 1992, Ruslan and Valery Zorkin, leader of the Constitutional Court had at least an understanding, which ensured Ruslan would have to only face off with the presidency in his struggle to consolidate power. It was part of a broader effort to remove term limits for judges and give them lifetime appointments.
[9]
Ruslan Khasbulatov was ethnically Chechen but had little in common with most Chechens. He was a young and respected professor of international economics at the Plekhanov Academy, despite the nearly unanimous consent of Western observes he knew anything about economics. Surprising everyone, he proved to be a very skilled manipulator who could manipulate the majority of the Supreme Soviet to reject or accept certain resolutions, although the effectiveness varied. Khasbulatov had frequent personal contact with many of the politicians, unlike Yeltsin, Burbulis, Rutskoy or the military, and recognized how the reformers and conservatives quickly moved to red-brown majorities of hard-core nationalists and communist nostalgia.
Moreover, Khasbulatov had chosen another diplomatic field of battle. While the Yeltsinites courted the West and the NATO, Khasbulatov courted the CIS (without Ukraine and Baltics) promising to rescue the agreement and transform it into something more efficient, as soon as the Supreme Soviet regained control of the CPSU property. A summer agreement with Kazakstan's president Nursultan Nazarbayev resurrected the effort to rejoin the two countries in a federation (less centralized than the Soviet Union) in which Nazarbayev's old ambition to replace Gorbachev no doubt played a role. Over the following months, two more republics would form additional bilateral agreements with the Supreme Soviet, forming the core of the future Sovereign Union.
The understanding with the Constitutional Court allowed Ruslan to continue expanding the Parliamentary Guard (a unit totally outside police and military chain commands) to 6000 people by August of 1992, as well to pass a law the gave broad authority to parliament to 'admit' various military and special forces unit under its aegis in the case of the '
constitutional danger to the integrity of the country.' The other result was the master move of endorsing Gaidar as the president of Russia just as the Constitutional Court closed the apparent loophole in presidential succession, declaring any candidate in the chain of succession not approved by the majority vote in the Supreme Soviet outside the chain of succession.
Khasbulatov correctly assumed that Burbulis was the only person who would be able to wield the office president as something efficient before the enlarged powers of the office expired at the end of the year. Burbulis resubmitted his vice-presidency for confirmation in the Supreme Soviet, but despite attempts to build a coalition to support him (by courting the energy lobby and any kind of anticommunists), the vote in the Supreme Soviet fell through, with Burbulis receiving 412 votes total in all houses, insufficient to confirm him.
Despite Khasbulatov's supremacy in the Supreme Soviet, the pointlessly large institution was divided into various hardliner, reformist and nomenklatura blocs whose behavior could be predicted only partially through ideological beliefs. Various power blocs, sensing opportunity, dug their feet in the ground and refused to compromise on many issues trying to force concessions on personal or ideological issues. The Speaker was dependent on doling out cash, subsidizing various interests and courted former elements of KGB, such a Phillip Bobkov, and the energy industrial complex. This is why steady emission of credits and rouble was important to continue and impossible to stop without dismissing the Supreme Soviet.
After the election in 1990, the Supreme Soviet was dominated by CPSU members (920 of them, 86.7%). While party allegiance dropped by the time of the First August Coup to 71.8%, emerging political parties had little to no representation in the Supreme Soviet, and those who did had done so through allegiance of the elected deputies. As a result, the Supreme Soviet was dominated by informal factions. By May of 1992, 81% of the Soviet were now members of 13 major political factions
[10], and a Council of Political Factions was formed to coordinate their activity in lieu of actual party discipline.
By August of Russian Federation still had not ratified Federation Treaty although it admitted Crimea as an indivisible and autonomous territory (the vote to make it a republic failed spectacularly due to surprise opposition from the communists). Some of the deputies had a vested interest in this as they were backed by remains of nomenklatura and newly emerging managers who favored unclear regional authority (it still remains a point of debate if this encouraged or stifled alleged ethnic separatism). Although major cities were not affected by the issue of territorial organization, this benefited territories such as rich areas in West Siberia where state managers could in practice rule their own private economic fiefdoms. This also fueled the fears of nationalists who believed Russia will fragment further although 80% of the country was free of minorities and only several areas, such a Chechnya, had a minority majority.
