loughery111
Banned
You've missed the point. The point is that a rogue or collapsed state, can sell nuclear weapons, without the international community being able to retaliate. For instance, if a terrorist group from Venezuela purchases from Belarus a "loose nuke" nuclear weapon through South African dissdents, are any of the 3 nations going to be attacked? Nope!! Also, you seem to forget that the section in question that collapses is at least c. 5-10 miles in length. In a major metropolitan area, you have killed c. 750,000 or more people. It certainly isn't an extinction event, but you certainly don't want to be anywhere near collapse...
You forget that any demolition expert or trained terrorist can dismatle the anchor, again causing massive amounts of destruction. As for the precious carbon fibers, since they were designed to withstand the friction of orbital re-entry, consider that hundreds of miles worth of falling carbon cable will certainly kill thousands of people on the ground...
Verrazano Straits Bridge Disaster...
Two very good examples of people taking their time for what authorities consider a "terrorist act":
The Great Escape or The Bridge ont he River Kwai
If the weapon could be traced to Belarus, the Belorussian government would almost certainly be held responsible by whoever was responsible for the construction and maintenance of the elevator. Thus their government has every incentive NOT to hand over a nuclear weapon, nor to allow one to be handed over. The same incentives that operate today in not allowing someone who will attack the US to get one of your loose warheads will apply here.
Only an unforgivably idiotic jackass of an engineer would even consider putting this thing in a major metropolitan area. If fact, I wouldn't be at all surprised if a primary factor in its location was that there is nothing for 30 or 40 kilometers of cable to hit if it were to fall. Obviously anymore than that would be difficult, but if it gets severed at the base it will do comparatively little damage.
Ahh yes, the "I say someone can do it, therefore they can" argument. What makes you think this anchor point is going to be unhardened? It is quite literally the most valuable target on earth; I would expect it to be designed to survive anything but a point-blank high-yield nuclear detonation. Consider, for instance, the possibility of anchoring the cable by branching it out at the ground terminus and tying each of several thousand strands of carbon directly into bedrock, then building a hardened facility around it to serve all logistical functions and as additional armor. Bit of a tough target, especially if it is placed in a no-fly zone, given heavy point-defense systems, and all inbound cargo is scanned (given that most bulk cargoes would be coming down as raw materials, this is less of a problem than one might think.)
For the last time, this thing is being constructed in orbit. Likely in GEOSTATIONARY orbit over the South Pacific... thus it will be extremely difficult to propel a piece of severed cable towards earth, and then to have it hit something crucial. There are a lot of physics working against you. Combine that with the fact that the construction effort will, of necessity, have ships on hand capable of handling those lengths of cables, and therefore might be able to retrieve it, and the probability of mass casualties is close to nil.
I assume this is referring to the Tacoma Narrows Bridge, as to my knowledge the Verrazano Narrows Bridge is still standing... Anyway, because engineers have, at some point in the past, screwed up one mid-level project, they're somehow going to screw up everything about the largest engineering project the world has ever even contemplated? Especially when the physics of orbital mechanics are so well-known that even a 10 year old child with a calculator and a textbook could position the elevator in orbit properly? Unlike the physics of wind dynamics, which were very ill-understood at the time of the Tacoma Narrows construction project, there are no major physical fields that we don't have a firm grasp of here except for some of the materials, which is less physics and more chemistry. Additionally, if a third-year civil engineering student can anticipate the problem you're suggesting and propose a means of solving it, it will definitely be dealt with in the final project.
And, finally, neither of those examples of "terrorist acts" left the technological equivalent of "HELP spelled in fire on the beach" for all to see. LONG, long before any nano-machines would even begin to slightly degrade the cable's structural integrity, there would be telltale signs of their presence lighting up every sensor and monitoring system this project has. Your analogies are both flawed because the evidence of those action's planning and early execution was much more easily concealed. A better analogy would be as if the Allied POW's in the Great Escape were digging their hole in broad daylight in full view of the German guards with a teaspoon. That should give you some idea of just how utterly visible the effects of any nanotechnology-based attack on the cable will be.
Just as they would be shot for even trying to do something that stupid, the nanites would be detected the second particulate matter from the outer sheathing of the cable started spalling into local space. That, of course, would be months before they actually caused any meaningful damage, and their threat would take, at most, days to completely eradicate. They, therefore, are NOT A THREAT AT ALL.
The threat to this structure from some rogue state or terrorist cell, assuming anyone involved in its construction and administration has three whole brain cells to rub together, is so close to nil that we can disregard it entirely. It will be, literally, the most heavily defended piece of real estate on earth and in orbit. There is quite literally nothing short of a major fleet action, contact nuclear detonation, or ramming it in space with a bulk cargo freighter that will damage it, and precautions will surely be taken for all three, which are in any case out of the resource base of a terrorist group.
Last edited: