Soviets equip North Korean army with StG 44s

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Deleted member 1487

Post-WW2 the StG44 was continued in production by the East Germans and used by the Czechs and Yugoslavs in the latter case into the 1980s. Not only that, but even the NVA was sent some during the Vietnam War. Since the AK47 wasn't ready and the StG already in production and a known weapon to western nations unlike the AK, given the advantages of the weapon over the variety of SMGs left over from WW2 it is somewhat surprising they didn't get any during the Korean War given that they got so much surplus Soviet equipment.

So what if the Soviets had gifted the North Korean Army with StG44s instead of PPSH-41/43s? Given the limited number of North Korean soldiers and the pretty substantial firepower increase it would mean, not only would it be feasible to do so, but would boost their combat power. Though heavier, it would allow for increased range of engagement, rather than forcing them to close within 100m or less to open fire and within range of effective counter fire (US OR demonstrated that US riflemen could generally only hit the enemy within 100m).

Rather than this being a minor POD, in 1950-51 small arms played a shockingly disproportionate role for both sides during the invasion, with artillery only taking back it's dominant place after the lines stabilized along the parallel after Chinese intervention. US OR demonstrated that and I can share the pdf of the report if anyone is interested, while the book "This Kind of War" covers a lot of the major engagements during the 1950 invasion that show how important small arms were during the critical fights, especially around the Pusan Perimeter when the North Koreans had outrun their support weapons they couldn't manhandle with them (or weren't smashed by airstrikes) while the US was short of everything due to the retreat and state of army supply at the time.

How might this impact US/NATO decisions around small arms? The Com Bloc forces were already decided on the assault rifle concept, they were just waiting for Soviet manufacturing/R&D to catch up to demand, so I only see this being confirmation for them.
 

trurle

Banned
US OR demonstrated that and I can share the pdf of the report if anyone is interested, while the book "This Kind of War" covers a lot of the major engagements during the 1950 invasion that show how important small arms were during the critical fights, especially around the Pusan Perimeter when the North Koreans had outrun their support weapons they couldn't manhandle with them (or weren't smashed by airstrikes) while the US was short of everything due to the retreat and state of army supply at the time.
Please upload. It would be an interesting reading.
 

trurle

Banned
From the sources you provided, seems the effect of StG 44 on the combat effectiveness of North Korean units will be small or may be even negative. The US (and likely, North Korean too) soldiers were limited mostly by short sighting distance in rugged terrain and often night fighting, therefore StG 44 designed for infantry operating mostly on flat ground (resulting in increased engagement range) and for defense will have limited positive effect on offensive combat in mountainous Korea.
Also, StG was quite heavy (2.3 kg over PPS) - a disadvantage in rugged terrain. Heavier weapon mean less ammunition or food per infantryman and therefore more frequent stoppages of assault for resupply.
 

Deleted member 1487

From the sources you provided, seems the effect of StG 44 on the combat effectiveness of North Korean units will be small or may be even negative. The US (and likely, North Korean too) soldiers were limited mostly by short sighting distance in rugged terrain and often night fighting, therefore StG 44 designed for infantry operating mostly on flat ground (resulting in increased engagement range) and for defense will have limited positive effect on offensive combat in mountainous Korea.
Also, StG was quite heavy (2.3 kg over PPS) - a disadvantage in rugged terrain. Heavier weapon mean less ammunition or food per infantryman and therefore more frequent stoppages of assault for resupply.
For night fighting certainly the SMG was superior, but I'm not sure about the rugged terrain issue given the increased cover penetration benefits of the assault rifle over the pistol round; in Afghanistan range is an issue despite the very rugged terrain there, so sighting is not likely to be a bigger issue in Korea than there. Is there a part in either PDF that you're basing your comment on? I'd like to read to know the context of what you're referring to.
 
While this is an interesting idea, small arms alone don't decide the way the battlefield turns. Additionally, the Soviets are still working out the kinks on the AK, and might need all the StGs to examine (although the AK is not necessarily fully inspired by the StG).

