Soviets get lucky and kill Hitler in February 1943

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Apparently during the height of Soviet exploitation after Operation Little Saturn they got within 50km of Hitler when he was visiting Manstein's headquarters and when news got to the HQ Hitler was bundled off and flown out immediately. What if the Soviets got lucky and had a fighter sweep in the area that lights up Hitler's airplane as he makes his escape, killing him and his entourage (no one important at that time AFAIK)? What happens on all sides when this becomes known? Do the anti-Nazi German military resistance try and make a disorganized play to stop Hitler designated successor, Goering, from coming into power, or do they bide their time and plot to remove him later? What impact would that have on military operations? How about the politics of inter-Allied relations?
 
If Goering tries to change the political situation (tries to make peace with the Soviet Union at any price) I can see the German Military resistance bide their time and see what happens and what kind of person they are dealing with.

Here is what is interesting.
Assuming things play out as in OTL:

Does Goering agree to Rommel's request to evacuate Tunisia in March 43 (destroyer runs and night flights could evacuate many soldiers without equipment anyway and no further could be committed)?
Does Goering do Kursk as OTL?
Does Goering do Operation Axis as ruthlessly as Hitler or does Italy get out easier in September 43 (same with Hungary etc)?
Of course there is the whole Jewish question and does this get as ruthlessly implemented?
Does Donitz convince Goering not to scrap the fleet?
How does Goering in charge change weapons development?
Does Goring not try to hold place such as the Kuban and Crimea and allow evacuations and retreats earlier?
Goering will likely adopt a more hands off approach to leadership the Hitler, delegate more, etc.. How does that effect things?
 

Deleted member 1487

Does Goering agree to Rommel's request to evacuate Tunisia in March 43 (destroyer runs and night flights could evacuate many soldiers without equipment anyway and no further could be committed)?
Does Goering do Kursk as OTL?
Does Goering do Operation Axis as ruthlessly as Hitler or does Italy get out easier in September 43 (same with Hungary etc)?
Of course there is the whole Jewish question and does this get as ruthlessly implemented?
Does Donitz convince Goering not to scrap the fleet?
How does Goering in charge change weapons development?
Does Goring not try to hold place such as the Kuban and Crimea and allow evacuations and retreats earlier?
Goering will likely adopt a more hands off approach to leadership the Hitler, delegate more, etc.. How does that effect things?
To all of this I can only say who knows. Goering is in a much weaker political position than even Hitler after the failure at Stalingrad and in so many other things. He'll probably be desperate to avoid a repeat of Stalingrad in Tunisia, so perhaps he will order the evacuation. IOTL in 1943 he agreed to Kammhuber's request to dramatically expand the night defenses of German against RAF attack, but IOTL Hitler shot him down; Hitler isn't around so that would probably happen, which means the Battle of Berlin is bloodier for the Brits. Kursk is a tough one, no idea there. Goering would be just as tough on Italy as anyone. Goering I don't think would be as interested in the Holocaust because he knows Germany is losing and will want to play nice to get peace with the West. I don't see the fleet getting scrapped, but who knows? Not sure if Goering changes weapons development much other than being more hands off than Hitler...but the question is who does he put in charge of it then? I think he had a good relationship with Speer after Speer agreed to keep his ministry under Goering's 4 Year Plan, so probably it is Speer's problem. For some reason I think Goering would be more of a retreater than Hitler, as the military would have more power to push Goering around than Hitler and Goering was not as wedded to the idea as Hitler was after the Winter campaign of 1941-42. Plus Goering got burned by Stalingrad pretty bad. As to hands of approaches...that depends on who he puts in charge. If he overpromoted Manstein, which I think might be possible after the Winter campaign of 1943...that might be worse because for Manstein's operational skill there seems to be some lacking strategic sense. If Goering just puts OKH in charge then it is Zeitzler's show.
 