Several emergency plans to resolve the issue of
sputniks (the dually appointed candidates for the positions) narrowly failed due to their attempts to be a nationwide solution. Despite accusations from Yeltsinites, Khasbulatov genuinely wanted to resolve the situation as it weakened the Supreme Soviet as well and opened a possibility for communists to remain even more entrenched in the system. If Burbulis managed to solve this issue, he would cement his authority as the leader of Russia so Ruslan may have tried to beat him to the solution.
Many
sputniks wanted to keep their appointments at all costs hoping that when a strong leader emerges they will be able to keep it, especially as the central authority weakened daily. The chain of authority became a multiple choice tree in both directions which provided the fertile soil for the seeds of Raskol. The possible saving grace for Russia prior to the Second August Coup would be the successful appointment of a vice-president which would at least point to the restoration of political consensus. But every attempt to build a coalition around a candidate in the Soviet would fail.
Besides obvious candidates such as Baburin and Burbulis, a more authoritarian group of Yeltsinites tried to push Korzhakov, Yeltsin's former bodyguard and current minister of the interior and defense, as the new candidate. Korzhakov allegedly had dirt on everyone and it was a deliberate rumor he engineered Rutskoy's resignation by leaking evidence of corruption. Korzhakov won slightly fewer votes than Burbulis, but roughly a third of them came from hardliners. Six candidates failed to reach the necessary votes during one session which prompted the now infamous incident.
Vladimir Zhirinovsky, a buffoonish ultranationalist politician was nominated and received incredible 421 votes. This was not due to his popularity or actual political support, but a joint attempt by reformists, moderates, and communists to demonstrate how the process had become farcical.
When the next day Zhirinovsky boasted his support during a debate on the inflation, someone heckled him by pointing out he was nominated as a cruel joke, similarly to how Nero made a horse a senator. The enraged Zhirinovksy charged towards the row where Yeltsinites sat, jumped on the desk and started pulling down his trousers in an apparent attempt to defecate on the heckler before he was wrestled down to the applause of the Soviet. The session had to be cut short as some of LDPR deputies ran over to wrestled down "attackers" on their party leader. As the session was televised, the incident was broadcast live and carried over to international news which featured as a story of interest.
--
The Year of the Four Tsars, 2007
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'
Did you hear about Russia today? No, they haven't found Trump yet. It seems that in an attempt to pick a new number two among themselves one of their politicians tried to do a number two on another.'
--American joke, summer of 1992
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The Plot for Russia
The Russian Supreme Soviet continued to work over the summer due to the constant tit-for-tat with the office of the president. Although there were relatively little results, nearly constant motions and discussion escaped the attention of even the parliament staff. Khasbulatov was whittling down the executive presidency and the only thing preventing him from doing that in several months was the internal strife in the bloated Supreme Soviet. There were two general warning strikes in July, and an indefinite one, the worst fear of anyone supporting any kind of reform, was planned to start around August 15th.
This contributed to a substantial change of circumstances compared to the First August Coup in 1991. State managers and regional politicians which opposed the First Coup did so to prolong the uncertainty that enabled them to increase their power and riches. Any effort to resolve the political crisis would be detrimental.
When details of planned rapid privatization have been learned by the Supreme Soviet, it quickly moved to invoke the Article 5 of the Soviet constitution which claimed 'the most important questions of state and public life can be resolved with the help of a referendum.' It was the same clause which was dormant until 1990 when Gorbachev tried to use it to achieve a popular mandate to preserve the Soviet Union and was so unused that the Congress of the USSR had to pass several laws to establish mechanism and laws for referendums.
Despite the presence of Yelsinite controlled media, there was the nearly unanimous consensus this is an attempt to loot the country before 1992 ends. It didn't help Western advisors endorsed it. The Supreme Soviet cried about the confiscated CPSU property and wanted it under parliamentary control, which would cement Khasbulatov as controller of possibly a trillion dollars worth of property.
