The guys that would be replaced at the top were all Hitler appointees, not revolutionaries.
It wasn't just the top-most guys who hated Goering. You can go all the way down to the army and corps-level, you'll find a few Goering supporters... and a overwhelming amount who hate his guts.
Goering would have his own bodyguards and the backing of the SS.
The SS also hated Goering and would be unlikely to support him.
Perhaps though Goering being less popular does get replaced in Summer 1943 for his interference and Kursk then doesn't happen due to the coup.
A coup which weakens Germany so much that it can't do Kursk weakens it's prospective defense too.
By summer 1943 the Germans were still quite powerful and Smolensk, Orel, and even the Kursk offensive demonstrated what they could do in terms of lopsided casualty inflicting when they had their strength topped up for the year.
It also showed that they consistely
lose and are incapable of
holding the Soviets on a timeframe of any more then a month.
Check Soviet losses at Smolensk compared to Kharkov and how much longer it took to tear through it.
Which, again, was a function of Smolensk being a secondary offensive and not the main blow. It was
not a function of the German defenses at Smolensk being any stronger then those at Kharkov like you are asserting. Had the Soviet forces committed to Kharkov been available to be thrown against Smolensk, then the German forces defending Smolensk would have been in for a very bad time.
without burning through their resources for Kursk they'd do even better on the defensive.
A myth that is based purely on German general apologia and not supported by an actual examination of the strengths and skills of the respective sides. What probably happens is the German line cracks months earlier since the Soviets are able to open their offensive months earlier. Reality is that by March of 1943 it was far too late for the Germans to be arguing about an offensive or defensive posture on the Eastern Front. With the losses of Stalingrad and the attrition of the previous years of war, the Germans no longer had the force to attack
or defend the existing line successfully.
It wasn't a matter of having to have the right intelligence about all the attacks to determine which was the major threat before it happened,
Yes it is and the fact that you assert otherwise is revealing in your ignorance. You can attack successfully without decent intelligence on the enemy, because you just force your will upon him, and make
him deal with your moves. But you
cannot defend successfully with poor intelligence,
particularly against a stronger foe. German infantry divisions were crippling weak against massed Soviet armour, and so what really mattered in stopping a Soviet attack was how many Panzer divisions there were, and
where they were. Where the German infantry were and were not dug in was far less important, since by the end of 1943 the Soviets had repeatedly demonstrated the ability to overrun defending German infantry who lacked armour support.
Even OTL post-Citadel, had the Germans had far better intelligence on Soviet numbers and intentions then they would have been able to position what limited forces they still had for better effect, and absolutely have achieved better results. Had 4th Panzer Army been reinforced and troops not dispersed to respond to diversions then it is absolutely the case that the Germans could have done better against the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive than they did historically. But achieving the kind organization capable of reliably providing this kind of insight requires a top to bottom shake up and reform of the whole broken German intelligence apparatus for the Eastern Front. It also required leaders who still believed they could win the war to accept some very harsh truths such honest intelligence would have told them. However, in the historical context of poor German intelligence then defensive failures were inevitable, and postulating scenarios where the Germans consistently have their forces positioned perfectly to block the Soviets through chance alone is hardly realistic. They got very lucky at Kursk as it was, with Hitler making the right decision that possibly saved Army Group South, if for the wrong reasons.
it was about having the reserves to put into the breakthrough areas,
And placing the reserves in the right place so they can intervene in a timely manner is a function of... wait for it... having intelligence on your enemies capabilities and intentions. Otherwise, your reduced to a blind guessing game where, the overwhelming majority of the time, you get it wrong. Then your reserves will arrive far too late to actually stop the enemy and can at best only achieve damage control, as happened at Kharkov.
without the Kursk offensive they'd have the power to hold longer than IOTL,
Which you base not on an objective analysis of German and Soviet forces as they stood in the spring/summer of 1943, but on a whole bunch of post-war sob stories by generals trying to wash the stink of failure off.
The reserves were committed to Kursk,
Not really. Model had held back a good portion of his armor from Citadel and thus actually had a substantial panzer reserve. As a result, when the Soviet assault ripped apart the German infantry infantry forces, it was only by hastily turning these panzers from the southern part and thrown into the defense that staved off a complete breakthrough. Even then, it was incapable of stopping the Soviets and the Germans were forced into a retreat.