To all of this I can only say who knows. Goering is in a much weaker political position than even Hitler after the failure at Stalingrad and in so many other things. He'll probably be desperate to avoid a repeat of Stalingrad in Tunisia, so perhaps he will order the evacuation. IOTL in 1943 he agreed to Kammhuber's request to dramatically expand the night defenses of German against RAF attack, but IOTL Hitler shot him down; Hitler isn't around so that would probably happen, which means the Battle of Berlin is bloodier for the Brits. Kursk is a tough one, no idea there. Goering would be just as tough on Italy as anyone. Goering I don't think would be as interested in the Holocaust because he knows Germany is losing and will want to play nice to get peace with the West. I don't see the fleet getting scrapped, but who knows? Not sure if Goering changes weapons development much other than being more hands off than Hitler...but the question is who does he put in charge of it then? I think he had a good relationship with Speer after Speer agreed to keep his ministry under Goering's 4 Year Plan, so probably it is Speer's problem. For some reason I think Goering would be more of a retreater than Hitler, as the military would have more power to push Goering around than Hitler and Goering was not as wedded to the idea as Hitler was after the Winter campaign of 1941-42. Plus Goering got burned by Stalingrad pretty bad. As to hands of approaches...that depends on who he puts in charge. If he overpromoted Manstein, which I think might be possible after the Winter campaign of 1943...that might be worse because for Manstein's operational skill there seems to be some lacking strategic sense. If Goering just puts OKH in charge then it is Zeitzler's show.

Goering will be much different now that he doesn't have to impress anybody. However you would have to be a spartan drug free kind of person to do Hitler's schedule. OKH would almost have to be put in charge.

A serious attempt at peace with the Soviets would have to be attempted (as peace with the democracies just ain't going to happen ever). Otherwise I suspect all that is left is to surrender (in exchange perhaps for some exile and prosecution immunity for German leaders) and if you don't surrender there will be a revolt and someone else will.

A two phase peace should be negotiated. German lease (expensive) occupation of Nikopol mines and Galacian oil and Estonian Oil Shale for 3 years (and rails leading back). Other wise back to 1941 boundary of Russia. No demolitions during withdraw, After 3 years the Germans revert back to the 1914 boundary with Soviets securing all of Galacia, Ruthenaia, Wassaw, Krakow, etc. Russian political dominance and establishment of Soviet friendly governments in Finland, Romania, Bulgaria, Serbian parts of Yugoslavia and all of Greece. German POWs are kept until this process is completed. Its harsh but worth it to Germany.
 

Deleted member 1487

Goering will be much different now that he doesn't have to impress anybody. However you would have to be a spartan drug free kind of person to do Hitler's schedule. OKH would almost have to be put in charge.
Hitler actually had a pretty leisurely schedule for the most part. Goering was not using drugs by 1940 AFAIK.

A serious attempt at peace with the Soviets would have to be attempted (as peace with the democracies just ain't going to happen ever). Otherwise I suspect all that is left is to surrender (in exchange perhaps for some exile and prosecution immunity for German leaders) and if you don't surrender there will be a revolt and someone else will.
After Stalingrad Stalin wasn't interested in peace. The problem is the Germans generally believed a separate peace with the Wallies was possible or at least a stalemate was, so they'll fight on under that delusion, because unconditional surrender gave them no options.

A two phase peace should be negotiated. German lease (expensive) occupation of Nikopol mines and Galacian oil and Estonian Oil Shale for 3 years (and rails leading back). Other wise back to 1941 boundary of Russia. No demolitions during withdraw, After 3 years the Germans revert back to the 1914 boundary with Soviets securing all of Galacia, Ruthenaia, Wassaw, Krakow, etc. Russian political dominance and establishment of Soviet friendly governments in Finland, Romania, Bulgaria, Serbian parts of Yugoslavia and all of Greece. German POWs are kept until this process is completed. Its harsh but worth it to Germany.
Yeah no deal with the Soviets is going to happen. Fullstop. The only terms offered by Stalin, which was apparently an effort to put pressure on the Wallies to open a 2nd front rather than a real offer, was a return to the 1941 border, which the Germans could simply not risk, as it removed all their critical strategic depth and returned to the Soviets tens of millions of potential workers and soldiers.
 

Wendigo

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To all of this I can only say who knows. Goering is in a much weaker political position than even Hitler after the failure at Stalingrad and in so many other things. He'll probably be desperate to avoid a repeat of Stalingrad in Tunisia, so perhaps he will order the evacuation.

What's a plausible amount of Axis troops that could have been evacuated?
 

Deleted member 1487

What's a plausible amount of Axis troops that could have been evacuated?
By March? The German offensive had failed, but the Allied major offensive started in April and Operation Flax, the effort to shut down aerial resupply of Axis forces didn't start until early April, so they probably could have pulled out at least 100k men relatively easily enough, especially if they started withdrawing north away from the Brits moving in from Libya. They could get out most of their aircraft and some of the heavy equipment, as it seems like things got bad starting in April in terms of Allied interdiction of Axis supply by the air and sea. Bad weather would be the Axis's friend during the retreat, as it kept away significant Allied interdiction attempts until early April. Then they'd have to start doing night flights and sacrifice units to the Allied ground offensive starting in late March.

As it was the Germans brought in 35k men in 15 days between December 15th and 31st 1942. I think if in early March the order is given in the face of the failure of the last German offensive they could hold out for 6 weeks and be pulling out a bunch of air force personnel and equipment first, then army heavy equipment without supplies (they had more guns than they had shells for) and pull out cadres to rebuild divisions and by the end of it they try to get out as many people as possible falling back on the last remaining airfields and ports. So I'm going to say 100k is probably reasonable if not more. At least 150k will be lost, probably a disproportionate number of Italians. That would leave a lot more men and equipment for Sicily, though they may not matter in the end. The HG Division would probably be up to strength due to the evacuations and the core of all committed German divisions would too, which would give a skeleton to rebuild divisions around, much more so than IOTL.
10th Panzer was never rebuilt IOTL, here it probably would. 15th Panzergrenadier division was rebuilt from survivors of the 15th Panzer lost in Tunisia IOTL, so here it might be up to full strength once replacements come in and even still have some of it's equipment from Africa.

Edit-
found this:
https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/axis-evacuates-tunisia-march-1943.247079/
 
A two phase peace should be negotiated. German lease (expensive) occupation of Nikopol mines and Galacian oil and Estonian Oil Shale for 3 years (and rails leading back). Other wise back to 1941 boundary of Russia. No demolitions during withdraw, After 3 years the Germans revert back to the 1914 boundary
And Poland no longer exists.
 
Kursk probably goes from "disaster" to "catastrophe" as Goering or whoever doesn't have the self-confidence or clout to either stop the generals from pushing it through or call it off before the Soviet counter-offensive smashes the German spearheads. That will accelerate the Eastern Front.

What if the Soviets got lucky and had a fighter sweep in the area that lights up Hitler's airplane as he makes his escape, killing him and his entourage (no one important at that time AFAIK)?

Wasn't Manstein there?
 
Kursk probably goes from "disaster" to "catastrophe" as Goering or whoever doesn't have the self-confidence or clout to either stop the generals from pushing it through or call it off before the Soviet counter-offensive smashes the German spearheads. That will accelerate the Eastern Front.



Wasn't Manstein there?
In one post you just contradicted yourself. Kill Hitler and Manstein, no Kursk. Goering plays it safe and does a fighting retreat to the PW line. Germany prioritizes fighter defenses in 43. War lasts until Aug 45 with the mushroom cloud, assuming someone doesn't off Goering beforehand and Germany doesn't totally collapse due to civil war and instability.
 
The interesting thing about this POD is that it can't win the war (or the peace) for Germany. Goering is not withdrawing from half of Russia and all of France (the very minimal offer he would have to make the moment after Hitler was dead to make the Allies entertain peace.) The Germans weren't going to give up everything they fought the war far because they lost one army in Stalingrad. In retrospect it would be a great trade, but no one knew that in March 43.

So the result is that the war goes longer and kills more people. It's possible the result is the Allies get Berlin and don't make as many concessions to Russia. Here's what would temporarily swing Germany's way.