At the same time, Gaidar wanted to reduce military procurement by 85%
[11] which would spell doom for the Soviet era military-industrial complex as well as forcefully reduce the bloated size of the military which numbered many divisions with obsolete equipment to shelter useless or old officers. This too was learned by the military and the Supreme Soviet.
This, unfortunately, coincided with the impact Yugoslavia had on existing military structures. Military strategists believed the rapid disintegration of Yugoslavia was a test run for a new NATO strategy. Encourage democracy which leads to internal turmoil, when central institutions break down declare neutrality and then swoop in and crush the remains of the central institutions once the situation escalates to civil conflict.
Several papers circulated among the Russian generals that warned that based on Yugoslavia, mere two months are enough to break the country. Russia had seemingly proceeded to the level of near civil conflict with Baburin and other radicals growing militias in Moscow and some other cities. And the case of Ukraine which was planning to pass a law nationalizing part of the remaining Soviet nuclear weapons presented a potential existential danger to Russian sovereignty.
With the failure of the Council of Ministers and the Supreme Soviet to fully purge the military after the First August Coup, it is reasonable to assume that many of the supporters would continue plotting or waiting for an opportunity to rise again.
[12] Indeed, the military had a pool of discontent figures that would be open to a shift in power as long as the civil conflict was avoided.
One of this men was Vladislav Achalov who rose suddenly to the post of the deputy minister of defense in the waning days of the Soviet Union. Rutskoy tried to make him the head of the CIS, angering the rest of the Russian military and Achalov maintained links with Khasbulatov as well.
He was opposed by Pavel Grachev who tried to become the minister of defense under Yeltsin and Rutskoi, only to end up without a post. He was in no doubt aiming for the post of the defense minister and it was rumored his loyalty was up to sale for the highest bidder.
The Chief of the General Staff, Mikhail Kolesnikov initially maintained the position that the military should be neutral and above politics, but was privately worried over the scope of the planned cuts to the military. The top generals were worried about the economic deadlock and got a hand of projections (in part made with foreign help) that would require the Russian military to decrease by 50% within the next five years. Kolesnikov was also frustrated how Burbulis, Gaidar and the rest of the government sidestepped the General Staff through special operation staff
[13]
Many believed that the proposed Miller-Gorton-Markey amendment, which was popularly called 'arms-for-food' would become a part of American policy. It did not help that Secretary of State James Baker was prioritizing denuclearization of former Soviet Republics over everything else.
[14] Russian military leadership was worried that calls for international multilateral help to Russia were just an excuse to hide the American hand, just as it did in Korea in 1950, just as it did in Kuwait in 1991...
Despite concerns, there was an internal consensus in the top brass that military has to be outside politics as anything else would lead to a state of civil war. The military had shown restraint in Tbilisi, Baku, Vilnius and elsewhere. Paradoxically, the same stance would create several cores of officers willing to intervene.
Between summers of 1991 and 1992, a number of mid-level positions have been reassigned by Yeltsin, Rutskoi and then Yeltsin again. They've avoided touching the top leadership but were more lenient with lower tiers since the army was plagued with corruption and plans to streamline it. After all, Soviet military system was peculiar and bloated with unnecessary divisions and bases that served as a career punishment or a sinecure for useless people. Many of the younger officers were ambitious, concerned over their position ('
the head of the body never suffers) and were influenced with GAP, Dulles plan and the rest of the anti-American conspiracy theories. Parallel to them was a core of old officers that did not understand the collapse of the Soviet Union and wanted to preserve the military and their place at all costs.
CIA analysts believe that informal plans for action have been privately discussed as early as May 1992 when Yeltsin started to issue unilateral discussion and demoted several generals that switched from Yeltsinities to Rutskoy. Some resented that plotters kept their position while they were forced to endure the consequences by moving downwards or sideways.
Perhaps the key point was when the future plotter base made contact with colonel general Leontiy Kuznetsov.
[15] Kuznetsov had a prestigious military career that included service in Germany, but Yeltsinites did not deliver on promises to bring him into the General Staff and other elite military structures, mostly due to his careful support of Rutskoi.
[16] Kuznestov was highly regarded, had good connections and good authority and would within weeks coalesce the various groups into a nationwide plot.