It was likely cheaper and easier to equip the North Koreans with all the surplus Mosin-Nagant M91/30s rather than the brand-new SKS, AKs or automatic rifles that would need more training time. Plus, with North Korea's proximity to the Soviet border, you'd need a huge amount of spare parts to be delivered straight from East Germany and Czechoslovakia, then transported across the USSR in the event of NATO blockades - which would take a lot of time.
 

trurle

Banned
For night fighting certainly the SMG was superior, but I'm not sure about the rugged terrain issue given the increased cover penetration benefits of the assault rifle over the pistol round; in Afghanistan range is an issue despite the very rugged terrain there, so sighting is not likely to be a bigger issue in Korea than there. Is there a part in either PDF that you're basing your comment on? I'd like to read to know the context of what you're referring to.
First link (Infantry Weapons and equipment in Korea), pp. 15-17.
Regarding Afghanistan, the difference may be in better supply chain of ammunition and widely available night vision equipment in Afghanistan compared to Korea. Both naturally helps to increase engagement range.
 

Deleted member 1487

First link (Infantry Weapons and equipment in Korea), pp. 15-17.
Regarding Afghanistan, the difference may be in better supply chain of ammunition and widely available night vision equipment in Afghanistan compared to Korea. Both naturally helps to increase engagement range.
I'm not seeing the report saying anything about rough terrain being a limit on sight or how often night combat happened vs. day combat; it doesn't appear that the North Koreans used night combat as their primary means of attack in 1950 based on what I've read of the campaign. For daylight combat the chart on p.15 had over 70% of daylight defensive combat happening over 150 yards (about 75% for offensive combat), which is generally considered to be the effective range limit of a WW2 SMG, so the StG44 would have given a pretty vital combat range extension for most of combat even if just suppressive fire, as that was, per the report, the majority of fire US soldiers engaged in, not aimed fire with gun sights. Since they were firing up hill while attacking range capabilities of rounds matter quite a bit, while firing downhill range could be even further. Since the 50% mark was about the ~250 yards that was well outside the effective range of the Soviet PPS/H SMGs, but right in the wheel house of the STG44 or really any assault rifle.
 
Additionally, the Soviets are still working out the kinks on the AK, and might need all the StGs to examine (although the AK is not necessarily fully inspired by the StG).
All 100,000+ that they had in inventory? Seems even more unlikely than handing them to the North Koreans, tbh.
 

Deleted member 1487

All 100,000+ that they had in inventory? Seems even more unlikely than handing them to the North Koreans, tbh.
They were even still making them in East Germany:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/StG_44#Post-1945
The Sturmgewehr remained in use with the East German Nationale Volksarmee with the designation MPi.44 until it was eventually replaced with variants of the AK-47 assault rifle. The Volkspolizei used it until approximately 1962 when it was replaced by the PPSh-41. It was still used by other public security formations thereafter.[20] The ammunition was manufactured there at least until 1961.[20] Other countries to use the StG 44 after World War II included Czechoslovakia (although it was not officially adopted)[20]and Yugoslavia, where units such as the 63rd Paratroop Battalion were equipped with it until the 1980s,[21] when the rifles were ultimately transferred to Territorial Defense reserves or sold to friendly regimes in the Middle East and Africa. France adopted captured StG 44 for colonial Foreign Legion units.[20]

Besides the designer of the StG44 was taken to the USSR to assist the Soviets in their own project:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hugo_Schmeisser
At the end of June 1945, American troops evacuated Suhl and all of Thuringia. One month later, the Red Army assumed control over the area, starting a civilian works project to manufacture weapons for the Soviet Union. By August 1945, the Red Army had created 50 StG 44s from existing assembly parts, and had begun inspecting their design. 10,785 sheets of technical designs were confiscated by the Soviets as part of their research.

Schmeisser was one of 16 Germans for which a special department (no. 58) was created at factory number 74, later known as Izmash. Schmeisser was appointed as one of the five designers of the group, together with Kurt Horn and Werner Gruner (both from Grossfuss) and Oscar Schink (from Gustloff), under the formal leadership of Karl Barnitzke (also from Gustloff). There is some evidence that Schmeisser was uncooperative with the Soviets because he received the most negative review by his Soviet handlers in this group of five German designers. In these Soviet reviews, Schmeisser was described as a "practical man", whose lack of formal training showed whenever he was presented with any design problems.

Schmeisser worked in Izhevsk until 1952 when he and other German specialists returned home to Germany. With short notice, his stay in the Soviet Union was extended beyond that of the other weapon specialists by a half year. He finally returned home on 9 June 1952. Schmeisser died on 12 September 1953, and was buried in Suhl. The 50th anniversary of his death was honored by a ceremony held in Suhl, as he is recognized as one of the most important technical designers of infantry weapons of the 20th century.[5]
 
While this is an interesting idea, small arms alone don't decide the way the battlefield turns. Additionally, the Soviets are still working out the kinks on the AK, and might need all the StGs to examine (although the AK is not necessarily fully inspired by the StG).

The AK has almost nothing in common with the StG except for external shape.

As for the OP, sure, they'll send an exotic captured weapon that never saw anything but limited postwar use over instead of the mountains of surplus that they had. This is like the Soviets giving the northerners captured Panthers and StuGs instead of surplus T-34s and Su-76s. It isn't going to happen, and if it somehow did happen, the advantages would be countered by having to shoehorn it in.
 

Deleted member 1487

The AK has almost nothing in common with the StG except for external shape.
There is about a 30% internal commonality, with much of the rest coming from the Garand.
http://www.smallarmsreview.com/display.article.cfm?idarticles=1540
The sights and trigger group are very similar to the STG, though Kalashnikov simplified the trigger group significantly. The gas system is basically the same too, though the AK's gas piston is more similar to the Garand than the StG.

As for the OP, sure, they'll send an exotic captured weapon that never saw anything but limited postwar use over instead of the mountains of surplus that they had. This is like the Soviets giving the northerners captured Panthers and StuGs instead of surplus T-34s and Su-76s. It isn't going to happen, and if it somehow did happen, the advantages would be countered by having to shoehorn it in.
It saw a fair bit of combat use during WW2 on both the Eastern and Western Fronts:
http://www.smallarmsreview.com/display.article.cfm?idarticles=2549
http://shooting-iron.ru/load/290-1-0-688
In September, the first full-scale military tests of the MR-43 were held on the Eastern Front in the elite German unit, the motorized division of the SS Viking. In the report on the combat use of machine guns by more than half of the shooters, it was noted that the MP-43 is an effective substitute for submachine guns and rifles. New weapons significantly influenced the increase in firepower of infantry units and reduced the need for them to use light machine guns for fire support. The fire to a depth of 400 meters was conducted by single shots, then during the battles on the near approaches, submachine gunners switched to firing in short bursts.
....
The persistent appeals of the front-line soldiers, supported by HWaA and the Minister of Weapons A. Speer, as well as the results of the tests, ultimately broke Hitler’s stubbornness. After he personally requested the opinion of the troops on the new machine gun and received positive reviews, at the end of September 1943, an order was issued to take the MR-43 into service with infantry and deploy its mass production.

After all the Soviets copied the concept after encountering it in combat in 1942 and capturing a few units:
http://tankarchives.blogspot.com/2018/03/mkb-42h-first-appearance.html
http://tankarchives.blogspot.com/2018/02/sturmgewehr-intel.html
https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Автомат_Калашникова#Разработка_и_постановка_в_производство
The starting point for the development of the automaton for the Soviet armed forces was the July 15, 1943 meeting of the Technical Council under the USSR Commissariat of Defense , which was based on a study of the captured German automaton MKb.42 (H) (prototype of the future StG-44 ) for the world's first mass 7.92 mm Kurz intermediate cartridge of 7.92 × 33 mm caliber , as well as the American light -duty self-loading M1 Carbine self-loading carbine supplied under the lend-lease for the .30 Carbine cartridge of 7.62 × 33 mm caliber , the great importance of a new trend in weapon thought was noted and the question was raised of the need to urgently develop its “reduced” cartridge, similar to the German one, as well as weapons for it [8] .

Since it was more effective in combat than their mountain of SMG surplus the argument is that they are giving them the best weapon given the doctrine they used in addition to the other weapons they had.
 
Soviet Ambassador at the UN.

The Korean Liberation Campaign has nothing to do with us. All the Soviet Union has done is sell the freedom loving Korean people captured weapons from the Great Patriotic War with which to defend themselves.
 

