Another way to save NASA after 1972 is to have the fourth N-1 launch in November 1972 to succeed. This would improve Soviet confidence enough to fly the N1F in 1974. With thoughs successful it may have begun the L3M lunar outpost or the OS-1 permanent spacestation (ISS equivelant in 2 launches). Then NASA would have to respond.
Good idea. Even more important than the N-1 to suceed or fail is to try and butterfly away Glushko takeover of 1974 that led to NPO Energia.
In 1969 the Americans had four options with the Space Task Group
- Mars
- more Moon
- space station
- space shuttle
The soviets didn't knew what option Nixon would pick, so they forged mostly similar options they would pick according to the american decision - symmetrical answer typical of the Cold War.
- Mars = Aelita nuclear-electric ship
- more Moon: L3M sorties and DLB lunar base
- space station: small, Skylab = Salyut, or huge, space base = the MKBS
And... there was no soviet shuttle. Not before 1976 ! In April 1972, onyl four months after Nixon started the american shuttle, a Soviet meeting on the subject led to... nothing.
The Aviation and Rocket ministries hated each others since 1960 when Mister K had shut down bombers in favour of ICBMs. The military hated reusable space planes, they hated Spiral.
Korolev heir Vasily Mishin was interested only in MKBS or L3M / DLB.
So nothing moved for years... and Glushko saw an opportunity there. He told Breznhev that a major reorganization was necessary, and that HE could build the damn shuttle... together with the Energia rocket he really wanted to go to the Moon and kill the N-1.
So Buran was, even for a Glushko, only a pretext to a) grab ower within the Soviet rocket industry and b) to get that Energia HLV.
Glushko however was trapped when his Energia lunar base was eaten alive by... Buran itself.