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Some thoughts prompted by reading Stanley Payne's *The Collapse of the Spanish Republic 1933-1936: Origins of the Civil War* (Yale UP 2006):

If Spain had been a normal parliamentary state, there would have been no question about who should have ruled it after the November 1933 elections. These elections showed a swing to the right (admittedly exaggerated by the election laws--just as the swing to the left in 1936 would be) giving the Catholic-conservative CEDA and the centrist Radical Party a combined majority in the Cortes. The most logical result, therefore, would be a center-right coalition of CEDA and the Radicals.

This, however, was a result which President Alcala Zamora was at first determined to prevent. The chief reason was that CEDA's attitude toward democracy was ambivalent. There was a minority "left" wing of CEDA which could be called Christian Democratic, and a larger "right" wing which wanted to establish a corporative-authoritarian regime like those of Salazar in Portugal and Dollfuss in Austria. The dominant tendency in CEDA, represented by its leader Gil Robles, was "accidentalist"--i.e., it held that forms of government, whether republican or monarchical, were "accidental" and that CEDA should work within the rules of the democratic game to bring about changes in the direction of corporatism. The party refused to call itself "republican" because that word was associated with the anticlerical left, but did pledge to respect republican legality, and generally kept that pledge.

In any event, Alcala Zamora was determined to keep CEDA out of the government until it became more unambiguously republican, and turned instead to the Radical leader Alejandro Lerroux to form a government. The problem with the Radicals is that while in theory their "live and let live" philosophy (Lerroux's slogan was "a republic for all Spaniards") should have been attractive in a new democracy subject to severe polarization, in practice it seemed to amount to sheer opportunism. For example, during the first round of the November 1933 elections, the Radicals aligned themselves with various small centrist republican parties; but then, seeing the chances for a major electoral advance through alliance with the right, the once virulently anticlerical Radicals allied themselves with CEDA in the second round, and gained many seats by doing so. Furthermore, the Radicals were a very localist party, consisting of many divergent groups, held together by Lerroux. (Some of these localist groups had a reputation for corruption in municipal administration.) Anyway, Lerroux formed a government composed of Radicals and other centrist and center-right parties but dependent on CEDA support--which Gil Robles was at first willing to give without demanding CEDA participation in the government.

Alcala Zamora, however, did not like Lerroux, whom he considered corrupt and dangerous. (He was convinced that Lerroux had been informed of, though not a direct part of, the abortive Sanjurjo pronunciamento of 1932.) In May 1934, he in effect forced Lerroux's resignation and replaced him with another Radical, Ricardo Samper, who formed what was generally considered to be a coalition of nonentities manipulated by the President. By autumn, however, CEDA and the Radicals were tired of Alcala Zamora's interference. CEDA made it clear that it would insist on seats in the cabinet, and the Radicals made it clear that they would insist on the return of Lerroux as Prime Minister, no matter how much Alcala Zamora or the left would object. The President reluctantly agreed to the formation of a *cedorradical* coalition led by Lerroux, since that was the only formula that could produce a parliamentary majority. (The three cedistas were from the moderate wing of the party, and were excluded from the most sensitive ministries, such as War and the Interior.) The Socialists and their allies responded with an abortive insurrection, which was followed by considerable repression. (Though as Payne points out, the repression was much less severe than after unsuccessful revolutions in other European countries, and involved nothing like the arbitrary executions of thousands of Communards in France in 1871.)

In 1935, the government moved further to the right, with Gil Robles becoming Minister of War in May. In September what should have been a routine government reorganization occurred. The two ministers from the Agrarian Party resigned. There was no reason why this should have led to a political crisis, since neither of the main coalition parties (CEDA or the Radicals) was involved and both were willing to keep the coalition going. Nevertheless, in keeping with precedent, all cabinet ministers resigned. Replacing the cabinet should have been an easy matter, since a stable cedorradical majority existed in Parliament, but Alcala Zamora saw the reorganization as an opportunity to weaken the cedorradical coalition and move the Republic further to the center. He appointed the independent nonparty Finance Minister Chapaprieta as Prime Minister. Gil Robles and Lerroux gave in, and Chapaprieta formed a new cabinet, tilted slightly more to the center, but still with three cedistas, including Gil Robles at War. The new government got a vote of confidence in Parliament but with many abstentions. One of the objectives of the new government was political normalization; thus in Barcelona all political centers were allowed to re-open except for the extremist Estat Catala. The Socialists were authorized to hold a large rally. Political violence had by no means disappeared but its pace in 1935 was the slowest of any year of the Republic. In short, the political situation did seem to be returning--though precariously--to "normal," and the economy was also improving.

It was in these circumstances of partial improvement and delicate political balance that the "Straperlo" scandal broke. "Straperlo" was a new electronic roulette-type gambling device, named after its two promoters, Strauss and Perle. (Later "estraperlo" would become the standard term for black-market dealing after the Civil War.) David Strauss, a Dutch businessman, was the principal partner. According to Payne, "The Strauss wheel differed from conventional roulette in that it was not based on chance but followed complex yet regular procedures that might be calculated by nimble players (though the operator had the means of further manipulating the outcome, if he chose, to throw off a winning calculation). This arrangement theoretically created a new game of 'skill' rather than one of pure chance." (pp. 381-2) Anyway, Strauss had hoped to legalize the Straperlo in Spain through personal negotiations with various politicians, mostly Radicals. Apparently a number of bribes were provided, but legalization never fully took place, and the frustrated promoters were determined on revenge. Strauss got in touch with the exiled Socialist leader Prieto and the Left-Republican Azana, who urged Strauss to write to the President, which he soon did.

Rather than turn the material over to the courts, Alcala Zamora retained it for political purposes. He first mentioned it to Lerroux just before the September crisis; Lerroux brushed it off as an unjustified triviality (as will be noted, there is a case that it was just that). In October Alcala Zamora showed the Straperlo correspondence to Chapaprieta. Chapaprieta urged Alcala Zamora not to reply to Strauss but to let him take the material to court if he chose. Had Alcala Zamora taken this course, the impact of the scandal would probably have been much less than in OTL. Indeed, Alcala Zamora might have followed this path, except for a petty incident a few days later: The Radicals organized a large banquet for Lerroux to publicize the dubious manner in which the President had just eased him out of the Prime Ministership. At the banquet, Lerroux said that one must always respect the office of chief of state, *whatever one's views of the individual holding that office.* Alcala Zamora, who could be a very vain man, was infuriated, and handed over the Straperlo correspondence to the cabinet, which, having heard that Azana was about to refer to it at a mass meeting, "decided to announce that a complaint had been received from a foreign source alleging irregularities by certain Spanish officials and was being handed over to the prosecutor of the Supreme Court for investigation."

With this announcement, opposition deputies in the Cortes smelled blood, and immediately formed an investigating commission, which within a few days reported as follows: In 1934, seeking to get authorization for use of his device in Barcelona, Strauss met with local Radical Party leader Jose Pich y Pon (then undersecretary of the navy) and to Aurelio Lerroux, nephew and adopted son of the party leader. They convinced Strauss to form a new corporation in which Pich y Pon and Aurelio Lerroux received fifty percent of the stock in return for gaining authorization from the government. They won approval from the Minister of the Interior, at that time Salazar Alonso, and his undersecretary (Eduardo Benzo) though apparently no bribes were paid to either of those officials, and approval was also needed from the Prime Minister, Samper. The latter's close associate, Sigfrido Blasco Ibanez, son of the famous novelist, allegedly promised to arrange matters in return for a 400,000 peseta bribe for the Prime Minister and a lesser amount for the Minister of the Interior. Authorization was obtained, and in August 1934 Strauss presented Alejandro Lerroux and Salazar Anonso with expensive gold watches valued at 4,600 pesetas each--the only money or objects of value known to change hands. The Strauss casino opened at San Sebastian on September 12, 1934 but was within hours closed down by the police, allegedly because of Strauss's failure to come up with bribes. An irate Strauss then demanded of Aurelio Lerroux that he return all that had been invested, but Aurelio Lerroux supposedly convinced him that it would be possible to mount the operation successfully in Palma de Mallorca, provided that modest bribes were paid to Juan Jose Rocha (now Minister of the Navy), to Pich y Pon, Benzo, and a few others. So Strauss opened a new casino in Formentera--only to see it closed within eight days, possibly as a result of pressure from local business interests. Strauss next demanded return of 50,000 pesetas allegedly paid to Aurelio Leroux and 25,000 to Benzo. The corporation was then dissolved, Strauss acknowledging the return of 75,000 pesetas against 450,000 allegedly lost.

The report caused a sensation, yet as Payne notes, despite all the allegations of bribery, the two gold watches are the only valuables known to have changed hands, and "The main document presented by Strauss and his lawyers was in fact unsigned and was unaccompanied by any material evidence, so its legal value was uncertain at best." When the report was debated by the Cortes on October 28, Gregorio Arranz, the independent head of the parliamentary commission, said "I would not go so far as to conclude from the materials investigated that a crime has been committed." (Payne, p. 124) The Radicals, however, were demoralized and failed to mount much of a defense. The two leading Radicals in the Cabinet, Lerroux and Rocha, resigned. To make matters worse, on November 28, another scandal broke, the Nombela scandal.

Nombela, the former inspector general of colonial administration, had made a public protest about the payment of funds to a colonial shipping merchant named A. Taya. Taya had won a case in the Supreme Court over government cancellation of his shipping contract. He demanded three million pesetas in settlement. The court had directed that a commission of experts determine the final sum, but Taya, who had had dealings with Lerroux in earlier years, made arrangements for direct payment from colonial administration funds through Lerroux's undersecretary, Moreno Calvo. Nombelo had protested, and a subcommittee of cabinet members reviewed the matter but routinely approved payment. Now Nombelo protested directly to Gil Robles, and on July 17 the Council of Ministers cancelled the payment--but at the same time Nombela was dismissed. He now demanded the clearing of his name. This time it was CEDA, not Alcala Zamora, that was most anxious to pursue the case; by further weakening the Radicals it could increase its own power. In the end Parliament found that the only person to blame was Moreno Calvo, but even though Lerroux was technically absolved, he and his party were further weakened.

