Volunteers, weapons, all kinds of other aid, yes, and the Finns were and still are very grateful for this. But diplomatically and officially, I think many Finnish historians would say that Sweden's actions fell short of the bolded description.
There were those that would have supported Finland, on the right and even in the SDP, for example Sandler. And he was out of the cabinet, partly because he couldn't get enough support for helping Finland to militarily defend Åland.
Generally the actions of Hansson's cabinet were very careful. In early February, for example, when the USSR send the Swedes a note critical of Swedish aid to Finland, the Swedish cabinet replied even somewhat apologetically that the Soviets are mistaken if they think that Sweden is helping Finland and that it hopes its actions have not offended the USSR. At the same time, Undén, the chair to the committee on foreign relations publicly declared that "the Swedish government... has never planned a Nordic defence union and the Swedish defense organisation is not built for a pre-emptive defensive war outside the Swedish borders". Prime Minister Hansson, for himself, said that Swedish policies were based on national consensus and this would be impossible to maintain if Sweden joined the war supporting Finland.
These policies culminated when Sweden refused to allow Allied troops the passage to Finland in mid-March - and that the refusal was immediately leaked to the national papers and confirmed by the prime minister himself, weakening the Finnish position vis-a-vis Moscow. Foreign Minister Günther put the sentiment in plain words to Paasikivi: Sweden would not risk war to help Finland retain Viipuri or Sortavala.
The Swedish government, first of all, did its best to keep the nation out of the general war during the Winter War. The Finnish position was secondary to this. Naturally.
I am sure plans were made. Let's just say I am not so confident Sweden would risk becoming an actual combatant in a world war over Åland when Soviet planes can bomb Stockholm from Turku and Helsinki as well as bases in Estonia with impunity and when Skåne is still theoretically under the threat of a German attack. Maybe Sweden has the troops and the hardware for war. But does it have the political will and decisiveness necessary? When a Soviet Finland is already a fait accompli and most of the northern Baltic is Soviet?
The Swedish track record in the period is not exactly reassuring when it comes to decisive and aggressive foreign and military policy. Sweden did what was necessary to stay safe and out of the harm's way. To illustrate this, words like careful, flexible and utilitarian rather come to mind.
Yes, Sweden was never planning on going full-out in defending Finland, despite some around "Ny Militär Tidsskrift" with Helge Jung in the leading position advocated for it. The Swedish army was too weak for any such campaign - capable of defending own territory, yes, but without the ability to project power in other countries. The Swedish government knew this and that was part of the reason Finland got 1/3 of the Swedish fighter force, half the AA guns, a good 10% of the artillery, 1/4 of the AT guns etc. etc. The Soviet Union remaining a good distance away from Åbo, Åland and Tornio was sensible Swedish strategic positions.
One of the reasons Sweden sent lots of aid but diplomatically held a rather low position was because of the skilled diplomacy of Madame Kollontaj. She "forgot" to pass several very sharp notes from the Soviet government to the Swedish government and was instrumental when Sweden offered to broker peace. Sweden would indeed not go to war for Viborg, but would for Åland. The Soviets knew this, and it was part of the reason why they settled for the March Peace and conveniently "forgot" about Kuusinen's Terijoki government, that they just three months earlier had declared the only legal government of Finland.
As for the allied intervention, everyone, including the Swedes, knew that the allied forces intended to occupy the ore fields rather than help Finland. Besides, Norway refused transit too, knowing that it was not help for Finland that was intended.
Sweden WOULD take Åland, and would take a Soviet declaration of war rather than give it up in case of a Finnish collapse. The Soviet bombers can reach much farther into Sweden from Åland than they can from Åbo.
At this time, it looked like the Soviets were intent on aggressive expansion - they have split Poland with Germany, they have effectively taken over the Baltic states and they have launched an aggressive war against the Finnish and usurped its government. The Red Scare was very much real, even for social democrats in Sweden (who has always been rather anti-communist).
The Swedish order of scenarios was;
1. Finland wins. All is peachy.
2. Finland loses the original Soviet demands. Not good, but much better than the alternatives. This is the peace Sweden attempted to broker, and managed to do. Finnish collapse was not far away in Spring 1940.
3. Finland collapses, Sweden takes Åland.
4. Finland collapses, Sweden does NOT take Åland.
Risking war to have 3 rather than 4 is what the Swedes would do. I do not think Stalin would risk it, he needs time to swallow the experiences of the Winter War and organise the newly annexed Finnish SSR, biding his time until the Western Powers and Germany have fought each other to exhaustion.