-Goering's embarrassment in entertaining the mission of resupplying Stalingrad will mean that he will likely have an aversion to no-retreat orders. This saves Germany big losses in Tunisia, Crimea, and elsewhere.
-Goering might be able to get generals who soured with Hitler back to being major contributors again (Gerd von Rundstedt, von Leeb, von Bock, Hermann Hoth
--lost his job after Kursk OTL)
-Goering is not necessarily against Germany taking the offensive. However, IOTL Hitler and his Generals vacillated about Kursk. ITTL, Goering is less secure than Hitler. If the Generals aren't sure about Kursk, he isn't doing it.
-This means 1943 is bloodier for the Russians (being that the cream of the German army is not attacking into a carefully laid trap like IOTL). Futher, Russia probably cannot cross the Dnieper because of this.
-Germany is more successful in conscripting Western Ukrainians and Balts into SS units and local militia. This acts as a force multiplier as IOTL many of these men ended up being conscripted by Russia. ITTL, delaying the Russians by six months in essence adds a lot more men in Germany's favor.
-Will Goering blow tons of dough on wonder weapons? If not, Germany may be in a better position to build more standard armanents, which can keep countries like Finland in the war longer.
-Germany, with these additional men and better, more prepared defenses likely delays Russia six months between summer 43 to summer 44. This keeps Finland in the war. This keeps the Balts in the war (as they are not out flanked.) The Balts fought like hell IOTL and the territory was very defensible and wooded. This forces Russia to not focus on Finland or the Balts, and instead attack in the center towards Poland, and Romania. Unlike Hitler, Goering isn't going to let all of his men get surrounded in front of the Carpathian mountains. They will do a fighting withdrawal. This keeps Romania in the war. Likely, Russia gets ground down fighting all these countries as they with increased losses ITTL and less men in Ukraine and the Baltic states to conscript will be facing earlier manpower issues. Hence, the six month delay I postulated before can become another 3 to six months, due to the cascading effects of the differences in manpower, and Romanian oil being on line longer.
-I can't see anyone being able to stop D-Day. Better Luftwaffe preperations will be used to defend German cities from terror bombing. Sure, there will be some benefits of no baby blitz and other abject stupidity, but the Allies WILL get air superiority over France. Will Rommel even be in France ITTL? Will the Germans fight at the coast? Will they have a larger strategic reserve? For the hell of it, I postulate the Allies will advance roughly at the same pace ITTL in Italy and France. This means by winter 45, Germany is forced to withdraw tons of forces from the East...Just long enough to delay the Americans from taking Berlin before an A bomb falls on it. As for the Russians, they will be at the end of their logistical tether even if they face meager German resistance and the Romanians switch sides. There is only so far they can traveled on destroyed rails. So, they likely end the war in control of Hungary, Poland, Romania, and most of the Baltic states. The Wallies will sit on most of Germany.
 
In one post you just contradicted yourself. Kill Hitler and Manstein, no Kursk.

I actually was inquiring, since my memories a bit hazy. I know Hitler was there to be meet with him would not be on the plane. In any case, Wiking clarified in the thread he posted on the other forum: Manstein wasn't on the plane.

But if Manstein is killed, you are likely correct that there is no Kursk... because there is no Third Kharkov. The Soviets are able to cut off and destroy a healthy chunk of AGS in the Donbass, seize all of Ukraine east of the D'niepr river, and establishes a number of bridgeheads across it.

However, IOTL Hitler and his Generals vacillated about Kursk.

