Soviets get lucky and kill Hitler in February 1943

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The problem with this is what happened IOTL: the Germans used paratrooper drops on Rome to decapitate the Italian high command. In terms of strategic impact vs. losses it was their most successful paradrop of the war.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Achse
As it was even IOTL post-Sicily at Salerno the Germans nearly succeeded in defeating the Allied invasion of Southern Italy, so having more men on hand and perhaps evacuated from Sicily might change things there.

Mussolini was never really friends with Hitler, he was a barnacle attached to Hitler's belly to get war spoils. Hitler respected Mussolini, Mussolini needed Hitler. As it was Mussolini was hated by the military and public by 1943, so he couldn't rally anyone to do anything and realized he depended on the Germans; he had a decent relationship with Goering, so there is no reason Mussolini would change his OTL actions ITTL.
And Achse was developed after Mussolini's fall. So if the Italians (be that Mussolini or his opponents), inspired by Hitler's death, move faster or at least differently, maybe the Germans can't act quickly enough to disarm them.
 

Deleted member 1487

And Achse was developed after Mussolini's fall. So if the Italians (be that Mussolini or his opponents), inspired by Hitler's death, move faster or at least differently, maybe the Germans can't act quickly enough to disarm them.
Achse was the latest variant after Mussolini fell, but contingency plans for Italy defection started after Tunisia, originally Operation Alarich starting in May 1943:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Achse#German_plan

Mussolini was not popular, so wasn't in a position to rally anyone if he tried to present himself privately as an organizer of Italian defection. The problem with Italian defection is that the Allies hadn't even talked to the Italians yet. As it was even the Italians weren't all that organized for peace either:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armistice_of_Cassibile#Background
Mussolini was very much in it to the bitter end with the Germans, as he understood that if he lost support of the Germans he'd be killed. In February 1943 it is way too soon for Mussolini to think about giving up even on Goering. The Italians were so disorganized and ham-handed in their peace efforts, not really even knowing what to do, much like their war effort, it is near impossible to imagine them defecting competently. Beyond that Hitler's death if anything would give more confidence in the Germans, as he was not that respected in Italy by 1943. Even Goering wasn't seen as as crazy as Hitler.
 
Achse was the latest variant after Mussolini fell, but contingency plans for Italy defection started after Tunisia, originally Operation Alarich starting in May 1943:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Achse#German_plan

Mussolini was not popular, so wasn't in a position to rally anyone if he tried to present himself privately as an organizer of Italian defection. The problem with Italian defection is that the Allies hadn't even talked to the Italians yet. As it was even the Italians weren't all that organized for peace either:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armistice_of_Cassibile#Background
Mussolini was very much in it to the bitter end with the Germans, as he understood that if he lost support of the Germans he'd be killed. In February 1943 it is way too soon for Mussolini to think about giving up even on Goering. The Italians were so disorganized and ham-handed in their peace efforts, not really even knowing what to do, much like their war effort, it is near impossible to imagine them defecting competently. Beyond that Hitler's death if anything would give more confidence in the Germans, as he was not that respected in Italy by 1943. Even Goering wasn't seen as as crazy as Hitler.
Well clearly I can imagine it, though obviously the details need work. But it's still just one element that, in my opinion, went as terrible as possible for the Allies (i.e. Italy messed it up completely) and anything changing anything at all is likely to make it as bad or better.

But perhaps this isn't the most likely to change; other things can also change, for better or worse, due to the knock-on effects of whatever happens after Hitler dies. Maybe someone is emboldened to join the resistance somewhere by the news, maybe some resistance group celebrates the news a bit too loudly and gets caught, maybe some resistance group celebrates by loudly blowing up more German troops...
 
Goering though would be a different leader not on their page and probably considering putting some of his own guys in charge to shake things up.

That would be a prime way for Goering to be shot by the army in a coup. Unlike Hitler, he was not at all liked or respected by them and him attempting to replace their top people or interfere with their operations like Hitler did would not be received well at all.

Except the Mius and Smolensk were heavily fortified and the Soviets had problems tearing through those areas IOTL; they couldn't do so quickly and even though they did draw off some German reserves they weren't then able to rip through around Kursk quickly or cheaply;

Mius and Smolensk weren't any more well fortified then Kharkov or Orel. Like those places, they were riddled with holes and weaknesses, as the German Front line established at the end of March 1943 was far too long for the depleted Wehrmacht to defend. The main reason the Soviets had such trouble was that they were sending secondary forces at these locations as they were secondary offensives of secondary importance. None of the Tank, Guards, or Shock Armies were committed to them. The Mius attack in particular was explicitly nothing more then a decoy operation. Make those operations the main blows instead of afterthoughts and the Soviets will achieve vastly better results.

