Political guesstimate:
Stalin, followed by Khrushchev, around (maybe a little after) his historical demise. No WW2, so while the party ranks are rotating, there is no equivalent to the Great Purge. But Khrushchev was fairly close to Stalin pre-1934 and an extremely capable politician, so he seems to be a likely result of the post-Stalin power struggle. Yagoda takes up Beria's role, but he'd be even worse off. Who comes after Khrushchev is an open question, likely influenced by global events (no Cuban revolution = longer Khrushchev term, for example), but Brezhnev's unlikely, since his rise to prominence started with WW2.
WW2 had a major influence on the psychology of the Soviet leadership; it put many in a siege mentality, fearing invasion. For the post-Khrushchev leadership, it was their defining experience as communists (rather than WW1 and the Civil War, as had been Lenin, Stalin and Khrushchev's). Without it, there's likely to be a lot less tension between the USSR and the West.
Guesstimates of the Soviet economy without WW2 follow:
In total, the Soviet Union lost about 11 years of growth to WW2; the 20% loss for arming itself is about 4 years growth, and then there's the 7 year loss of fighting the war and recovering from it.
If we look at the labor surplus problem, where the late Soviet slowdown is due in large part to the reduction in excess labor supply in the countryside down to almost nothing, this means that a lack of WW2 will move the slowdown of the 1970s a decade earlier, into the Khrushchev era. A conversion from soft budget constraints to hard budget constraints (i.e. reduction in subsidization of inefficient factories) and green field investment rather than reconstruction (i.e. building new factories rather than improving old ones, which proved more efficient, though Brezhnev pursued the latter) would have been effective, and Khrushchev was the sort of man to pursue improvement plans on the large scale (e.g. Virgin Lands campaign), unlike the conservative Brezhnev.
Resource depletion also played a role in slowdown, however, and that probably wouldn't go too far backwards, since the Soviet Union was still consuming natural resources as it built up for WW2 and then fought it. After a while, European Russia's reserves were depleted and resource extraction had to move to Siberia, where it was much more expensive. Productivity declined by about 11% for ferrous metals in the 1975-85 period, and it was even worse for oil (21%) and coal (24%). This is a serious problem for the late USSR. On the other hand, without WW2 (which was the defining political experience for the post-Khrushchev leadership of the USSR), and possibly (though not certainly) the Cold War, then there is the very real possibility this problem will be compensated for with importation of these resources rather than dogged insistence on using domestic resources.
Another problem was growing inefficiency of the Soviet Union's energy consumption in its late era. In 1980, the USSR consumed .95 tons of oil equivalent per US$1000 of GDP, as compared to Canada (with a similar climate) which consumed .74 tons. In 1988, Canada was consuming .64, while the USSR was consuming .99. Switching to a more efficient management strategy would have required large-scale changes, which again is entirely possible if your name isn't Brezhnev.
As with many counterfactuals involving the USSR, this one gives it a better chance of survival, since the economic problems of the 70s and 80s can be avoided, dealt with, or prevented by a more competent administration.
Stalin, followed by Khrushchev, around (maybe a little after) his historical demise. No WW2, so while the party ranks are rotating, there is no equivalent to the Great Purge. But Khrushchev was fairly close to Stalin pre-1934 and an extremely capable politician, so he seems to be a likely result of the post-Stalin power struggle. Yagoda takes up Beria's role, but he'd be even worse off. Who comes after Khrushchev is an open question, likely influenced by global events (no Cuban revolution = longer Khrushchev term, for example), but Brezhnev's unlikely, since his rise to prominence started with WW2.
WW2 had a major influence on the psychology of the Soviet leadership; it put many in a siege mentality, fearing invasion. For the post-Khrushchev leadership, it was their defining experience as communists (rather than WW1 and the Civil War, as had been Lenin, Stalin and Khrushchev's). Without it, there's likely to be a lot less tension between the USSR and the West.
Guesstimates of the Soviet economy without WW2 follow:
In total, the Soviet Union lost about 11 years of growth to WW2; the 20% loss for arming itself is about 4 years growth, and then there's the 7 year loss of fighting the war and recovering from it.
If we look at the labor surplus problem, where the late Soviet slowdown is due in large part to the reduction in excess labor supply in the countryside down to almost nothing, this means that a lack of WW2 will move the slowdown of the 1970s a decade earlier, into the Khrushchev era. A conversion from soft budget constraints to hard budget constraints (i.e. reduction in subsidization of inefficient factories) and green field investment rather than reconstruction (i.e. building new factories rather than improving old ones, which proved more efficient, though Brezhnev pursued the latter) would have been effective, and Khrushchev was the sort of man to pursue improvement plans on the large scale (e.g. Virgin Lands campaign), unlike the conservative Brezhnev.
Resource depletion also played a role in slowdown, however, and that probably wouldn't go too far backwards, since the Soviet Union was still consuming natural resources as it built up for WW2 and then fought it. After a while, European Russia's reserves were depleted and resource extraction had to move to Siberia, where it was much more expensive. Productivity declined by about 11% for ferrous metals in the 1975-85 period, and it was even worse for oil (21%) and coal (24%). This is a serious problem for the late USSR. On the other hand, without WW2 (which was the defining political experience for the post-Khrushchev leadership of the USSR), and possibly (though not certainly) the Cold War, then there is the very real possibility this problem will be compensated for with importation of these resources rather than dogged insistence on using domestic resources.
Another problem was growing inefficiency of the Soviet Union's energy consumption in its late era. In 1980, the USSR consumed .95 tons of oil equivalent per US$1000 of GDP, as compared to Canada (with a similar climate) which consumed .74 tons. In 1988, Canada was consuming .64, while the USSR was consuming .99. Switching to a more efficient management strategy would have required large-scale changes, which again is entirely possible if your name isn't Brezhnev.
As with many counterfactuals involving the USSR, this one gives it a better chance of survival, since the economic problems of the 70s and 80s can be avoided, dealt with, or prevented by a more competent administration.