Myth. Hitler had doubts about Kursk, but not enough to overrule it. The bulk of his generals were for it and those who were not for Kursk were not against it because they thought it would fail. It is only after the war that several German generals wrote a series of scathing critiques of the Kursk offensive, and blamed everything on Hitler. David Glantz argues that these formerly accepted truths need to be challenged, being historical distortions or even outright false. The traditional view on Kursk put forward by writers like von Manstein and Heinrici rests on the following points:

1.) Citadel would have succeeded had it been launched in spring of 1943.
2.) When it was launched in July, Citadel was destined to fail.
3.) German adoption of a mobile defensive strategy at Kursk and thereafter would have produced either German victory or stalemate, or, at least delayed German defeat.
4.) Hitler, and Hitler alone was responsible for the failure of Citadel
[Glantz, "The Battle of Kursk," p.261]

Glantz then challenges, or outright demolishes each of these assumptions. Firstly Glantz states there is "absolutely no basis for assuming that Citadel would have succeeded had it been launched in the spring of 1943." [p.261] Glantz points out that what Manstein (who was the main advocate of this immediate attack) did not know is that the Soviets had been preparing massive spring offensive operations of their own, and had cancelled them and rushed ALL their reserves to Kursk after Manstein's brilliant successes at Karkhov. The ratio of forces at Kursk in March of 1943 was staggeringly against the Germans, and was actually redressed somewhat by the delay into July, which allowed the Germans to bring up more troops and reconstruct their battered Panzer divisions.[p.262]

Secondly, no German general at the time assumed Kursk, which was a limited offensive, would fail. Up to that point the Germans had always been able to shatter Soviet defenses in the tactical and operational depths, and the Soviets had only every succeeded in stopping them over strategic distances. There was near universal agreement among the generals that the offensive at Kursk would punch through the immediate defenses with relative ease. Hitler's input was to limit the strategic goals of the operation, which was sound given that strategic over extension had led to disaster for the German offensives in '41 and '42.

Thirdly, the concept of mobile defense was still in its infancy at Kursk, and had not yet gained much credence with the military leadership. The professional debate in the spring/summer of 1943 was not on what type of defense to adopt, but what type of attack. At that point the German military leaders were still playing to win, not delay their defeat.[p.263]

Finally, Glantz points out that at Kursk Hitler nearly always followed the best advice of his professional soldiers, despite his own misgivings. In fact, Hitler saved the German forces conducting the offensive from an even greater disaster by calling it off early (the right decision made for the wrong reasons in this case), when Generals like von Manstein were still pushing for the attacks to continue. When the Soviet counter-offensive broke Hitler followed his natural reaction to order the troops to stand fast, but in each case soon acquiesced to the demands of his generals to withdraw, and even authorized the pre-emptive evacuation of the Orel salient to re-create a strategic reserve, which Glantz states was "undoubtedly the best precaution to deal with the threats in both Italy and Kharkov." [p.264] It was the defeats of 1944 that created the deep rift between Hitler and his generals, and in the summer of 1943 the disputes were still minor. Hitler still listened to the advice of his Generals (particularly at Kursk) and they still respected his direction and uncanny foresight.

-This means 1943 is bloodier for the Russians (being that the cream of the German army is not attacking into a carefully laid trap like IOTL). Futher, Russia probably cannot cross the Dnieper because of this.

Hardly. Even if the Germans adopt a defensive stance, the Soviets are under no obligation to attack where the Germans expect them too. What likely happens is that the Soviets use a decoy offensive action at Kursk (which is where the Germans were expecting any Soviet offensive to materialize pre-Citadel) to draw the Germans in and then hit them somewhere else, like the Mius or by Smolensk, with the main blow and in doing so inflict a staggering defeat. Then afterwards we have a profusion of memoirs by German generals talking about how Goering squandered the advantage by going on the defensive in '43 when just one more German offensive could have won the war...
 
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But if Manstein is killed, you are likely correct that there is no Kursk... because there is no Third Kharkov. The Soviets are able to cut off and destroy a healthy chunk of AGS in the Donbass, seize all of Ukraine east of the D'niepr river, and establishes a number of bridgeheads across it.
Why? Because the Russians are somehow less over-extended with a dead Manstein? Perhaps with Manstein dead, in the chaos, the Germans cannot react?

Myth. Hitler had doubts about Kursk, but not enough to overrule it. The bulk of his generals were for it and those who were not for Kursk were not against it because they thought it would fail.