There is evidence the Yeltsin's funeral was used to form the core of the future plans. Events accelerated beyond further expectations when an indefinite general strike was being planned for late August. This would be the perfect chance for the military, called to help secure the protests, to intercede. Such a clean action would have the support of the people, the high command would follow it due to its declared mission and would likely be at least tolerated by the international community and the CIS states. The plans for August were hectic as it was believed that Burbulis, Khasbulatov or CIA would soon learn of it and take steps for precaution.
Indeed, American, British and Israeli secret services noticed something out of the ordinary in July but ascribed it to Khasbulatov and Burbulis trying to probe the military for their own purposes. This was not incorrect as envoys of Khasbulatov, Korzhakov, Burbulis, and Baburin consulted with various senior and junior staff. Thus the warnings by Western diplomats went unheeded.
The aim of the plotters was to step in and force a national unity government while calling for elections for the Supreme Soviet, the president, and a new constitution. This was to tentatively happen in late October or early November, after which the military would return the power to the elected institutions (and would be amnestied for their actions). The military would be explicitly upholding the democratic will of the people by forcing a clean break that has made the existing institutions stop working, not attempting to restore the hardliners, fight for any of the existing political factions or establish a military dictatorship.
The plot depended on three objectives - quick and sudden action; persuading the military high command they are not in service of any political faction and demonstrating their authority. The final objective would prove to the most problematic
As there was no man that could reliably rally everyone, and a military strong face would lend to fears of a military dictatorship, another bedrock would be needed. A radical school of thought formed among some strategists based on the study of Yugoslavia, Iraq and previous international responses. This school of thought believed that the key to international conflict is sovereignty through military deterrent, with the nuclear being the most effective.
This was hardly a new thought, but some of the conclusions of this theory would have far-reaching conclusions for the remainder of modern history. If the plotters could ensure they have control of at least a part of the nuclear arsenal, they would have a trump card to prove they are serious, determined, and capable. More importantly, it would deter the rest of the Russian military from trying to oppose them, averting the threat of civil conflict.
As during the First October Coup, the international response would not be a problem as Soviet military commanders took special note to convince the NATO that there is no danger of a nuclear launch by the plotters, and this would likely be no different. The military would quickly unite behind the hypothetical arbitrated national unity government.
Not only would the reality prove to be quite different than anyone expected, but the plot was a direct precedent for the recently uncovered Sevsk Option. The radical plan was called the first geopolitical maneuver of the post-Cold Era and threw out the window nearly a century of diplomatic and military conventional thought.
--
The Fall and Rise of the USSR, 1999
____________________
'
During 1991-92, legal anarchy, a truly Hobbesian world, prevailed.'
--economist Anders Aslund, 2007
[17]
____________________
Russians protest privatization [OTL, 1998]
Russia: Capitalist Hell and Capitalist Utopia
As has been mentioned before, during the Soviet period the state and the economy were not the same but were inseparable. Its citizens were provided with many public utilities in an environment that nominally discouraged private ambition. In reality, many people would use their political power to gain control over the access to those services. A sort of bourgeoisie was emerging in a society where private enterprise was officially frowned upon while the majority of the economy had grown out of the planned economy framework.
Private activity existed in the Soviet Union, but outside the books and often through other means than monetary. Officials could not and would not enforce various prohibitions as they kept the system going. This all changed in the late eighties when the pace of reforms increased until the communist system was brought down. The newly born democratic Russia had no framework and no infrastructure to support private activity. Property law and practice had to come into existence out of nothing and entire practice of law that would cover economic activity was nearly non-existent.
The Soviet-era economic system first disintegrated with the Soviet union splitting into more than a dozen independent republics, and then further with Raskol the following year. The specter of hunger was everpresent as was the void. Various import business that sprung up in 1992 filled the stores with foreign goods, but the consumers could not buy them without a functioning economy. Organized crime, which in Russia of the nineties often meant any economic activity outside the norm, filled the void when borders became porous if not open and thrived on traversing the emerging barriers.
Gorbachev's incomplete reforms actually created a new class of rent seekers who thrived on subsidized credits, state subsidies, regulated exports of commodities and subsidized grain imports. By 1992 they were making fortunes and were wary of any reform that would jeopardize this position. They may have accounted for an incredible 80% of the GDP in 1992
[18] which is more than the combined share in years before and after.