Now had the Germans consistently had the intelligence to ideally position their forces in anticipation of Soviet moves it would have been possible for them to secure a far better result in the war than OTL. However, fixing this problem would have required years of prior investment in a superior intelligence organization, and was not something that was suddenly going to be fixed in 1943.

in fact during the Kursk offensive they attacked on the north side of the Orel Bulge, figuring that since German AFV reserves were fully committed to fighting on the south side of the bulge they'd have an easy time of things;

The Soviets were very well aware that the Germans had significant AFV reserves in the Orel region. They had just been fighting them for the past week after all.

they still managed to inflict disproportionate losses on the Soviets over several weeks before being too worn down from their offensive plus the transfer of units to Italy to hold.

Losses the Soviets handily replenished and carried on attacking while the Germans just grew weaker.
 

Deleted member 1487

That would be a prime way for Goering to be shot by the army in a coup. Unlike Hitler, he was not at all liked or respected by them and him attempting to replace their top people or interfere with their operations like Hitler did would not be received well at all.
The guys that would be replaced at the top were all Hitler appointees, not revolutionaries. Goering would have his own bodyguards and the backing of the SS. Removing him would come from the resistance, not the intellectually castrated high command officers. The army was filled by different interest groups in and out of Hitler's favor, 'the army' as a whole did not exist in terms of backing a coup. Perhaps though Goering being less popular does get replaced in Summer 1943 for his interference and Kursk then doesn't happen due to the coup.

Mius and Smolensk weren't any more well fortified then Kharkov or Orel. Like those places, they were riddled with holes and weaknesses, as the German Front line established at the end of March 1943 was far too long for the depleted Wehrmacht to defend. The main reason the Soviets had such trouble was that they were sending secondary forces at these locations as they were secondary offensives of secondary importance. None of the Tank, Guards, or Shock Armies were committed to them. The Mius attack in particular was explicitly nothing more then a decoy operation. Make those operations the main blows instead of afterthoughts and the Soviets will achieve vastly better results.
Check Soviet losses at Smolensk compared to Kharkov and how much longer it took to tear through it. By summer 1943 the Germans were still quite powerful and Smolensk, Orel, and even the Kursk offensive demonstrated what they could do in terms of lopsided casualty inflicting when they had their strength topped up for the year. In all of the defensive operations the Germans inflicted higher losses on the Soviets by a significant margin, without burning through their resources for Kursk they'd do even better on the defensive. The question of course is what that means for the rest of the year.

Now had the Germans consistently had the intelligence to ideally position their forces in anticipation of Soviet moves it would have been possible for them to secure a far better result in the war than OTL. However, fixing this problem would have required years of prior investment in a superior intelligence organization, and was not something that was suddenly going to be fixed in 1943.
It wasn't a matter of having to have the right intelligence about all the attacks to determine which was the major threat before it happened, it was about having the reserves to put into the breakthrough areas, which they did at Kharkov for a while, but were worn down due to the Kursk offensive, so lacked the staying power to hold the line as a result. Panzer reserves were at the decisive point, they just lacked the power to stop the Soviets; without the Kursk offensive they'd have the power to hold longer than IOTL, but probably by Autumn/Winter they'd have to fall back because Soviet reserves were so deep that eventually attrition would overtake the Germans.

The Soviets were very well aware that the Germans had significant AFV reserves in the Orel region. They had just been fighting them for the past week after all.
The reserves were committed to Kursk, they attacked on the opposite side of the Orel Bulge from where the German AFVs were and still couldn't breakthrough. The Germans were able to disengage and resist with their worn down strength and prevented the Soviets from being able to do more than squeeze out the bulge. They never broke through in that sector and were worn down badly in the process; had German AFV reserves been in the central reserve point Soviet losses would have been far worse:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Kutuzov

Losses the Soviets handily replenished and carried on attacking while the Germans just grew weaker.
Right, I'm not saying the line would be held for the entire year; even if it were they would give way in 1944 due to attrition. Its just a question of how many losses the Soviets take in the meantime and what the delayed advance costs them and how Goering reacts that matters; evacuating the Kuban in time and having 17th army for operations on the Dniepr would be very helpful.
 