Hitler was the big pusher (and delayer) of the operation. He thought he needed it for "political reasons." Remove Hitler, and you change the politics of the situation. Even if there is still a Kursk, it would have been an early Kursk, which might have succeeded, and even if it failed it would have not been in a carefully laid out trap and it would have not involved AGC.

The ratio of forces at Kursk in March of 1943 was staggeringly against the Germans, and was actually redressed somewhat by the delay into July, which allowed the Germans to bring up more troops and reconstruct their battered Panzer divisions.[p.262]

Were the Soviets in the position to unleash an immediate counter offensive if Spring Kursk failed, as they were IOTL? How are the Soviets magically equally prepared in Spring 1943 as they were in Summer 1943?

Up to that point the Germans had always been able to shatter Soviet defenses in the tactical and operational depths, and the Soviets had only every succeeded in stopping them over strategic distances.

And arguably, this actually occurred IOTL:

On July 13, the day after the Battle of Prochorovka, Fourth Panzer Army reports declared that the II SS Panzer Corps had 163 operational tanks, a net loss of only 48 tanks. Actual losses were somewhat heavier, the discrepancy due to the gain of repaired tanks returned to action. Closer study of the losses of each type of tank reveals that the corps lost about 70 tanks on July 12. In contrast, Soviet tank losses, long assumed to be moderate, were actually catastrophic. In 1984, a history of the Fifth Guards Tank Army written by Rotmistrov himself revealed that on July 13 the army lost 400 tanks to repairable damage. He gave no figure for tanks that were destroyed or not available for salvage. Evidence suggests that there were hundreds of additional Soviet tanks lost. Several German accounts mention that Hausser had to use chalk to mark and count the huge jumble of 93 knocked-out Soviet tanks in the Leibstandarte sector alone. Other Soviet sources say the tank strength of the army on July 13 was 150 to 200, a loss of about 650 tanks...

The fighting, characterized by massive losses of Soviet armor, continued throughout July 12 without a decisive success by either side–contrary to the accounts given in many well-known studies of the Eastern Front, which state that the fighting ended on July 12 with a decisive German defeat...In fact, the fighting continued around Prochorovka for several more days.Das Reich continued to push slowly eastward in the area south of the town until July 16...

After receiving the news of the Allied invasion of Sicily, as well as reports of impending Soviet attacks on the Mius River and at Izyum, Hitler decided to cancel Operation Citadel. Manstein argued that he should be allowed to finish off the two Soviet tank armies. He had unused reserves, consisting of three experienced panzer divisions of XXIV Panzer Corps, in position for quick commitment. That corps could have been used to attack the Fifth Guards Tank Army in its flank, to break out from the Psel bridgehead or to cross the Psel east of Prochorovka. All of the available Soviet armor in the south was committed and could not be withdrawn without causing a collapse of the Soviet defenses... On the night of July 17-18, the corps withdrew from its positions around Prochorovka. Thus, the battle for Prochorovka ended, not because of German tank losses (Hausser had over 200 operational tanks on July 17) but because Hitler lacked the will to continue the offensive.

http://www.historynet.com/battle-of-kursk-germanys-lost-victory-in-world-war-ii.htm

ITTL, if there is a withdrawal from Tunisia there are more German reserves in Italy, which might encourage Goering not to call off any ATL offensive in the East.

What I find more likely is that the Allied attack of Sicily occurrs sooner because Africa is captured by April. This may lead to the cancellation of Citadel entirely, even if it was in a serious planning stage. If Citadel was not canceled, they are not going to pull out to quick. I can go make a sexual double entendre but you get the point.

What likely happens is that the Soviets use a decoy offensive action at Kursk (which is where the Germans were expecting any Soviet offensive to materialize pre-Citadel) to draw the Germans in and then hit them somewhere else, like the Mius or by Smolensk, with the main blow and in doing so inflict a staggering defeat.

