Soviet victory in Afghanistan?

What would need to change for Soviet Union to win in Afghanistan?
And by win I mean an outcome where Kabul is led by a pro-Moscow regime that controls the country against internal opposition and allows Soviet troops to be based on Afghan soil.
 
The death of Ahmed Shah Massoud during one of the Soviet campaigns in the Panjshir (sp?) Valley would be a big help.

If the Afghan Communists had been less heavy-handed during the early stages of their regime, they might have provoked less internal opposition. You'd still have the Pashtun chauvinists upset about women being taught to read and non-Pashtun languages being given legal equality with Pashto, but you wouldn't have the people upset about goon squads killing mullahs and other legitimately bad things.
 
When the U.S. Senator and his "friends" are meeting with Mujahadeen, pictures are taken of the event. On the threat of being replaced by a hardliner, Gorby demands that aid to the Afghanis be cut off on pain of the Cold War going hot.
 

Cook

Banned
When the U.S. Senator and his "friends" are meeting with Mujahadeen, pictures are taken of the event.
A US Congressman on a fact finding tour of Pakistan meets representatives of the Afghani refugee community, no harm in that.
 

Ak-84

Banned
Both Pakistan (especially) and Iran are going to make sure its uncomfortable for the Soviets in Afghanistan.
 
Could they have found a compliant reformist regime which did not put off sectuibs of the population.

By the way No Pakistan (whidh probably requires a 1930s pod might help
 
The major problem the Soviets faced in that war was that their initial atrocities cost them and anyone willing to work with them any meaningful basis for popular support, and this in the long term meant they could win battles but not the war. And for the Soviets to go into the war with a more clear-cut rationale as to how or why requires Brezhnev to kick the bucket and be replaced by someone who'd focus on that matter enough to ensure it did have sufficient attention paid to it, as IIRC the Soviet generals weren't particularly enthused with the idea of a war in Afghanistan in the first place.
 
The major problem the Soviets faced in that war was that their initial atrocities cost them and anyone willing to work with them any meaningful basis for popular support, and this in the long term meant they could win battles but not the war. ...

They were doing pretty well until effective counters to the Soviet helicopters were available.
 
They were doing pretty well until effective counters to the Soviet helicopters were available.

The flip side to this is that in the Second Sino-Japanese War Japan won literally almost all the battles but in no ATL with its policies as per OTL will ever win that war. The Soviets can win battles, yes, but they can't win the war if their political power is dependent on brute, crude force alone.
 
When the U.S. Senator and his "friends" are meeting with Mujahadeen, pictures are taken of the event. On the threat of being replaced by a hardliner, Gorby demands that aid to the Afghanis be cut off on pain of the Cold War going hot.

This would only serve to undermine Gorbachev's leadership. Why make threats that both you and the other side know you will not make good on? At best it would make him look like a fool, at worst it would make him look like a desperate fool.
 
The flip side to this is that in the Second Sino-Japanese War Japan won literally almost all the battles but in no ATL with its policies as per OTL will ever win that war. The Soviets can win battles, yes, but they can't win the war if their political power is dependent on brute, crude force alone.


Worked for them internally. And in the East Block.
 
What would need to change for Soviet Union to win in Afghanistan?
And by win I mean an outcome where Kabul is led by a pro-Moscow regime that controls the country against internal opposition and allows Soviet troops to be based on Afghan soil.

Brezhnev was already a dying man by the time the decision to invade had been made, and he also was too enamored of his own self-styled "Brezhnev Doctrine". Thinking what armored brute force that was applied to the open fields of Hungary and the politically paralyzed Czechoslavaks could be applied to a fuedal society like Afghanistan.:rolleyes:

The KGB was hyper-paranoid about the Amin Regime. While it was true Amin WAS reaching out to the US in the hopes of doing a balancing act to make peace with the mujaheedin, his actions were certainly not to the degree of "treason" that the Soviets believed they were. But in the end, as with all seemingly insurmountable problems, Moscow had only one real response: send in the troops!:mad:
 
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