The guys that would be replaced at the top were all Hitler appointees, not revolutionaries.

It wasn't just the top-most guys who hated Goering. You can go all the way down to the army and corps-level, you'll find a few Goering supporters... and a overwhelming amount who hate his guts.

Goering would have his own bodyguards and the backing of the SS.

The SS also hated Goering and would be unlikely to support him.

Perhaps though Goering being less popular does get replaced in Summer 1943 for his interference and Kursk then doesn't happen due to the coup.

A coup which weakens Germany so much that it can't do Kursk weakens it's prospective defense too.

By summer 1943 the Germans were still quite powerful and Smolensk, Orel, and even the Kursk offensive demonstrated what they could do in terms of lopsided casualty inflicting when they had their strength topped up for the year.

It also showed that they consistely lose and are incapable of holding the Soviets on a timeframe of any more then a month.

Check Soviet losses at Smolensk compared to Kharkov and how much longer it took to tear through it.

Which, again, was a function of Smolensk being a secondary offensive and not the main blow. It was not a function of the German defenses at Smolensk being any stronger then those at Kharkov like you are asserting. Had the Soviet forces committed to Kharkov been available to be thrown against Smolensk, then the German forces defending Smolensk would have been in for a very bad time.

without burning through their resources for Kursk they'd do even better on the defensive.

A myth that is based purely on German general apologia and not supported by an actual examination of the strengths and skills of the respective sides. What probably happens is the German line cracks months earlier since the Soviets are able to open their offensive months earlier. Reality is that by March of 1943 it was far too late for the Germans to be arguing about an offensive or defensive posture on the Eastern Front. With the losses of Stalingrad and the attrition of the previous years of war, the Germans no longer had the force to attack or defend the existing line successfully.

It wasn't a matter of having to have the right intelligence about all the attacks to determine which was the major threat before it happened,

Yes it is and the fact that you assert otherwise is revealing in your ignorance. You can attack successfully without decent intelligence on the enemy, because you just force your will upon him, and make him deal with your moves. But you cannot defend successfully with poor intelligence, particularly against a stronger foe. German infantry divisions were crippling weak against massed Soviet armour, and so what really mattered in stopping a Soviet attack was how many Panzer divisions there were, and where they were. Where the German infantry were and were not dug in was far less important, since by the end of 1943 the Soviets had repeatedly demonstrated the ability to overrun defending German infantry who lacked armour support.

Even OTL post-Citadel, had the Germans had far better intelligence on Soviet numbers and intentions then they would have been able to position what limited forces they still had for better effect, and absolutely have achieved better results. Had 4th Panzer Army been reinforced and troops not dispersed to respond to diversions then it is absolutely the case that the Germans could have done better against the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive than they did historically. But achieving the kind organization capable of reliably providing this kind of insight requires a top to bottom shake up and reform of the whole broken German intelligence apparatus for the Eastern Front. It also required leaders who still believed they could win the war to accept some very harsh truths such honest intelligence would have told them. However, in the historical context of poor German intelligence then defensive failures were inevitable, and postulating scenarios where the Germans consistently have their forces positioned perfectly to block the Soviets through chance alone is hardly realistic. They got very lucky at Kursk as it was, with Hitler making the right decision that possibly saved Army Group South, if for the wrong reasons.

it was about having the reserves to put into the breakthrough areas,

And placing the reserves in the right place so they can intervene in a timely manner is a function of... wait for it... having intelligence on your enemies capabilities and intentions. Otherwise, your reduced to a blind guessing game where, the overwhelming majority of the time, you get it wrong. Then your reserves will arrive far too late to actually stop the enemy and can at best only achieve damage control, as happened at Kharkov.

without the Kursk offensive they'd have the power to hold longer than IOTL,

Which you base not on an objective analysis of German and Soviet forces as they stood in the spring/summer of 1943, but on a whole bunch of post-war sob stories by generals trying to wash the stink of failure off.

The reserves were committed to Kursk,

Not really. Model had held back a good portion of his armor from Citadel and thus actually had a substantial panzer reserve. As a result, when the Soviet assault ripped apart the German infantry infantry forces, it was only by hastily turning these panzers from the southern part and thrown into the defense that staved off a complete breakthrough. Even then, it was incapable of stopping the Soviets and the Germans were forced into a retreat.
 
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