The early private enterprise in Soviet Union and successor states was characterised by depending on the patronage of politicians and bureaucrats which granted them privileges, assistance and later even property as well of emerging criminal organizations which extorted them or even protected them from other organizations and police (criminal protection would indeed emerge into a sizeable branch of legal private security and private military companies by the end of the decade).
Social connections became the primary infrastructure of economic activity in Russia
[19] and this led to a situation where both businessman and their political clients depended on each other more than on the rest of the state, opening the door for fragmentation of power and corruption. Depending on the case, this social contracts would be involved with enormous margins of profit and could spell life or death situations of thousands of employees, bureaucrats, politicians and even state service employees servicing them.
In 1992, various economic factions emerged, underlying already political ones. Chubais was widely seen as the boss of the financial sector, Korzhakov as the boss of the defense industry,
[20] Chernomyrdin as the boss of the energy sector, Soskovets of the heavy industry and so on.
The economic hardships Russia endured proved to be a self-perpetuating process as unprofitable factories depended on credit and subsidies from the state which in turn led to inflation and lack of service delivery which in turn led to unpaid employees and short working weeks which in led to turning to private enterprise.
After January of 1992, the worst happened. Decades of state planning, cities relying on a singular economic activity and lack of realistic budget constraint, infrastructure, and alternate suppliers/buyers caused a near collapse of entire branches of economy. Soviet-style heavy industry, once a symbol of Soviet economy, was nearly wiped out and would survive only upon state support.
The Yeltsinite government desperately sought Western assistance from November of 1991 onwards but was met with stern disinterest to the shock of Gaidar and others. Various Western institutions and G-7 pledged humanitarian assistance and were interested in the successor states guaranteeing the servicing of the Soviet Debt.
[21] This contributed to the rise of conservative reformers like acting president Rutskoy who was rightfully suspicious of West economic motives even if he had no understanding of the economy.
By the summer of 1991, US, Germany and various G-7 members promised around $25 billion dollars for economic reform. The assistance would be in the form of credits targeted at benefitting Western agricultural interests. The credits soon became another form of rents for Russian traders and bilateral, circumventing international financial institutions.
The Yelsinite sponsored privatization program would be dependent on vouchers which would theoretically allow everyone a fair chance to acquire the enterprise. It was expected that the new owners would invest the equivalent of the purchase price in the acquired enterprise but there was nearly no way that government could enforce this even if Raskol did not happen.
Yeltsin created a government of best and brightest technocrats. They were somewhat of a paradox in itself, as they were liberals who came from the intellectual elite in Moscow and St. Petersburg and were members of the CPSU (a requirement to be the part of the elite and thus the best academic research). During time Yeltsin was alive, liberal Burbulis was the sole point of communication between them and Yeltsin
[22] which included even Gaidar. The Council of Ministers would reside in the old Central Committee headquarters at the Old Square while Yeltsin initially resided in isolation in Kremlin (to which he did not return upon his brief recovery from coma, instead opting for a special improvised penthouse near the government).
Opposed to them were (broadly speaking) the Soviet era industrialists. The galloping inflation meant little immediately because people and enterprises moved from rubles to dollars, Deutschmarks and good. But a problem was in nonpayments which are usually a sign of a healthy capitalist instinct. This was completely out of place for the centralized communist style economy which could not cope with the emerging chaos among the new enterprises. The immense pressure to issue more money and credit came from the need of the industrialists to settle debts and have some sort of working capital.
This tied in with the ruble zone that existed in the CIS area. The Commonwealth of Independent States was always more of a fig leaf to the former Soviet Union than a planned replacement for the Soviet Union. One area where partial integration continued was the ruble. Instead of one, 15 central banks issued ruble credits (although by summer of 1992 Baltic countries had their own currencies) contributing to hyperinflation. Gaidar and Yeltsinites wanted to nationalize the "ruble" to prevent runaway costs. It is estimated by IMF that at least 22% of the Russian GDP was lost to the uncontrolled ruble emission in CIS ruble zone
[23]. Proponents of the CIS wanted to coordinate banking systems in order not to destroy the CIS.