Still, you are not going to get the Germans being ground down and destroyed in a planned trap like in Kursk. The Germans handed their butts to the Russians on a silver platter.

tumblr_nic8gbOGSO1u27pz3o1_1280.jpg


Same thing happened to the Rebellion IOTL, but they compensated for their losses by blowing up the death star, killing Vader and the Emperor all at once.

Then afterwards we have a profusion of memoirs by German generals talking about how Goering squandered the advantage by going on the defensive in '43 when just one more German offensive could have won the war...
Probably, but as I said before defense buys German six months, which has a lot of knock on effects which grinds down Russian manpower.
 

Deleted member 1487

It was the defeats of 1944 that created the deep rift between Hitler and his generals, and in the summer of 1943 the disputes were still minor. Hitler still listened to the advice of his Generals (particularly at Kursk) and they still respected his direction and uncanny foresight.
That rift always existed, in fact in the East in late 1941 he sacked dozens of generals and later dropped von Bock during Case Blue. He took over OKH himself and replaced the Chief of Staff with his own handpicked choice. In reality Hitler thought he knew better than the guys he didn't put in charge and by 1943 had pretty much hand picked all of he senior leadership he was dealing with, so of course by Kursk he agreed with them, because he had already picked the people he agreed with to run the show. Nevertheless he still had problems with them, even though they were picked to run the war the way he wanted them too, which ultimately lead to Manstein's firing and later Guderian's again among others. The way you present the situation is at odds with the reality of what had happened by Kursk: Hitler picked only those generals that agreed with him and he agreed with, creating an intellectual hive mind of sorts, so of course by the time Kursk happened they were all on the same page and in some sort of culture of personality. Goering though would be a different leader not on their page and probably considering putting some of his own guys in charge to shake things up. You can't necessarily expect things to be just like IOTL with a different 'Führer' in charge of OKW and OKH and wanting to make sure it is his will be done, not the last guy's.

Hardly. Even if the Germans adopt a defensive stance, the Soviets are under no obligation to attack where the Germans expect them too. What likely happens is that the Soviets use a decoy offensive action at Kursk (which is where the Germans were expecting any Soviet offensive to materialize pre-Citadel) to draw the Germans in and then hit them somewhere else, like the Mius or by Smolensk, with the main blow and in doing so inflict a staggering defeat. Then afterwards we have a profusion of memoirs by German generals talking about how Goering squandered the advantage by going on the defensive in '43 when just one more German offensive could have won the war...
Except the Mius and Smolensk were heavily fortified and the Soviets had problems tearing through those areas IOTL; they couldn't do so quickly and even though they did draw off some German reserves they weren't then able to rip through around Kursk quickly or cheaply; in fact during the Kursk offensive they attacked on the north side of the Orel Bulge, figuring that since German AFV reserves were fully committed to fighting on the south side of the bulge they'd have an easy time of things; it turns out they didn't and in fact never managed to do more than squeeze out the bulge rather than rip and hole and exploit it. Instead the Germans fell back from line to line with an intact fortified line waiting for them and inflicting heavy losses on the Soviets despite being worn down from the Kursk offensive. Even at Kharkov-Belgorod in August even after the failed Kursk offensive and being drawn off to defeat a Soviet offensive on the Mius, they still managed to inflict disproportionate losses on the Soviets over several weeks before being too worn down from their offensive plus the transfer of units to Italy to hold. Remove the Kursk offensive from the equation perhaps they do hold, even with a demonstration on the Mius.
 
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For all we know the death of Hitler leads to Italy switching sides somewhat properly - I think there's just too much impact alround to make small defined statements like 'Goering will do Y leading to Z' without describing why A-X will not obsolete making choice Y.
 

Deleted member 1487

For all we know the death of Hitler leads to Italy switching sides somewhat properly - I think there's just too much impact alround to make small defined statements like 'Goering will do Y leading to Z' without describing why A-X will not obsolete making choice Y.
Why would Italy switch sides when it was so dependent on Germany and the line of succession in Germany was set, so Goering would take over pretty much as soon as the word got back? As it was Italy couldn't even effectively surrender until Allied troops were on their mainland and even then there were a lot more Germans present in important areas and were able to take control without that much difficulty.
 