The result was that when another crisis brought down the Chapaprieta government in December, Alcala Zamora had only two choices: to allow a CEDA-led government with Gil Robles as Prime Minister or to dissolve the Cortes and hold new elections. In effect, he chose the latter course, appointing as Prime Minister an independent centrist, Manuel Portela Valladores, whom he knew could not get a majority in Parliament. He hoped, however, to use Portela's interim government as the basis for a new centrist party which would prevent either the Popular Front or the Right from getting a majority in the forthcoming election. The strategy failed completely; Portela's party (like the Radicals) did very poorly in the elections; http://groups.google.com/group/soc.history.what-if/msg/ca50b1b2e2fb4107 the Popular Front won, and Spain was on its way to Civil War.

So suppose there had been no Straperlo scandal. (Or what if it had been covered up successfully by the Radicals yielding to Strauss's blackmail?) Without it, the center-right could have governed Spain until late 1937, when the next parliamentary elections were scheduled. (The Nombela scandal would have been of very minor significance without the Straperlo.) Even if one grants the very dubious assumption that Gil Robles wanted to introduce fascism, he would simply not have the power to do so. (Yes, he did control the Ministry of War, but the generals at this time were in no mood for a coup. Ironically, Alcala Zamora's fear that Gil Robles would use his position to encourage a coup turned out to be a self-fulfilling prophecy. Gil Robles had not previously sought such a coup but in December when Alcala Zamora made it clear that he would never appoint Gil Robles Prime Minister--never mind that he was leader of the largest party in Parliament and that many members of the rapidly-decaying second largest party, the Radicals, were willing to follow him--he did sound out Franco, the chief of staff. Even then, what he wanted of Franco was not a military takeover of the government but a sort of "legalitarian pronunciamento" in which the military leaders would force Alcala Zamora to appoint a majoritarian parliamentary government, which would presumably have to be led by CEDA. Franco declined, saying that the Army could not intervene in what seemed a routine political dispute, not yet a true national crisis. Of course a second what-if is what if Franco had agreed...)

Even if there had still been a Straperlo scandal, according to Payne, "it might have amounted to little had it not been carefully exploited by the Spanish president, even though he was fully aware that Strauss had been trying to blackmail his own prime minister. Having leveraged Lerroux from power, Alcala Zamora then appointed the Chapaprieta government. Though Chapaprieta had initially recognized that the case should be handled by the courts, his own position was very weak, which was why the president had appointed him in the first place. Thus he caved in to pressure from Alcala Zamora and others, so that the case was handled in a flagrantly political fashion, with parliament acting as both judge and jury...Major Spanish officials were forced to resign on the unproven and unsigned word of a sordid con man..." Payne contrasts this with the French Stavisky Affair, which involved much more serious misconduct--including murder!--yet did little long-term harm to the French Radical party, partly because unlike the Spanish scandal it was handled through normal channels, and partly because the Spanish political system was much more fragile and weakly institutionalized than the French, so that scandals that were in themselves small potatoes could have a devastating effect.

Of course there is one other what-if here: What if in December 1935 Alcala Zamora had agreed to the formation of a Gil Robles-led government instead of calling new elections? I have to agree with Payne that this would have been by far the wiser decision. If elections had been delayed until November 1937, there is at least some chance that political polarization might have declined in the interim. (Furthermore, some degree of electoral reform in the direction of greater proportionality--as favored by such disparate groups as CEDA and the Lliga Catalana, as well as by Alcala Zamora--could have moderated the polarization in the next election results.)

OTOH, there are causes for concern about a CEDA-led government. Even Payne acknowledges that "despite the CEDA's legalism, its youth movement experienced the vertigo of fascism and adopted a semifascist language and style, minus the key fascist element of violence, which was much more typical of the left." (Gil Robles once explained--a bit lamely IMO--that he did not repudiate the semifascist militants of the CEDA youth, because it was better to keep them in CEDA where he could control them than to have them join more extreme groups like the Falange.) Still, CEDA could not have ruled by itself; even after the decline of the Radical Party, the deputies elected as Radicals would still be in Parliament and would exercise some restraining influence on the cedistas. And anyway it's hard to think that a CEDA-led government would be worse than what actually happened...

Alcala Zamora's intentions were basically good. He wanted a centrist party that was more progressive than the Radicals and less corrupt. (The chief rival to the Radicals for secular bourgeois support, Azana's Left Republicans, would not do, for they had decided to align themselves with the revolutionary left.) Unfortunately, he thought he could create such a party through presidential manipulation of the political process, and that proved disastrous. It was wrong for him to imagine that he could strengthen the center in Spain by helping to destroy what was, with all its faults, the only major existing centrist party, the Radicals. And once that party had been destroyed, he should have seen that creating a new center on its ruins would take time--and time was precisely what he denied it by calling new elections.
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