The energy lobby was the big swing vote in the Russian economy and they were courted by the Burbulis and Khasbulatov alike. The energy lobby wanted two things: continuing the thorny tug of war over privatization which would enable them to secure and vertically integrate their former state enterprises and leave the energy prices regulated by the state. Price regulation in the energy sector meant that companies could file and report income and losses in subsidized regions and low tax regions, reaping large sums of profit in the difference.
The greatest problem for the emerging Russian economy was the false belief of the Yeltsinites and Western observers that moderate managers (now businessmen) who opposed the First August Coup in 1991 were progressive. In reality, state enterprise managers wanted lengthy and unclear reforms that would enable them to continue making fortunes through rent-seeking and securing former state assets for their own property.
[24] Reformers tried to gain their trust, coopting them like Burbulis and Gaidar tried to. It was a futile task as their interests would invariably be to disrupt the transition in order to extract more rents from the state.
[25]
The greatest fear of the reformers, popular strikes from coal miners (like in years before) and ordinary citizens, eventually came to fruition in summer of 1992.
[26] Instead of initial plan of over the board radical liberalization of prices in January 1992
[27] the reformers under Yeltsin, Rutskoy, and Gaidar were forced to continually backtrack and cede certain concessions to the Supreme Soviet, creating certain subgroups that had it easier (former soldiers, key managers etc.) which turned the public opinion against the price liberalization.
Paradoxically enough, the absence of the CPSU and the KGB meant that nothing restrained previously traditional corrupt state apparatus from trying to profit at the backs of each other. All while the politicians blamed reformers, the West, the democracy or separatist republics.
-
An Economic Companion to Modern Russian History, 2009
____________________
'
Where you see letters U, S and R, I see not the letters of the old Soviet Union, but even worse, the letters of K, G and B.'
--senator (R-AZ) John McCain, 1994
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Phillip Bobkov
The Mastermind Checks the King
Security services were never clearly loyal to Yeltsin. Yeltsin tried to consolidate the power in late 1991 and early 1992 by consolidating all Soviet-era intelligence into one agency subordinated to the presidency but this was struck down by the Constitutional Court. This led to piecemeal reform of the former KGB and other services throughout 1992
[28]. Many of the former KGB higher ups survived and dabbled with allying themselves with the Supreme Soviet where many unreformed communists and hardcore nationalists were emerging as the major factions. Others connected with the emerging entrepreneur class of speculative rent seekers, owners of privatized businesses. Finally, some formed an informal partnership with the remaining reactionaries in the military.
This proved to be fatal to the Yeltsinites as secret information leaked from the Council of Ministers regularly to the Supreme Soviet, industrialists and the military. The internal divisions among the reformers as well as plans were well known to almost everyone who wanted to know. Concerningly, many of the security services provided arms to nationalists out of opportunism or careful hedging of political bets.
[29]
This would prove instrumental for the former head of KGB's Fifth Directorate, Philipp Bobkov
, to engineer the downfall of the radical, moderate and conservative reformist. As mentioned before, Bobkov started his career under Beria and was the hidden mastermind that really led the KGB since the 1970s, despite officially having only the post of the first deputy.
Bobkov had been laying the groundwork for his great project for years in advance. According to Gorbachev's close advisor and former member of the Politburo, Alexander Yakovlev, Bobkov had been personally responsible for resolving ethnic conflicts in the Soviet Union in Estonia, Latvia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Armenia. Bobkov also invented the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia to serve as a nationalist decoy and puppet.
[30] Furthermore,
perestroika was a plan Bobkov hatched with his KGB colleagues to renew the Soviet Union and move it ahead.
[31]
The entire early process of privatization had been compromised by the KGB which in 1990 and 1991 created commercial firms and banks that had been managed or advised by trusted KGB officers while Bobkov quietly "retired" in 1991, withdrawing to organize a private security service which coincidentally employed thousands of former KGB officers and had the entire archive of the Fith Directorate.
[32] Western agencies completely failed to detect the long-term plan by Bobkov to engineer a messy transition until the final stage of the plan was put in motion.