Why would Italy switch sides when it was so dependent on Germany and the line of succession in Germany was set, so Goering would take over pretty much as soon as the word got back? As it was Italy couldn't even effectively surrender until Allied troops were on their mainland and even then there were a lot more Germans present in important areas and were able to take control without that much difficulty.
Well, let's try something, these will have holes in them naturally as already too short to take into account repercussions:

Goering orders an evacuation of Tunisia, so that the defence of Sicily contains a ton more German troops while the Italians feel their own troops were disproportionally sacrificed to allow Germans to flee from Tunisia. In Sicily, however, these extra German troops begin failing - but it takes much longer, so the German government feeds in more troops to defend it, while the Italians do their best but the Germans claim all shipping... So when Ciano moves on Mussolini after the surrender of the remaining German troops in Sicily, the German armies in Italy are still exhausted and concentrated in southern Italy, with everything south of Napoli falling to the Germans but the Italians making a fight of it in the north. With a fight happening, the Allies move in troops uncontested between Genoa and Florence, bolstering the Italians and leading to a long strung-out conflict over a frontline running from just west of Genoa, inland onto the Po plain, and along the Appenines towards Rome. The Allies never get stuck fighting up the Appenines and the Italian front sucks up far more troops.


Goering takes power, but Mussolini is upset by losing his good friend, and seeing the defeat of his adventure in Africa tries to extricate himself. With Mussolini behind it the Italian troops get more clear direction when Italy does drop out, Mussolini bombastically declaring the Germans had betrayed Italy to its fate and that Italy must claw out its destiny against the betrayers. While not ultimately succesful in holding all of Italy, fighting continues long enough for Allied troops to establish a front at the Po plain, after a few months of mopping up German enclaves along the Peninsula.
 

Deleted member 1487

Well, let's try something, these will have holes in them naturally as already too short to take into account repercussions:

Goering orders an evacuation of Tunisia, so that the defence of Sicily contains a ton more German troops while the Italians feel their own troops were disproportionally sacrificed to allow Germans to flee from Tunisia. In Sicily, however, these extra German troops begin failing - but it takes much longer, so the German government feeds in more troops to defend it, while the Italians do their best but the Germans claim all shipping... So when Ciano moves on Mussolini after the surrender of the remaining German troops in Sicily, the German armies in Italy are still exhausted and concentrated in southern Italy, with everything south of Napoli falling to the Germans but the Italians making a fight of it in the north. With a fight happening, the Allies move in troops uncontested between Genoa and Florence, bolstering the Italians and leading to a long strung-out conflict over a frontline running from just west of Genoa, inland onto the Po plain, and along the Appenines towards Rome. The Allies never get stuck fighting up the Appenines and the Italian front sucks up far more troops.


Goering takes power, but Mussolini is upset by losing his good friend, and seeing the defeat of his adventure in Africa tries to extricate himself. With Mussolini behind it the Italian troops get more clear direction when Italy does drop out, Mussolini bombastically declaring the Germans had betrayed Italy to its fate and that Italy must claw out its destiny against the betrayers. While not ultimately succesful in holding all of Italy, fighting continues long enough for Allied troops to establish a front at the Po plain, after a few months of mopping up German enclaves along the Peninsula.
The problem with this is what happened IOTL: the Germans used paratrooper drops on Rome to decapitate the Italian high command. In terms of strategic impact vs. losses it was their most successful paradrop of the war.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Achse
As it was even IOTL post-Sicily at Salerno the Germans nearly succeeded in defeating the Allied invasion of Southern Italy, so having more men on hand and perhaps evacuated from Sicily might change things there.

Mussolini was never really friends with Hitler, he was a barnacle attached to Hitler's belly to get war spoils. Hitler respected Mussolini, Mussolini needed Hitler. As it was Mussolini was hated by the military and public by 1943, so he couldn't rally anyone to do anything and realized he depended on the Germans; he had a decent relationship with Goering, so there is no reason Mussolini would change his OTL actions ITTL.
 
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