Deleted member 1487

There is nothing there that says they were manufactured, only used. It’s perfectly plausible that they kept the factories running for a while, but it’s equally plausible that they just used the piles and piles of rifles the soviets captured with the factories.
Sorry, I was also incorporating information from another article about the post-war manufacture of the rifles in the GDR.
They also developed it to take a 7.62mm bullet and lightened it:
https://www.thefirearmblog.com/blog/2015/07/15/unknown-post-war-stg-44-derivative/

Given the number of StGs made during WW2 and the size of the North Korean Army in 1950 it is entirely plausible they wouldn't need more than accumulated stockpiles, but that would deprive the GDR of the weapon...though given that they redesigned it anyway, the may not have really needed it, as the redesign used the Soviet 7.62 intermediate bullet, which would simplify logistics in Europe quite a bit.

https://wwiiafterwwii.wordpress.com/2015/09/27/stg-44-in-africa-after-wwii/
When WWII ended in 1945, the Soviet army retained and stored every StG-44 it found. By best estimate, in 1948 there were about 102,000 StG-44s in Soviet custody. As the SKS and AK-47 were already entering Soviet use, the captured StG-44s were not issued to Soviet units but rather made available for transfer abroad, with Czechoslovakia being the first and main recipient, followed by East Germany. Hungary also received a small (about 4,000) batch, and Yugoslavia also received some prior to it’s split with the east bloc. These joined StG-44s captured by the Yugoslavs themselves. Finally the Soviets transferred a few to North Vietnam; these in turn were joined by more transferred from Czechoslovakia and East Germany (which themselves had come from the USSR) as those two countries phased the type out.

The Czechoslovakian army began using the StG-44 in 1946 and by 1949, it was one of the country’s main battle rifles. In 1950 it began to be phased out to storage or passed to other users (primarily East Germany and North Vietnam). It was gone from frontline Czechoslovakian service by 1955 however several thousand still were in storage. Czechoslovakia was also the main nexus for Kurz ammunition after WWII. Czechoslovakia itself had secured a decent supply inside it’s borders when WWII ended in May 1945. Beginning in 1946 and running for about ten years, Czechoslovakia was also used by the Soviets to repackage German-manufactured, WWII-vintage Kurz rounds which had been captured by the Soviet army in quantity sizes ranging from factory truckloads to 900-round crates to individual loose rounds. Finally, Czechoslovakia manufactured new-production Kurz rounds, both for it’s own use and to an East German contract.
 
What about logistics and maintenance?

Would the DPRK/USSR be able to keep units supplied with enough ammunition? This seems like it would cost a lot more than OTL as Kurz rounds are a lot less common than the 9mm rounds used by the PPSH.

Also the StG 44 was a good deal more complicated and finicky than the PPSH. Do the North Koreans have the resources to adequately train their troops and maintain the rifles for optimum efficiency? If not the benefits might be outweighed by more frequent misfires and jams.
 
Rather than this being a minor POD, in 1950-51 small arms played a shockingly disproportionate role for both sides during the invasion, with artillery only taking back it's dominant place after the lines stabilized along the parallel after Chinese intervention. US OR demonstrated that and I can share the pdf of the report if anyone is interested, while the book "This Kind of War" covers a lot of the major engagements during the 1950 invasion that show how important small arms were during the critical fights, especially around the Pusan Perimeter when the North Koreans had outrun their support weapons they couldn't manhandle with them (or weren't smashed by airstrikes) while the US was short of everything due to the retreat and state of army supply at the time.

"This Kind of War" states that it was precisely because the US had inordinate amount of artillery and mechanized firepower anchored on a solid continuous front that it was able to win at the Pusan Perimeter. It flat out says "In August, however, within a tight little box, the United States Army could at last fight the way it had been trained, and it could finally bring its inherently superior firepower to bear." It goes on to note that between North Korean losses and American reinforcements, the US had a 5:1 advantage in armor. Most of it’s accounts of tactical engagements around Pusan tend to emphasize fire from crew-served weapons, artillery, or air power over small arms.
 
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Deleted member 1487

What about logistics and maintenance?

Would the DPRK/USSR be able to keep units supplied with enough ammunition? This seems like it would cost a lot more than OTL as Kurz rounds are a lot less common than the 9mm rounds used by the PPSH.

Also the StG 44 was a good deal more complicated and finicky than the PPSH. Do the North Koreans have the resources to adequately train their troops and maintain the rifles for optimum efficiency? If not the benefits might be outweighed by more frequent misfires and jams.
The PPS/H both used 7.62x25mm ammo, not 9mm. Only available from the USSR.
Since the post-war Communist governments in Eastern Europe manufactured 7.92 Kurz for their own use apparently there was plenty to go around. If the Com Bloc ships their entire stockpiles of wartime ammo and rifles to the North Koreans and uses what they were already producing in Czechoslovakia and East Germany there would be plenty to get through through 1950-51 at a minimum.

North Korean troops were vets from WW2 fighting the Japanese, then Chinese Civil War veterans. They shouldn't be too hard to train on the weapon given their wealth of experience working with so many different varieties of weapons, like Japanese, Chinese, Soviet, US, etc. weapons. They even used Thompson SMGs from the 1930s it was found. Plus the STG was known for it's ease of maintenance and reliability, as it was designed to be used primarily on the Eastern Front and designed after they dealt with the horrors of the Soviet winter. The only issue is if the stock is broken the weapon is rendered useless as the spring goes deeply into the stock, which is a feature that gave it 'constant recoil' and made it very accurate in automatic fire, but vulnerable to being disabled until the stock was repaired.

"This Kind of War" states that it was precisely because the US had inordinate amount of artillery and mechanized firepower anchored on a solid continuous front that it was able to win at the Pusan Perimeter. It flat out says "In August, however, within a tight little box, the United States Army could at last fight the way it had been trained, and it could finally bring its inherently superior firepower to bear." It goes on to note that between North Korean losses and American reinforcements, the US had a 5:1 advantage in armor. Most of it’s accounts of tactical engagements tend to emphasize fire from crew-served weapons, artillery, or air power.
Relative to the situation in previous fighting. But if you go by the accounts of the fighting the author repeatedly talks about the importance of small arms to the North Korean forces, as they had lost most of their armor and artillery along the way and due to the logistics interdiction that the USAAF was conducting. So US ratio in armor was a function of the NKs having so little by that point, not because the US had so much. Crew served MGs and Mortars were absolutely important to the NKs, but the bulk of their firepower derived from what they carried as their personal small arms by that point. I will post quotes later when I have more time.

The US of course depending heavily on air power given their equipment losses to that point and the shortages all around, which were constantly pointed out in the book for the fighting in 1950.
 
Post-WW2 the StG44 was continued in production by the East Germans and used by the Czechs and Yugoslavs in the latter case into the 1980s. Not only that, but even the NVA was sent some during the Vietnam War. Since the AK47 wasn't ready and the StG already in production and a known weapon to western nations unlike the AK, given the advantages of the weapon over the variety of SMGs left over from WW2 it is somewhat surprising they didn't get any during the Korean War given that they got so much surplus Soviet equipment.

So what if the Soviets had gifted the North Korean Army with StG44s instead of PPSH-41/43s? Given the limited number of North Korean soldiers and the pretty substantial firepower increase it would mean, not only would it be feasible to do so, but would boost their combat power. Though heavier, it would allow for increased range of engagement, rather than forcing them to close within 100m or less to open fire and within range of effective counter fire (US OR demonstrated that US riflemen could generally only hit the enemy within 100m).

Rather than this being a minor POD, in 1950-51 small arms played a shockingly disproportionate role for both sides during the invasion, with artillery only taking back it's dominant place after the lines stabilized along the parallel after Chinese intervention. US OR demonstrated that and I can share the pdf of the report if anyone is interested, while the book "This Kind of War" covers a lot of the major engagements during the 1950 invasion that show how important small arms were during the critical fights, especially around the Pusan Perimeter when the North Koreans had outrun their support weapons they couldn't manhandle with them (or weren't smashed by airstrikes) while the US was short of everything due to the retreat and state of army supply at the time.

How might this impact US/NATO decisions around small arms? The Com Bloc forces were already decided on the assault rifle concept, they were just waiting for Soviet manufacturing/R&D to catch up to demand, so I only see this being confirmation for them.
If the US / UN forces in Korea encountered well trained enemies who primarly used small arms to inflict casualties who were using the Stg 44 to deliver both effective semi auto fire at longer ranges (say 200 to 300M or more) as well as effective full auto fire at closer ranges, perhaps there would have been less enthusiasm for the 7.62x51 NATO round ?
 

Deleted member 1487

If the US / UN forces in Korea encountered well trained enemies who primarly used small arms to inflict casualties who were using the Stg 44 to deliver both effective semi auto fire at longer ranges (say 200 to 300M or more) as well as effective full auto fire at closer ranges, perhaps there would have been less enthusiasm for the 7.62x51 NATO round ?
That is what I'm wondering, especially if US troops start using captured rifles for themselves and liking them.
 
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