Bobkov engineerd the First August Coup and although it failed temporarily, it is likely that former KGB had a hand in Yeltsin's quick demise, returning the power to the Speaker of the Congress of Deputies. It is likely that Ruslan Khasbulatov is only the mouthpiece of Bobkov, given how Khasbulatov came out of nowhere and is widely understood to be a generic clueless Soviet-era economic professor. Bobkov quickly became personal security adviser of Khasbulatov, emerging as the head of security of the Supreme Soviet and later Deputy Chairman of the Parliamentary Guard.
In the time before completing the preparations for the Second August Coup, Bobkov also orchestrated divisions among Yeltsinites, handpicked many leaders of the quasi-communist parties and is certainly behind the current election of the new Sovereign president, Nina Andreyeva.
In August of 1992, it was time for the decade-long KGB plan to finally unfold, the most brilliant plot that the twentieth century had ever seen. It would restore a greater Russia and leave it in sole control by the security services. But even the best plans require improvisation and good luck and the scale of Russia would mean Bobkov's plan would encounter unexpected difficulties.
--
The Road to the Red Resurgence, 1994
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'Mr President, we have some bad news.'
'What can be worse now than Pat's speech? Have you seen it. Christ, he declared a war.'
'It is Russia. [pause] Case ORDEAL RED.'
--movie dramatization of 1992 elections, 2017
______________________________
[ 0.01] I recommend listening to the OTL version before making too many conclusions from the ATL version. Many of the lines are vaguely speculative in OTL version and work well for any timeline.
[ 0.02] Both were true OTL, there were literally articles in 1991 and later years wondering if Yeltsin's dead since nobody would see him, which was both the result of his health problems, habits and his tendency to seclude himself with confidants. Here, people mistake this for a change in character since there is a coma interlude.
[ 0.03] Happen OTL in spring to summer of 1992, so this is a bit later.
[ 0.04] Roughly OTL
[ 0.05] It has been considered OTL, although allegedly later in 1992 and 1993.
[ 0.06] Amazingly enough, this is OTL, and the ATL events may only exacerbate this.
[ 0.07] If this seems familiar, a previous extra has been reincorporated in the update as it fits now perfectly with the context. The old extra will be eventually removed from threadmarks.
[ 0.08] OTL, as recounted by Anders Aslund in his book I wholeheartedly recommend - Russia's Capitalist Revolution
[ 0.09] OTL happened in December of 1992.
[ 0.10-11] OTL
[ 0.12] Happened OTL, although ITL it happens rapidly in the summer of 1992 instead of 1993
[ 0.13] ATL speculation.
[ 0.14] Although it doesn't seem it is entirely OTL, ITTL even worse with the precedent of Yugoslavia and Ukraine no longer trusting Russia.
[ 0.15] OTL Kolesnikov was promoted in April of 1992, but due to shennanigans between Rutskoy and Yeltsin, he has been left wanting, along with many officers that carefully neutrally supported Rutskoy.
[ 0.16] OTL he resisted initial Yeltsins orders in the 1993 dispute with the Soviet.
[ 0.17] OTL quote, Anders Aslund, Russia's Capitalist Revolution: Why Market Reform Succeeded and Democracy Failed, p. 148, 2007
[ 0.18] OTL figure.
[ 0.19] Happen OTL but will be much worse ITTL.
[ 0.20] Although it seems as if Korzhakov's position is ATL outcome, it is actually OTL outcome as well.
[ 0.21] OTL, although the influence of domestic problems and recession is downplayed in the text
[ 0.22] OTL, this is why Burbulis is ATL's "Third Tsar"
[ 0.23] OTL estimate, ITTL it is likely the most conservative estimate.
[ 0.24-25] OTL
[ 0.26-27] Major ATL differences - ITL strikes never happened as everyone was hit the same.
[ 0.28] OTL, but even worse as there was a major reform every three months for years.
[ 0.29] Seems ATL, but it is OTL (nothing came out of it).
[ 0.30] OTL Yakovlev claim, disputed by Bobkov.
[ 0.31] OTL Bobkov claim.
[ 0.32] Happened OTL. Read more on the Gusinsky and Media-Most to see what came of it OTL:
